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Abstract
W A R R E F O R M A N D S T A T E -B U IL D IN G IN B R A Z IL A N D IN T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S
Slavery, Em ancipation and Decision-Making Processes in th e Paraguayan and Civil
W a rs (1 8 6 1 -1 8 7 0 )
by

Vitor Izecksohn
University of New Hampshire, May, 2001
The present dissertation undertakes a comparative-historical analysis of
the impact of the American Civil War and the Paraguayan War on the American
and the Brazilian populations. It investigates how both war’s dynamics interfered
with the social orders existent in both countries. It underlines the impact of
recruitment to show how the pronounced growth of each national state during
wartime interfered with the lives and customs of the populations subjected to the
draft.
War mobilization is always a dramatic event in any society. Increasing
government intervention during wartime normally leads to a temporary invasion
of local prerogatives through recruitment and mobilization. The remarkable
political centralization established during these processes frequently resulted in a
reduction of local autonomy.

Many of these problems were similar in both

countries although they found very different solutions in the postwar period. The
long-term results were very dissimilar, both for the patterns of state organization

xiii
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and for the place of racial and socially oppressed groups. These solutions
affected the distribution of power, the place of the races and the historical
memory of war events in the decades following the ends of the two wars.

xiv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Introduction

This dissertation has its origins in my earlier MA thesis on the
professionalization of the Brazilian Army. That work investigated the impact of
the Paraguayan War on the Brazilian officer corps. I analyzed the reconstruction
of the Brazilian military bureaucracy in the light of the war efforts. Warfare in
Brazil provided army professional cadres with a corporate identity and a
consistent discourse about the nation. That development widened previously
existent fissures between civilian and military authorities. These differences were
increased by the complaints and recriminations raised after the war by veterans
who felt abandoned by the government.1
An important question raised but not answered by that earlier work
concerned the failure of the war mobilization to provide for an improved life for
those Brazilians, freed slaves and poor whites, who constituted the bulk of the
Imperial army. Although slavery was seriously damaged by the conditions that
the war created, social segregation survived the enormous national effort.
In the long run, the war’s results were detrimental to the stability of
political institutions and to social reform.

1 Vitor Izecksohn, “O Ceme da Discdrdia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Nucleo Profissional do
Exdrcito," MA thesis, IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1992.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Military protests did not bring broad transformations in the structure of
Brazilian society. That society remained very hierarchical, even after the abolition
of slavery and the proclamation of a republic at the end of 1880s.
I decided that it would be necessary to reconsider the issues of state
formation and the military experience during the war in the light of slavery and
social stratification. Thus, slavery and collective action should be central
elements in any discussion about war mobilization, mainly because military
service in Brazil, during the 19th century, was viewed as a menial task, confined
to the poor, the black, and the social undesirables. The problem of citizenship
was not central in the military organization, although today’s military discourse in
Brazil presents the institution as widely integrative.
I felt, consequently, the need to compare conditions in Brazil to those
present in another country, where the solutions for similar problems had been
supposedly different from those found in the Empire. My expectation was that
many of the problems concerning the operation of state structures and political
systems could be better observed in a comparative context, making the historical
specificity of social structures more apparent for both countries. I decided to
measure the Brazilian war experience against that of the United States, thus
examining the junctures where the slave and free sections of each country
intersected with the state bureaucracy, as well as connecting individual
experiences with large social processes. I believed such a strategy could provide

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fertile ground for more encompassing conclusions by breaking the parochial
limits of national boundaries.

The present dissertation undertakes a comparative-historical analysis of
the impact of the American Civil War and the Paraguayan War on the American
and the Brazilian populations. It investigates how both wars’ dynamics interfered
with the social orders existent in both countries. It underlines the impact of
recruitment to show how the pronounced growth of each national state during
wartime interfered with the lives and customs of the populations subjected to the
draft. War mobilization is always a dramatic event in any society. Increasing
government intervention during wartime normally leads to a temporary invasion
of local prerogatives through recruitment and mobilization. The remarkable
political centralization established during these processes frequently resulted in a
reduction

of

local

autonomy,

a

process

Max

Weber defined

as

the

“monopolization of the means of coercion.”2
Military sen/ice can be seen as a civic duty, but it is also an obligation that
restricts individual liberties. It means the acceptance of the nation, as a primary
subject of loyalty, above the family and other groups. This acceptance
contributes to the internalization of public values, but it also raises questions

2 Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Weber was writing before Leon Trotsky,
who declared at the Brest-Litovsky conference that “Every State is founded on force.” The use of the
term “claims,” by Weber, suggests that modem states did not completely achieve this monopoly. See
“Politics as a Vocation" in H. H. Gert and C Wright Mills (eds.) From Max W eber Essays in
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

3
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connected to the ideological and social divisions present in societies subjected to
war. In the advent of a total war, whose individual liberties should be sacrificed
first? Whose class should contribute more to the war effort? How was such
interference perceived?
This study advances many themes that were central to earlier research:
the expansion of citizenship, the different national projects, the place of slavery
in face of the patriotic feelings raised by war. However, it focuses on the impact
of war and of state expansion on those who served or who were otherwise more
affected by the large mobilization of troops. It also discusses how national
authorities responded to social protests emerging from wartime tension.3
The comparative analysis of military enlistment may provide a means to
overcome some of the problems that afflict the study of collective action and
bureaucratic organization in the case of a single nation. By confronting evidence
from one case with that from another, it allows us to evaluate these national
trajectories from different perspectives. It can provide fertile ground for deeper
insights to come. Can the army provide an avenue of social mobility for
disadvantaged people? If yes, then, on what grounds can social demands for
freedom and equality enter the military discourse?
Many of these problems were similar in both countries, although they
found different solutions in the postwar period. The long-term results were very

3 In this approach the role of military officers is to some extent They are focused on only when their
decisions affected the sectors of the population targeted by recruitment

4
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dissimilar, both for the patterns of state organization and for the place of racial
and socially oppressed groups. These solutions affected the distribution of
power, the place of the races, and the historical memory of war events in the
decades following the ends of the two wars.

The Role of Comparisons
Brazil and the United States have been compared in several studies.
There is however no consensus on the best approach to comparative research.
The historian’s concern for specificity, particularity, and ambiguity, focusing on
the developments of singular groups instead of on large processes, has limited
the growth of this field in the last thirty years. As George M. Fredrickson
underlined some years ago, “there is no firm agreement on what comparative
history is or how it should be done.”4
Existing comparisons between Brazil and the United States are centered
on

various

subjects,

embracing

both

historical

processes

and

political

institutions. A first methodological problem of these comparisons is that Brazil
has most often been included as part of a larger group, the Latin American
countries. This classification diluted continental cultural diversity by subsuming
all countries into a single pattern of national organization. Richard Morse, one of
the critics of this classification, pointed out that the concept of Latin America diffused by Napoleon Ill’s foreign policies - covers over the profound diversity

George M. Fredrickson, “Comparative History," in Michael Kammen, The Past Before Us.
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). This limitation

*
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among states and societies, ignoring the distinctions between Dutch, French,
Hispanic, Portuguese, and British Cultures.5
Historical comparisons have usually been framed to give account of
particular institutions. One of the pivotal themes in the comparative literature
about Brazil and the United States has been slavery. Post-Second-World-War
studies emphasized the influence of each country’s political culture on the
creation of different patterns of slavery. These studies have provided one of the
richest multidisciplinary branches of historical analysis involving historians from
many countries. Emphasis here will be given to the American branch of this
group.6
In American historiography, Frank Tannenbaum opened the debate in
1947, arguing for the importance of political culture in the creation of distinct
patterns of slavery. Tannenbaum was the first to observe systematically the
comparative impact of cultural and institutional traditions in the shaping of
master-slave relations. According to Tannenbaum, Latin American slavery was
milder than British American because the slave was recognized as a Christian.
Slavery in Latin America was marked by the previous experience of slavery in

is not particular to the Brazilian-American comparisons. It encompasses the current state of
comparative analysis in the discipline.
5 Richard Morse, El Espeio de Prospero (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982), especially p. 8.
6 There were, of course, studies produced before the Second World War, the most important of
which are, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and
Anglo-Saxon America (Stanford: 1914), H. B. Alexander, “Brazilian and United States Slavery
Compared,” in Journal of Negro History. VII, 1922, pp. 349-464, and Mary M. Williams, “The
Treatment of Slaves in the Brazilian Empire: a Comparison with the United States,” Journal of the

6
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the Iberian Peninsula and the contact with the Moors, by the Catholic tradition of
these countries, and by the existence of a juridical tradition regulating slavery.
He asserted that Catholicism mediated the master-slave relation, creating a
pattern of social life that was more tolerant and that allowed the slave to develop
a “moral personality,” a concept central to his thesis. The moral personality
provided for a less traumatic transition from slave to free man in Latin America.
This transition was not tensionless but permitted some slave groups to achieve
real social mobility in spite of color.
Tannenbaum’s comparisons encompassed institutions like the Church
and the state, and argued that both the Law and the Church defended the slave
in Latin America. In contrast to this “mild” environment, the combined effects of
Protestantism,

individualism,

capitalism,

and

localism

in

British America

accentuated the separation of races. This circumstance degraded the position of
blacks after abolition because slaves were considered as chattel, not as persons.
They were subjected to strong prejudice even after gaining freedom. AngloAmerican institutions and culture, based on decentralized political government
and lacking both the corporate constraints of Catholicism and a judicial tradition
regulating the relations with slaves, resulted in a harsher variant of slavery.
After comparing the two variants of slavery, Tannenbaum explained the
peaceful path to abolition and easy incorporation of the freedmen into the

Negro History. XV, 1930, pp. 313-336. But these studies did not inaugurate a systematic debate on
the issue.

7
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national community in Latin America. In the United States, on the contrary,
emancipation required a civil war, and the freedmen continued to suffer severe
disabilities.
Tannenbaum relied heavily on the pioneer work of Giiberto Freire and
abandoned the ethnocentric conceptions of progress prevalent in most American
historiography. His Slave and Citizen broke new ground in historical research
because it presented alternative parameters to evaluate concepts such as
“national development" and “social order." Tannenbaum emphasized the
consequences of slavery for the establishment of divergent patterns of social
order in both countries, advocating the Latin American “open” pattern of race
relations as superior to American segregation.
However,

Tannenbaum’s

influential comparisons

overestimated the

impact of cultural and institutional factors in the definition of the slave’s status
and moral personality, and his excessive concern with ideological and
institutional traditions in the shaping of slave societies and race relations also led
to a neglect of the differences in the social structure of the free communities
which coexisted after the end of slavery. In Stanley Elkins’s Slavery: A Problem
in American Institutional and Intellectual Life, this vision received a more
sophisticated

conceptual

framework through

the

use

of

social

theory,

psychology, and anthropology. Elkins maintained that slavery was much more
oppressive in British America than in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies and
stressed the psychological impact of the capitalist nature of the North American

8
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slave plantation on slaves. The development of the plantation within a context of
unopposed capitalism meant that economic considerations were not restrained
by prior arrangements and institutions, because, “With the full development of
the plantation there was nothing, so far as [the planter’s] interests were
concerned, to prevent unmitigated capitalism from becoming unmitigated
slavery.”7
A second wave of comparative studies on “racial relations” showed that
the development of citizenship in societies marked by the existence of slavery
grew over an ocean of ambivalence. The works of David Brion Davis and Carl
Degler demonstrated that Latin American slavery did not differ markedly from
slavery in British America. Davis demonstrated that the dual status of the slave
as both man and thing created problems for enslavers of both cultures, who were
rarely able to deny the slave a moral personality.8 The evidence presented by
Davis, A.A. Sio, and Degler showed convincingly that neither were there such
systematic differences in law and custom between American and Latin America
slavery, nor did the officials of Church and Crown represent for Latin American

7 Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 49.
8 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Western Culture (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988). This thesis was very influential on Genovese’s development of the concept of
negotiation and the roles of hegemony and consensus on southern plantations. Eugene D.
Genovese, Roll, Jordan. Roll. The World Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

9
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slaves a widening in the range of other significant lines of communication with
the wider society.9
The work of Carl Degler,

Neither Black nor White, explored the

ambiguities of the definitions of the legal status of the slaves in Brazil. Degler
also pointed out the limitations of the Catholic Church, especially the small direct
influence of priests and bishops on plantations. He emphasized demography and
differential rhythms of economic development as possible variables to explain
differences. According to Degler, there were no major differences between
Brazilian and North-American slavery based on legislation or on the position of
the national state. Degler also contested Tannenbaum’s assumptions concerning
the benevolence of Brazilian slavery and the average number of slaves held by
masters. Degler even states that the persistence of the international slave traffic
made Brazilian slavery harsher in some ways than American, but he does not
analyze in depth the impact of the central state in the struggles for abolition and
reform. In Brazil, the continuation of the international slave trade until 1850 and
the sharp imbalance in the sex ratio of the slave population created unfavorable
conditions for the slave family’s stability. The negative rate of natural increase of
the slave population throughout the whole slavery period provides indirect
evidence of this.

9 Arnold A. Sio, The Legal Structures of Slavery in the United States (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1958). Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the
United States (New York: Macmillam, 1971).

10
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Summarizing, Tannembaum explained different attitudes about race as
resulting from the long evolution of attitudes. He stressed the role of political
culture as the main explanatory factor behind these differences. This “idealistic”
vision was very influential in the works of many Brazilianists, among other
students of Latin American history. Degler and Davis based their analyses on the
unequal development of material and demographic capacities, concluding that,
except for the incidence of manumissions, Brazil and the U.S. did not remarkably
differ. This provided for a materialistic model of comparative explanation. The
“idealistic” and the “materialistic” paths were present in most of the comparisons
made since the end of the 1960s.10
The wave of comparative studies that so successfully opened the debate
about the status of black slaves and the degree of severity of slavery did not
endure. In the last thirty years, comparisons by historians in both countries have
focused on specific issues. Broad comparative analyses have been infrequent,
coming piecemeal in the work of one or another student. Most recent
historiography on slavery remains very insular, relying on particular individuals
and groups.11

10 The idealistic-materialist pattern of comparative analysis was first suggested by Eugene
Genovese. See “Materialism and Idealism in the History of Negro Slavery in the Americas,” in
Genovese and Foner (eds.) Slavery in the New World (Englewoood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1969), pp. 238-255.
11 A mark of the importance of comparative studies in the American historiography was the
publication of a collection of essays, just some months after Tannenbaum’s death. This collection
was edited by Laura Foner and Eugene Genovese in 1969. It included resumes of the main books
from several comparative historians and historical sociologists such as Sydney Mintz, Marvin Hams,
Arnold A. Sio and Magnus Momer, among others. See Slavery in the New World. A Reader in
Comparative History.
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We can say that the few recent comparative studies made by Brazilian
and American scholars have revolved around the themes raised during the
sixties, especially political culture and material development. Consequently more
recent works, more concerned with the themes of citizenship and cultural
identity, still return to the questions raised by the pioneering comparisons.12
In 1981

Richard Graham reinvigorated the debate with his article

comparing the patterns of economic development in Brazil and in the South of
the United States. According to Graham, “Brazil’s development sluggishness in
comparison with the South cannot be attributed to the presence of slavery, since
even with slavery the South experienced a much higher degree of development
than did Brazil.”13 In order to understand differences, Graham points to the
“contrasting structures” in Brazil, originating in the seigniorial values and the
hierarchically structured society. These values were more firmly present in
Portugal

than

in

England.

Thus,

Graham

rejects

materialist-centered

explanations, returning to a path of a broad analysis of political culture.
Other historians of slavery followed Graham, underlining the differing
political cultures as the main explanatory variable to account for differences
between the two countries. Celia M. Azevedo analyzed antislavery movements in
both countries. She remarked that, while political and religious ideals could be

12 Marco A. Pamplona. Riots. Republicanism and Citizenship. New York City and Rio de Janeiro City
During the Consolidation of the Republican Order (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996).
13 Graham, Richard. “Slavery and Economic Development Brazil and the United States South in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 23. No. 4, 1981, pp. 620655.
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very important in the American tradition, Brazilian antislavery kept more in tune
with the ideals of enlightenment. According to Azevedo, the central theme in
Brazilian abolitionism was the idea of progress, not human rights or individual
freedom or Christian sin. The Brazilian case was characterized by the absence
of a “community of feeling,” because Brazilian elites were concerned, not with
fulfilling God’s commandments, but with an abstract ideal of “public interest,” that
is, the defense of a social order commanded by men of wealth and power.14
In spite of the great contribution of these comparative works to the
debates on slavery and racial relations, little has been said about the influence of
slavery over the organization of the states’ bureaucracies or the ideas about the
nation in societies where it flourished. Nothing has been said about the ways
state-building helped to shape the patterns of racial relations in both nations, or
vice versa. The scholarly debate on slavery has been centered, instead, on
themes including the capitalist or pre-capitalist character of slave systems, the
economic efficiency of slave labor, and the degree of severity of treatment slaves
received in different societies.15
The basic assumption underlining this study is that only through the wars
against Paraguay and the Confederacy did Brazil and the United States
consolidate definitively their national unity, establishing national armies that were

14 Celia A. Marinho, Abolitionism in the United States and Brazil. A Comparative Perspective (New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995).
15 But see the recent contributions of Anthony Marx, “Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial
Identity and Social Movements," in International Review of History. Vol. 40, Supplement 3,1995 and
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independent of both regional influence and external political patronage. My
primary intention here is to test the validity of the idealistic and materialist models
in terms of the consequence of each war for social organization. I will examine
whether differences in the core values of each country’s culture provide an
explanation for patterns of war mobilization. I will also examine whether those
differences were relevant to the ways each elite group faced and responded to
their main war challenges. Did differences at the level of political cultures
account for the distinct levels of state management in the conduct of each war?
My hypothesis is, that if slavery and freedom in Latin America were not
very far from each other, this was not because the status of the Brazilian slave
was much different from that of the North American slave, but because the status
of the majority of free men in Brazil was not far from the condition of slavery.
Consequently we can say that, in America’s 19th century liberal society, the
military tradition was very racist, denying African Americans access to the state
militias and the army, while the Brazilian army admitted blacks and mulattos with
fewer restrictions, simply as two among the voiceless lower class groups
belonging to a highly unequal society and a highly authoritarian polity.
Comparison of the Paraguayan and the Civil Wars has been previously
suggested by American historians such as James McPherson, Richard Berlinger,
Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still. A point common to these

Desmon King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995).
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analyses was that the capacity of the Confederate nation to resist should be
compared and contrasted to the Paraguayan example, to demonstrate that the
South could have kept fighting for years longer.

A possible reason for the

differences between the “lesser” Confederate and the “greater” Paraguayan
resistance could be found in the fact that slavery was an issue that split the
gentry and the plain folk in the Confederacy. Because slavery was much more
central to the Confederacy than to Paraguay, these disputes contributed to the
disintegration of the Confederate fighting capacity during the last months of the
war, while homogeneous poverty kept the Paraguayans fighting even when
chances of victory had vanished completely.16
Unlike those historians, I intend to compare the Brazilian and the Union
situations. My focus will be directed both to the efforts of each nation state and to
the divisive social and racial tensions in each country. I will take into
consideration the idealistic and materialistic approaches. In order to test the
validity of the concept of political culture, Chapter One offers a digression on the
dissimilar routes of historical formation followed by each society. The insertion of
chronological information aims at explaining the national trajectories of each
society. I will analyze the roles of slavery, centralization, and the army in both
countries before 1860 in order to underline their differences, both from one
another, and from the European patterns of state building.

16 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988); Richard E. Berlinger, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still, Jr. Why the
South Lost the Civil W ar (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), pp. 440-442.
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This dissertation has, as its point of departure, an interest in a better
understanding of Brazilian. Consequently, most comparisons begin with chapters
centered on the Brazilian experience and comparisons are developed in order to
underline the Brazilian case. I expect also to furnish new light on American
issues, although my command of American sources is less complete than my
command of Brazilian ones.
Following this strategy, Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the origins of the Civil
and the Paraguayan wars in the context of the state-building process in each
nation. These chapters focus on the connections between internal and external
politics and the expectations of the main elite groups in both cases. Chapters 4
and 5 analyze the crises in the recruitment systems in each country during the
war, stressing the similarities of both cases, especially the increase of
recruitment demands and popular resistance to them, including the draft riots
that occurred in both Brazil and the U.S. These chapters show how military
traditions in both countries prevented the army from exerting a pivotal role in
national politics. They will also show how both countries were unprepared for war
and how both faced enormous structural limitations as they tried to mobilize their
free populations. Chapters 6 and 7 show the pivotal role of freed slaves in
solving the recruitment problems in each society. They emphasize the
contradictions presented by the enrollment of people of African descent in each
country. They analyze how each government dealt with these contradictions and
16
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the results of the conflicts. They also underline the ways slaves were freed and
the slaves’ impressions concerning the enormous impact of the war in their lives.
The conclusion analyzes the postwar panorama and the consequences of
the processes that were touched off during the wars. It also discusses the
consequences for citizenship and bureaucratization, emphasizing the situation of
blacks in both countries.
While those cultures were dissimilar, the circumstances of war created
similar recruitment problems for the Imperial and for the Union governments. The
nature of the total wars fought by Brazil and the Unites States reinforced
centralization and conscription as measures necessary for victory. It forced elites
to break old compromises and invade the rights of local communities.
Consequently, the materialistic model provides the best framework to analyze
the wartime period. It was during the post-war period that political cultures
became dissimilar. Especially in the former Confederate states, Reconstruction
provided a substantial difference in the ways racial issues could be addressed.
Consequently, differences during the post-war period can be better understood
when framed through the idealist model.
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Chapter 1

Two Projects of Nation-building
Brazil and the United States from the Late Colonial Period to Independence

The fact that Brazil and the United States lie in the same
continent is a geographic accident, about which it would be foolish
to give an exaggerated importance.
Eduardo Prado, 1893.1

Introduction
This chapter will examine the nature and evolution of social structures and
the institutions in American and Brazilian societies. This chronological analysis
treats the years from the late colonial period up to the triumph of national
integration

in both countries. It will emphasize questions related to the

maintenance of territorial unity and slavery. These questions would be at the
center of elite concerns leading to both the Civil and the Paraguayan wars.
Brazil and the United States evolved from colonial possessions to
independent nations in different ways. From their positions as colonization nuclei
in the New World, their local leaders formulated distinct projects of nationhood.
Such

projects embraced

agendas

that included

redefining the

political

participation and membership in the civil community. Each nation-building project
represented an unique compromise between the ruling group and the general

1 Eduardo Prado, A HusSo Americana (1893, reprint, SSo Paulo: Ibrasa, 1980), p. 17.
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populations, as colonial backgrounds and economic opportunities helped to
shape specific sets of social relations.
Although there were many traits common to both countries, slavery being
one of them, independence enabled the development of peculiar divergent
patterns of political and social organization in each nation. As a consequence,
the independence movements of the two countries took on sharply divergent
social meanings. The differences were in part cultural, but the nation-building
projects helped to accentuate those differences still more. The way each
emergent political culture faced fundamental challenges - especially slavery and
the maintenance of national unity - varied accordingly. In order to compare how
each country confronted these challenges I will briefly analyze the process of
acquiring independence as it occurred in Brazil and the United States, focusing
on both the goals and limitations of these national movements.2

Independence and Its Limits
Independence did not solve the problem of slavery in either the newly
independent Brazil or the United States. Both countries inherited compulsory
forms of labor introduced during the colonial period. Slaves worked in the cities
and in fields, in skilled crafts and at menial labor. It was in agriculture, however,
that slavery established its firmest roots. After the 16th century, the development
of an international market-based economy created a worldwide demand for

2 On the differences between Latin American and North American political traditions, see Richard
Morse, O Espelho de Prdspero (SSo Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988). For an account of the
ways each culture stereotyped the other, see Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and Latin
America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1992).
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tropical products. Plantation slavery arose in the Americas as part of this world
movement. It helped to shape specific patterns of society, the ramifications of
which have been crucial in the development of multiethnic cultures in Brazil and
the United States.3 Plantation slavery also enabled the emergence of paternalist
master classes, whose political behavior was based on a sense of social
supremacy. It supported the notion that blacks were incompetent and child-like,
whose nature required supervision by white owners as a civilizing influence.4
At the time of independence in both countries, slave labor had established
firm roots, becoming essential for labor-intensive, high-volume agricultural
produce like cotton, rice, tobacco, sugar cane, and coffee. On the eve of the 19th
century, Brazil and the southern United States were the two largest slaveholding
societies in the Americas. According to Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman,
between 1500 and 1870 Brazil and the U.S. accounted for 44% of the slave
traffic between Africa and the New World. By 1825 these two countries contained
67% of the total slave population in the Americas.5

3 For the relations between slavery and the wealth of European nations, see Immanuel
Wallerstein, The Modem Worid-System. Vol I: Capitalist Agriculture in the Sixteenth Century
(1974, reprint, New York: Academic Press, 1990).
4 On the relation between the world market and the spread of slavery, see Elizabeth Fox
Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese "Slavery: The World’s Burden" in Fruits of Merchant Capital:
Slavery and Bourgeois Propriety in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), pp. 391-414. See also, David Brion Davis, Slavery and Human Progress
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern Worid-Svstem.
Vol. Ill: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy. 1730-1840s (New
York: Academic Press, 1988). Wallerstein defined the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries as the second era of great expansion of the capitalist world economy.
5 Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross. The Economics of American
Nearo Slavery. (1974, reprint, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), pp. 14,2 8.
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More relevant than the sizes of their slave populations were the tenacious
and initially successful efforts of elites in Brazil and the American South to keep
slavery as a legal system of productive labor, contrary to the experience of the
French, Spanish, and other English former colonies6. Wealthy slaveholders were
able to resist the first international wave of anti-slavery reform and revolution by
taking advantage of their strong internal political positions.7
Slaveowners struggled to keep their privileges. During constitutional
debates in the United States and Brazil, they strenuously opposed the few
abolitionist reforms which were proposed. After independence, the initial threat to
slaveholders came from central and federal restrictions. For Brazil, this took the
form of limitations on the volume of the international traffic in slaves. For the
American South, it took the form of northern reformist opposition to territorial
expansion. Slaveholders in both countries recognized these as opening shots in
a protracted battle which would place their enterprise at risk.8

6 With the exception of Cuba.
7 According to Eugene D. Genovese the success of slaveholders in Brazil and the southern United
States was due to the fact that in these regions they constituted a ruling class while in the French
and the British sugar colonies they were a stratum of the metropolitan ruling class. I believe this
hypothesis is difficult to test for Brazil, as I hope to show later on. For a comparative approach to
the experience of abolition in different slave societies, see Eric Foner, Nothing But Freedom.
Emancipation and its Legacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), especially
chapter I, “The Anatomy of Emancipation," pp. 8-39.
8 For the political action of slaveholders in America, see Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the
Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Sharpe, 1999). According to
Finkelman slavery was a central issue in the founding of the US. The slaveholders dominated the
government from 1787 to 1819. For Brazil, see Luiz C. Barbosa and Thomas D. Hall, “Brazilian
Slavery and the World-Economy: An Examination of Linkages within the World-System.” in
Western Sociological Review. Vol. 15, No. 1,1986, pp. 99-118.
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Through a series of political compromises, pressure, and manipulation,
these emerging political elites prevented more progressive reforms or restrictions
of slavery in their respective countries, and for long avoided direct state
intervention against their class interests. Slaveholders confidently relied on
national authority to enforce the politics of slavery as property; when these
policies seemed about to collapse, they accused the central bureaucracy of
threatening their local prerogatives.9 By the second quarter of the 19th century,
Brazil and the American South openly challenged the transatlantic diffusion of
the abolitionist movement. Both societies faced strong criticism for maintaining
the coercive plantation system and enforcing its expansion to new geographic
areas.10
The self-interested agenda of slaveowners undermined the project of
nation-building in both the United States and Brazil. It was socially and politically
divisive. Progressive sectors of each society criticized slavery as an aberration, a
sin, and an impediment to the spread of civilization and true religion. Slavery
symbolized backwardness in a world dominated by the idea of progress.11

9 The U.S. Fugitive Slave Law is a clear example of this. It was perceived and denounced as proof
of “Slave Power” by American abolitionists during the 1850s. I will discuss this in depth in chapter
III.
10 Close to the outbreak of the Civil W ar the American South had approximately 4,0000,000
slaves. In 1872, at the first demographic census made in Brazil, slaves numbered around
1,500,000 in a population of 10,000,000 inhabitants.
11 On religious criticism of slavery, see Ronald G. Walters American Reformers. 1815-1860 (1978.
reprint: New York, Hill and Wang, 1997), pp. 77-102 and The Antislaverv Appeal: American
Abolitionism After 1830 ( Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); for Brazil, see Heloisa
Toller Gomes, As Marcas da Escravidao. O Negro e o Discurso Oitocentista no Brasil e nos
Estados Unidos (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ, 1994). For comparison of Abolitionist behavior
in the two countries see Celia M. Azevedo, “Abolitionism in the Two Countries: an Overview” in
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In spite of such opposition, few practical measures were introduced to
combat slavery effectively. Abolitionism remained limited to a minority of religious
leaders and progressive politicians in the U.S. and enlightened bureaucrats in
Brazil.12 For their part, moderate political leaders avoided making substantial
changes which would threaten early constitutional compromises that allowed for
political unity. By the middle of the nineteenth century, social peace and territorial
integration were still considered more important than social justice. Only very
slowly would these priorities be modified.
According to David Brion Davis, the rise of abolitionist ideology was
predicated on the victory of bourgeois individualism inside the expansion of
international capitalism. This development put slaveholders on the defensive
throughout the world.13 The degree of abolitionist success regionally depended
on the political power, social authority, strength, and fragility of each group of
slaveholders within their territorial dominion: where they achieved enough
legitimization, slaveholders were able to resist abolitionist condemnation and
successfully counterattack. In countries like Brazil and the United States,
territorial control became the key to sustaining the enterprise of slavery.

Abolitionism in the United States and Brazil. A Comparative Perspective (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 3-21. Azevedo centers her analysis on the American development of
anti-slavery feeling since the 18th century. This feeling was absent in Brazil until the 1880s.
12 According to Celia M. Azevedo, except for a few isolated writers, there was no community of
abolitionist sentiment in Brazil, at least until the mid-1860s. See Azevedo, Abolitionism in the
United States and Brazil, p. 4.
13 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp. 398-99.
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From Colony to Nation: The Creation of the Brazilian Empire
According to Stuart B. Schwartz “Brazil was created to reproduce
Portugal, not to transform or transcend it.”14 The Brazilian economy was directed
toward the fulfillment of Portuguese interests. Its center lay in Lisbon, outside the
colonial territory. The goal of settlement and settlers was the quick achievement
of opulence, not social transformation.15
From the earliest colonial times, Lisbon strove to isolate its territories in
South America from each other.16 The Portuguese imperial structure, of which
Brazil was to become the most important part by 1640, was based on colonial
fragmentation and imperial centralization. Portuguese colonial administration in
South America created therefore, only a weak cohesion among the different
regions of the entire colony.17 Speaking about the lack of integration of Brazilian
provinces at the end of the colonial period, French naturalist August De SaintHilaire observed that:

14 Stuart B. Schwartz, “The Formation of a Colonial Identity in Brazil,’’ in Nicholas Canny and
Anthony Pagden (eds.), Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987), p. 19.
15 This strategy was reinforced during the late colonial period. For a broader analysis concerning
Portuguese intentions and reforms see Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal. paradox of the enlightenment
(Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a comparative point of view, see
Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain. Portugal. Britain and
France C. 1500- C.1800 (New York: Yale University Press, 1998). Dorn Luis da Cunha, an 18th
century Portuguese reformer, compared the king to a father dealing with a great family.
Testamento Politico de Dorn Luis da Cunha (1749, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Alfa-Omega, 1976).
16 In these efforts the Portuguese colonial administration also relied on the natural forces. Contrary
sea currents and prevailing winds made communication from the Amazon easier with Lisbon than
with Recife or Salvador. From 1616 to 1772 the Amazon region was administered as a separate
colony outside the jurisdiction of Brazil's governor general.
17 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, “Local Government in Portuguese America: A Study in Cultural
Divergence," in Comparative Studies in Society and History. (16), 1974, pp. 187-231.
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The colonial system did not only impoverish Brazil; it had a still
more despised function: to divide it. Spreading germs of dissension
among the provinces, the metropolis aimed to keep the balance of
power that was necessary to maintain its tyranny. Each [province]
had its own satrap, each of them with its small army; each with its
small treasury. [They] hardly communicated with each other;
frequently they even ignored each other’s existence. There was no
common center in Brazil: it was a huge circle the radii of which
converged far from the circumference.18
Saint-Hilaire, who lived in Brazil during the late colonial period (from 1816
until 1822), traveled extensively through its main provinces. As a result he
became deeply convinced of the detrimental influence plantation slavery had on
Brazilian life. Constant observations in his writings were the lack of modern
technology and the precariousness of colonial roads. In fact, this situation was
not new. Since the initial settlement tropical agriculture, together with the
extension of the plantation system and of slavery, comprised the formative
patterns of Brazilian society, a society that gravitated around an export economy
directed to gratify European needs.19
Black slavery was the main source of labor on the great properties that
produced most Brazilian export goods. The importation of African slaves began
simultaneously with the Portuguese decision to 'colonize” the land, in the
1530s.20 As a result Brazil became the largest slave-importing region of the

18 Auguste De Saint-Hilaire, Viaaem Pelo Distrito dos Diamantes e Litoral do Brasil (SSo Paulo:
Editora da Universidade de SSo Paulo, 1974), p. 213.
19 Forty-four years later some Confederate fanners who immigrated to Brazil reached similar
conclusions. According to Reverend Ballard S. Dunn, “Brazilian slaves cultivate cotton exactly as
American Indians cultivate com.” Rev. Ballard S. Dunn, Brazil, the Home for the Southerners
(New York: George B. Richardson, 1866), p. 139.
20 On the colonial administration in Brazil, see Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil
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Americas.21 Social inequality became an important characteristic of the territory’s
political culture. Inequality existed not only between the free men and the slaves;
it divided society into distinctive status groups, limiting political participation to a
thin minority of landlords, priests and bureaucrats. Chances for social mobility
were very small, as poor whites lived segregated from society’s mainstream as a
pariah group.22
Nothing could differ more from the southern yeoman’s situation than the
living conditions of poor Brazilian whites. Without land ownership rights, and far
from the elective franchise brought by American republicanism, they were kept in
a permanent state of dependency in relation to the plantation slaveholders.
Unlike their American counterparts, Brazilian poor whites did not benefit from the
race-based egalitarianism provided by the southern social order. Under these
circumstances, poor whites in Brazil endured a miserable existence, with no

with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio. Viceroy. 1769-1779
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), especially chapter 16, “Relations with Governors
and Captains-Generals,” pp. 447-51.
21 According to Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, Brazilian dependence on slavery was part of a
Portuguese strategy to keep the labor market dependent on foreign supplies. See
“0
Aprendizado da ColonizasSo," in Economia e Sociedade. 1 ,1 9 9 2 , pp. 135-62.
22 On the social position of poor whites in Brazil, see Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco, Homens
Livres na Ordem Escravocrata (SSo Paulo: Atica, 1972); Alzira Lobo de Campos, “A configurapSo
dos agregados como grupo social: marginalidade e peneiramento (o exemplo da cidade de SSo
Paulo no s6culo XVIII),” in Revista de Histdria. Vol. 117, 1984, pp. 27-69; Hebe Maria Mattos de
Castro, Ao Sul da Histdria: Lavradores na Crise do Trabalho Escravo (SSo Paulo: Brasiliense,
1987). For a summary of the argument, see Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro “Beyond Masters and
Slaves: Subsistence Agriculture as a Survival Strategy in Brazil During the Second H alf of the
Nineteenth Century, Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 461-89. O f course
chances for social mobility varied according to place, time, and the position of the slaves of the
labor structure.
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reason to consider slavery “the poor man’s best Government.”23 Commenting on
the condition of the Brazilian peasants, abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco
painted a somber portrait:
We are dealing here with a population without resources, without
assistance, a population taught to think of labor as an activity
suitable only for slaves. We are referring to a population without
markets for its products - if such an El Dorado even exists in our
country - and therefore without any alternative but to live and raise
its children in the conditions of dependence and misery in which
they are allowed to vegetate.24
Another important feature of early Brazilian society was the size and
importance of the central state. It is normally accepted that in Brazil the state
invented the

nation.

The formation

of the

central state

preceded the

independence movement. It had been implanted by the Portuguese Crown as
part of a general strategy to enhance its control over an extensive territory with a
scattered population. Early in the 20th century, historian Capistrano de Abreu
perceived the consequences of this evolution for the social order, remarking that
after three centuries of colonization, “There was no such a thing as social life there was no society. Public affairs were also not of interest and went
unheralded.”25

23 Joseph E. Brown, Governor of Georgia (at secession time), quoted by Steven Hahn, The Roots
of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of Georgia Upcountrv. 18501890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 86-7.
24 Joaquim Nabuco, The Abolitionism. The Brazilian Antislaverv Struggle. (1883, reprint, Illinois:
University of Chicago Press 1977), p. 123.
25 JoSo Capistrano de Abreu, Chapters of Brazil’s Colonial History. 1500-1800 (1907, reprint, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 202.
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With scarce resources and a strong dependence on British commerce,
Portugal could not afford a large degree of autonomy for its most important
colony. After independence, the part of the elite that opted for Brazilian
nationality supported administrative continuity in order to avoid territorial
fragmentation. In the words of historian Ron Seckinger, “The [Portuguese]
bureaucracy survived virtually intact in configuration and personnel.”26
According to sociologist Raymundo Faoro, Brazil can be best defined as a
compromise solution between the incipient liberalism that flourished in the
Iberian Peninsula during the late 18th century and the political tradition centered
on the supremacy of the Iberian idea of state.27 General freedom and local
autonomy were surrendered to more pragmatic concerns, as order and peace
became the supreme goals of the political system. After Brazilian independence
in 1822, in strong contrast to the decentralization of the colonial period, the ruling
elite opted for an aggressive centralization.28 Under these circumstances, the
kind of state organization that flourished in Brazil aimed to control, discipline, and
organize the population, instead of reflecting the wills and demands of its people.
The Brazilian national state was a "constituency state,” not a constitutional one.

26 Ron Seckinger, The Brazilian Monarchy and South American Republics. 1822-1831 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), p. 8.
27 According to Perry Anderson the origin of the term liberalism is in the Iberian Peninsula, not in
the core of the international system. The term was created by the Spanish resistance during the
Napoleonic occupation. Later it became a popular term in the French and British salons. See
Perry Anderson’s introduction to As Origens da P6s-Modemidade (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1999).
28 Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder. Formacao do Patronato Politico Brasileiro (1958.
reprint; Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1984), vol. I, pp. 73-96.
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According to Euclides da Cunha, “it was the singular case of a nation produced
by a political theory."29

Colonial Sources of American Republicanism
The British settlement in North America presents sharp contrasts when
compared to Portuguese settlement in colonial Brazil. Perhaps the most
important difference was the broader differentiation among the colonization
nuclei of British America. No single pattern followed, as migration was
undertaken by families or individuals; skilled laborers or adventurers; Anglican
ministers or members of dissenting congregations; free people, or involuntary
laborers. Heterogeneity was great, not only between Britain’s North-American
provinces, but also within them (with the possible exception of New England).
Some colonies, like South Carolina, were able to develop regions favoring slave
and free labor simultaneously. Others, like Massachusetts, preserved their
original identity as much as possible. Heterogeneity varied according to the set
of options adopted by each major migration group, although in most cases, it had
far more to do with the force of circumstance than with a struggle over
principles.30

29 Euclides da Cunha, “A Margem da Reptiblica,” in Obra Completa Vol I (Rio de Janeiro: Aguillar,
1995), p. 374.
30 On peopling diversity in South Carolina, see “The Land and the People” in William W. Freehling,
Prelude to Civil War. The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 7-24. On Massachusetts see Patricia Bonomi, “The New
Heavens and the New Heart," in Under the Cope of Heaven. Religion. Society and Politics in
Colonial America (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). For the enormous cultural
differentiation between the British colonies see David Hackett Fisher, Albion’s Seed. Four British
Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Such diversity makes it difficult to define a single American pattern
because the white immigrants represented nearly all the cleavages in northern
European societies with the exception of great lords or nobility. The colonists
showed various motivations for immigrating to the new world. The interaction
between individual motivation and the environment of settlement contributed to
the formation of a peculiar political culture, contributing to a large degree of
differentiation among the initial thirteen colonies.31
A second difference between Brazil and British North America concerned
variations in the timing and direction of colonial integration into the Atlantic
commercial system. In the British colonies there was not a single main pattern of
economic activity, nor a unified strategy for commercial integration. Commercial
companies worked over scattered areas without a unified monopoly over the
land and its inhabitants. Under these circumstances, England’s North American
colonies presented a diversified set of economic activities and partners. Some
served mainly as sources of raw materials for Europe, while others slowly
diversified their economies, assuming a more complex pattern of economic
development. In New England and some of the Middle Colonies, this complex
pattern characterized a social attitude in which curiosity, investigation, and
experiment became paramount.32 Some areas (like Pennsylvania) formed part of

31 Even the large numbers of indentured servants coming to the North aimed at a new life. It was
probably due to this circumstance that the English Revolutionary, Tom Paine, considered
revolutionary America “an asylum for mankind," for only there did freedom survive after having
been expelled from other parts of the world. See Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary
America, p. 78.
32 For an elaboration, see David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York: W. W.
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a three-way pattern of commercial interaction with the Caribbean and Southern
Mediterranean, while other regions maintained strong ties with Africa and the
slave trade. In the long run, economic variation would lead to strong sectional
competition.33
A third difference was the larger degree of autonomy exercised by the
ordinary British America colonists when compared with the narrower liberties
achieved in the Portuguese-American colony. During the 17th and 18th centuries,
streams of individuals and families crossed the Atlantic Ocean in pursuit of a
larger degree of autonomy. Immigrants came from a myriad of regions and
cultures in order to settle in North America. Some were attracted by the
possibility of making a fortune. Others emphasized the purity of their religious
faith, contrasted with the corruption of the Church of England. Other groups of
dissenters sought the right to religious freedom and a society free from political
and religious tyranny. In spite of the initial orthodox attitudes shown by the
dominant

religious

groups of each

American

region,

by the

time

of

independence, religious freedom prevailed.34

Norton, 1998). According to Landes, by 1640 in places like New England and the middle colonies
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey the colonists developed metallurgy and other activities
associated with iron. See p. 298.
33 Although the Middle Colonies allowed for the selling of larger land tracts even then the tendency
was for dividing large tracts into small parts to be cultivated by families. See John Allen Krout and
Dixon Ryan Fox, “The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830 “ A History of American Life.” vol.
V (New York: Macmillam, 1944), pp. 53-7.
34 Richard Hofetadter suggested that an extraordinary number of the colonists were just content to
live either without organized religion or with only a weak relation to it. America at 1750. A Social
Portrait (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 180-216. The idea of religious freedom is currently
subjected to strong revaluation. During the early colonial period, Massachusetts religious leaders
wanted freedom to practice their own Calvinist version of Protestantism. They persecuted and
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Migrating Puritans, Quakers, Lutherans, Mennonites, Presbyterians and
other religious groups struggled to escape what they perceived as a corrupt Old
World system characterized by religious intolerance, absolutism, and corruption.
Having felt the sting of centralized power in church and state, these colonists
emphasized local exercise of authority as an antidote. The avowed intention of
the most politically ambitious religious sect, the Puritans, was to establish “a city
on the hill,” that is, a “New England” more perfect than the Old. This unattained
ideal of social and religious perfection survived the Puritan epoch and influenced
New Englanders to the IQ * century.35
Religious diversity helped colonists to develop new ideas concerning the
exercise of political activity and the legitimacy of established authorities through
a set of dramatic experiences peculiar to the New World. Implementation of
these new ideas directly increased levels of literacy and political participation for
white males and gave consistency to the formation of a civic culture based on
religious freedom and individual liberty. The seeds of modern civic republicanism
were planted during the early colonial period and developed well in the American
environment. By the same token, the concept of a strong central state was
undermined because, to suspicious colonists, it represented the worst side of
European despotism. These experiences also helped to crystallize colonial

even executed religious dissenters. Only during the late Colonial period did religious freedom
spread to most colonies, except those such as Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, where religious
freedom had been established earlier.
35 On the historical trajectory of the idea of "The City on the Hill," see Maurice Gandillac Geneses
da Modemidade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 3 4,1 99 5 ), especially chapter 1, “Cidade dos Homens e
Cidade de Deus,” pp. 11-22.
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perceptions of the injustice of their subordination to Parliament and their lack of
imperial

representation, thereby reinforcing the

importance of economic

autonomy. Benjamin Rush, a physician and civic leader in colonial Pennsylvania,
expressed such an understanding in 1777: “a people who depends on strangers
to be fed and dressed will be always subject to them.'46
The Northern Meaning of Freedom
There was more disparity between Brazil and the northern British
American colonies than existed with the southern ones.37 The character of
colonization in the New England and the Middle Atlantic differed from that in
other settlements in religious as well as in social terms. Speaking about
Philadelphia, Eric Foner emphasized the fact that, during the 18th century, in the
northern colonies “a large majority of the citizens were yeoman farmers who
owned their own land with titles free from the complex restrictions of feudal land
law which still persisted in Europe.”38
In the North, free colonists coming to the new lands could not be satisfied
with fewer political liberties than those they enjoyed at home. When limits were
too narrow, the possibility of fewer restrictions in another colony was always an

36 Quoted in John W. Oliver, History of American Technology (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), p.
89.
37 However, as shown by Stuart Schwartz, the American South experienced a much greater
degree of development than Brazil. See his “Slavery and Economic Development: Brazil and the
United States South in the Nineteenth Century," Comparative Studies in Society and History
(148), 1981, pp. 6 2 0 -5 5 .1will return to this point latter.
38 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionaire America, p. 24.
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incentive against accommodation.39 This situation encouraged a permanent
exchange of people and ideas across the northern colonies, a constant mobility
fostered by optimistic expectations of finding a better place to live.40 Behaviors
were no more uniform than the personal intentions or the social origins of those
who abandoned their homelands in England and continental Europe. In spite of
their differences, the inhabitants of the northern colonies slowly developed
common attitudes and objectives in the new lands.41
Except for the Narragansett valley in Rhode Island, where tobacco was
cultivated, slavery never became the foundation of the northern colonial work
force, for labor-intensive crops such as sugar and rice would not grow in colder
climates. In spite of that, involuntary labor provided by black slaves, indentured
servants, and apprentices supplied a significant portion of the workforce. During
the late colonial period slaves were visible and important elements in the larger
northern cities. Slaves were employed as artisans, worked on the waterfront, and
filled the crews of vessels. Under the circumstances, living and working

39 Bernard Bailyn, “The Rings of Saturn” in The Peopling of British North America (Reprint 1986,
New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 45.
40 In his first proposition, Bernard Bailyn showed that the peopling of British America was an
extension and an expansion of domestic mobility but he also revealed the enormous
transformation this transatlantic migration introduced in the traditional configuration, Peopling of
British North America, p. 20. However, most movement from Pennsylvania was to the South
(along the mountain valleys).
41 According to Fred Anderson during the 1760s most northern colonists still saw themselves as
members of the British Empire. For many young men to serve in the Imperial Army was still
considered an honor. See his A People's Armv: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven
Year’s War (Chappel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984). See specially Part I chapter 2
“Sons of Some of the Best Yeomen in New England": Army and Society in Provincial
Massachusetts, pp. 26-62.
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conditions were not so hard as on southern plantations. In spite of that, freed
slaves were considered inferior to all white poor and recent European
immigrants.42

The Special case of New England
In British America,

New England exhibited a peculiar pattern of

colonization, especially when compared to the Caribbean and the South.
Especially in Massachusetts, but also in its neighbors, religious motivations set
the tone of occupation of the new lands, creating an atmosphere of political
redemption and religious reform. According to Bernard Bailyn in those provinces:
u[R]eligion shaped the leadership, organization and ethos of the Puritan
migration during the colonial period...”43 The first settlers coming to New England
saw themselves as a colonial vanguard creating the social structures with which
they could finally make visible their faith. These settlers wished, in first place,
liberty of faith in order to build the culture to which they aspired. Democracy was
one consequence, because the New World was a place to rescue humankind
from the ruins of the Old World.
As an important consequence of their independent behavior, New
England’s colonists developed a pattern of economic activity that was oriented
toward the countinghouses of London much less than was true in other colonies.
By doing so they escaped to some degree the more usual relationship of a

42 According to Eric Foner as late as 1772 ten per cent of Philadelphia craftsmen owned slaves
and over 80 percent of the young men apprenticed in the city in the early 1770 were bound to
craftsmen. See, Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 43.
43 Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America, p. 25.
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colony as hinterland serving as an economic prop to its parent metropolis, which
was common in other parts of the continent, including the southern colonies. In
spite of the strong importance of Atlantic commerce, New England colonists
developed economic activities based on the free labor of independent farmers,
with a diversified production that was also directed to the internal market. This
permitted the crystallization of a free labor ideology that was kept alive long after
wage labor became paramount during the first half of the 19th century.
The northern economy was not focused only on exports, nor restricted to
agricultural activities, timbering and fishing. The development of a shipping
industry and the widespread formation of craft shops - some of them even able
to produce guns - diversified the economic landscape in remarkable ways. A
strong commercial elite developed that was less dependent on metropolitan
sanction. In cities, powerful groups of artisans, such as printers, began to assert
their cultural and political influence. If the above pattern did not prevail
everywhere under British rule, it was, notwithstanding, common. Americans, of
many regions, believed themselves to be a people favored by divine Providence.
They tried to establish a society and government suited to a chosen people. In
this endeavor, economic autonomy played an important part.
In spite of the importance given to individual freedom, there was little room
to negotiate demands for racial equality. The colonists’ identity (except for the
Quakers) was based on a strong valorization of demographic homogeneity as a
formative characteristic of their society. During the 17th and 18th century, the
Puritans’

descendants

proudly

emphasized

their

homogeneity,

always
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associating it with God’s designs. In the Federalist Papers, one of the strongest
expressions of American constitutionalism, this point of view was ratified by
Alexander Hamilton:
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that providence
has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united
people ~ a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking
the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the
same principles of government very similar in their manners and
customs....44
Notwithstanding racial prejudice, shared background and experiences
provided a unified foundation for white colonial aspirations. Political culture
developed partly from English political thought, partly from the philosophical
theories of the Enlightenment, and partly from the experience of civilizing the
“wild land” of a New World. It flourished around the ideal of ethnic homogeneity
based on English ascendancy, the Protestant faith, and a missionary zeal
validated by a millennial destiny. During the 18th century, as elected legislatures
in the hinterlands of American began to dispute with the colonial administrators
appointed by London, political thinkers in the thirteen colonies began to develop
a rationale for resistance based on the ideals of political emancipation,
independence, and a republican form of government. But the articulation of
these ideals only very slowly shifted from a protest to the point of rebellion.
Thus, in North America, a peculiar colonial culture developed, which
derived from the spontaneous immigration of close-knit groups, some of which

44 Publius (Alexander Hamilton), Paper Number II, “Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and
Influence,” in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1788,
reprint, London: Penguin, 1988), p. 91.
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emigrated to escape political and religious turbulence in Europe. It is this political
culture, centered on the ideals of social homogeneity, religious freedom, and
local organization, that would provide the distinctive pattern of the American
political tradition, in marked contrast with that of Brazilian. Observing American
society in the IB"1 century and analyzing what he termed as “The AngloAmerican Civilization” Alexis De Tocqueville observed that:
It is the product of two perfectly distinct elements which elsewhere
have often been at war with one another but which in America it
was somehow possible to incorporate into each other, forming a
marvelous combination. I mean the spirit of religion and the spirit of
freedom.45
The main legacy of the struggle for religious freedom to the process of
nation building was the development and diffusion of the republican and
democratic ideals that shaped American civic culture. Another important colonial
legacy to national political culture was the primacy of “local power." In America,
state making had been preceded by community making on a vast scale, as
citizens showed a general enthusiasm for local government. Town councils, local
newspapers, and district representatives became characteristic features of a
political culture centered on local competition. De Tocqueville, again, has much
to say about the importance of local organization in early American political
culture. Writing in the middle of the 19th century, he observed how the features of
American politics were still notably local, emphasizing that:

45 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Reprint 1848, New York: Anchor Books, 1969),
volume I, part I, chap. II, pp. 46-7.
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In New England, local communities had taken complete and
definite shape as early as 1650. Interests, passions, duties, and
rights took shape around each individual locality and were firmly
attached thereto. Inside the locality there was a real, active political
life, which was completely democratic and republican. The colonies
still recognized the mother country’s supremacy; legally the state
was a monarchy, but each locality was already a lively republic.46
As Tocqueville observed, self government and freedom of speech existed
in New England before independence; they were derived from the aspiration to
religious freedom and respect for natural rights, the essence of which may be
found in the relatively free practice of religious dissent. This process was
supported by the expansion of public opinion, the development of a popular
press, and by the series of religious revivals that became known as “The First
Great Awakening.” All these proceedings enabled the establishment of a peculiar
regional political culture, where the possibility of contesting established authority
was open to citizens of Protestant origins. When independence came, New
England had long known a kind of republicanism in town meetings and annual
elections. But in other regions as well, colonists enjoyed different degrees of
representative government and religious awakening. Together these processes
opened possibilities for a more permanent pattern of democratic participation for
white males. It was through an amalgamation of deep-rooted local interests with
the tumultuous development of the Revolutionary War that a national identity
was established.47

48 Ibid.. p. 44.
47 According to Eric Foner, Tomas Paine description of the virtues of civic republicanism as it was
made in his Common Sense confirms the widespread diffusion of such experience through the
colonies, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, p. 80.
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After Independence
Independence did not bring citizenship to members of previously excluded
racial groups in Brazil or in the United States. Initially, nation-building and slavery
were reconciled during the early years of independence in both states. This
contradictory reconciliation proved to be more problematical in the United States,
as national integration, sectional differentiation, and economic development
divided the country into opposing regional interests. In Brazil, the contradictions
seemed less extreme in the plantation economy, which dominated most regions,
providing one unquestioned pattern of economic development for the whole
society. Consequently, in Brazil sectional differentiation did not lead to regional
competition until very late in the 19th century. Free labor in areas with less
productive soil actually complemented the plantation economy and furnished a
resen/e of free workmen as well as food for the slaves who wrestled wealth from
more fertile ground.48
Nation building and Slavery
In Brazil, state building was characterized by conflict between central and
local powers. From its independence in 1822 until the 1850s, the Empire faced a
turbulent period, socially and politically. There was no initial consensus between
the central power and many of the provinces disagreed about the rules and
procedures for establishing the

national

government.

Central

authorities

48 James Lang, Portuguese Brazil: The Kina's Plantation (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp.
153-56.
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struggled to impose and retain control in spite of local demands, endowing
themselves with the responsibility to maintain territorial integrity based on the
boundaries they inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration. For their
part, many peripheral regions perceived independence as nothing more than a
move of the political center from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. Those provinces were
not served by any efficient system of roads or canals.49 Taxes drained away
wealth without providing any perception of public services in return. Feeling
oppressed by the new order, prominent members of some provinces strove for
decentralization and autonomy.50 They understood independence to mean a
larger allowance of power to their regions, not complete submission to heirs of
absolute power.51
The initial victory of the pro-center forces established the pattern which
was followed during the next 67 years, but it did not settle the question
permanently.

49 According to traveler’s narratives, it took usually three months to go from Rio de Janeiro to the
capital of the province of Golds and five months to go to Cuiabd in Mato Grosso. See llmar
Roholoff de Mattos, O Tempo Saauarema (SSo Paulo: Edusp, 1986), p. 34. See also Alcir
Lenharo, As Tropas da Moderacflo ( O Abastecimento da Corte no Formacdo Politica do Brasil 1808-1842) (SSo Paulo: Slmbolo, 1979), especially pp. 57-72.
50 Jos6 Murilo de Carvalho classified 17 different rebellions from 1831 to 1849. These rebellions
involved 11 provinces and the Court. See Teatro de Sombras. A Politica Imperial (Rio de Janeiro:
Vdrtice, 1987), p. 13.
51 From the Brazilian northwest, a secular priest, Frei Joaquim do Amor Divino Rabelo Caneca
(1774-1825) provided the best account of the threats posed by centralization. See his “Crltica da
ConstituipSo Outorgada” in Frei Caneca, Ensaios Politicos (Rio de Janeiro: PUC/Conselho
Federal de EducapSo, 1976), pp. 65-76. The original date of publication is 1824. Frei Caneca was
later executed for the crime of “high treason” because of his intellectual leadership in a provincial
rebellion known as ConfederapSo do Equador. On the trajectory of centralization in Latin America,
see Claudio V6liz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), especially chapter 7, “The Survival of Political Centralism,” pp. 141-62.
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Map 1 - Brazil in the 19th Century
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Source: Roderick Barman, Brazil the Forging of a Nation, p. 37

The central government headed the nation. It was composed of Imperial
bureaucrats, Fluminense landlords, and a circle of the Emperor’s closest
advisors. But its power was very elusive as it lacked the financial or the military
means to constrain the landowners’ private interests.52
The central government could sternly command provincial presidents and
collect taxes, but it could not enforce decrees within plantations. As illustrated by
the famous observation of the Viscount of Uruguay, the Imperial government was

52 The term "Fluminense" designated the inhabitants of the old province (current state) of Rio de
Janeiro. The term “Carioca” was used to define the inhabitants of the Rio de Janeiro city
previously called "the Court” because it was the center of the Brazilian monarchy.
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a "macrocephalic structure,” because in spite of its size, it could not penetrate
deeply into the periphery of its own society. As a result, while the interior had to
submit to external strictures, it kept its own rules. The foundation of these rules
was the preeminence of the baron.53 The enormous amount of power exercised
by the slaveowners over their slaves and clients impressed the German painter
John Rugendas. Commenting on the lack of effectiveness of government
regulations limiting the number of lashes a slave could receive, Rugendas
observed that:
These laws have no force and probably may be unknown to the
majority of the slaves and masters; on the other hand, the
authorities are so removed that actually the punishment of the
slave for a true or imaginary infraction or the bad treatment
resulting from the caprice and the cruelty of the master, only
encounters limits in the fear of losing the slave by death, by flight,
or as a consequence of public opinion.54
The great number of rebellions, some with secessionist tendencies, that
took place in Brazil both before and after independence, shows that the business
of keeping the country together was a very difficult task indeed. After the
resignation of the first Brazilian Emperor, Portuguese-born Pedro I, in 1831,
central authority seemed to collapse, and revolts became endemic, threatening
the country’s territorial integrity for the next two decades.55 Instability achieved its
peak during the Regency period (1831-1840), while future Emperor Pedro II was

531 am using the terms Baron, Planter and slaveowner interchangeably.
54 JoSo Maurlcio Rugendas, Viagem Pitoresca Atrav6s do Brasil (Reprinted. SSo Paulo: Cia.
Editora Nacional, 1941), p. 185.
55 For a narrative concerning Dorn Pedro I’s life and times see Neil Macaulay, Dorn Pedro: The
Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal. 1798-1834 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).
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still a child. For nine years, different regents alternated in power, undermining the
exercise of central authority.56 The rebellions which inevitably occurred had to do
with the amount of power provincial leaders would be allowed to exert at the
local level. In particular, conflicts centered on the right of access to provincial
government positions. Some provinces, such as the strategic Rio Grande do Sul,
were the scene of constant political turmoil that was generated not by radical
social aims but, rather, by strife within the ruling elite. It was a “power struggle”
within the regime rather than about the regime. So serious was the situation, and
so strong the fears concerning territorial fragmentation, that Father Diogo Feijo, a
leading Imperial politician, recommended that, “in case of separation of the
northern provinces, it would be necessary to hold those of the South.”57
In other cases, provincial disputes escaped elite control, spreading social
protest. According to historian Hendrik Kraay, revolts such as the Cabanos W ar
in Pernambuco (1832-1835), the Cabanagem in Par£ (1835-1840), and the
Balaiada in Maranhao (1838-1841) represented la ] vigorous contestation of the
elite project of the new state by excluded groups more than political struggles
between regional elites’ and Rio de Janeiro.”58

56 Norman Holub, “The Liberal Movement in Brazil, 1824-1848,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York
University, 1968).
57 Quoted in Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Impferio. Nabuco de Aratiio. sua vida. suas
opiniOes. sua dpoca. (1899, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: CivilizagSo Brasileira, 1936), Vol. I, p. 36.
M Hendrik Kraay, 'As Terrifying as Unexpected: The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838' in Hispanic
Historical American Review. Volume 72, Number 4, November 1992, p. 503. For recent
scholarship on the Balaiada see Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, 'Memdrias da Balaiada. Introdugdo ao
Relato de Gonpalves de MagalhSes' in Novos Estudos CEBRAP. 23, 1989, pp. 7-13. For the
Cabanagem see D6cio Freitas, Cabanos: Os Guerrilheiros do Imoerador (Rio de Janeiro: Graal,
1978). For Cabanagem’s racial causes see David Cleary, “ ‘Lost Altogether to the Civilized World':
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In political as well as in social terms, these revolts expressed not only
parochial dissatisfaction but also social discontent. They also made clear the
temporary incapacity of the central government to articulate a military reaction.
Finally, they expressed the importance of race and class discontent. Such was
the case during the Maids’ Revolt, in 1835." The social panorama was also
affected by poor whites and freed slaves who attacked Portuguese immigrants in
Rio streets, and by radical liberals who were angry about the direction taken by
the monarchical regime. It was clear that Brazilians of many classes and regions,
some of whom had fought for independence, now demanded for themselves the
liberty Brazil had won from Portugal and full citizenship in the new political
order.60
Political

instability

prevailed

until

the

mid-century,

when

more

sophisticated instruments of political consensus finally achieved some degree of
legitimization among different elite groups. By 1850 the regional movements
were over and a conciliatory cabinet, composed by members of both the Liberal

Race and the Cabanagem in northern Brazil, 1750 to 1850" in Comparative Studies in Society and
History Vol. 40, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 109-35. For the Cabanos W ar see Marcus Joaquim
Maciel de Carvalho, “Hegemony and Rebellion in Pernambuco (Brazil), 1821-1835,” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1989), pp. 251-83.
59 The Males’ Revolt was the largest Brazilian urban slaves’ uprising. In July 1835 a group of
African Muslim slaves took control of parts of the city of Salvador, Bahia’s provincial capital for
some hours. On the Males' Revolt best work is JoSo Jose Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The
Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia (John Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture)
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
60 For the role of military discontent and its articulation within social uprisings see John Schulz, O
Ex6rcito na Politica. Orloens da Intervencao Militar. 1850-1894 fSao Paulo: EDUSP, 1994).
especially chapter 2, “Reformadores e Revoltados," pp. 35-51; and Jose Murilo de Carvalho,
Teatro de Sombras: A Politica Imperial, pp. 11-22.
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and Conservative parties, sealed a political agreement that would make possible
decades of institutional stability for the Empire.61 This “golden age” of imperial
political stability at the mid-century is defined by Brazilian historiography as the
period of “Conciliation.”62 This term expresses the victory of the conservative
forces that favored central power in the long struggle for hegemony against
centripetal impulses, if political stability became a reality, the social situation
remained a strong source of concern for the political elites. Slavery was at the
core of the persistent social crisis as it reinforced the precariousness of the
country’s social cohesion and debilitated its military capacities.63
The Slave Supply Crisis
A second order of problems related to the labor question. Since the
beginning of colonization, black slavery had been the basis of the Brazilian
economy, directed toward the production of tropical agricultural commodities. It
provided the main labor force on the great plantations. Toward the second
quarter of the 19th century, the emergence of coffee plantations in the CenterSouth reinforced both the centralization process and the importance of slavery,
increasing the need for slaves to keep agricultural production at its full rate.64

61 For a good description of the chronology of these events see Roderick J. Barman, Brazil: The
Forging of a Nation. 1798-1853 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). See especially pp.
160-242.
62 For a contemporary conservative account of "Conciliation” see Justiniano Jos6 da Rocha,
“AgSo, ReagSo e TransagSo” in R. MagalhSes JOnior, Trfes Panfleterios do Segundo Reinado
(SSo Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1956), pp. 161-218.
63 In many provinces slaves and freed blacks outnumbered whites creating deep concerns on the
Imperial bureaucrats.
64 According to Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Brazil alone accounted for 38 per cent
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During the 1840s, the main coffee plantations moved away from the
exhausted, overworked soil around the city of Rio de Janeiro to a new location
near the center of the province. In the Paralba do Sul Valley, 95 miles from Rio,
the coffee Arabic found fertile ground on which to establish dominion.65 From
there, coffee production spread to the adjacent provinces, devastating the native
forests. Coffee estates in the southwest established the last cycle of plantation
slavery in Brazil. The coffee barons were the heirs of a seigniorial culture whose
influences would endure long after slavery’s termination. Observing slavery’s
diverse influences over the American and the Brazilian societies, abolitionist
leader Joaquim Nabuco noticed they differed most markedly in that, “[Sjlavery in
the United States did not affect the entire social order [while] in Brazil the
complete body was infected by the influences of that institution.”66
Robert Conrad, Leslie Bethell and others have already shown that the
extinction of the international slave traffic was due to international, mainly British,
pressures.67 Opposition to slavery appeared in Europe during the last decades of
the 18th century, a philanthropic movement which pressed the English and

of the world traffic in slaves. See Time on the Cross. The Economics of America Negro Slavery
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974), p. 14.
65 On the Paralba Valley see Warren Dean, "The Planter as Entrepreneur: The case of SSo
Paulo,” Hispanic American Historical Review 46 (May 1966), pp. 143-145 and Stanley J. Stein,
Vassouras. a Brazilian Coffee County. 1850-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
86 Joaquim Nabuco, The Abolitionism, pp. 120-21.
67 Leslie Bethel, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), Robert Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1972); Seymour Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom. Comparative
Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
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French metropolitan governments to free the slaves toiling in their colonial
dependencies.68 The British solution of gradual emancipation constrained
Portuguese policies because of Portugal’s strong dependence on British trade.69
For pragmatic reasons Lisbon attempted to minimize restrictions on the slave
trade as much as international conditions permitted, while at the same time
honoring the old commercial and military alliances between the two countries.70
Brazilian independence in 1822 brought important changes to the
dialogue over slavery. The main social question emerging was the role of slaves
and freedmen in the nation-building process. The process itself was peculiar in
Brazil because national organization developed from the top, based exclusively
on a political alliance between the state bureaucracy and the landowners.
Naturally, the discussion of the future of slavery was undertaken by members of
the political elite. Jos£ Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, a Brazilian founding father,
took a position which was typically ambivalent: he attacked slavery for the evils it
brought to Brazil, but was against its immediate suppression.71 Bonifacio feared

68 Protest against slavery began in the second half of the 18th century. After visiting Barbados,
William Edmunson opened the attack in 1776, imputing that slavery was responsible for the sins
of that island. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Western Culture, especially
chapter X, “Religious Sources of Antislavery Taught: Quakers and the Sectarian Tradition,” pp.
291-332. Seymour Drescher and William Law Mathieson (eds.), British Slavery and Its Abolition.
1823-1828 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967).
69 For a discussion on the British abolitionist struggles see Howard Temperley British Antislaverv.
1833-1870 (London: Longman Group Limited, 1972), especially chapters I, "The Antislavery
Tradition,” and II, “Emancipation and After.”
70 For a more complete vision of the impact of the slaves’ traffic on the Brazilian economy with
special attention on the Court and Rio de Janeiro settings see Manolo Florentino. Em Costas
Negras: urn estudo sobre o tfafico atfantico de escravos para o oorto do Rio de Janeiro. 17901830 (SSo Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1997).
71 See Emilia Viotti da Costa “Jos§ Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva. A Brazilian Founding Father” in
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that emancipation would devastate the Brazilian economy. In a speech on the
subject written in 1825, Bonifacio defended a gradual emancipation policy:
I do not wish to see slavery abolished at once; such a fact would
bring great evils. In order to emancipate slaves without social
damages we should first make them deserving of liberty: we should
be forced, by reason and by law, to convert them gradually from
mean slaves to free and active men.72
An independent Brazil found it even more difficult to balance the need for
an active slave trade to counteract plantation mortality with British abolitionist
demands. The imperial government found itself in the uncomfortable, ultimately
impossible position of trying to satisfy simultaneously both its most powerful
international ally and its most powerful political elite. Brazilian slaveowners
remained deeply dissatisfied with what they saw as improper government
interference in their business interests.73
After Pedro I declared independence, England demanded an end to the
Brazilian slave trade before it would recognize the new South American nation.
In 1826, the Brazilian government was forced to sign a treaty that declared the
slave trade to be “piracy,” abolishing all legal traffic by 1829. In the popular
sense, it was "a law to be seen by the English.'74 During the 1830s and 1840s

The Brazilian Empire. Myths and Histories (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985), pp.
24-52.
72 jo s 6 Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, Representac5o a Assembl6ia Constituinte e Leaislativa do
Impferio do Brasil (Paris: Typographia Firmin Didot, 1825), p. 142.
73 "In the British and French West Indies, in Dutch Guyana, and in Brazil, the death rate of slaves
was so high, and the birthrate so low, that these territories could not sustain their population levels
without large and continuous importation of Africans.” Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, p.
25.
74 “Uma lei para inglfis ver,” as it was said in Portuguese. This expression is still very popular in
Brazil, referring to laws impossible to be fulfilled.
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Brazilian naval officers practiced selective blindness, abetting slavers and
ignoring the treaty as much as they could. By that time, the Brazilian economy
had swelled with the coffee boom. Coffee planters in Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paulo supplied half of the growing and apparently inexhaustible world demand.
Under such circumstances, the Brazilian landlords had good reason to resist the
initial attacks against slavery with all means at their disposal, and they did so
from a position of power.75
The Empire issued a set of timid pronouncements against the traffic in
Africans to fulfill two agendas: First, the government would have a seemingly
civilizing influence, and second, implementing even weak rules required
strengthening the national administration The slaveowners struggled to keep
traditional privileges and power, and, pragmatically, to maintain an active traffic
in slaves. In part because of the imminent threat of closure of the slave trade, the
years between 1830 and 1850 were marked by the importation of thousands of
African slaves. David Eltis shows how astonishingly large numbers were
absorbed into the important northern province of Bahia.
Finally,

after more than twenty years of reluctant and indifferent

enforcement, under a virtual blockade designed to intercept slavers imposed by
the British navy, the Brazilian government effectively abolished the international
slave traffic in 1850. We can say without hesitation that until the decree of the
Eusdbio de Queirds law (1850) put an end to the slave traffic, the main foreign

75 Eugene W. Ridings Jr., “Class Sector Unity in an Export Economy: the Case of Nineteenth
Century Brazil," in The Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 5 8,1 97 8 .
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question faced by the Brazilian government was how to maintain slavery, not
how to abolish it.76

Chart I
_________Slaves Imported Into Bahia in the Nineteenth Century________
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Source: David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 243-244. Also quoted in Thurston Graden Dale, "From
Slavery to Freedom in Bahia, Brazil, 1791-1900.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut,
1991), pp. 148-149.

The end of the importation of slaves into Brazil in 1850 compelled
profound changes in the nature of slavery as an institution, bringing about great
changes for slaves as well as for administrators and overseers charged with the
control of enslaved workers. In spite of the opposition to the embargo by coffee-

76 Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain. Brazil and the Slave Trade
Question. 1807-1869. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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growing interests, the demise of the African slave trade reassured a considerable
number of Imperial politicians who feared the imbalances between slave and free
sections in some provinces. From the beginning of the 19th century, many
regions were becoming overpopulated with slaves. Stanley S. Stein and Barbara
H. Stein estimate the Brazilian slave population around 1820 to be two million,
that is, two thirds of the country’s total population. In certain parts of the country,
slaves were always more numerous than the free population. According to
Kenneth Maxwell, in the province of Minas Gerais in 1786 slaves were 47% of a
total population of 362,847 inhabitants.77 According to Robert Conrad, in 1821 a
military map of the province of Rio de Janeiro showed a slave population of
173,775 and a free population of 159,271. It is estimated that in the rural areas
the slave portion of the population was still larger.78 Even in more peripheral
provinces such as Rio Grande do Sul, the proportion of slaves to free was very
high. Herbert Klein estimates that at the end of the 18th century this province had
21,000 slaves and 5,000 free men of color out of a total population of 71.000.79
If slaves could comprise a large proportion of some provincial populations,
the proportion of African-born slaves was also impressive. According to Joaquim

77 Kenneth Maxwell, Conflict and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal. 1750-1808 (Cambridge
[England]: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 266.
78Stanley J. Stein and Barbara J. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: 1970),
p. 148. “Mappa dos fogos, pessoas livres e escravos compreendidos nas freguezias da cidade e
provlncia do Rio de Janeiro, AN, I G 1-428 and Relatdrio do presidente da provlncia do Rio de
Janeiro....para os annos de 1840 a 1841 quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery.
p. 6.
79 According to Herbert Klein, these slaves were linked to the export sector of Gaucho economy.
See Herbert S. Klein, A Escravidao Africana. America Latina e Caribe (Sflo Paulo: Brasiliense,
1987), p. 89.
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Norberto de Souza e Silva, in the late 1830’s forty-five percent of the total slave
population of Sao Paulo was African born. Pernambuco also listed 45% of its
slaves as foreign-born. An extraordinarily large African-born slave population
inhabited the city of Rio de Janeiro itself—the capital of the Empire-representing
60% of its slave labor force in 1849.80 This potentially explosive situation inspired
fear because it reproduced some of the most dangerous conditions found in
Santo Domingo Island prior to the Haitian revolution. Nevertheless, during the
first half of the century opponents of slavery were linked to the public
administration, not to popular demands. No free labor ideology was developed.81

Inter-provincial Traffic
When coffee growing was introduced to Brazil, sugar cultivation had long
been in a decline brought on by international competition, an excessive supply,
and the development of new technological refining processes in Europe. Cycles

80 Joaquim Norberto de Souza e Silva, InvestigacOes Sflbre os Recenseamentos da Populacflo
Geral do Impferio (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Nacional de Estatlstica, Servigo Nacional de
Recenseamento, Documentos Censitdrios, S6rie B, Numero 1, Rio de Janeiro, 19,510 [original
edition 1870], pp. 48, 95, and 99.
81 Even in regions were slaves were not the main labor force, an antislavery policy did not develop
until very late in the century. See J.H. Galloway, “The Last Years of Slavery on the Sugar
Plantations of Northeastern Brazil,” in The Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 57, 1871;
Peter Eisenberg, “A Mentalidade dos Fazendeiros no Congresso Agricola de 1878” in Jos6
Roberto do Amaral Lapa (ed.), Modos de Producflo e Realidade Brasileira (Petrdpolis: Vozes,
1980), pp. 167-94. From the same author, see the more encompassing, The Sugar Industry in
Pernambuco. 1840-1910 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974). For a divergent
position on the issue see Robert B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil (New York:
Atheneum, 1972) and Thomas H. Holloway, “Immigration and Abolition: The Transition from Slave
to Fee Labor in the SSo Paulo Coffee Zone," in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (eds.), Essays
Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville: The University
Presses of Florida, 1977), pp. 150-177. For an accurate description of the controversies involving
the subject see Stuart B. Schwartz, “Recent Trends in the Study of Brazilian Slavery” in Slaves.
Peasants, and Rebels. Reconsidering Brazilian Slavery (Urbana: University of Chicago Press,
1992), pp. 1-38. It should be noted that Toplin and Holloway's analyses are restricted to the last
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of economic growth were quickly followed by depressions that damaged the
regional economies of sugar producing areas. Thus, sugar lost its prominence in
the Brazilian agrarian economy. Under these circumstances, with international
export at an end, it was almost impossible for the sugar barons to hold on to their
slaves in competition with the stronger demands of southern coffee plantations.82
With the final termination of the Atlantic slave traffic, the coffee planters
turned for labor to the under-utilized slave populations of the more decadent
areas in the sugar-dependent northeast and in the southern provinces,
particularly the jerked beef areas of the Rio Grande do Sul. Slaves from Bahia,
Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul began to be moved to the center-south
coffee regions of the Paralba Valley. This shift also marked the increasing
importance of coffee plantations in the country’s economy and heralded the
power of coffee to change the demographics of slavery.83
Stanley Stein has provided evidence for the demography of decay in
Brazilian slavery. In the northeast section as whole, the slave population fell from
500,000 in 1823 to 350,000 in 1872, a reduction of approximately 30% in 49

phase of the process, from 1880 until the complete abolition of Brazilian slavery.
82 On the situation of the Northeast elites, the best account is Evaldo Cabral de Mello, O Norte
Agr£rio e o Impferio. 1871-1889 (1984, reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999).
83 Rio Grande do Sul was the largest slave province of the southern region of Brazil. During the
mid-century, as a consequence of the jerked beef crisis, it became the second largest exporter of
slaves to Rio de Janeiro. From 1867 to 1872 the province’s slave population dropped from 77,000
to 67,000. It is still impossible to estimate the impact of the recruitment for the war in this
demographic decay. On Rio Grande do Sul’s role in internal traffic see Herbert Klein, “The Internal
Slave Trade in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: A Study of Slave Importation into Rio de Janeiro in
1852," in The Hispanic American Historical Review. Volume 5 1,1971, pp. 567-77.
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years.84 According to Eustequio Reis and Elisa Reis, during the same period, the
region’s total population grew approximately 60%. Therefore, the share of the
slave population in the northeast areas felt from 23% in 1823 to 10% in 1872. In
the Northeast province of Pernambuco the internal slave trade accounted for
24% of the total number of individuals removed from the slave population during
the period from 1850 to 1888.85
Many of those slaves were sold to the southwestern region, especially to
the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and S3o Paulo, while traditional sugar producers
began to shift toward free labor. After 1850 the flood of international traffic
became so great that, for a short period, the supply of slaves met the most
dynamic demand. Thousands of slaves were sold out of economically stagnant
areas and sent toward the booming southern coffee plantations.86
Uprooted slaves suffered the sudden loss of family and community.
Husbands and wives, mothers and children were easily split apart as coffee

84 It should be emphasized that a steady inter-provincial slave trade had gone on before the
termination of the Atlantic traffic, although long-distance seaborne trade developed most fully after
the Atlantic trade was terminated. See Robert Edgar Conrad, “A New Forced Migration. The Inter
provincial Slave Trade” in World of Sorrow. The African Slave Trade to Brazil (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp.171-90.
85 Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County. 1850-1900 .The Roles of Planter and
Slave in a Plantation Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 296. Eustequio J.
Reis and Elisa P. Reis, “As Elites Agrdrias e a Aboligdo da EscravidSo no Brasil” in Revista
Dados. 31 (3), 1988, p. 316. Peter Eisemberg, “From Slave to Free Labor on Sugar Plantations:
The Process in Pernambuco” (paper presented at the 1979 meeting of the American Historical
Association).
86 Herbert Klein minimizes the impact of the internal slave traffic. Klein’s estimates the total
number amounts to 209,000 for the whole period from 1850 to 1888. These numbers were much
smaller than the 482,000 brought in by the Atlantic traffic in the period 1831-1850, “The Internal
Slave Trade...,” p. 583.

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

planters demanded more laborers for the new agricultural bonanza.87 These
slaves were transported in boats or on foot with rates of mortality not much less
than those of the Middle Passage.88 Transportation and settlement tended to
encourage the concentration of slaves in single properties. These changes
affected their rhythms and reinforced the predominance of males over females
among Creoles.89 The Paralba Valley, the most important coffee-growing region,
absorbed most of this flood of slave labor, but some additional groups were sent
to places like Minas Gerais or the newest open areas of Western Sao Paulo.90
By this time, coffee was so profitable an activity that planters could cope
with taxes and increasing cost of slaves without much difficulty, as long as slaves
were available. Slavery in Brazil changed very little from 1850 to 1865, although
the total number of slaves declined drastically, due to the end of international

87 This situation established remarkable similarities with the American internal slave migration. As
shown by recent research, especially Michael Tadman’s book, Speculators and Slaves. Masters.
Traders, and Slaves in the Old South (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), an
extensive slave trade substantially outweighed planter migrations in numerical importance. See
especially pp. 3-11.
88 For one view of conditions in the internal trade, see Robert Conrad. World of Sorrow. For a
different interpretation see Klein, “The Internal Slave Trade,” p. 578. According to Klein the
average cargo size was 4 slaves per vessel. This compares to the figure of over 4 8 0 slaves per
vessel in the transatlantic-Atlantic slave trade from Africa to Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. See Klein, “The Internal Slave Trade...," p. 578.
89 According to Stanley Stein the county of Vassouras (Paralba Valley), an area of dense, recently
imported slave populations, revealed a high of 63% males for the decade 1850-1859. See his
Vassouras
p. 77.
90 For the impact of interprovincial traffic in the life of the slaves see Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro,
Das Cores do Silfencio. Os Sianificados da Liberdade no Sudeste Escravista - Brasil Sfeculo X IX
(Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo Nacional, 1995), especially chapter VI, “Sob o jugo do Cativeiro”, pp.
119-36.
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importation.91 No open criticism was directed against the internal traffic in slaves
with its high demographic costs, most apparent in the dissolution of families and
the concentration of displaced individuals in single properties. Until the Triple
Alliance W ar came, no relevant manifestation of anti-slavery sentiment appeared
in Brazil.92

Brazilian Sectional Differences and the Planter’s Behavior
It remains unclear how sectional differences affected the political behavior
of the Northeast sugar planters. Many of the revolts which occurred in the
Northeast during the first two decades after independence were exacerbated by
declining production, although it is uncertain how export of slave labor to the
Southwest affected productive capacity.
In the SertSo, the Northeast backlands, a population of poor whites was
available to serve as a seasonal workforce on the great plantations. This poor
free class emerged early in the 16th century, when subsistence agriculture
flourished in parts of the coastal area. During the 19th century, planter elites,
supported by the central state, reduced these farmers to complete dependence
on the plantation system. While slavery declined locally, a rigid legal framework

91 In 1865, Imperial Councilor Sousa Franco reported to Pedro II his estimates concerning the
proportions of freemen over the slaves. According to Sousa Franco, for the whole Empire, there
were 4 free men to each slave. In the North that proportion was 7 to 11; in the southern littoral it
was 3 to 1 and in the center of the Empire it w as 6 to 1. Sexual imbalances among the slaves
were huge. Sousa Franco estimated that, from 1,800,00 slaves, 1,100,000 were men. S ee Jos6
Hon6rio Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasilia-DF: Senado Federal, 1978), p.

202.
92 On the absence of a strong abolitionist criticism in Brazil see Heloisa Toller Gomes, As Marcas
da Escravidao. especially part III, “A ExpressSo do Pensamento Racial no Brasil Oitocentista,” pp.
140-43.
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based on discipline developed in order to provide cheap and tractable wage
laborers as substitutes for the diminishing number of slaves.93 It seems then valid
to conclude that the Northeast Brazilian agrarian elites also benefited from the
coffee boom in the South. Some authors even state that the internal traffic
“brought to the northeast agrarian elites the possibility of obtaining bigger profit
rates with slave exportation than those obtained from the exploitation of
slaves.”94
Whether the export of slaves was good business or bad is difficult to
determine. Even assuming the worst, agrarian elites tried to turn a profit by
selling their slaves to other parts of the country. But internal traffic in slaves was
at best a temporary measure that could not maintain the supply for long. Unlike
the southeastern United States, Brazilian was unable to sustain population
growth among slaves. As a result, the end of the international traffic challenged
the structure of Brazil’s longterm workforce even as it rerouted the supply of
slaves. The government could only offer temporary palliatives to cope with the
scarcity of labor. By the time of the Triple Alliance War the capacity of the
internal slave trade to redistribute labor was reaching its limit. Under these

93 An extensive summary of the history of free workers in the Northeast areas can be found in
Guillermo Pallacios, “Uma Proposta de PeriodizagSo para a Histdria dos Cultivadores Pobres e
Livres no Nordeste Oriental do Brasil, C. 1700-1875.” in Revista DADOS Vol. 30, No. 3 ,1 9 8 7 , pp.
311-24. For a general account about the relations between landlords and the free-poor see Emilia
Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire. Myths and Histories (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1985), especially pages 81-4.
94 Eustdquio and Elisa Reis. ”As Elites Agrdrias e a Aboligdo...,” p. 316; Nathaniel H. Leff,
“Economic Development and Regional Inequality: Origins of the Brazilian Case,” in The Quarterly
Journal of Economics. Vol. 86, 1972. For a broad analysis of the Northeast agrarian elites after
the end of the traffic see P. L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco. 1840-1910 (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), especially pp. 121-79.
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deteriorating conditions the authorization to enlist slaves finally came.
Nationbuilding and Democracy
In contrast to what happened in Brazil, nation-building in the United States
was linked to the definition of economic and social patterns of development.
These were based on individual entrepreneurship and popular sovereignty. The
American experience from the end of the 18th century was marked by the
emergence of mass political participation and the expansion of market relations.
Together, these two elements helped to create an integrated set of both public
and private institutions. Their functional interaction promoted national integration
during the next 50 years, despite intermittent sectional divergence.95
During the Revolutionary War, Americans revolted against the imposition
of European patterns of political order. They also revolted against what they
perceived as a threat to impose the system of absolute rule prevalent in most
European countries. Finally, Americans revolted against the threat of change in
the basis of political power from local consensus to imperial authority, in the
freedom they and their ancestors had been building since the 17th century.
If there was consensus among Patriots concerning what they did not want,
it was more difficult to agree about what these new United States should be like
after independence. As colonial experience differed, so did the rationale behind
rebellion against England. The intensity of the war and each colony’s disposition

95According to Robert H. Wiebe, “The very essence of the American Revolution was political selfdetermination, with the right to construct governments, allocate sovereignty, and select officials
according to America’s own republican lights." The Opening of American Society. From the
Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Desunion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984).
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to endure it differed during these crucial years. According to historian Edward
Countryman,
The revolutionary movement was never a united front facing one
enemy. It was a series of coalitions that formed, dissolved, and re
formed, as people considered what they needed, what they
believed, and what their situations were.98
The American Revolution affected the lives, of all social groups. It broke
the weak links between church and state; it enlarged popular participation in
many crucial aspects of the American life; it led to a larger degree of integration
between the colonies; it restricted slavery and precipitated the decline of various
forms of unfree labor in the North; it made possible a future end to the
international slave traffic.97 However, its political architects faced many dilemmas
on the road towards independence: How would relations between the colonies
be regulated? What function would the national government have? What was the
best form of government? Which limits should be established for political
participation?
In social terms, the Revolution brought the rise of radical political
leadership from the “patrician” class. During the war artisans, soldiers, sailors,
laborers, servants and other denizens of the urban lower class acknowledged
the importance of political participation by shifting from spontaneous mob actions

96 Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 7.
97 The Revolution enabled changes in different areas. The Confiscation o f loyalist lands and the
nationalization of banks being some of the most important. James Franklin Jameson, The
American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1926),_especially chapter I, “The Revolution and the Status of Person,” pp. 1-39; James A.
Henretta, “Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston, “ in William and Marv
Quarterly. XXII, 1965. For more recent sources, see Gordon Wood, T he Radicalism of the
American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), especially Part III, “Democracy,” pp. 229-370.
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to more organized forms of protest. This army of “humble men,” the effective
footsoldiers of liberty, fell outside the ideological factions that fought for
Independence, although they assumed a shortlived control of three state
legislatures created during the Revolutionary period. They could be an important
force in local assemblies, but they were not part of the national elite that pushed
for independence.
Moderate and conservative Revolutionary leaders with a background of
privilege feared radical democratic sentiment and preferred to establish a more
moderate course for the movement, securing it from popular excesses.98 They
were skeptical about the republican capacity to resist factionalism arising from
conflicts of interest and, according to social preferences, they envisioned more
balanced forms of government as an ideal solution.99
However, radical liberals supported more direct forms of democracy and a
larger degree of autonomy for states. During the 1780s, as the economic
situation worsened, the radical political agenda became the cause of distrust and
alarm for the elite, as growing inter-state rivalry and factionalism appeared to
endanger the structure and foundation of the new nation.
For their part, the men who led the American Revolution did not have a
model for government that could be directly compared with their experiences.
When the Revolution came, the historic legacy of the Greek, Roman, and

98 See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969),
pp. 497-597.
99 Saul Cornell, “Aristocracy Assailed” The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism,” in Journal of
American History 76. March 1990, pp. 1149-172.
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Florentine republican ideals was no more than a myth linked to the failures of
classical and modern republican examples.100 These early comparative historians
understood that previous republican experiments failed to maintain their original
virtue and were contaminated by corruption and decadence.101 Even the concept
of virtue could have very different meanings depending on the group. It could
mean “a willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest to the greater good of
society,” but the supporters of a more laissez-fairean vision of society believed
with Mandeville that “private vices could led to public virtues."102
This republic was a fragile experiment in a world ruled by kings, emperors,
tyrants, and aristocrats. Even the concept of republican government was not
clear once it was subjected to the different viewpoints of the Founding Fathers.
In spite of their differences, most of the Framers agreed that the philosophical
basis of the new political pact would be the individual interest and the search for
personal happiness.103 Many of them agreed that a minimum size state was

100 For a comparative approach concerning different forms of Republicanism at the end of the 18“'
century, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), especially pp. 462562.
101 The Greeks developed an aristocratic elite whose privileges were harmful to the maintenance
of their civic virtue. Roman Imperial and commercial expansion degenerated into an oppressive
empire founded on the destruction of its original republican institutions. Italian republics during the
Renaissance also perished when fragmentation appeared as a challenging obstacle to national
unity. On the Enlightenment interpretation of the decline of Roman civic virtue, see Edward
Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1774, Reprint, London: Penguin Books,
1980), for the loss of classical civic virtue, especially chapter XI, pp. 436-67.
102 A summary concerning the different meanings of the concept of “virtue” is offered by Eric
Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America., pp. 158-59.
103 An interesting account on the Founding Fathers’ points of convergence is provided by Richard
Hofstadter, “The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism" in The American Political Tradition. And
the Men Who Made it (1948. reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 3-22; Wood, The
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necessary for a nation to make war and keep diplomatic relations with other
nations. At the same time, the idea of a strong nation state was still deeply
associated with tyranny and despotism. It is not surprising that contradictions
and conflict grew out of the institutions created by the American Revolution,
regardless of the compromises which made a central government barely
palatable.104
Limited suffrage, based on a board of electors, was one of the issues
which received less criticism from the opponents of the Constitution. Alexander
Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 68, “The mode of appointment of the Chief
Magistrate of the United States [aimed] to afford as little opportunity as possible
to tumult and disorder.”105
Early National Agreements
The ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787 gave consistency to
American nationhood. The Constitution was the result of changes in the
perception of the priorities necessary to stabilize the Revolutionary process and
transform the rebellious colonies into a nation. The Constitutional debates were
marked by intense conflicts about the division of powers, the nature of the

Radicalism of the American Revolution, pp. 95-108. Joyce O. Appleby, Liberalism and
Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994),
especially chapter 6, "The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology,” pp. 161-187.
104 According to Drew R. McCoy, on this level, ”[T]he Revolution became a struggle to establish a
society that would escape the decay and corruption that had overtaken so much of the Old
World..." The Elusive Republic. Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 48.
105 See Publius (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist Papers. Federalist XLVIII from 14 March,
1788. There has been no tumult in the Hamiltonian sense but the recent American electoral
events showed that the system could enable a little disorder.
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republican government, and the meaning of democracy and participation.
American politics during the early national period also encompassed conflicts
based on divergent economic interests, as the development of commerce and
industry challenged the old patterns of economic life. If the modified political
processes were not free of friction, yet they also had the merit of sustaining early
revolutionary aspirations. Federalists blocked some democratic advances and
restricted political participation. But these limitations operated inside the patterns
given

by the

existing

political

culture.

No “terror” appeared

after the

Constitutional Convention. Although the Constitution limited popular radicalism, it
also provided a new set of rules and practices to organize the freedom
Americans had inherited and fought for. The success of the Constitution made
the American War for Independence the unique example of a Revolution that did
not devour its sons.106
Early national integration was based on a series of compromises between
the

leading

independence

factions
in

of the

order to

revolutionary

preserve

local

movement.
control

They

against

supported
metropolitan

interference. Acquiescence to a national organization was slow and pragmatic.
Even the framing of the Constitution (one that unified American procedures),
limited, but did not destroy, local prerogatives. By the middle of the 19th century,
the main features of American politics were still notably local.
In spite of this decentralized construction, it would be inaccurate to say

106 On the impression that American Revolution was failing in its libertarian promises during the
first years of the Republic, see Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 393-96.
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that no “state” at all developed in the United States. After independence, early
Federal organization was based on the idea of a relatively weak but functional
central state. Like most revolutions, the American experience began as a
repudiation of the state, of power, and of authority in the name of liberty. Like
most revolutions it ended with the revival of authority to tame the excesses of
liberty. The need to create some articulation between the states was a
permanent force in the process whereby the Continental Congress was replaced
by a Federal Government. This process was not free of conflicts, but it did not
take the dimensions of the Brazilian sanguinary struggles, because the inter
elite’s degree of consensus was higher in the U.S. than in Brazil.107
Special circumstances pushed the Founding Fathers to promote what
philosopher Hanna Arendt called “the constitutio libertatis,” that is, the
organization of liberty. In concrete terms the American leaders did not need to
create an abstract idea of liberty (as the French revolutionaries did), because the
tradition of civic republicanism had been very well rooted in the land. But it was
necessary to establish norms for the operation of human rights in order to avoid
the disastrous effect of factionalism and to assure it would not undermine the
republic.108

107 Drew McCoy emphasized the roles of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, for whom, “the
reorganization of American government was the necessary prerequisite of the establishment of a
republican political economy.” They envisioned America not as a virtuous agrarian economy, but
“as a powerful, economically advanced modem state such as Great Britain..." The Elusive
Republic, pp. 1 21,133. The French Revolution and the revolt in Haiti confirmed the fears of some
Founding Fathers, that democracy was a drug too dangerous to distribute at large.
108 It is probably for that reason that Arendt emphasizes the fact that the American Revolution was
the only that did not devour its sons. For Arendfs clarification of the concepts involved in the
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According to Arendt, independence was not a move to the future, it was
the juridical and constitutional sanction of a situation developed over the course
of generations. The new origin, the revolutionary mutation, was not in the
mythical idea of an impossible future. It was, rather, in the positive conviction of a
past that could provide the guaranties for the future. More recent monographs,
especially the works of Gordon Wood, Eric Foner and Edward Countrymen, have
underlined the enormous transformations produced by the Revolution in the lives
of ordinary individuals, emphasizing change and transformation in relation to the
colonial past. But the concrete fact is that, by the middle of the 18th century,
Americans had achieved degrees of literacy and political participation much
higher than those of any other people in the Western Hemisphere.109 Their
institutions were more solid and stable, and their capacity for continuous
improvement largely surpassed that of early 19th century Latin American
Republics.
The organization of liberty meant the creation of institutional devices to
order the relation between the states. The framing of the Constitution was a
fundamental step for the achievement of an initial degree of unity. It provided a
national unified government for the country. This government furnished the

making of the American Revolution see, On Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1963),
especially chapter4, “Foundation I: Constitutio Libertatis," pp. 139-78. Fora comparison between
the French and the American revolutionary process see Georges Gusdorf, “L6s Revolutions de
France et d"Am6riaue (Paris: Librairies Acad6mique de Perrin, 1988).

109 For the emergency of popular electoral franchise, see Wiebe, The Opening of American
Society. 152-56.
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essential framework for commercial development through the creation of a
national market, public credit, a uniform decimal currency, and the protection of
contracts. According to Stephen Skowronek, early America developed and
maintained an integrated organization of institutions, procedures, and human
talents whose peculiarity was “to control the use of coercion within the national
territory.” Following this line of thought, Americans built an “invisible kind of
state.” It was based on the general acceptance of a system of widespread rules
and on the existence of some organizations, like the parties and courts, that had
a national existence. Skrowoniek also points out that the United States certainly
had a state, both in the sense of “an organization of coercive power" and in the
sense of “stable, valued, and recurring modes of behavior within and among
institutions, but such a system would only be crystallized during the 1830's.”110
It was this kind of national state that made war against the Indians,
arranged territorial disputes between the states which formed its internal
constituents, maintained an integrated legal order on a territorial scale, aided
economic development, and negotiated treaties with foreign nations. The fact
that there was no clear perception of the state did not mean it did not exist.
Despite the absence of a sense of the state, this structure was essential to the

110 J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” in World Politics. Vol. XX, No. 4, July 1968,
pp. 559-92. Stephen Skrowoniek, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities. 1877-1920 (1982. Reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993), p. 24-5.
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maintenance of the social order and to social development in nineteenth-century
America.111
Later conflicts between Federalist and Jeffersonian groups did not
challenge the early pattern of national organization, nor did growing sectional
differences. Territorial expansion, immigration and economic development kept
the Union as the preferred solution for all contending interests as long as it did
not disrupt sectional sources of power. Conciliatory agreements kept a stable
balance of power between northern and southern sections as slavery was
regulated by ordinances limiting its expansion in the north and west of the
country.
The union of the thirteen British colonies as one nation and the adoption
of the republican government were achieved because Revolutionary leaders
considered it the best solution at the time. Disputes created by sectional
differentiation were settled by compromises. If the Constitution solved some of
the initial contradictions of this new republic, many other problems were kept
intentionally unsolved. As territorial expansion and material development
progressed, these contradictions became more visible and acute. Concern
deepened regarding the nation’s civic faith and the survival of its republican
virtue in a context of territorial expansion and economic diversification.
Protestant hegemony was challenged by foreign immigrants, especially Irish

111 Ibid., pp. 26-37.
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Catholics, whose method of worship and social behavior did not comport with
colonial ideals.112
But the most important problem was slavery in the American South.
Slowly this sectional division outgrew the compromises that knit the nation
together and threatened its existence as a Union. Slavery and abolition would
show how costly it could be to change the nature of political institutions when
intransigent issues overwhelm the spirit of compromise and conciliatory
demands fail to provide solutions to sectional differences.

Early Differences
By the 1820s Brazil and the United States had established different
patterns of social development. The contrasts were most pronounced between
Brazil and America’s northern states. While the northeastern part of the United
States changed rapidly due to industrialization, immigration and the growth of
cities, many colonial features survived in Brazil: slave labor, the patronage
system, a predominantly rural population, and the conservative character of
dominant groups.
Although slavery existed in both countries, it was more firmly rooted in
Brazil than in the United States. In Brazil, slavery was a national institution, while
in America it was largely limited to the South. Although it created social and
political problems for both societies, Brazilian inertia could have been shattered
only by external pressures. The prohibition of the Atlantic traffic in slaves and the

112 For a summary of these conflicts involving the impact of modernization over early notions of
civic virtue see Leo Marx, The Machine on the Garden. Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in
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war against Paraguay would become landmarks in the slow process of Brazilian
emancipation. For Americans, however, slavery sparked an internal pattern of
increasing sectional competition, the relevance of which would be felt more
clearly after the 1820s.

America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
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Chapter 2

The Coming of the Triple Alliance War: History and Historiography

From colonial times, Portugal and Spain disputed between themselves the
amount of American territory in their colonial empires. In spite of its smaller
resources (in terms of population and military power), Portugal did better in this
geographical competition. From the initial Treaty of Tordesilhas (1494), that
divided the world between Portugal and Spain, until the Treaties of Utrecht
(1713), and Madrid (1750), when territorial disputes were settled on a more
permanent basis, the Portuguese enlarged their territorial possessions in the
South American sub-continent.1 Such successes were obtained, partly due to the
concentration of efforts on a single colony (after Portuguese restoration in 1640),
partly due to the efforts of the “Bandeirantes,” pioneers who penetrated the
interior under Portuguese support, and partly due to the alliances established
with England.2

1 For the Tordesilhas Treatise see Bailey W . Diffie and George D. Winnus, Foundations of the
Portuguese Empire. 1450-1580 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 282-283.
For Utrecht and Madrid Treatises see, J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1966), pp. 266,269-70.
2 On the Bandeirantes as a historical phenomenon see Vianna Moog, Bandeirantes e Pioneiros.
Paralelo entre Duas Cultures (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1955), especially chapter III,
“Conquista e ColonizagSo,” pp. 125-90, Richard Morse’s “Introduction" in Richard M. Morse The
Bandeirantes. The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965),
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The rhythms of such disputes also varied according to a set of
metropolitan reforms that redefined the colonial administration during the second
half of the 18th century (Bourbons in the Spanish side, Pombalinas in the
Portuguese). In addition, competition between colonial groups and the extension
of commercial links also played their part in the long disputes. By the end of the
18th century Brazilian limits were reasonably settled.3

The Portuguese Expansion and its Heritage
Even with such a successful background, Brazilian access to the rivers of
the La Plata estuary was still subjected to territorial disputes with the Spanish
speaking republics during the 19th century.4 The tensions originating in these
conflicts

constantly

challenged

Brazilian

capacity

to

keep

in

regular

pp. 3-39. For a critical approach to Morse and Moog see David M. Davidson, “How the Brazilian
West W as Won: Freelance & State on the Mato Grosso Frontier, 1737-1752 in Dauril Alden (ed.)
The Colonial Roots of Modem Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 61-106.
3 For a general survey of the border disputes and administrative reforms during the IS"1 century,
Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal: Paradox of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), especially chapter 6, “W ar and Empire,” pp. 95-118; see also Joaquim Verfssimo SerrSo,
Histdria de Portugal. Volume V, “A RestauragSo e a Monarquia Absoluta (1640-1750)" (Lisbon:
Editorial Verbo, 1980), pp. 265-69. Territorial additions included the conquest of French Guyana
and the Cisplatin Province (Uruguay), although these were lost later. The current state of Acre
was added to Brazil in the first decade of the 20th century as well as parts of the Paraguayan
territory between the rivers Apa and Pilcomayo that were conquered as a result of the peace
treaty with Paraguay in 1871. On the Brazilian acquisition of Paraguayan territory see Harris G.
Warren, “Brazil’s Paraguayan Policy, 1869-1876," Americas vol. 28, n. 4 (April) 1972, pp. 3-24.
4Only in 1858 was there a treaty between Brazil and Paraguay concerning the free navigation of
the Paraguayan river. See John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of The Paraguayan Republic.
1800-1870 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 160, and “The Undrawn Line: Three
Centuries of Strife on the Paraguayan-Mato Grosso Frontier” in Luso Brazilian Review V ol. 17, no.
1, 1980, pp. 17-40. See also Thomas Whigham, The Politics of River Trade (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1991), p. 76.
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communication with its western provinces. After independence, such problems
threatened the Empire’s territorial integrity.5
Territorial

expansion

in

colonial

Brazil

was

achieved

through

a

combination of public and private initiatives. Even taking into consideration that
the interests of colonial freelancers and metropolitan bureaucrats did not always
coincide, they shared responsibility for Portuguese penetration far beyond initial
agreements permitted by treaty. If early Brazilian historiography viewed the
Bandeirantes’ intrepidness as the main factor behind territorial acquisition, more
recent contributions have stressed the role of the Portuguese state as the main
entrepreneur in territorial disputes with Spain. According to David M. Davidson:
Portuguese freelancers were necessary to the winning of the West,
but the state proved to be the sufficient agent. Freelancers settled
isolated nuclei and revealed strategic rivers; the state defined such
rivers as boundaries and in so doing gained an area far more
extensive than that actually held or traveled by freelancers.6
Portugal lacked the resources for establishing strong bureaucratic
surveillance and could not control her freelancers. A clear limit on Portuguese
capabilities was shown in the lack of control of commerce in frontier areas. The
Portuguese crown could neither prevent inter-colonial commerce between its
settlements and the Spanish missions, nor restrict the autonomous actions of
provincial leaders. The Emboabas War, a conflict involving Paulistas’ settlers

5 La Plata Estuary or River Plate are terms used to designate a region cut by the Rivers Parana,
Uruguay and Paraguay that form the River Plate.
6 Davidson, “How the Brazilian West Was Won,” p. 106.
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and Portuguese agents for the control of the mines, provided a clear signal
where tensions could go.
As the mid-IS*11century Brazilian “gold rush” paid off and possession was
confirmed, South American boundaries were altered. The Portuguese secured
more than half of the continent’s available lands as their possession, coming
close to the estuary of the River Plate, the easier route to the Bolivian silver
mines. And what is more important, local interests in frontier areas were
crystallized in Brazil, and they would claim a broader set of rights and privileges
for the colonists in the years ahead. Meanwhile, Gatichos in Uruguay and
Paulistas in Mato Grosso and Paraguay would keep pressuring the Portuguese
colonial administration for new territorial acquisitions, especially after the fall of
the Spanish Colonial Empire in 1 8 0 8 /
During the 19th century, most of the disputes were over those lands,
particularly around the River Plate region and Mato Grosso frontiers, where
Brazilian border interests most intensely conflicted with those of their old colonial
neighbors and future international rivals. As a result, after demarcation, most of
the Brazilian interior was better connected with rivers whose courses crossed the
territories of Spanish-speaking nations than with the Brazilian coast. Such was
the case of the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso, whose best transportation
route was made toward the Paraguay River. Such was also the case of the
Missiones’ region, in the province of S3o Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul. Sao

7 Gaucho is the name by which the inhabitants of the old province and current state of Rio Grande
do Sul are known. Paulistas is the designation for the inhabitants of S3o Paulo.
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Borja, Missiones’ most important center, was the home of a growing commerce
with the Upper Plate, involving the Yerba Mate and the Tobacco trades. The
processes of state formation, the growth of commercial interests, and access to
the main rivers constituted the leading elements of disputes during the early
years of autonomous existence of the new states of the region.8 According to
historian Sergio Buarque de Hollanda: “In Brazil the rivers, much more than the
railroads, provided the main transportation. [Consequently] it was natural that the
country sought to obtain almost every one of the River Plate’s margins.”9
The Consolidation of Independence and the Formation of a System o f States
Independence brought a new phase in the long disputes over boundaries
for the newly autonomous nations of South America.10 Due to its higher degree
of continuity, the Brazilian Empire was able to keep most of its bureaucratic
structure and exert control over its territorial units. In particular the Empire had
more effective control over distant regions than its neighbors on the Spanish

8 On the yerba mate production and its trade see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, "El Mercado Colonial y
la Yerba Mate {siglos XVI-XIX), in Nova Americana. Volume 4, 1981, pp. 163-210, V era Blinn
Reber, “Commerce and Industry in Nineteenth Century Paraguay: The Example of Yerba Mate,”
in The Americas. 42 (1), 1985, pp. 29-53. John Hoyt Williams, “Paraguayan Isolation under Dr.
Francia,” in The Hispanic American Historical Review. 52, 1972, pp. 102-22 and Thomas Lile
Whigham, The Politics of River Trade., especially part 2, “Export Commodities and Development
in the Upper Plata, chapter 3, “Yerba Mate,” pp. 105-07.
9 Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, Histdria Geral da Civilizac3o Brasileira. Vol. 4 (SSo Paulo: DIFEL,
1974), p. 248.
10 On territorial disputes after independence see Gordon Ireland, Boundaries. Possessions, and
Conflicts in South America 11938. reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1978) and also Tulio
Halpering Donghi, Histdria da America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975), especially
chapter II, “A Crise da Independ&ncia”, pp. 47-80.
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side.11 For the South American republics, the breaking of ties with Spain in the
1810s and 1820s brought full-fledged nationhood to only a few areas. In most
instances, the continent’s lengthy history of chaos only gradually gave way to
more stable patterns of governance.12
As mentioned previously, the Portuguese colonial administration in South
America created only a weak cohesion between the different regions that formed
the entire colony.13 Ties were not broken during the Napoleonic wars, as the
Portuguese royal family migrated to Brazil (1808), establishing Rio de Janeiro as
the capital of a United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve (1815). After
Brazilian independence (1822), in strong contrast to the decentralization of the
colonial period, the ruling elite opted for an aggressive centralization. This did not
prevent completely the impulse of centripetal forces, but it helped to keep the
country together, avoiding territorial fragmentation and political discontinuity.14

11 On Brazilian more stable transition from colonial to independent status see Zairo Cheibub,
“Diplomacia, Diplomatas e Polltica Externa: Aspectos do Processo de InstitucionalizagSo do
Itamaraty," MA Thesis. IUPERJ, 1984, Ron Seckinger, “O Estado Brasileiro e a Politica Externa
no S6culo XIX,” in Revista Dados 19. 1978, pp. 111-33, and Moniz Bandeira, 0 Expansionismo
Brasileiro. 0 Papel do Brasil na Bacia do Prata: D a Colonizac5o ao lmp6rio.(Rio de Janeiro:
Philobiblion, 1985).
12 Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Lovaltv: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire
(Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Richard Graham, Independence in Latin
America: A Comparative Approach (1972, reprint, New York: McGraw Hill, 1972); David Bushnell
& Neill Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988).
13 A. J. R. Russel-Wood, “Local Government in Portuguese America: A Study in Cultural
Divergence, “ in Comparative Studies in Society and History. (16), 1974, pp. 187-231.

14 The significance of the moving of the Portuguese royal family to Rio de Janeiro still deserves a
complete study. For references see Kenneth R. Maxwell, “The Generation of the 1790’s and the
Idea of Luso-Brazilian Empire,” in Dauril Alden (ed.), The Colonial Roots of Modem Brazil, pp.
107-38, JoSo Camilo de Oliveira Torres, A Democracia Coroada Teoria Polltica do lmp6rio do
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Jos6 Olympio, 1957), and Oliveira Lima, Dorn JoSo VI no Brasil (Rio de
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In contrast with the Brazilian situation, during the first decades after
independence, the former viceroyalty of de La Plata, Brazil’s most immediate
neighbor, was involved for a long period in permanent warfare and political
turmoil. These crises were linked to old colonial disputes, when the Spanish
preference for Buenos Aires minimized the role of other cities in commercial
exchanges. The Viceroyalty fragmented into more or less separate five
countries: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia.15
The Argentinean Confederation was formed by the province of Buenos
Aires (led by its city-harbor of Buenos Aires), and its sister provinces of the
“littoral” (along the Parana River) and “the interior” (as were derogatorily called
those provinces without river connections with Buenos Aires).16 The arrogant
attitude showed by Buonairenses in relation to the needs and demands of the
interior was one of the principal causes of the country’s divisions.17 The nature of
such rivalries was not restricted to territorial boundaries, but extended to differing
notions of nation building, what Nicolas Shumway terms “guiding fictions.” This

JaneiroiTopbooks, 1995). Roderick Barman and Jean Barman, “The Role of the Law Graduate in
the Political Elite of Imperial Brazil," in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 18,
No. 4, November 1976, pp. 423-50.
15 J.C. Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina. 1776-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979); Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro. pp. 86-97.
16 Two good references for understanding the patterns of change and conflict in the relations
between Buenos Aires and the provinces were written by James Francis McLynn during the
1980’s. See “Economic Trends and Policies in Argentina during the Mitre Presidency" in Jahrbuch
Fur Geschichte Vonstaat. Wirtshaft und Gesellschaft LateinAmerikas. n. 19, 1982, pp. 244-284,
1982 and “Political Instability in Cordoba Province During the Eighteen-Sixties,” in IberoAmerikanished Archiv N . F., J66, hf, 3 ,1980.
17 Buonairense, inhabitant of the province of Buenos Aires. Portefio, inhabitant of the city of
Buenos Aires. Those categories were created during the 19th century when a new geography of
the River Plate emerged.
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resulted in an ill-defined sense of national identity and in the precariousness of
Argentina’s place in the new continental order after independence.18
Map 2 - South America by 1850

Source: La Politique du Br6sil ou La Fermeture des Fleuves. 1867, Apendix.

Platine conflicts influenced regional politics as they involved the countries
of the region in permanent tension. As a careful examination shows, most of the

18 Nicolas Shamway, The Invention of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993),
pp. 1-24.
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conflicts in the River Plate region had as their causes Brazilian and Argentine
intentions to preserve borders inherited from their colonial ancestors. If Brazilians
succeeded quickly in this task, the less successful Argentineans kept trying for
the rest of the century.19
Argentina and the Entropic Years
After the

invasion of Spain

by

Napoleon’s troops in 1808,

the

independence of the viceroyalty of La Plata became a question of time and
opportunity. After a series of revolts, de facto independence came in May 1810.20
However, political emancipation did not lead to the formation of a centralized
state, that is, a state under the control of unified elites, centered in the province
of Buenos Aires. Very soon the links with more distant regions, like those on the
Upper Peru (current Bolivia), felt apart. An expedition commanded by general
Manuel Belgrano tried to re-annex Paraguay, but local militias loyal to the
Spanish

Viceroy

twice

defeated

it.21 The

Paraguayans

established

an

independent state a few months later.22 The Cisplatin Region (Uruguay), closer
to the River Plate, was annexed after a long campaign by the Portuguese

19 Miron Burgin, The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, 1820-1852 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1946).
20 John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration. 1782-1810: The Intendance System in the
Vicerovaltv of the Rio de La Plata (London: Athole Press, 1958).
21 Loyalty to the Spanish Viceroy was more a question of opportunity than a commitment. For a
summary of the events that led to the Paraguayan independence see Jerry W. Cooney, “The Rival
of Doctor Francia: Fernando de La Mora and the Paraguayan Revolution," in Revista de Historia
de America. No. 100, Mexico, July-Dee. 1985, pp. 201-29.
22 About Paraguayan loyalty to the Vice-Roy and the fragmentation of the old Vice-Royalty and an
accurate description of the events that led to the Paraguayan independence see John Hoyt
Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic. 1814-1879. especially chapter II “Jose
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government (then in exile at Rio de Janeiro), in 1816, and became part of the
Brazilian-Portuguese Kingdon as the Cisplatin Province. In 1821 the Cisplatin
Congress voted for provincial union with the United Kingdom of Brazil, Portugal,
and Algarve.

Portuguese and, after independence, Brazilians controlled the

province until 1828.23 By that time, as a result of the long war between Brazil and
the United Provinces (1825-1828),

Uruguay finally got its independence,

becoming a buffer state between Brazil and Argentina. Thus, through British
mediation, Uruguay became a nation-state, although its politics would be very
sensitive to the conditions in the border countries.24
Initial fragmentation did not bring internal peace to the remaining parts of
the Argentinean Confederation, nor end disputes between different groups of
merchants and cattle ranchers. The newly independent areas, with the possible
exceptions of Chile and Paraguay (that soon split away from Argentina), were
not politically integrated in administrative or in social terms.25 In most of these

Gaspar de Francia and the Paraguayan Revolution”, pp. 19-42; Thomas Whigham, Politics of
River Trade in the Upper Plata. 1780-1870. p. 20-21.
23 John H. Hann, “Brazil and the Rio de La Plata, 1808-1828”, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Florida, 1964).
24 On the annexation of Uruguay see Ron Seckinger, op. cit., and Lindolfo Collor, ContribuicOes
para a Histdria da Guerra entre o Brasil e Buenos Aires (S5o Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1946).
For a Uruguayan view of the situation see Alberto Zum Felde, Proceso Historico del Uruguay
(Montevideo: Area, 1967), especially chapter III, “La Cisplatina,” pp. 71-110.
25 Chile, because of its small population, and the concentration of political power in the hands of
the Chilean Valley elite, did not face a prolonged period of disputes concerning “who would
govern.” With the Portales' dictatorship (1830-1837), an initial political cohesion was established,
forging a sense of national unity and political integration that would prevail in the years ahead. For
Paraguay, the ascension of the Dictator Jos6 Gaspar de Francia (1814) restricted any fractional
competition. On the singularities of the Chilean elites see Alberto Edwards Vives, La Fronda
Aristocratica en Chile (Santiago: Ediciones Ercilla, 1936). On the process of Chilean
independence and its initial conditions see Robert N. Burr, By Reason or by Force. Chile and the
Balancing of Power in South America. 1839-1905 (1965. reprint Los Angeles: University of
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provinces, endemic warfare between militia chiefs (caudilhos) undermined the
few possibilities of control that the political center could exert over its
extremities.26
The fact is that no side could achieve hegemony during Argentina’s initial
years of nationhood because all of them lacked the necessary military and
financial resources to impose a permanent order. As a result, previously existent
economic activities were deeply affected, as trade with the mining regions was
interrupted. At the same time, bureaucratic capabilities were lost for decades as
cruder representatives of local power, without expertise or experience, quickly
substituted themselves for old vice royal employees.

Everything for a Nation
During the late 1820’s, as Argentinean centripetal tendencies lost
momentum, Juan Manuel de Rosas emerged to become Buenos Aires’
paramount leader.27 According to Jos6 Guilherme Merquior, Rosas’ long regime
(1829-1852) was a Hobbesian answer to Argentina’s lack of institutional order.
Although he was a man of the provinces, Rosas’ ascension made him a
champion of Porteno aspirations to a larger degree of control over the

California Press, 1974), especially chapter II, “The Foundations of National Power,” pp. 12-32. On
the Paraguayan independence process see Julio C6sar Chaves, Histdria de las Relaciones entre
Buenos Aires v el Paraguay . 1810-1813 (Buenos Aires: 1949) and El Supremo Dictador (Madrid:
Ediciones Atlas, 1964).
26 For works on social and institutional history focusing in the linkages between families and state
in early Argentina see Suzan M. Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires. 1778-1810: Family
and Commerce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and Mark D. Szuchman, Order.
Family, and Community in Buenos Aires. 1810-1860 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).
27 According to Argentinean historian Tulio Halperin Donghi, “The ascension o f caudilhismo (big
bosses), led to “a generalizing ruralization of Portefio basis of power.” See his Revolucidn v

81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

provinces.28 It also allowed the exercise of a level of social control in Spanish
South America rivaled only by the Francia’s regime in Paraguay.29 The main
expressions of this power included the control of the rivers in the La Plata
estuary and growing tax oppression. With Rosas, river blockades became a tool
for permanent blackmail of some areas dependent on open rivers. Due to a
tradition of self-sufficiency, some regions, like Paraguay, were able to live in
isolation, but the economies of the coastal provinces of Cordoba, Entre-Rios and
Corrientes, and even parts of Uruguay were deeply affected by political
instability, as pr6 and anti-Rosas tendencies fought for local power.30
Rosas’ determination to keep control of the rivers of the Platine system
enabled the formation of a powerful anti-Rosas alliance between the Brazilian
government and the dissident caudilho Justo Jos§ de Urquiza, leader of the
Entre-Rios province. Urquiza had been the main Rosista general in that region,

Guerra: Formation de una Elite Diriaente en la Argentina Criolla (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1994),
especially the Conclusion, pp. 380-94.
28 Jos6 Guilherme Merquior, “Padrfies de ConstrugSo do Estado no Brasil e na Argentina" in John
Hall (ed.), Os Estados na Hist6ria (Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1992), p. 389.
29 Similarities between Francia and Rosas' autocracies are restricted to social control because
Francia tried to destroy the Paraguayan Creole elites and their peninsular allies in order to forge a
nationality. Rosas, in an opposite situation, permitted the crystallization of a cohesive group,
centered in the Buenos Aires province. This way, as the action of Francia transformed and even
democratized the property relations in the Paraguayan rural world, Rosas, on the contrary, led to
an enlargement of the process of oligarquization of the agrarian power in Argentina. For a good
biography of Francia see Jos6 Ramos Meijia, Rosas v El Dr. Francia (Madrid: Editorial Am6rica,
1917), Julio C 6sar Chaves, El Supremo Dictador. Bioarafia de Jos6 Gaspar de Francia (4th
edition, Madrid: 1964). For a political examination of Francia’s government philosophy see
Adriano Irala Burgos, La Ideologia del Doctor Francia (Asuncion: 1975).
30 For Rosas’ government I have followed: John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de
Rosas. 1829-1852 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Carlos Malamud, Juan Manuel de
Rosas (Madrid: Ediciones Quorum, 1987); Oscar Ozslack, La Formacidn del Estado Argentino.
Orden. Progresso v Organization Nacional (Buenos Aires: Planeta Argentino, 1997), especially
chapter 5, “Azar, L6gica o Voluntad?," pp. 260-74; and Maria Ligia Prado, A FormacSo das
Nacfles Latino-Americanas fS5o Paulo: Unicamp, 1987).
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but turned against his master as tensions grew.31 Such an alliance reflected
regional integration as well as transformations in the Argentinean economy with
her integration into the international commerce in wool. The cattle ranchers
wished peace in order to consolidate the economic stability achieved during the
Rosas years. Ironically, the same nationalistic goals that forged Rosas’ power
led to his fall, as navy blockades undermined commercial development.
Consequently, Rosas lost momentum among his most important supporters. On
the other hand, the Brazilian government saw with rising concern the support
given by Rosas to the Blanco party in Uruguay, because Blanco’s supremacy
affected that country’s neutrality as a buffer state. Brazilian Gauchos were
sensitive to any fluctuations in Uruguayan politics. The Farrapos’s revolt,
Brazilian longer sectional crisis, had just ended in 1845, when, after more than
ten years of conflict, Rio Grande do Sul was reintegrated into the Empire.32
Rosas’s interference in Uruguay was considered a threat that could not be
tolerated by the Imperial government, because it brought the possibility of
renewed civil war to Gauchos’ politics. For the second time in twenty years, a

31 For an Urquiza’s biography see Beatriz Bosh, Urquiza v su Tiempo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI,
1971).
32 The Farrapos' W ar was the longest sectional movement in Brazilian history. From 1835 to 1845
the province of Rio Grande do Sul seceded from the Empire proclaiming the Piratiny Republic. In
1845 military stress and long negotiations brought the province back to the Empire. Farrapos’
leaders were pardoned and many of their provincial goals were achieved. For a good analysis of
this revolt see Alfredo Varela, Histdria da Grande RevolucSo (Porto Alegre: 1925), 6. Volumes,
Spencer Leitman, Raizes Sdcio-Econdmicas da Guerra dos Farrapos (Porto Alegre: Graal, 1979),
and Josd Hildebrando Dacanal (ed.), A Revolucao Farrooilha: Histdria e Interpretacao (Porto
Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 1985).

83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

question involving Uruguayan politics became the key for Brazilian international
intervention.33
Brazil was the only country of the region with a permanent navy and a
capacity to retaliate which was greater than Rosas’s capacity to counterpoise
attacks. Urquiza counted then on Brazilian support when he organized an army
that would defeat the dictator in the battle of Caseros (1852), opening the
window for a more decentralized political order in the Argentina during the
following decade. A new project for Argentina was under way. With the formation
of an allied government in Uruguay, Brazilians got a treaty of boundaries,
commerce, and friendship, signed on October 12,1851. This treaty regulated the
deportation of runaway slaves and the exemption from taxes of the cattle
crossing from Uruguay to the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul.34
During the

1850’s, neither the province of Buenos Aires nor the

Argentinean Confederation accumulated enough force to impose its goals on the
rest of the country.35 Federalists kept control of most of the nation and framed a
constitution in 1853. Justo Jos6 de Urquiza, Argentina’s first constitutional
president, foresaw an enlargement of autonomy for the provinces under the
umbrella of a rebuilt Argentinean Confederation. As observed by Oscar Oszlack,

33 On the political goals of Blanco and Colorado political parties see Juan Pivel Devoto, Histdria de
Los Partidos v de las Ideas Pollticas en el Uruguay: La Definicidn de los Bandos. 1829-1838
(Montevideo: Paidos, 1956).
34 Moniz Bandeira, O Expansionismo Brasileiro. p. 192. From Rosa’s defeat until the outbreak of
the Paraguayan War, the Brazilian government had considerable influence on the Uruguayan
internal policy, transforming that country into an economic satellite.
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this solution did not encompass the province of Buenos Aires, still in command of
the Plata estuary and its taxes. Portefios refused to participate in the
Confederation, rejecting a project of national integration that did not fit their
interests and needs.36 As noted by writer Juan Bautista Auberdi “There was no
Argentinean government because there was no Argentinean Republic in the old
meaning of such a term.”37
The province of Buenos Aires slowly recovered from the battle of Caseros
and

rebuilt its political power, gradually imposing

its prerogatives and

undermining both the Confederation’s economy and Urquiza’s leadership. Many
years of struggle would still be necessary until that province’s ruling elite would
suppress, completely, regional impulses and impose on the Federalists a final
defeat between 1860 and 1880.36
When the Triple Alliance War came (1864), Portefio power was in the
middle of its long struggle against a weakened (but not dead) Confederation. It
was not clear which side would win the provinces. There was no political center
capable of mobilizing enough resources to build a strong army, or a unified

35 The Argentinean Confederation was an entity that congregated all provinces opposing Buenos
Aires under a single political confederation. It existed from 1852 to the early 1860's when Buenos
Aires finally reduced the other provinces to submission.
36 Oscar Oszlak, La Formacidn del Estado Arqentino, pp. 58-59. For a synthesis of the argument
in English see his “The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and
Methodological Guidelines for Its Study,” Latin American Research Review, vol. XVI, no. 2 ,1 9 8 1 ,
pp. 3-32.
37 Quoted in Earle D, Macarthy Moreira, “Alberdi e a Guerra do Paraguai. DecodificagSo de urn
Texto Polfimico,” in Veritas. Vol. 35, no. 140,1990, p. 565.
38 On the metamorphosis of the Unitario action see Shumway, The Invention of Argentina, pp.
168-214, and Daniel E. Zalzar, La Evolucibn de las Ideas de Domingo F. Sarmiento (Sommerville.
N.J., SLUSA, 1987).
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infrastructure of services to unify the country.39 Although Argentina was at war
with Paraguay, in many provinces Portefios, not Paraguayans, were perceived
as the enemy. In these circumstances, the Triple Alliance War, in spite of its
international significance, can also be viewed as an essential event in the
continuous civil war in which Argentina was immersed during most of the
nineteenth century. For Leslie Bethell, the War of The Triple Alliance “was a
regional civil war although it had international dimensions.” For Uruguayan
historian Jose Pedro Barren the war meant, in the geopolitical perspective, “a
triumph of the classical Bismarckian expedient of defeating local resistance
through a national war.”'0
The important fact to keep in mind is that the result of the war of the Triple
Alliance reinforced the dominion of the central governments of Brazil and
Argentina over their rebellious provinces' attempts to establish a new status quo
in the region. After the War, international political competition would occur under
a system of states dominated by a bi-polar hegemony. The Paraguayan
government and the Uruguayan nationalistic faction would no longer challenge
this new situation.

39 For the importance of the Triple Alliance W ar for the Argentinean state-building see Fred
Murphy, “Latin American State Formation in Regional Context” The Case of Argentina in the War
of the Triple Alliance,” The Working Paper Series. New School for Social Research, n. 71.
40 On the Argentinean influence in the events that lead to the outbreak of the Triple Alliance War,
see James Francis McLynn, “The Causes of the War of the Triple Alliance: An Interpretation,” in
Inter-American Economic Affairs. Volume XXXIII, n. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 21-43.Leslie Bethell,
“IntrodufSo” in Maria Eduarda Castro MagalhSes Marques (ed.), Guerra do Paraauai. 130 Anos
Depois (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumard, 1995), p. 22. Pedro Barrdn, “Apogeo y Crisis del
Uruguay Caudillesco, 1839-1875" in Histdria Uruouava. Tom o4, p. 97.
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Paraguay: The Limits of Isolation and Integration
Since its end, in 1870, the War of the Triple Alliance has been subjected
to a variety of interpretations. Some approaches praise the progress of the
Paraguayan state before the war, while other interpretations emphasize
savagery and dictatorship as permanent features of the Paraguayan regime
during the ante-bellum period (1810-1864). The fact is that Paraguayan society,
during this period, diverged from those of its neighbors not because it was
entirely unique,

but because some common features of Latin America

institutional developments were enlarged.41 The debate has underlined the size
and power of the Paraguayan state, in contrast with the weakness of its civil
society and institutions. This fact impressed the few travelers that were permitted
to visit the country during the “Franciata,” and those foreigners who settled and
stayed after Francia’s death (1840).

It still impresses those who compare

decision-making in Paraguay with similar processes in other Latin American
areas during the same period. But strong states and weak institutions were
present in other nations as well, differing mostly in their dimensions, not in their
importance.
During the 1960s and 1970s some analysts saw the destruction of
Paraguay as a defeat of “Latin American endogenous reason.” Such a
perspective presented Paraguay as an original society in permanent struggle

41 In spite of recent interest in Paraguayan history in the United States, very little has been written
concerning the social history of Paraguay. One of the few recent exceptions is Jerry W. Cooney
and Thomas L. Whigham (eds.) El Paraguay Baio los L6pez. Alaunos Ensavos de Historia Social
v Polltica. (Asuncion: Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Socioldgicos, 1994).
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against

British,

Brazilian,

and

Porteho

interests.

According

to

such

interpretations, Paraguayan resistance to a more effective integration in Platine
commerce and its isolation in relation to the Platine economic agenda was at the
root of the War’s outbreak. These analysts view the Triple Alliance as a lost
cause of Latin American anti-imperialist struggle against the forces of capital,
which demanded integration and subordination.42
Recent interpretation by authors like John Hoyt Williams, Diego Abente,
Thomas Whigham, Ricardo Salles, Vitor Izecksohn and Leslie Bethell have
questioned such a "dependentista approach.”43 According to such critics, the
Paraguayan War is best understood as the outcome of changes in the region’s
system of states, and as part of a political process that began with the

42ln 1979, the same year Sandinistas defeated Anastdcio Somoza, a Nicaraguan historian Jose
Alfredo Fomos Peflalba defended a dissertation at the University of California that would become
the most representative work of revisionist research. His The Fourth Ally: Great Britain and the
War of the Triple Alliance, presented England as mainly responsible for the destruction of
independent Paraguay. English financial support to the members of the Triple Alliance was
stressed as the differential factor in the Allies' victory. See also his “Draft Dodgers, War Resisters
and Turbulent Gauchos: The W ar of the Triple Alliance Against Paraguay,” The Americas. Vol. 38,
No. 4, 1982, pp. 463-79.
43Dependency Theory is a school of interpretation that flourished during the 1960’s and found its
zenith during the 1970's. This line of research focuses on the problem of foreign penetration in the
political economies of Latin America. This theory explains underdevelopment throughout Latin
America as a consequence of outside political and economic influence. For many researchers the
War of the Triple Alliance appeared to be an excellent illustration of the validity of dependency
theory. See Ronald H. Chilcote, “Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature,” Latin
American Perspectives. Vol. 1, 1974, pp. 4-29. For classic examples of the Dependency
approach, see especially Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faleto, Dependency and
Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and Peter Evans,
Dependent Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). A historical analysis of the
emergence of Dependency Theory is found in Gary Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and
Dependency in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), chap I. The most
thorough criticism of the mechanical application of dependency to the Paraguayan case is offered
by Diego Abente, “The W ar of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models," in Latin American
Research Review. Vol. XXII, No. 2 ,1 9 8 7 , pp. 47-60.

88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

independence of South American colonies and their institutionalization as nation
states.44
Structural transformations related to advances in centralization and
changing political capabilities implied great transformations in the region’s
international

relations.

Paraguayan

diplomacy

underestimated

such

transformations, pushing the country into a war that was disastrous for its
organization as an independent state. In order to give a better picture of the
situation,

we

must

outline

Paraguayan

historical

development

from

Independence until the outbreak of the Triple Alliance War, in December of
1864.

The Route to Autonomy
Paraguayan history between independence, in 1810, and the outbreak of
the War of the Triple Alliance, in 1864, is the subject of one of the most
fascinating debates among Latin American specialists. The first sixty years of
Paraguayan existence as an independent state have been treated as a period of
authoritarian rule, and, later, by revisionist historians, as a period of progress and
relative social justice.45 The analyses of the amount of personal power achieved

44 Abente, “The War of the Triple Alliance,” Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraguai: escravidSo e
cidadania na formacSo do Exdrcito (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), Thomas L. Whigham, The
Politics of River Trade. Vitor Izecksohn, “0 C em e da Discdrdia. “ A Guerra do Paraguai e o
Niicleo Profissional do Exdrcito,” MA Thesis, IUPERJ, 1992, and Leslie Betthell, “O Imperialismo
Britdnico e a Guerra do Paraguai” in Maria Eduarda Castro MagalhSes Marques (ed.), A Guerra
do Paraouai. 130 Anos Deoois (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumara, 1995), pp. 131-50.
45 For the critics see the classical works of Horton Pelham Box, Origins of the Paraguayan War. 2
vols. (Urbana: Illinois, 1927), and Augusta Tasso Fragoso, Historia da Guerra entre a Triplice
Alianca e o Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado Maior do Exdrcito, 1934), 5 vols.
These authors wrote narratives of diplomatic history that followed the Empire’s line of reasoning,
viewing the W ar as a conflict that opposed civilization (the Brazilian Empire) against barbarism
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by different dictators and of the high degree of state interference in economic
activities exemplify this disagreement. Many such interpretations are centered on
the long government of Jose Gaspar Rodrigues de Francia, Paraguay’s first
dictator,

who

directed

the

country’s

resistance

against

Argentinean

expansionism.48
At the time of Paraguayan independence Francia was one of the few men
in the country who were capable of governing. He held a high degree in
Canonical Law, from the prestigious University of Cordova, and combined great
intellectual capabilities with a permanent opposition to both Portefios and
Peninsulares. During the process of independence, these qualifications pushed
him to the highest post of the republic, from which Francia conducted his long
government, struggling constantly against foreign influence in domestic issues.47
He was able to eliminate competing factions of Paraguayan oligarchies, breaking
the back of the Creole elite and smashing the power of Spanish merchants.

(the Paraguayans and their dictator). For examples of revisionist approaches in English see
Gilbert Phelps, Tragedy of Paraguay (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975) and Charles Kolinski,
Independence or Deathl The Story of the Paraguayan W ar (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1965), E. Nicholas Tate, “Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of
Paraguay, 1811-1870," Ibero-Amerikanishes Archiv Vol. 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 39-70, and Henryk
Szlajfer, “Against Dependent Capitalist Development in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: The
Case of Haiti and Paraguay.” Latin American Perspectives. Issue 48, Vol. 13, no. 1, winter 1986,
pp. 19-44. For a critical review of these works see Edy Kaufman, Authoritarianism in Paraguay:
The Lesser Evil?,” Latin American Research Review. Vol. XIX, no. 2 ,1 9 8 4 , pp. 193-207.
48 For traveler's accounts about Paraguay see Johann R. Rengger and Marcel Longshamp, The
Reign of Dr. Joseph Gasoard Roderick de Francia in Paraguay (London: 1827), Edward a.
Hopkins “The Republic of Paraguay Since the Death of the Dictator Francia.” American Review
(September 1847), pp. 255-256, and Charles Blacksford Mansfield, Paraguay. Brazil and the
Plate. Letters Written in 1852-53 (Cambridge. 1856).
47 For a general survey of the intellectual environment in the University o f Cordova during the last
quarter of the 18th century see Bernard Moses, “The Colonial University o f Cordova,” in Richard E.
Greenleaf, The Roman Church in Colonial Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knoppf, 1971), pp.
129-37.
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Sequentially, Francia’s determination to subordinate the army and to restrain the
Church’s influence gave him a degree of personal control over the entire country
that justified his title “El Supremo” (The Supreme).48
As a consequence of Paraguayan independence, contacts with the
exterior were constantly broken

because of the

permanent hostility of

international rivals and exiled adversaries based in the Platine region.49 This
isolation has been erroneously taken for granted by some authors, to underline a
hypothetical Paraguayan desire for complete autonomy and independent
development. Recent research has emphasized Paraguayan insistent, although
unsuccessful, efforts to re-establish regular commercial links with foreign
countries.50
Paraguay’s isolation during Francia’s regime was not self-imposed; rather
it resulted from political instability in the region. After independence, conflicts
between the new nations in the Rio de La Plata were frequent. These conflicts
included Paraguay’s victorious defense of her independence against the
Provisional Government of Buenos Aires in 1811; the Portuguese invasion of
Uruguay six years later; Argentina’s conflict with Brazil from 1825 to 1828;
Uruguayan interest in the Guerra dos Farrapos (1835-1845); and the effective

48 The best literary appreciation about Francia's personality and government is Augusto Roa
Bastos, Yo el Supremo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Argentina Editores, 1964).
49 For a delineation of the faction struggles in the Upper Plate during this period see Richard Aleen
White, Paraguay’s Autonomous Revolution. 1810-1840 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1978).
50 For an overview of the isolationist issue see John Hoyt Williams, “Paraguayan Isolation Under
Dr. Francia” A Re-evaluation” in The Hispanic American Historical Review. Volume 5 2 ,1 9 7 2 , pp.

102- 22.
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alliance of the Argentine provinces of Entre-Rios and Corrientes with Uruguay
and Brazil against the government of Juan Manuel Rosas (1852). As a
consequence of such events, the Paraguayan state grew in permanent
international tension in direct proportion to Francia’s rising power within it.

Table I
Brazilian Interventions in the River Plate - i/lain Episodes, 1816-1870
Campaign

Duration

Uruguayan
Annexation

1816-1821

Cisplatine
War
Intervention
Against Rosas
Intervention
in Uruguay

1826-1828
1864-1865
1864-1865

Countries Involved
Vice reign of River Plate
Portuguese United Kingdom

Forces Used
Resolution
Portuguese Colonial Portuguese
Army and Navy
Military victory

Brazil,
Uruguay,
and
Argentina
Brazil
Uruguay,
and
Argentina.
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina,
and Paraguay

Army, Navy, National British
Guard
Arbitration
Army and National Brazilian
Military Victory
Guard
Army, Navy, National Brazilian
Guard,
and Military Victory
Volunteers

Sources: Tulio Halpering Donghi, Hist6ria da America Latina and Joaquim Nabuco. U m Estadista do Impferio

During Francia’s government a national identity crystallized in Paraguay.
Such an identity was rooted in a number of distinct factors such as the country’s
position in the River Plate region, its permanent exposure to Argentine instability,
and its isolation because of rivalries with the Portefios and Brazilians.

Finally,

the ethnic composition of the Paraguayan people, mostly descending from
Spanish Creoles and Guarany's Indians, and the widespread use of the Guarany
language as the lingua franca, facilitated the perception of their ethnic identity as
something distinct from the white, European society to the south in Buenos
Aires.51

51 For this point see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “Soldados y Campesinos: Dos Siglos en la Historia
Rural del Paraguay in Suplemento AntropolOaico. Paraguay, 1986, pp. 7-71.
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In addition to symbolic and geopolitical considerations, Francia gave
special attention to the condition of the peasants. He developed a policy of
access to land and supported a flourishing subsistence economy in order to
create a social basis for support among his countrymen. His government also
undertook lucrative land expropriations that provided the government with
substantial rents. The expropriated lands became State Estancias, that is, they
were converted into public lands and used as a tool of state control in order to
ensure the peasants’ loyalty against the Hispanic oligarchs. Together, such
policies were more than sufficient to keep Paraguayans united against the
interests of Platine oligarchies and helped to support the three dictatorial regimes
that succeeded from 1814 through 1870. But Paraguay was neither progressive
nor a precursor of twentieth-century leftist nationalism. It was just a small nation
in a desperate struggle for survival, adapting protectionist practices from the
Bourbons’ administrative reforms.52

Carlos Antonio Lopez and Paraguay’s Golden Age
In contrast to its earlier years as an independent state, the decade of
1850’s was a time of progress and expansion for the small Republic of
Paraguay. With the consolidation of Carlos Antonio L6pez’s dictatorship (18441862), the country entered into a developmental boom, concurrently with a great
effort to open its external commerce, after decades of stagnation. These

52 On the agricultural reforms and the relations between the Paraguayan state and the peasants
there is an interesting debate in John Hoyt William, “Paraguay’s Nineteenth-Century Estancias de
La Republica,” in Agricultural History. Vol. XLVII, n. 4, October 1973 pp. 206-15 and Vera Blinn
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developments resulted In political gains for the power groups that directed the
country’s destiny. They also resulted in much greater involvement in the region’s
political problems. In the face of new international issues, neutrality would be
kept as the tone of Paraguayan foreign policy as long as Carlos Antonio Lopez
ruled.
Having inherited a unified nation from his predecessor, the paradigmatic
Jose Gaspar de Francia (1768-1840), L6pez (the father) did not have to face the
problems his neighbors confronted in the Platine region. Paraguay had no
secessionist movement nor an articulated opposition. These conditions, in
addition to the political isolation, reinforced the role of the central state as the
country’s main entrepreneur, maintaining a tradition that, according to Thomas L.
Whigham, had been established by the Spanish bureaucrats during the late
eighteenth century. Carlos Antonio Lopez enlarged the state’s capacities by
legalizing its control over foreign commerce. The monopolies over yerba mate
and tobacco gave the

government substantial incomes, decreasing the

importance of taxes in the nation’s economy.
L6pez’s land polices were not free of personal interests. In many cases,
expropriations reverted to the L6pez family, which quickly became the country’s
largest oligarchy. In spite of that, there is no evidence that peasants’ access to
land was menaced. Until the outbreak of the War of the Triple Alliance the

Reber, “Commerce and Industry in Nineteenth Century Paraguay: The Example of Yerba Mate” in
The Americas (42V n. 0 1,1 98 5 , pp. 29-53.
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development of agricultural exports did not interfere with the small farmers.
Social peace was maintained in the fields.53
During the 1850’s foreign technicians, most of them English, supervised
this program of economic modernization. These came to implement the main
governmental projects, like Asuncion’s Arsenal and shipyards, the Ybicuy
Ironworks, the construction of the Asuncion-Vila Rica railroad and the extensions
of the telegraphic net connecting Asuncion to the main villages and military
outposts of the country. O f all the economic initiatives of Carlos Antonio Lopez’s
government, the most ambitious was certainly the hiring of almost two hundred
European technicians with the express objective of quickly modernizing the
nation’s infrastructure.54

Solano Lopez and the Paraguayan Diplomatic shift
It is impossible to understand the causes of the Triple Alliance War
without referring to the importance of personal decisions in history. Modem
readers may object that it is superficial, or inherently conservative, to emphasize
these factors of personality without considering the question of what there was in
the Paraguayan politics that prevented the development of any viable alternative

53 "Although opportunities to export increased with improved roads and the more favorable
commercial policies of Carlos Antonio LOpez, the type of subsistence crops grown did not change
from the colonial era...Over half the Paraguayans were small property holders, while the
remaining fanners either rented land of utilized unoccupied land.” Vera Blinn Reber, "Small
Farmers in the Economy: The Paraguayan Example, 1810-1865." The Americas. Vol. 51, no. 4,
April 1995, p. 499.
54 On the contribution of such technicians to Paraguayan development see, Josephina Pla, Los
Britanicos en el Paraguay. 1850-70 (Asuncion: Arte Nuevo Editores, 1984). On Paraguayan
advance during the Ldpez regime see Thomas Lyle Whigham, “The Iron Works of Ybicui:
Paraguayan Industrial Development in the Mid-Nineteenth Century” in The Americas (351. 1978,
pp. 201-18.

95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to the

leadership of Francisco Solano Lopez.

Nonetheless, taking into

consideration the extreme centralization of Paraguayan society and the
importance of its leaders in the decision-making processes, one is led to the
conviction that only a framework emphasizing personal choices makes sense.
During the 1860’s Paraguayans were victims of both changes in the region’s
political structure and shifts in Paraguayan foreign policy. Together, such facts
became pivotal for the catastrophic decisions taken by Ldpez’s son, which led to
a war that Paraguay could not win.
When C.A. L6pez died, in 1862, his legacy was a progressive one, in
terms of both economic development and the higher degree of social stability.
His elder son, Francisco Solano L6pez, succeeded C.A. L6pez. However, with
the ascension of Solano L6pez, foreign affairs and militaristic issues dominated
the Paraguayan political scene on a scale never before achieved. Solano L6pez
inherited a country without great internal problems, endowed as it was with a
high degree of social cohesion. Ironically, it was probably the consciousness of
such basic unity that enabled the new Paraguayan dictator to make the
disastrous decisions that led the country to enter a war that would destroy its
political order.
Solano L6pez’s personality remains an enigma for historians. The
L6pezes were the closest thing to an oligarchy Paraguay produced in her first
sixty years as an independent nation. Having traveled through Europe and in the
Platine countries in diplomatic missions during the 1850’s, Solano Lopez
possessed military and diplomatic skills that made him the natural successor to
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his father. Notwithstanding this background, L6pez early developed a more
arrogant and centralist approach to both military and diplomatic issues that
contrasted with the brutal simplicity of his predecessors. In contrast to the
neutrality of his father’s diplomacy, Solano L6pez aimed for a larger degree of
influence for Paraguay in Platine matters and developed a militaristic approach
to diplomatic issues, including extensive mobilizations of the Paraguayan
population in the countryside.55
Nevertheless, Paraguayan diplomacy even under Solano Lopez seems to
have been governed by a sincere wish to keep a fictitious balance of power in
the region at any price.56 The efforts employed by Solano L6pez to end the
Argentinean Civil War in 1862 seem to show his equivocal understanding that
Paraguay's great enemy was the Brazilian Empire, not a restored Argentinean
Federation.57 Events would show this to be L6pez’s fateful mistake.58

55 In the Paraguayan case another factor impelling the decision to go to war could be what
Thucydides called “honor,” that is a sense of being valuated, a sense of being respected, a sense
of prestige. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin, 1972),
especially Book I, pp. 35-123. The theme of “honor” as the main motive for going to war has been
recently recovered by Donald Kagan, an admirer of Thucydides’ approach. See his On the Origin
of W ar and The Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor Books, 1996). According to Kagan
honor has been a more common reason for the outbreak of conflicts than many economic and
political designs.
56 On the ambivalence of the application of the concept of “Balance of Power” for the Platine
scenario see Diego Abente, The W ar of The Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models, pp. 47-67,
and Vitor Izecksohn, 0 Ceme da Discdrida chap. I, “A Guerra do Paraguay - Alguns
Esclarecimentos Necessarios,” pp. 10-27. On the concept of “Balance of Power" see Ernest
Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept and Propaganda" in James N. Rosenau
(ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policies: A Reader in Research and Theory (New YorkFree Press, 1961), pp. 318-29.
57 For the story of Paraguayan diplomacy during the Argentinean Civil W ar see Juan E. O’Leary,
El Paraguay en La Unificacion Argentina (Asuncion: Institute Paraguayo de Cultura, 1976).
58 For an appreciation of the role of Argentina in the outbreak of the Triple Alliance W ar see F. J.
McLynn, “The Causes of the Triple Alliance: An Interpretation" in Inter-American Economic Affairs.
Volume XXIII, n. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 21-44.
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The Uruguayan Crisis
In 1863 a civil war started in Uruguay involving the parties Blanco (then in
power) and Colorado. This civil strife also involved Brazilian and Argentinean
interests in Uruguay. Gaucho cattle ranchers never followed the classical
conception of a territorial boundary dividing Brazil and Uruguay. According to
Jose Pedro Barren, Brazilian citizens controlled 30% of Uruguayan territory in
the 1860s. By 1860 Brazilians were the most important foreign group living in
Uruguay, accounting for 10 to 20 per cent of her population.59 The Blanco party
adopted a policy of “borders nationalization,” that is, to tax Brazilian citizens and
control the movements of their cattle and slaves in the Uruguayan border
regions.60 Gaucho leaders pressed the Imperial government to support the
Colorado Party, which favored their interests but was out of the power. The
Brazilian diplomat Jos6 Antonio Saraiva, plenipotentiary in Uruguayan matters,
directed an “appeal” to the Blanco government on May 12,1864, demanding that
the Uruguayan government should:
[T]ake into consideration our complaints over the serious offenses
made against Brazilian subjects residing in Uruguay, whose
property, honor, and life did not find protection, protection [that is]
warranted by the Constitution of the same republic, in reason of
which Brazil and the Argentinean Confederation consented to her
political existence.61

59Jos6 Pedro Barren, “Barren, “Apogeo y Crisis del Uruguay Caudillesco,” p. 82.
“ Thus in opposition of the 1851 agreement.
61 A summary of the Uruguayan events can be found at Minist&rio das R e la t e s Exteriores.
Relatbrio da ReparticSo de Neadcios Estranqeiros Apresentado a Assemblfeia Geral Leaislativa
na Terceira Sessao da D6cima-Seaunda Legislature pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secreterio de
Estado. Joao Pedro Dias Vieira. Rio de Janeiro, Typographia Universal de Laemmert, 1865, pp.
1-28.
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There were many motives behind Brazilian interventionist behavior in
Uruguay. Some of them were linked to the latent tensions with the Spanish
speaking republics that had never been resolved after the end of the colonial
period.62 For this reason, during the 19th century, Brazil intervened many times in
River Plate affairs.

Brazilian intervention and the military support given to the

Colorados in Uruguay deeply irritated the Paraguayan government because
there were treaties of mutual defense between Paraguay and Uruguay.63
The Paraguayan evaluation of the 1864 crisis did not take into account
the important institutional transformations that were taking place in the region,
following the failure of the Argentinean federalism. The consolidation of national
states around projects of centralization led to a decrease in the power of
provincial leaders. The emergence of Bartolom6 Mitre as president of a united
Argentina meant a program of “modernization” and “civilization," that is, of the
transformation of Argentina into a modem society, deeply integrated into the
capitalist world system. As a consequence of such structural changes, many of
the Argentinean

provincial

leaders,

tempted

by

material

progress

and

modernization, opted for submission to a centralized order. At the same time,
reintegration of the province of Rio Grande do Sul into the Empire by 1845 also

62 In 1811, troops under the leadership of D, Diogo de Souza invaded the Uruguayan territory,
granting land concessions to Brazilian and Portuguese citizens. See Moniz Bandeira, O
Expansionismo Brasileiro. p. 73.
63 According to Fred Murphy, until 1855 the Brazilian Empire kept 5000 military troops based in
Uruguay. According to the same author, 15% of the Uruguayan population, by that time, were
Brazilian Gauchos. They occupied 3 0% of Uruguayan territory. Fred Murphy, “Latin American
State Formation in Regional Context," p. 9.
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restored Brazilian interventionist capabilities in the River Plate. Although national
integration was still far from complete, Brazil and Argentina were much more
stable and solid nations by the middle of the 1860’s than they had ever been
before. That situation is defined by Diego Abente as “Power Transition,” that is,
one where the main country players cannot understand correctly the shifts
through which a system of states is going.
The Paraguayan government counted on the support of those same
‘caudilhos’ and dissident oligarchies that opposed Buenos Aires in her long
struggle for nationhood. Lopez expected cooperation from the political chief of
Argentina’s Entre-Rios province, Justo Jos6 de Urquiza. Such support never
materialized, as Urquiza gradually moved to accept the new rules and
procedures establish for political competition in Argentina. Those new rules
enabled greater prosperity in the pampas even while they diminished the
chances of people like Urquiza to come to power.

Finally, the Paraguayan

dictator also expected that the presence of slaves would undermine the
operational capabilities of the Brazilian Army.

The problem with such

calculations is that they were based on the previous international situation, not
taking into account the modifications that had taken place in the region.
In response to Brazilian intervention in Uruguay, Paraguayan authorities
apprehended the Brazilian merchant vessel Marques de Olinda. in December
1864, in Asuncion harbor. Following this, a Paraguayan naval expedition landed
in the Brazilian city of Coimbra, initiating an invasion of the province of Mato
Grosso. Quickly most of the northern section of that province fell into
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Paraguayan hands. In early 1865, L6pez asked permission from the Argentinean
government to cross its province of Missiones in order to reach Uruguay in time
to help the Blancos, who were by then losing the Civil War with the Colorados.
But the Argentinean president, Bartolomg Mitre, refused permission. The
Argentinean Unitarians supported the rebellion of the Colorados in Uruguay
because they saw the Uruguayan Blancos, who had been historical allies of
Argentinean Federalistas, as a threat to their modernization policies. After the
Argentinean refusal, Paraguayan troops invaded the province of Corrientes in
April 1865. These reckless Paraguayan military movements led to the worst
possible outcome.
Paraguayan troops risked their chances of victory with an initial offensive
on two fronts. This strategy proved to be a disaster because the Paraguayans
wasted valuable resources (in terms of troops and weapons), invading the
Brazilian province of Mato Grosso while at the same time trying to help their
Blancos allies in Uruguay. Crossing an enormous territory without adequate
means and finally outnumbered by their enemies, the Paraguayans lost their
best men and ammunition. They never got to Uruguay, nor did they destroy the
allies’ vital sources or supply’s nets.64

“ According to George Thompson, from a total of 12,400 men who marched in the Paraguayan
expeditionary force to Uruguay, 1900 died or got sick. From the remaining 10,500, 2,500 were
killed in the battle of Yatay and 8,000 surrendered at Uruguayans (Brazil). Thompson remarked
that most rifles were so old they could not repeat a shot. See George Thompson, A Guerra do
Paraguay. Com um Esboco Histbrico do pais e do Povo Paraauaio. e notas s6bre a enoenharia
militar durante a guerra (1869 reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Conquista, 1968), pp. 83-92. Thompson
was a British engineer who participated in Ldpez's inner-circle. He was one of the few foreigners
who were commissioned with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
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Tropical diseases, hunger, the lack of adequate winter clothes and
equipment victimized many troops.65 By November 1865 most of the remaining
Paraguayan troops were back to their territory in order to defend their Southern
frontier against an Allied invasion. The remaining expeditionary forces were kept
in the distant garrisons of Mato Grosso, isolated from any help.66
The next phases of this war were the most bloody and difficult in the entire
campaign. After the defeat of the Paraguayan offensive the war turned into one
of invasion and conquest of Paraguayan territory. On May 1, 1865, Brazil,
Argentine and Uruguay (now effectively governed by Colorados), signed the
Triple Alliance Treaty, consolidating military, political and diplomatic agreements
that had long been nourished. The Treaty united the region’s most powerful
countries against Paraguay, creating a completely adverse military balance. The
Triple Alliance Treaty clearly stated that the Allied forces would put down arms
only after the total defeat of the Paraguayan government.67

“ Ibid. For a good description of the Paraguayan mistakes during this first phase of the operations
see pp. 21-81.
“ The Paraguayan troops in Mato Grosso lacked any regular supply. One of the reasons why the
Imperial army regained the city of Corumba through a surprise attack was due to the fact that the
remaining Paraguayan garrisons were fishing while Brazilians approached. This episode was well
described in the memoirs of one Paraguayan general. See Francisco Isidoro Resquin, Datos
Historicos de la Guerra del Paraguay contra la Triple Alianza (Asuncion. Compafiia SudAmericana de Billetes de Banco, 1895), p. 74.
67 The nature of such a treaty was subjected to strong controversy. It was to have been kept
secret until the end of the war. Its revelation by the English ambassador in Argentina resulted in
bitter criticism as many governments (like the Bolivian and the Peruvian) severely criticized its
draconian clauses against Paraguayan autonomy.
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Map 3
Paraguayan Offensives, 1864-1865
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Paraguay’s fate was sealed, although few could imagine how much effort
would be necessary to defeat the Guarany nation.
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Chapter 3

The American Civil War: History and Historiography

On the left bank of the Ohio work is connected with the idea of
slavery, but on the right with the well-being and progress; on the
one side it is degrading, but on the other honorable; on the left
bank no white laborers are to be found, for they would be afraid of
being like the slaves; for work people must rely on the Negroes; but
one will never see a man of leisure on the right bank: the white
man’s intelligent activity is used for work of every sort.
Alexis de Tocq ueville1
W e are not one people. W e are two peoples. We are a people for
Freedom and a people for Slavery. Between the two, conflict is
inevitable
Horace Greely2.

The coming of the American Civil War has been the subject of diverse
historical interpretations since the end of the conflict in 1865. It has been seen
as an irrepressible conflict, where opposing sectional economic interests
clashed;3 It has been seen as the tragic result of rapacious political behavior;4 it

1Alex De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1848. reprint. New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p.
346.
2 Quoted in Eric Foner, Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men. The Ideology of the Republican Party
before the Civil W ar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 310.
3Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (2 vols., New York,
1933), Frank L. Owsley, “The Irrepressible Conflict” in Twelve Southerners (eds.) I'll Take my
Stand (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1930), and Arthur C. Cole, The Irrepressible Conflict.
1850-1865 (1934, reprint New York: Macmillam Company, 1969).
“Avery Craven, The Repressive Conflict 1830-1861 (Baton Rouge, University of Louisiana Press,
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has been seen as a consequence of the lack of alternatives provided by the
party system;5 it has been seen as a constitutional crisis affecting the concepts of
law and order.6 Although many issues divided North and South, most recent
historical research has argued that slavery was the central element in the crisis
that led to secession and to war.7
Slavery was pivotal to the outbreak of the American Civil War because it
divided the Union created by the Declaration of Independence and the U.S.
Constitution into two distinctive sections: a free North and a slave South. This
division led in turn to increasing differences in the levels of economic
development, in the degree of freedom, in the scale of values, and in each
section’s capacity to elaborate, develop, and apply new technologies to their
environments.
During its first 85 years as an independent nation, America’s leaders tried
to cope with such sectional differences through the construction of an elaborate
political system. When conflicts occurred, a series of political compromises
aimed to bring North and South together. One of the reasons why such

1939), James R. Randall, “The Blundering Generation” in Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
XXVII (June, 1940), pp. 3-28.
5Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850's (New York: John Wiley

&

Sons Inc., 1978).

6Phillip S. Paludan, “The American Civil W ar Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order," in
American Historical Review). Vol. 77, No. 4, October 1972, pp. 1013-1034.
7Of course this refers to the development that has been taking place during the last fifty years.
And such recent developments in American historiography owe much to the efforts of Kenneth M.
Stamp and Herbert Aptheker.
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compromises were feasible in earlier periods of crisis (like 1787 and 1820) was
the symmetry (in resources and means) between the two sections.8
Another important reason was the cross-sectional party organization.
During the Jacksonian era, both major parties were national organizations
divided over local issues. According to David M. Potter Democrats, and Whigs
“were both coalitions of local organizations rather than fully developed national
political organizations.”9 Together, these circumstances helped to keep sectional
antagonism out of the political agenda as much as circumstances permitted.
But, during the 1850’s, the system collapsed under the pressure of strong
sectional competition. As sectional asymmetry grew, the room for compromise
kept narrowing down until the political system proved completely unable to
reconcile the growing differences. Conflict over slavery progressively weakened
the groups that, during the first half of the 19th century, had fought tenaciously for
the maintenance of the Union. The outcome was the destruction of two main
features of the ante-bellum republic: the Second Party System, and plantation
slavery. Another result was a growing (even if temporary) interference of the
Federal government in southern social and political institutions. After the Civil

8 Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (New York:
Sharp, 1999), especially chapter II, “Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity,”
pp. 34-56. According to Finkelman Garrisonian abolitionists offered an accurate interpretation of
the Constitution as a “proslavery” document, but they were wrong to absent themselves from
politics rather than fight for reform.
9David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis. 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 8.
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War, the American nation would be marked by new political and social
landscapes.
The above chain of events distinguishes the outbreak of the American
conflict from the coming of the Triple Alliance War. The main difference lies in
the fact that, while slavery was central to the American sectional disputes, it was
little more than a secondary factor in the crisis that brought war to the River Plate
region.

The Platine conflict had its roots in the regional processes of state-

formation and in the turbulent political situation in Uruguay and northern
Argentina. Although slavery was also a central institution in the Brazilian society
(possibly much more central than in the US as a whole), it has never been
considered a central element in the outbreak of the War against Paraguay.10
Differently from the Platine conflict, the American Civil War resulted from
the conflict around the expansion of slavery towards the western territories. As
Ira Berlin has argued, the expansion of cotton and sugar production in the lower
Mississippi valley beginning in the mid-1790s transformed the region from “a
society with slaves" into a “slave society.”11 The districts along the Mississippi
River from above Natchez to below New Orleans included some of the highest
proportions of slaves in North America.

’“Although it was considered in the military calculus as an element of potential Brazilian fragility by
the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano L6pez.
11 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 325-57.
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During the decades of the 1840’s and the 1850’s, diverging conceptions
of the future clashed. Would the U.S. be a free society, or one in which slavery
was a central institution? The Civil War was a final contest to determine which
project would prevail. In the W ar of the Triple Alliance, the Brazilian Empire
fought to defend its territory and to keep its status quo as the region’s main
power. The Empire was not fighting for the creation of a new situation but, as it
had done in previous conflicts, to maintain the same situation it had inherited
from its colonial background. Both wars led to the increasing importance of the
central states on the victorious sides, allowing a temporary increase in each
central state’s capacity to intervene and interfere with domestic issues at the
local level.
A second difference between the processes that led to the outbreak of the
two wars relates to the creation of each nation’s frontiers. The American Federal
Constitution (1787) consolidated the idea of a government of limited powers. It
resulted from inter-sectional agreements on the country’s basic questions. The
resulting Hamiltonian Federalism was a compromise between confederation and
centralization, whereby duplication of functions was the order of the day. There
were two systems of law, state and federal, two taxing powers, two police forces
and two governments having authority over the same territory.12 In spite of such
limitations, through the Constitution it was possible not only to enforce law and

12On the concept of Hamiltonian Federalism see Roy F. Nichols, "Federalism versus Democracy.
The Significance of the Civil War in the History of the United States Federalism” in Roscoe Pound.
Charles H. Mcllwain and Roy F. Nichols (eds.) Federalism as a Democratic Process (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), pp. 49-75.
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order, but also to open the way for territorial expansion. The Federal government
was pivotal for American expansion, and this makes U.S. history quite distinctive
from the Brazilian experience.
Brazil’s current borders were determined primarily during the late 18th
century, when Brazil was still a colony of Portugal, while America’s borders were
not crystallized until an independent state structure was created, one that
supported the expansionist aims of some sectors of its population. Among the
many reasons for the colonists’ dissatisfaction, during the colonial crisis, were
the obstacles established by the English colonial administration against territorial
expansion. English colonial officers probably feared more the colonist’s potential
for expansion than Indians’ raids. Even though the Native Americans could fight
for their lands, they did not challenge British rights in North America. American
independence opened the door for American expansionist forces, releasing
impulses long restrained. The American borders kept advancing during the first
half of the nineteenth-century, enabling a westward migration that did not stop
until very late in the same century.13
In spite of strong constitutional limitations on the powers of the central
government, the American territorial expansion found in the same federal
government a crucial agent to fulfill its “Manifest Destiny.” The Federal
government controlled the army and the keys to foreign agreements and it was

13 Robert F. Berhofer, Jr. “The North American Frontier as Process and Context,” in Howard
Lammar and Leonard Thompson (eds.), The Frontier in History. North America and Southern
Africa Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 43-75.
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constitutionally authorized to declare war and to make peace, and to control the
process of admission of these territories as new states.
The great contradiction of American development lies in the fact that the
capture of the central government became itself a central strategy for the survival
of the southern project, while the southerners were the most aggressive
defenders of the Jeffersonian tradition, one that opposed strong federal
government. The disturbances resulting from this contradiction manifested
themselves in bitter quarrels over the nature of the Federal system and over
demands for its redefinition and alteration.

The Economic Prospects
From its independence to the 1850’s, all sections of the United States
lived through a spectacular development of their economic, demographic, and
democratic capacities. Until that epoch, no other society had witnessed such
rapid changes in so little time.14 No other people experienced such great
confidence in their prospects for the future than the Americans of the ante
bellum republic.15 In spite of such hopes, these economic changes brought a
new set of challenges for the young nation and her leaders. On many occasions
they had to reconcile their original republican ideals with the realities of political,

14American population grew from 4 million in 1790 to 23 million by 1850. The area of the country
grew from 890,000 at the time of the inauguration of George Washington to 2,997,000 square
miles. Potter, op. cit., p. 7.
15An extensive description of American faith in their material progress is presented in James M.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter I, “The
United States at Mid-century," pp. 6-47.
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economic, and social change. Territorial increase, immigration, urbanization, and
industrialization presented many challenges to the generation of American
Founding Fathers. For some of them, like Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, the
advancement

of commerce

and industry posed

severe threats

to

the

maintenance of public virtue. Jefferson was not alone in these fears as many of
his peers in the political elite shared the fear of the corruption that wealth could
bring.16
According to the Jeffersonian point of view, the commercial expansion of
past republics was the main source of their corruption and decay. Wealth
brought inequality, intensifying the potential for class struggles that threatened
the social fabric of the American republic. The examples of the Roman Empire,
the Dutch United Provinces and, above all, the British historical experience,
provided a strong justification for Jefferson’s reservations against “commercialindustrialism." Jefferson feared that American Republican virtue, so strongly
defended against British enemies, could be undermined by internal forces. This
time, it would be threatened not by poor urban crowds, but by a rich and
aristocratic minority that would seek to use the powers of government to further
their own interests. From this perspective, the concentration of wealth, not

16Benjamin Franklin, whose observation of the British society was extensive, became an important
reference for the establishment of a negative vision of the effects of economic change and
disparity of wealth over the quality of life. According to Drew McCoy, Thomas Jefferson started a
similar point of view as Benjamin Franklin. But Jefferson also understood territorial expansion as
something essential to the maintenance of the public virtue. See Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive
Republic. Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: W. W . Norton & Company,
1983). See especially chapter II, “The Republican Revolution," pp. 48-75.
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radical republicanism (sanscoulotism), was the potential source of despotism. As
underlined

by

Drew

McCoy,

“American

society

was

to

be

revolutionary...precisely because it would not repeat the familiar eighteenthcentury pattern of a stark and widening division between the propertied few and
the masses of laboring unpropertied poor.”17
Jefferson’s election in 1800 was the result of the anti-Federalist reaction
against both Federalist centralization and restrictive legislation in the 1790’s. It
was a movement that recovered the roots of American republicanism. According
to John Ashworth “The opponents of Federalism rallied, formed the Republican
Party and won control of the government. In so doing, and in placing Thomas
Jefferson at the head of the federal government, they re-structured the American
polity and re-established the American democratic tradition.”18
In spite of his strong reservations about structural modernization and
political

centralization,

Jefferson’s administration

(as the

American

third

president), was characterized by conciliatory policies. Jefferson was involved in a
movement to mediate between traditional and modern ways of thought searching
for a balance among the various branches of economic activity. During his
presidency, the new republic was troubled by international threats, and the
nation too anxious for stability, to abandon completely a centralized organization.

17 Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic, p. 66.
18John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 30.
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Jefferson’s pragmatism as president only occasionally modified the Hamiltonian
system that prevailed during most of the ante-bellum era.
Following a pragmatic capacity to adapt to the country’s fortunes, and in
flagrant contradiction with the classical historical examples he so much admired,
Jefferson supported territorial expansion as the best means to maintain and
strengthen American civic virtue. According to Jefferson and his followers, the
availability of land guaranteed that the republic would continue to be dominated
by the independent farmer, the ideal citizen of a republic. Anti-Federalists
believed that only by openly keeping access to free land would it be possible to
keep alive the possibility of framing a nation of small holders, not dependent on
the will of the rich and powerful members of the wealthy minority.19 In one of his
most famous comments on the subject Jefferson stated that:
Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever
he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.... Corruption of the
morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age
nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those
who, not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as
does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on the
casualties and caprice of costume. Dependence begets
subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and
prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.20

19 On Jefferson’s vision of the ideal society, see Joyce Appleby, Origins of Jeffersonian
Democracy: Republicanism, the Class Struggle, and the Virtuous Farmer (Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2000), especially chapter 7, “The Virtuous Farmer,” pp. 153-164..
“ Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia. “Query XIX” (1785; reprint, New York, Harper
& Row, 1964). Quoted in J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society. White Liberty
and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press,
1985), p. 21. Harris' discussion about republicanism is on pages 20-2.
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In the South, such a pastoral ideal had a stronger appeal than in the
North.

Three reasons explain the difference: black slaves were the main

exploited group; they provided the bulk of the work force used on the great
plantations; and they were excluded from the political system. Under such
circumstances, it was easier for southern slaveholding to reach a modus vivendi
with the democratic aspirations of non-slaveholding whites. Jefferson, John
Taylor and other southern leaders supported a more egalitarian view of the
public interest. They defended the superiority of their agrarian social organization
over the urban industrial environment. In this agrarian world farmers, be they
slaveholders or not, could pursue equal rights and share the same aspirations for
freedom and democracy. But such an alliance was possible because the
democratic order they envisioned was limited, including only white males. Such
an order delineated a racist egalitarian society. J. William Harris explained the
working patterns of that society:
Southerners attempted to reconcile liberty and slavery by appealing
to one important conservative strain of republican ideology.
Slavery, they claimed, actually enhanced the sense of equality
among white men, and confined to the most debased categories of
society - menial labor - an inferior race. Every white man was at
least one giant step above all slaves in status, and thus, relative to
slaves, true republican equality existed in the ruling group of
citizens...21
In the North, where slavery was not significant, such an alliance was much
less feasible because class conflict and social unrest challenged patrician
strategies to control the social structure. During the early American republic,

21 J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, p. 190.
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northern elite groups were dominated by the fear of the people and the fear of
radicalism, while southern leaders could be more consistent in their claims for
democratic political participation (even if restricted by racist considerations). In
the South, white claims were not considered a challenge to the slaveholder’s
power, while in the North the mass of poor whites constituted a potential threat to
the maintenance of the social hierarchy. Under these circumstances, northern
positions about such issues sounded, for a while, much more conservative than
those presented by men like Thomas Jefferson and, later, Andrew Jackson. It
was often under the inspiration of the ideas and actions of these southern born
leaders that democratic claims for enfranchisement were advanced during the
first half of the 19th century. The American democratic paradox is that of a society
that advanced the quest for universal white male suffrage, yet did not consider
African American’s bondage a relevant question.22

The Roots of the Sectional Controversy
During Jefferson’s administration American territory practically doubled after the
purchase of Louisiana Territory (1803). Jeffersonians believed that a free
society, with its promise of independence for the yeoman, required territorial
expansion. The enlargement of the American boundaries was intended to
increase the expanse of real estate that would prolong spiritual and economic
regeneration of democratic republicanism. In Jefferson’s words:

22 A fuller discussion would require attention also to the situation of Women and Native Americans,
but these were not a main source of sectional conflict.
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However, our present interests may restrain us within our own
limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our
rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover
the whole northern, if not the whole southern continent, with a
people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms,
and by similar laws.23
However, as expansion enlarged the number of free as well as the
number of slave territories added to the nation, it created new sources of tension
for the new republic. As a consequence, the question of slavery expansion to the
western territories would become a permanent problem in American politics,
although not necessarily a disruptive one.
While agreements were desirable, it was possible to maintain the Union
compact by limiting slavery expansion to make sure that it did not cross the
borders of freedom established by the Northwest Ordinance. These agreements
also helped to keep sectional tensions as a subordinate political issue, while
local topics and controversies dominated the nation’s debates. The basic
agreement was to maintain the numeric balance between the free and the slave
states. Until 1820, nine new states entered the Union: Vermont (1791), Ohio
(1803), Indiana (1816), and Illinois (1818) in the North (as free states) and
Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Louisiana (1812), Mississippi (1817), and
Alabama (1819) in the South (as slave states). While the northern population
was able to grow fastest than the southern, the Senate kept an even balance,
maintaining its veto power in more conservative (pro-southern) hands.

23Quoted by Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), p. 9.
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A second point of agreement was that the Federal government should not
interfere in a state’s internal issues except to protect slaveholders' interests.
Initially such a conception was an answer to the growing fear that Federalism
inspired in many Americans, especially Jefferson’s followers. The prospects of
an expanding Federal government frightened political leaders in both sections
because it opposed American centrifugal impulses.24 Thus the States’ Rights
creed of the anti-Federalists insisted on the right of every state to govern itself
according to its interests. The problem was that this pattern of government
behavior responded not to the people’s will, but to an abstract notion of local
autonomy, that is, each state as a sovereign body deciding its own matters. In
this way, States’ Rights doctrines, originally conceived to safeguard domestic
liberties, became a functional support of slaveholders’ interests; by preventing
the Federal Government from interfering against slavery, they perpetuated
slaveholder prominence in the areas subjected to human bondage.

An Asymmetric Geography
Originally the two main sections of the American republic had been fairly
equal in population, in their political representation, and in their export earnings.
These

circumstances,

simultaneously

with

relentless

economic

growth,

supported the achievement of a series of long-lasting compromises that, from the
framing of the Federal Constitution, kept their leaders on good terms through the
maintenance of an even balance of power between the northern and the

24Such impulses were discussed in Chapter I.
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southern states. This balance was kept through inter-elite political agreements
that began with the establishment of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) and the
three-fifths clause. The first agreement banned slavery from the territory
Northwest of the Ohio River, making free labor that region’s only alternative. In
the same Constitutional Convention, the representatives from the North and the
South faced the question of each region’s representation in the Congress. There
were differences concerning how slaves would be counted for electoral
purposes. Finally, both groups agreed on the three-fifths clause, that is, a slave
would be equal to three-fifths of a free person.
In spite of the widespread sentiment toward compromise, economic and
demographic transformations were not symmetrical. The North succeeded much
better than the South in attracting immigrants and diversifying its economic
activities. Widespread development and territorial expansion created a huge
difference between a “free labor" and industrial North and an agrarian South.
According to James McPherson:
Of 143 important inventions patented in the United States from
1790 to 1860, 93 percent came out of the free states and nearly
half from New England alone -- more than twice that region’s
proportion of the free population. Much of the machine-tool industry
and most of the factories with the most advanced forms of the
American system of manufactures were located in New England.25
During the 1820’s the expansion of a market-oriented economy was an
important factor behind the growing sectional divergence in the United States.

25James M. McPherson. Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 19.
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While the North had moved rapidly in the early decades through commercial and
capitalist development, the South, loyal to her Jeffersonian inspiration, had
remained largely rural and agricultural. For historian Drew Gilpin Faust “Slavery
had profoundly inhibited the growth of market relations in the [southern] region,
both by preventing the emergence of a free market in labor and by limiting the
number of the section’s independent consumers.”26 But such asymmetry was not
significant enough to put the South in a subordinate position in the nation’s
geography.27 Politics was the channel through which southern leaders sought to
counterbalance their structural inferiority. Skilled Southern politicians exploited
northern unionist feelings to build alignments that made this period of American
history very rich in alternatives. If sectionalism did not assume its disruptive
powers earlier than it did, this had a lot to do with the southern capacity to
control the Federal government’s main positions, imposing the defense of the
southern interests and needs on a northern majority. In these issues they
benefited from their influence over the Federal Government. They also benefited
from the ideology professed by the Democratic Party, which pledged a strong
commitment to white egalitarianism while ignoring the existence of slavery.

“ Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism. Ideology and Identity in the Civil
War South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p. 43.
27ln the long debate concerning the causes of the Civil W ar partisans of the “blundering
generation” view led by Avery Craven and James G. Randall pointed out that the social and
economic differences between the sections were not so important and not relevant enough to lead
necessarily to war. They blamed the inability of political leaders to cope with compromisable
problems for the outcome.
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By another token, if slavery prevented the formation of a truly free market
in the South, it was nevertheless much more efficient as a labor system than
northerners could have understood. The success of cotton culture and the
demographic growth of the native slave population destroyed the idea that
slavery would gradually die out.28 Such a perspective had helped to promote the
compromises made during the Constitutional debates and had served the
Jeffersonian republican ideal. In postponing more effective action, northern
leaders, many of them critics of slavery, assumed that manumission would be
gradual and ought not to cause social or economic dislocation. Many of them
believed that, through individual initiatives of manumission and colonization, it
would be possible to eradicate slavery from America.
Until the 1820’s slavery was not a central issue in the American political
debate, nor were the attacks against the institution perceived as a crusade
against the South. The American Colonization Society was founded in 1816 and
assumed as its mission the task of sending ex-bondsmen to Africa (especially to
the new colony of Liberia). On their side, many southerners viewed slavery as a
“necessary evil,” that is, an unfortunate legacy from the colonial period. But
slaves were a form of property and the right to posses them was guaranteed by
the southern interpretation of the American Constitution, the same Constitution
that allowed for the peaceful termination of the Atlantic slave traffic by 1807.

280 n the growth of the cotton economy see Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton
South. Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York: W.W.Norton &
Company Inc., 1978). See especially chapter 2, “The Structure of the Cotton-Slave Economy," pp.
10-42.
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The victory of the Revolution and the end of the Atlantic slave trade led
many northerners to believe that slavery would gradually vanish from the United
States.

To

reinforce

such

perceptions

during

the

two

decades

after

independence, there was the evidence of slavery’s gradual extinction in the
northern states and individual initiatives to manumit slaves in Virginia and other
southern bastions of bondage. But the American experience differed from other
slave societies in the New World basically because of the natural increase of its
slave population.29 According to Robert Fogel, “the US colonies not only overtook
but far exceeded the rate of growth of the slave populations elsewhere in the
hemisphere...Thus, the United States became the leading user of slave labor in
the New World, not because it participated heavily in the slave trade but because
of the unusually high rate of natural increase.”30
The Missouri Crisis in 1819-1821 provided the first major confrontation
between purely sectional interests since the end of the Constitutional debates.
Missouri’s request for admission as a slave state shocked northern public
opinion. The Missouri Crisis showed to an astonished northern audience the
disruptive potential of the southern defense of the right to push slavery into the
West. For the first time party lines were shaken by sectional interests,

29According to Arthur Bestor, the census of 1860 revealed that more than half the American slaves
were held in bondage outside the boundaries of the thirteen states that had composed the original
Union. See “The American Civil W ar as a Constitutional Crisis" in Michael Perman (ed.) The
Coming of the Civil War (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), p. 77.
“ Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract. The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1991), pp. 32-3.
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threatening the maintenance of the Union as it had existed until then. A
conciliatory bargain known as the “Missouri Compromise” (1820) admitted
Missouri as a slave state, while in the future slavery would be prohibited in the
Louisiana Purchase above the 36 30’ line of latitude. At the same time, and in
order to maintain the sectional equilibrium, Maine was admitted into the Union as
a free state. The Missouri Compromise assured that the balance of power
between the representatives of free and slave states would be kept in the
Senate. But above all, from then on, it made it clear that slavery was not a
backward institution, condemned to perish in face of the progress and
development brought by capitalism. On the contrary, it was a powerful force with
potential for growth and expansion.

The Great Transformation
The years between the beginning of Andrew Jackson’s administration
(1829) and the compromise of 1850 were marked by frontier expansion, the
standardization of paper money, the protective tariffs, the Indians’ removal, and
the raising of a militant abolitionist movement. In spite of the variety of such
questions that divided northern and southern interests along sectional lines,
slavery kept its prominence as the main divisive factor in American society. The
transformation of slavery into the America’s biggest political issue was not
automatic.31 It had much to do with northern economic transformations, the

31And in this sense this work disagrees with interpretations coming from the “irrepressible conflict”
school because I attribute great weight to personal decisions. The interpretation of the Civil War
as an “irrepressible conflict” was effectively presented in Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard,
The Rise of American Civilization (2 vols., New York, 1933).
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Republican Party critique of southern social organization, and the violent
southern responses to such challenges. But slavery’s growth and expansion
beyond early expectations of both northern and southern leaders, and its
dependence on new fertile lands, were also pivotal elements in the increasing
tension that opposed the states north and south states of the Mason-Dixie line.
When the inter-sectional consensus finally broke, in 1860, both sections went to
war to preserve what each civilization believed to be its superior social
organization. Slavery was at the core of these expansionist issues.
The American political situation after 1812 was marked by the absence of
nearly foreign enemies. As a consequence, the army, as an institution, had but
small significance in the state-making process as a whole, although military
heroes, from time to time, could become candidates for executive positions.32
Although wars against Indians were permanent, the size and importance of the
kind of army needed for such campaigns was relatively small. It did not require a
high degree of mobilization nor an excessive amount of financial resources
because the use of modern military tactics, the spread of white diseases, and the
employment of modern warfare technology made the difference. Indians were

32 During the Ante-bellum republic seven major presidential nominees may be classified as military
heroes: George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin
Pierce, Winfield Scott, and John C. Fremont. From these only Taylor and Scott can be considered
as professional military in the sense that their professional career was their primary occupation.
According to Samuel P. Huntington these numbers furnish a conclusive proof that "political power
and military professionalism are incompatible in the American climate.” For Huntington, “The
successful military hero [in politics] has been the man either who was a nonprofessional soldier or
who, if he was a professional soldier, abandoned his military trappings and adopted the guise of
liberalism." Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State. The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 158.
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decimated and progressively spoiled of their lands as waves of white settlers
crossed to the West.33
Following such a rapid wave of progress toward fresh lands, a new kind of
leadership emerged in the political landscape. It reflected the aspirations for
broad participation and local power that bloomed in American social culture. Not
coincidentally Andrew Jackson was a man from the frontier and an officer.
Having being an Indian fighter, a military leader, a slaveholder, and a hero of the
War of 1812, Jackson took on a symbolic aura, which represented the values
and aspirations of a large spectrum of white American males, from the
immigrants in the northern cities to the poor yeoman in the southern fields.
Jackson personified the new style of policy-making that emerged after 1800. His
successful political career was framed by feelings of independence and
autonomy that were endemic among a new generation of American politicians.
Such politicians were linked to political machines that did not require men of
reputation and cultivation for their operation. Instead, they depended on the work
of professionals skilled in techniques of mass mobilization and driven by a
passion for organizational efficiency. These were men like Martin Van Buren and
his peers at the Albany Regency, who did not owe their positions to birth or to
any previous superior social position. Their status was due to their work as
builders of political machines. Their prestige depended upon an iron loyalty to

“ Although it was important to provide the security the settlers needed. For the army life during
“peacetime,” see Edward M. Coffman, The Old Armv: A Portrait of the American Army in
Peacetime. 1784-1898 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986).
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their party organizations. Such circumstances enabled them to denounce what
they believed to be the elitist course of American politics.34 With their relentless
capacity for political organization, they defeated president John Quincy Adams,
the heir of one of the most prestigious American dynasties, in his efforts for reelection in 1828, and brought Jackson to the presidency.
The election of Andrew Jackson and the rise of the Democratic Party
would signal great changes in the practices of American politics in the direction
of a new party system. According to Richard Hofstadter: “[The Democratic Party]
would create opportunities for nominations, patronage, careers, in return for the
loyalty it demanded of its members.35
Democrats and Whigs, the two main parties, mobilized the American
electorate at all levels of public administration, using the spoils of office to
motivate party cadres. Through the institution of the spoils system, American
democracy would undermine the possibilities for creating an independent
bureaucracy on a more European style. Most posts in the government services
would become a prerogative of the party in power. Such a configuration
reinforced the role of the political parties as national organizations and
intermediaries between the common citizen and the national government on a

34 According to Douglas Miller, “By the 1820’s the politician was becoming a specialist - not the
statesmen, lawyer, merchant, or planter of an earlier era.” See The Birth of Modern America.
1820-1850 (New York: Macmillam, 1985) p. 155. For a classic account of Jackson’s life and times,
see John W, Ward, Andrew Jackson. Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press,
1955).
“ Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United
States. 1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 244.
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scale never achieved by similar institutions in Latin America or Europe.
According to Theodore J. Lowi, the dominant American parties have been
labeled “constituent parties” because of their importance in facilitating states’
operations.36The advent of the Second Party system transformed the parties into
organizations with power to control temporarily the Federal government. As
interpreters of local political demands, such parties were able to monopolize
many of the tasks normally achieved by the permanent bureaucratic organization
of national states in other countries. Under these specific constitutional rules, the
political

parties turned

into the main sources of order,

continuity, and

predictability in government operation. According to Stephen Skowronek:
The regimen of voter mobilization, party coalition building, and
national two party competition provided the extra-constitutional
framework necessary to channeling the energies and ambitions of
officials in government. The party machinery freed the Constitution
from dependence on a patrician class, depersonalized power
relations, and focused activity within America’s fragmented
institutional structure.37
In the absence of a professional bureaucracy, parties and courts furnished
the operational rules for government routines. Even the positions in the small
professional army would

become subject of political

patronage.38 Party

identification permitted the reduction of conflicts between the various levels of

^Theodore J. Lowi, “Party, Policy and Constitution in America" quoted by Stephen Skrowronek,
Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920
(1982, reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 26.
37 Skrowonek, Building a New American State, p. 24.
38 William B. Skelton, “Officers and Politicians: The Origins of Army Politics in the United States
Before the Civil War,” in Armed Forces & Society. Vol. 6, N o .1 ,1979, pp. 22-48.
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the constitutional structure as well as some stabilization of administrative
procedures by means of patronage, rotation of posts, and external controls over
public employers. William Marcy, a member of the Albany Regency, affirmed that
triumphant politicians “claim as a matter of right the advantages of success. They
see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy.”39
Jacksonian polices were aided by the continuous enfranchisement of
white males, which in turn helped to make the American presidency less
patriarchal. By 1810 a majority of states had lowered franchise requirements to
the point where most adult males could vote. By 1824 only three states restricted
suffrage in a significant way. With Jackson, the extended franchise was
accompanied by the substitution for the caucus system of the institution of “party
conventions,” as the most convenient process to select presidential candidates.40
This new political environment created the conditions for the emergence of more
popular forms of leadership.41
This long shift in the direction of mass political parties had nothing to do
with

the

revolutionary

processes

that

swept the

European continental

monarchies during the 1840s. It had still less to do with the strong dependence
of the Brazilian parties on the central state. In Brazil such parties were still

39 Quoted in Miller, The Birth of Modern America, p. 159.
''“While in South America such activity normally contributed to political oligarquization in America it
helped to enlarge the democratic spirit. For an interesting comparison of personal political
trajectories see John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas. 1829-1852 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981).
"'Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers. 1815-1860 (reprint 1978, New York: Hill and Wang,
127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

headed by eminent leaders who controlled the process of ascension from their
top positions. A new form of policy making was taking shape in America, a
system that was even open (in many areas) to the then-recent immigrants, and
one that reinforced the importance of professional politicians as leaders of such
organizations. According to Eric Foner, the primary aim of the Jacksonians:
[W]as not to redistribute the propriety of the rich, but to open the
avenues of social advancement to all laborers.42
Jacksonian democrats reflected a middle-class perception of the social
order that viewed social opportunity as a key to a more egalitarian order. In
reality, no aspect of American political life amazed more foreign observers than
the higher degree of political participation of its white male inhabitants. The
access to political participation, especially after the advent of the Jacksonian
democracy, was a remarkable achievement of the American democracy system.
Traveling around the country in the late thirties, Alexis de Tocqueville observed
that:
In the United States in our day the principle of the sovereignty of
the people has been adopted in practice in every way that
imagination could suggest. It has been detached from all fictions in
which it has elsewhere been carefully wrapped; it takes on every
possible form that the exigencies of the case require. Sometimes
the body of the people makes the laws, as at Athens; sometimes
deputies, elected by universal suffrage, represent it in its name
under its almost immediate supervision.43

1998), p. 7.
42Eric Foner, Free Soil. Free Labor, Free Men, p. 19.
43 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p.60.
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The two political parties emerging from this new situation would divide
over themes brought to the forefront by Jackson’s presidency: the struggle
against the second Bank of the United States, the occupation of Mexican
territory, the faith in the people, the defense of the rule of the majority, the
controversy about subsidies to the industry, the struggle against aristocracy, etc.
Both the Democrats and Whigs were national organizations with support in all
regions. These parties were not homogeneous organizations, because their
composition and political interests expressed a complex articulation of local
interests, ethnic affiliations, and state issues. For nearly twenty years these two
major parties demonstrated their “ability” to help contain or control the
divergence and minimize the conflicts between the North and the South.
Sectional Tensions
Jackson’s main sectional challenge came from the heartland of American
slavery. From 1829 to 1832, the state of South Carolina, one of the few areas
excluded from the democratic revolution brought by the Jacksonian political
system, defied the national administration by refusing to collect taxes owed to
the national government in an episode known as the Nullification crisis. As
William Freehling has shown, behind the tariff question laid the larger issue of
Federal power. And the concern with Federal power was prompted above all by
the fears over slavery. During the ante-bellum period South Carolinians
developed a more fundamentalist defense of slavery than did the people of any
other southern state. In many important ways this defense was anchored in an
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ideology of “States’ Rights" that was aimed to reinforce southern interests in the
American nation. Even the elevation of the tariff as an issue among southern
militants depended to a considerable extent upon the slavery question. The
Nullification movement was intensified by Vice-President John C. Calhoun’s
resignation and threats of secession and war. The problem was finally solved
with a compromise tariff reduction, but the confrontation over the right of any
state to invoke nullification to neutralize Federal laws was clear evidence of the
strong resistance a southern minority could present to Federal actions. If
sectional grievances were clearly behind South Carolina’s move, the fear of
government interference against slavery was also a symbolic leitmotiv of the
movement, and this led directly back to the controversies involving slavery.44
During the 1830’s, encouraged by the revivalist experiences brought by
the Second Great Awakening, a new current of abolition opinion emerged. It was
oriented around the demand for “immediate abolition” for all slaves without any
compensation of their southern masters. On January 1st, 1831, the first issue of
William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator would present this uncompromising view of
abolitionism in its perfected form. Soon abolitionist societies appeared in
Massachusetts and elsewhere. Abolitionists were not numerically strong, but
they could make noise, and they began to circulate material through the mail and

440n the Nullification issue see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. The Nullification
Controversy in South Carolina 1816-1836. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). Eric Foner,
Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men. 178, and John Ashworth, Slavery. Capitalism, and Politics, pp.
136-137. According to Ashworth [Nullification] was an attempt to unite the South behind a
constitutional theory that sharply limited the power of the numerical majority.
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send petitions to Congress. As a reaction to such practices, Southern
representatives, with the support of northern Democrats, imposed the Gag Rule
in Congress. Through these procedures (which remained in force until 1844)
antislavery petitions would be received but then immediately laid upon the table,
without discussion. But the abolitionist movement was still too small in number
and too heterogeneous in its objectives to become a real threat to the
maintenance of slavery. Abolitionists were not very popular in the northern cities,
as widespread racism and fears about secession undermined their potential
appeal. There were also sharp differences between abolitionist militants in terms
of the question of political involvement. By the same token, revolts of slaves in
the South were not able to affect the established order in that region, but they
were able to raise southern fears to paranoid proportions.45
The real issues that brought debates over the desirability of slavery to the
center of politics were those related to the integration of the territories taken from
Mexico. The annexation of Texas (as a slave state) during the 1840’s and the
War against Mexico added tension to this unsolved issue. The War against
Mexico was opposed by a large number of northern Whigs, who feared southern
representatives in Congress would push for the admission of more territories as
slave states. Thus, the decision to go to war disturbed the balance of power
between the North and South, as each section desired to dominate the process

45A more substantial discussion of the objectives of the abolitionist movement will be given in
chapter 7.
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of

territorial

integration.

This

process

threatened

party

discipline

as

representatives were divided by sectional lines. In 1846 David Wilmot, a
Democratic representative from Pennsylvania, presented a resolution banning
slavery from the new acquired lands where it previously did not exist. The Wilmot
Proviso, as the resolution became known, was the source of bitter debates in
Congress and the nation came again close to secession. According to David M.
Potter, the Wilmot Proviso was the climax to a series of intra-party rivalries that
took a sectional form within the Democratic organization, including discussions
about tariff reduction and the exit of Van Buren’s followers.46 As a conciliatory
response, moderate members of both parties tried to pass a series of separate
resolutions to get an agreement.

The Compromise of 1850 would be the last

successful party bargain aimed to maintain the American unity by peaceful
means. By the various parts of the agreement, self-determination and popular
sovereignty, not the Missouri Compromise, would be the main tools to determine
whether a territory should be accepted as a free or a slave state. The
compromise also strengthened the role of the federal administration as a slave
catcher through a new Fugitive Slave Law. Under this law, press gangs could go
to the North to “recover" runaway slaves. In performing such tasks they would
have the protection of U.S. commissioners, conducting hearings and authorizing

46 Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 27.
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the return of runaways. The slaves caught had no right to appeal, nor to habeas
corpus.47
The Fugitive Slave Law undermined the position of the northern states as
sanctuaries for fugitive slaves, creating an environment of fear and hatred
against the South. The image of the “Slave Power” would become, from then on,
one of the most powerful symbols of southern despotism and influence over the
federal government. Southern political aggressiveness made it appear that the
abolitionists and other northern critics of the “southern way of life" had a strong
basis for their charge that slave labor degraded free labor and that there was a
sinister conspiracy in the government to promote the interests of slavery against
those of a free society. Remembering the circumstances of political struggle
during the ante-bellum period, former vice presidential candidate Henry Wilson
defined the main lines by which northern Republicans viewed southern
movements:
This complete subversion of the natural rights of millions, by which
they were “deemed, held, taken, reputed and adjudged in laws to
be chattels personal to all intents, constructions, and purposes
whatsoever,” constituted a system antagonistic to the doctrines of
reason and the admonitions of conscience, and developed and
gratified the most intense spirit of personal pride, a love of class
distinctions, and the lust of dominion. Hence arose a commanding
power, ever sensitive, jealous, proscriptive, dominating, and
aggressive, which was recognized and filthy characterized as the
Slave Power.48
47A good account of the Fugitive Slave Law can be found in Donald G. Nieman, Promises to
Keep. African-Americans and the Constitutional Order. 1776 to the Present (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), see especially chapter 2 “Law and Liberty, 1830-1860, pp. 30-49.
48Henry Wilson, “A Slave Power Conspiracy" in Michael Perman, ed. The Coming of the American
Civil W a r (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), p. 8. For a general discussion about
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During the 1850’s such an image would to many northerners become a
paramount threat to republican liberty. As new questions involving slavery
emerged, such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision and John
Brown’s raid (at Harpers Ferry), the possibilities for compromise were strongly
undermined. The emerging opposition forces in the North would take advantage
of the situation, identifying themselves as defenders of republican liberties.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act formally erased the Missouri Compromise as
the main reference for the limits established to slavery extension in the territories
of the Louisiana Purchase. From the Compromise of 1850, there was a shift in
the rules for the admission of new states. Rather than the old geographic lines
inherited from the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise, the
legislators assumed that the territorial labor organization should be subject to
local referendum or popular sovereignty. This enactment gave the inhabitants of
the territories, through their legislatures and by means of referenda, the power to
determine the character of their local institutions, and particularly to define the
kind of labor they desired, so as to admit or exclude slavery.

Bloody

confrontations in Kansas between partisans of slavery and free-soilers would
result.49

the concept, see Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power. The Free North and Southern
Domination. 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000), especially pp. 127.
49 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 148-150.
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The Dred Scott decision was the result of the appeal of a slave to the
Supreme Court. Dred Scott had lived more than two years in free areas and
decided to sue for his freedom in court. The Supreme Court ruled that black
inhabitants of the United States (freed or slave) could not be citizens and that
they were not entitled to constitutional rights. Abolitionist John Brown and his
followers adopted a violent position. His raid on Harpers Ferry, a Federal arsenal
in Virginia, apparently aimed to set off a generalized slave revolt in the South.
With its failure and Brown’s execution, he became a northern martyr in the
struggle against the Slave Power.
The repercussions of these controversies included the realignment of the
discontented

northern

political forces

into a

clear sectional party.

The

appearance of the Free Soil Party in the late forties was followed several years
later by the Native American Party (Know Nothing). But these organizations
lacked the necessary strength to unify all the discontented groups. Finally, the
creation of the

Republican Party (1854) enabled the replacement of a

Democratic majority by an anti-Democratic majority in the North. In the words of
Abraham Lincoln, it was clear that the American nation could not prevail “half
slave and half free.” Republicans came close to winning the 1856 election with a
still-fragile party organization. In 1860, they were able to defeat a divided
Democratic party in the presidential race. It was the election of Abraham Lincoln
by the Republican Party that instigated the final crisis, through which most of the
slave states would secede, provoking the outbreak of the Civil War.
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As long as the political system was flexible enough to achieve and
maintain compromise, it was feasible to keep northern and southern interests in
the same political organization. But as sectional differences over slavery
escalated, the bases of early agreements were shaken. Northerners’ leaders
feared that the southerners were breaking the rules, established during the
1820’s, and were trying to dominate the Federal government. The Republican
Party proclaimed that it would not interfere with slavery in the states where it
already existed. At the same time, it was not willing to give the South any more
influence over policy-making processes at the federal level. For their part, the
southerners were unwilling to compromise as they feared that the loss of
government control would deprive them of the power to protect slavery. By then,
southerners were fighting against majority rule, because they were fighting for
the federal government’s protection of their minority rights. In other words, they
were fighting to increase and maintain extraterritorial enforcement to their state
laws; that is, to make those laws enforceable by the federal government, acting
as an agent for their interests as sovereign states of the Union. Such actions
give support to Frederick Douglas’s statement that “slavery was a power in the
state greater than the state itself.”50
If, during its first years as an independent nation, changes had been
accommodated, the sectional capacity to support such a challenge was stressed
by the end of the 1850’s. During the 1820’s and 1830’s, crises like Nullification

“ Frederick Douglas, “A Battle of Principles and Ideas" in Perman, op. cit., p. 17.
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did not disturb the country’s unity, although they could raise apprehension. But
the acquisition of half of Mexico’s territory in the War of 1848 brought a new set
of challenges that could not be solved by the tools provided by the Second Party
System. Under the pressure of sectional interests the Second Party system
broke down and a clear regional organization, the Republican Party, emerged to
vindicate the northern interests. By the middle 1850’s, the chances of an
imminent conflict between the North and the South were no longer distant and
far from absurd. As northern Democratic leaders began to take sides and the
party split apart, no agreement was capable of maintaining the southern states in
the Union.

Summarizing
The origins of the American Civil War differ remarkably from the origins of
the Paraguayan War. The Civil War was preceded by long disputes involving
different visions of the American national organization. The Paraguayan War
resulted from disputes around territorial hegemony, especially those concerning
the control of the main rivers and the influence of national states over semidesert territories.
While the coming of these wars differed enormously from one case to the
other, the military structures of both the American Union and the Brazilian
Empire showed some similarities. During their first decades as independent
nations Brazil and the United States forestalled the development of strong
armies in order to preserve social and political stability.
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Map 4
A Brazilian Map of the American Civil War, 1861
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In America this policy was linked to both the fear of European despotism
and of the accumulation of too much power under a single branch of the
government. The division of military power among the army and the states was
one of the most concrete compromises of the Constitutional process that created
the American national state. For this reason, most military functions were
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handled at the state level. Brazilian reduction of the army’s size, undertaken
during the 1830’s, was connected to the dangerous examples furnished by the
Spanish republics’ instability, and to the disturbances produced by the old army
organization during the immediate post-independence period. Thus, in both of
the two largest states in the hemisphere the amount of dissuasive power either
country had at the outbreak of both the Civil and the Paraguayan conflicts was
not proportional to the dimensions of each war. The capacity for taxation was not
a fundamental element of the state-building process in either country, so there
was no need for a strong monopoly of the coercive means, nor reason for a
strong national army in any of the countries. The effects of two prolonged wars
would affect radically these scenarios.
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Chapter 4

From Inertia to Rebellion
The Crisis in Brazilian Recruitment, 1866-1868

In any case the war would be even more disastrous to us if we had
to take from industry and agriculture their working hands through
violent means, which could result in harsh reactions.
Senator Nabuco de Araujo,
Minutes of the Council of State,
November 1866

Introduction
The War against Paraguay was a landmark for Brazilian society and is still
one of its points of civic reference. It was the first time a military campaign
developed into a logical sequence of previously planned movements in order to
advance formally established objectives. The complexity of the situation led to
the creation of long lines of supply to support the army in operations outside the
country. It involved many distant Brazilian provinces in the war effort, turning the
mobilization into a national phenomenon. The War of the Triple-Alliance may be
described as a total war experience because it led to a national mobilization. As
a “total war”, the conflict against Paraguay led to an involvement of every major
institution of imperial society: government, public institutions, political institutions,
and the population of every region, race, ethnicity, class and status. There was a
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military mobilization based on universal recruitment and the creation of a military
infrastructure in the rearguard. There was also the construction of a powerful war
machine under the state’s coordination. This situation led even to the
reorientation of the financial sectors to make possible the feeding and supply of
the growing military forces until the total defeat of the Paraguayan army.1
As in the American Civil War, the conflict against Paraguay enabled a
collective and bureaucratic effort of the whole society and, as for the American
Civil War, this effort was achieved only slowly. Consequently, the war faced the
burden of unpopularity and resistance. In symbolic and in concrete terms, the
challenges brought by the mobilization were important because they reminded
Brazilian leaders of structural deficiencies in their country’s state-building
process. Such deficiencies reinforced old fears about the precariousness of the
Brazilian social order. They also revealed the lack of bureaucratic development
and military expertise in the country. Finally, the War against small Paraguay
would create new tensions involving the control of the internal social order,
exposing the problems posed by disputes over the local control of the
recruitment and the politicization of military service. These problems had always

1Many Brazilian city streets, squares, and neighborhoods were named in honor of episodes and
heroes from the W ar of the Triple Alliance. Vitor Izecksohn studied this phenomenon in his
“Introduction to “O Cem e da Discdrdia." (M.A. Thesis, IUPERJ, 1992), pp. 1-27. For general
accounts of War, memory and symbols see Lawrence M. Baldwin and Michel Grimaud, “How New
Naming Systems Emerge: The Prototypical Case of Columbus and Washington” in Names.
Journal of the American Name Society. Vol. 40, Number 3, September 1992, pp. 153-166,
Maurice Agulhon, “La 'statuomanie et la Histoire” in Etnoloaie Francaise. Vol. 8, 1978, pp. 145172. James M. Mayo, “W ar Memorials as Political Memory” in The Geographic Review. Vol. 78,
No. 1, pp. 62-75, Joseph Zikmund II, “National Anthems as Political Symbols” in The Australian
Journal of Politics and History. Volume VX, No. 3, December, 1969, pp. 73-80, and Miguel Angel
Centeno, “Symbols of State Nationalism in Latin America,” in European Review of Latin American
and Caribbean Studies. No. 66, June 1999, pp. 74-106.
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challenged the Army’s capacity, but this time, due to the rashness of the
international campaign, they revealed acute limitations in the capabilities of the
country,

alarming

the

sectors

responsible

for

Brazil’s

defense

to

an

unprecedented degree. The raising of men and resources would be the Achilles
heel of the Brazilian government during these crucial years of its institutional
development.
While most authors agree on the war’s relevance in Brazilian history, it is
also true that, until recently, the conflict has been analyzed basically as a
continuous process, with the basic situation unchanged for the entire campaign.
This approach, very common among more traditional military and diplomatic
analyses, is not completely absent even in revisionist approaches that appeared
during the nineteen-sixties and seventies. It minimizes the tensions usually
associated with the campaign’s execution, reinforcing a more homogenous
vision of the conduct of the war. Sometimes the campaign is pictured as a heroic
episode, while on other occasions it is portrayed as a complete disaster. In either
case the conflict is portrayed in a very homogenous framework. Political
variations in internal affairs or the role of strategic decisions are minimized as
secondary details that do not change the overall picture: the conduct of the war
was unpopular because its origins were unpopular.
My interpretation of its many phases emphasizes discontinuity and
underlines the differences between the dispositions of the groups involved and in
the timing of their actions. The war presented problems of a kind not before
faced by the military commanders. The result was political and social tension in
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the rearguard, which affected the sequence of the campaign. Among these
problems was the growth of recruitment, which affected the lives of thousands
and changed the relationship between Brazil’s center and its peripheries.
Recruitment also interfered with the power of local bosses, based as it was on
the loyalties of their clients, suddenly removed by central authorities. But the
popular mood was not uniform, and its variations depended on the quality of the
relations between state and society in the 19th century Brazil.
This chapter discusses the situation faced by the Imperial government
during the interval from January of 1865 to December 1868. During this period,
the conduct of the campaign against Paraguay faced a crisis due mostly to the
lack of efficient means to mobilize the Brazilian population, thus transforming
civilians into soldiers. The root of the problem lay in the unexpected dimensions
reached by the war. Its long duration and the strategic dilemmas faced by the
military command made it bloodier than could have been foreseen. Because
such a war could not be fought with the usual military resources, the state
needed to increase, temporarily, its demand for human and material resources.
In particular, eighteen thousand professional Brazilian troops were not enough to
fight a prolonged war, therefore the government needed to enlarge its army
quickly.2
Many sectors of Brazilian society reacted against these increasing
demands. The Barons attacked the transfer of their workers to the battle fields

2 These numbers correspond to official estimates. They are presented in John Schulz, O Exfercito
na Politica (SSo Paulo: Edusp, 1994), p. 216.
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for obvious utilitarian reasons, while the poor free workers also reacted against
conscription, because it temporally erased the differences of class and status,
reducing them to the level of the worst social scum.3 The crisis underlined the
deficiency of the state’s capacity to extract resources, especially when recruiting
its population. From the middle of the 19th century, conflicts over registration and
the adoption of the metric system had opposed tradition against rationalization,
but with the war, conflicts of interest between the Imperial bureaucracy and local
political bosses became much more intense. State power interfered with
traditional arenas of private regulation, recruiting clients and proteges, forcing
larger contingents of the free population into the Army, and finally increasing its
demands for the liberation of slaves for the Army.4 As the campaign extended,
popular resistance against enlistment created great tension in the relations
between the government and the Barons in all the areas of the country.5
Those reactions were so widespread because the state modified, even if
temporarily, its pattern of relationship with society. For a better understanding of
the nature of the crisis, it will be necessary to discuss briefly relationships

3 Social stratification was very strong among the poor whites. Those involved in permanent work
tasks counted on the planter’s protection while vagrants and other non-assimilated poor
inhabitants were clearer targets of recruiter agents. I am using the term Baron to characterize
those big local bosses with a certain amount of power over land and people.
4 For an analysis of previous conflicts over the registration and rationalization issues see
Guillermo Palacios. A Guerra dos Marimbondos: Uma Revolta Camponesa no Brasil Escravista
(Pernambuco 1851-1852) (Rio de Janeiro: CPDA/UFRJ, Mimeo, 1989).
5 A more embracing vision of the impact of recruitment over the poor sections of the Brazilian
society can be found in Joan E. Meznar, “The Ranks of the Poor: Military Service and Social
Differentiation in Northeast Brazil, 1839-1875," in Hispanic American Historical Review. Volume
72, number 3, 1992, pp. 335-51.
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between the center and its peripheries from independence until the third quarter
of the 19th century.

The Patterns of Early Brazilian Military Organization
Brazilian independence in 1822 did not mean the expulsion of the
Portuguese functionaries and their immediate substitution by Brazilian-born
people. When the

Portuguese were finally expelled

from the

Imperial

bureaucracy, during the 1830s, the government reduced the size of the army as
much as circumstances permitted. As shown by Michael McBeth, during the first
Empire the Brazilian Army was a permanent source of trouble. Conflicts between
Brazilian

and

Portuguese

officers,

troop

mutinies,

and

episodes

of

insubordination were frequent and exposed the country’s precarious state of
institutional organization. The troops’ revolts severely undermined civilian
authority when the country needed stability and order above all. During the
Cisplatine campaign (1825-1828), tensions reached a peak as a group of Irish
and German mercenaries revolted in Rio de Janeiro, causing great turmoil.6 The
Brazilian defeat and the loss of the Cisplatine province exposed the inadequacy
of the Brazilian Army, underlining the danger presented by large concentrations
of troops in the main cities.7 After Emperor Pedro I’s resignation, the intense
political factionalism penetrated deeply into the officer ranks, enhancing its

6 Oliveira Lima, O Movimento da Independfencia: 0 lmp6rio Brasileiro. 1821-1889. 2nd. ed. (SSo
Paulo: Melhoramentos, n.d.), pp. 420-25.
7Michael McBeth, “The Politicians and the Generals: The Decline of the Brazilian Army during the
First Empire, 1822-1831,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, 1972). Rio de Janeiro city
experienced a foreign mercenary rebellion in June 1828. According to McBeth, the riots originated
from tensions between drunken soldiers and the civil population of Rio, pp. 92-5 and 161.
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potential for disruption and aggravating the growing problem of military
insubordination. Commenting on the state of anarchy presented by the troops, a
contemporary observer noted that “the Army that took an active part in the
abdication of Pedro I was so insubordinate that it lacked the necessary unity to
give some kind of authority to the winning revolution.”8
During

the

Regency

period

(1831-1840)

liberals,

now

in power,

demobilized most of the Brazilian professional troops and many of the officer
corps, establishing complete civilian control over the military. Most Portugueseborn officers were sent into retirement, while the remaining troops were
demobilized or sent to distant garrisons, mostly in the southern frontier
provinces.9 The process of demobilization helped to stabilize the country’s
institutional situation, but it made the country as a whole more exposed to
external threats. Because fortune was on their side, the Brazilian elites did not
face strong external threats, but secessionist revolts constantly threatened the
country’s unity during the Regency period. In spite of that, the decision to
restrain the army was rational, as the Brazilian elite saw militarism as the
greatest challenge to internal peace. Demilitarization was in accord with the logic

8Justiniano Jos6 da Rocha, “ApSo; ReagSo; Transapao” in R. MagalhSes Junior (ed.), Trfes
Panfleterios do Segundo Reinado (S5o Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, ColepSo Brasiliana, vol. 286,
1956), p. 177.
According to McBeth, all salary increases and promotions were suspended indefinitely to
pressure officers to resign. A law from August 3 0 ,1 8 3 1 , suspended all recruitment and limited the
Army size to 10,000 officers and men (approximately half of its size in 1830). See Michael C.
McBeth "The Brazilian Recruit During the First Empire: Slave or Soldier?” in Dauril Alden and
Warren Dean (eds.) Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese
India (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1977), p. 85.
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of Brazilian political competition, and it was praised as a perfect solution by
liberal thinkers:
The democracy employed two heroic medicines against mutinies
and insurrections: the Army discharge and the creation of the civic
guard [National Guard]. Those were two great facts that brought
most notable consequences: the public order in the capital was
preserved and could overcome every attempt of assault.10

Political Decentralization and Social Control
After 1831 the Brazilian defense system became increasingly based on
volunteers, private groups organized into the National Guard. The Guard was
created by a decree of August 18, 1831. It was an essentially civilian military
organization, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, not to the Army. It had been
created as a liberal response to the threats presented by the military mutinies
and revolts of the first Empire (1822-1831). Those liberals feared the internal
disturbances coming from an insubordinate army even more than external
attacks coming from the Spanish-speaking republics. Above all, they knew how
nasty the experience of permanently organized armies had been for those
Spanish speaking republics, where political instability had led to the destruction
of their territorial integrity.11
The Guard was closely linked to the local powers, as it transferred many
prerogatives related to the social control from the army to the Barons. Affiliation

10 Justiniano Jos§ da Rocha, Ac5o. Reac3o e Transacao.. p. 180.
11 For a better appreciation of the derogatory perception by which the Brazilian elite analyzed the
political situation of their neighbors see Amado Luiz Cervo, 0 Parlamento Brasileiro e as
RelacCes Exteriores (1826-1889) (Brasilia: Ed. UNHB, 1981) especially chapter III “0 Equillbrio
no Prata e a Neutralidade," pp. 16-26. Few works have analyzed the role of the Brazilian
Parlament in the formulation of the Imperial foreign policy.
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with the Guard was heavily dependent on income. It encompassed as members
all free Brazilian men between the ages of 18 and 60. For admission a minimum
family income of 200$000 (Two hundred thousand contos) was required.12 This
organization, modeled on the French National Guard, progressively replaced the
Army as the main provider of law and order in the Brazilian hinterland.13
Due to its intimate links with the Empire’s local leaders (landowners,
slaveowners, magistrates, and

liberal professionals), the National Guard

assumed a peculiar form of partisan politicization. Cleavage in its ranks reflected
those of the political parties. Its elective character (until 1850), and the
preponderance of staff linked to the political parties, meant that the social
position and political affiliations of its members were more valuable than military
skills. During the 1840’s, central state interference grew as the elective character
of the Guard also was subordinated. But local authorities still controlled the
designation of functions to an important degree.14

12 Antonio Edmilson Martins Rodrigues, Francisco Calazans Falcon e Margarida de Souza Neves,
A Guarda Nacional no Rio de Janeiro. 1831-1918 (Rio de Janeiro: PUC, 1981), pp. 14-9.
13 Recent research has shown that this amount was not so high. Some studies point out that the
Brazilian electoral system incorporated a substantial parcel of the national population to the
electoral system, something around 10% of the total population or half the men in electoral age
according to the 1872 census. See Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in NineteenthCentury Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) especially chapter 4, “The Theater of
Elections,” pp. 101-21. See also Herbert S. Klein, “ParticipagSo Politica no Brasil do S6culo XIX:
Os Votantes de S§o Paulo em 1880” in Revista Dados. Vol. 38, no. 3,1995, pp. 527-44.
140 n the definition of the Empire private forces I am assuming some of Victor Nunes Leal’s
assumptions concerning the character and composition of the local power in Brazil. In his classical
work Coronelismo. Enxada e Voto (Rio de Janeiro: Alfa Omega, 1948), Nunes Leal pointed out
the fact that propriety of land was not the only source of power in the interior, underlining the
connections between local bosses (Corongis) and the state as sources of prestige and influence.
See chapter I, “AtribuigOes Municipals,” pp. 7-35. For the nature of the conflicts around the control
of National Guard’s designations see Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil. 1808-1871.
Social Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982),
especially part III “Reaction and the Conterreform, 1837-1871”, pp. 129-200.
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The Brazilian experience differs greatly from that described by the
German historian Otto Hintze for most Western European countries. According
to Hintze, in those states, the national army was the core of the state-building
process, and the formation of the armies “transformed and determined the
structure and the life of the more remote organs and functions of the state.'15
Unlike those examples, the Brazilian process of state building was made
simultaneously with the decentralization of coercive military means. The Army as
a permanent institution with a national impact did not cease to exist, but it lost
most of its earlier prominence. For the Brazilian nation, during the early
troublesome years of its existence, the demobilization of the Army enhanced
stability and helped to consolidate the political order.16
Militias and the Gaucho W ar System
Until the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the National Guard as whole
kept the internal peace, while some provincial militias and the remaining military
units were responsible for the maintenance of external security. Recent
academic research has extensively demonstrated that the army recruited
personnel from the lower sectors of Brazilian society.17 The small Brazilian army

15For Hintze the phases of organization and concentration of violence in the hands of the states
related significantly to the historic European continental armies. In those countries the centralized
power of the kings expropriated seigniorial prerogatives. See especially “The Formation of States
and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics” and “Military Organization and
the Organization of the State,” in Felix Gilbert (ed.) The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975). pp. 157-77 and 178-215.
18 Jeanne Berrance de Castro. A Milfcia Cidadfl: a Guarda Nacional de 1831 a 1850 (SSo Paulo:
Cia. Editora Nacional, 1977).
17 Meznar, “The Ranks of the Poor/’ Petter Beattie, Transforming Enlisted Army Service in Brazil
1864-1948: Penal Servitude Versus Conscription and Changing Conceptions of Honor, Race, and
Nation,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Florida at Coral Gables, 1994). Hendrick Kraay,
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centered its recruiting actions on those who could not count on the protection of
an influential person or who had no godfather to exempt them from this hard
service. Vagrants, potential criminals, and jobless men were the main targets of
the “recrutadores.” For most of the 19th century, service in the army was
considered to be a brutal and dangerous activity, fit only for society’s undesirable
individuals. In the army, their conditions of life were regulated by the procedure
of Count Lippe’s regiments.18 Those unhappy persons who served in the army
considered their fate worse than that of slaves. Not only they, but their military
chiefs also, thought that fate a terrible one. General Cunha Mattos, a deputy at
the Brazilian parliament, well summarized these feelings in 1826, when he
asserted that “the worst disgrace in the entire universe is to be a recruit in Brazil.
It is a real punishment; a common soldier is considered a miserable slave.”19

“The Army in Bahia, Brazil, 1808-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin,
1995), especially chapter III, “The Enlisted Men,” pp. 255-305. Fernando Doras Costa, “Os
Problemas do Recrutamento Militar no Final do S6culo XVIII e as Questfies da ConstrugSo do
Estado e da NagSo,” in Anfllise Social. Vol. 30, no. 130, pp. 121-55. FSbio Faria Mendes, “0
Tribute de Sangue: Recrutamento Militar e Construgdo do Estado no Brasil Imperial, Tese de
Doutorado, IUPERJ, 1997.
18 Count Wilhelm de Shaumborg-Lippe was a disciple of Fredrick the Great who was
commissioned to reorganize the Portuguese Army during the Seven-year's war. His influence on
the Portuguese Army was strongly felt at the end of the 18th century, especially because he
provided the Portuguese army with its first penal code constituted by twenty-nine laws, eleven of
which prescribed capital punishment for aggravated crimes ranging from desertion to wartime
mutiny. Lippi was a loyal follower of Frederick The Great’s assertion that soldiers should fear their
officers “even more than any danger.” Frederick The Great quoted in Guibert Bullow, “From
Dynastic to National War.” In Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modem Strategy: Military
Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (1943, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 49-76.
On the Count of Lippe’s influences over the Brazilian army see William, Count of SchaumburgLippe, Requlamento Para o Exerclcio e Disciplina dos Reaimentos da Infantaria dos Exfercitos de
Sua Maaestade Fidellssima (Lisbon: R6gia Officina Typografica, 1794). Manoel Joaquim do
Nascimento e Silva, Synopsis da LeaislacSo Brasileira ate 1874 Cuio Conhecimento Mais
Interessa aos Empregados do Ministerio da Guerra. 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do
Dterio do Rio de Janeiro, 1874), Vol. 2, p. 153, Beattie, “Transforming Enlisted Army Service ...,”
pp. 42-3, and McBeth, "The Politicians and the Generals..., "pp. 256-60.
19 Quoted in McBeth, “The Brazilian Recruit,” p. 81.
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From the late 1840’s on, the Brazilian state relied on the Gaucho militias
for its international military conflicts. After the end of the Farrapos’ War (18351845) the province of Rio Grande do Sul had been reunited to the Empire’s
territory and became the nucleus of interventionism by nature of its military
organization. Because of its strategic position, closer to the Platine Republics
than any other, Gaucho society was extensively militarized, with troops directed
both to self-protection and to rapid interventions in the border countries.20
According

to

Fernando

Uricoechea,

in

Rio

Grande

do Sul,

the

bureaucratic control of the professional military over the National Guard was
more permanent, more systematic, and more generalized than in other regions
of the Empire. In these circumstances, the commandant of an Army Division in
the region could also become a commandant of the National Guard.21 The
interconnection of those organizations (the Army and the Guard) generated
contradictory situations in the region, but it also crystallized the loyalty of Gaucho
warriors to the Empire.22 These groups of private warriors formed the basic units

20Rio Grande do Sul was the only province to keep frontiers with the three other nations in the
Platine Estuary: Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay. The other Brazilian border provinces had
borders with one or two countries. But those were a kind of no man's land due to the lack of roads
or villages. Since its reintegration the province achieved increasing importance in Imperial military
politics. See Joseph Love, Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1971). According to John Schulz, one fourth of the Brazilian troops served in this
province. 0 ExSrcito na Polltica. Origens da IntervencSo Militar (S3o Paulo: Edusp, 1996), pp.846. The inhabitants of the province of Rio Grande do Sul were known as GaOchos. So the term has
a different meaning when compared to the Argentinean definition. For the Argentineans, the term
Gaucho designated semi-nomad groups of landless people that moved from farm to farm without
establishing more permanent links as a working force.
21 Fernando Uricoechea, O Minotauro Imperial. A Burocratizac5o do Estado Patrimonial Brasileiro
no S6culo XIX (Rio de Janeiro, DIFEL, 1978), pp. 251-52.
22 During the Farrapos War (1835-1845), Andrade Neves, one of the Gaucho's most famous
military chiefs (who died in Paraguay in 1869), occupied the post of Lieutenant Colonel of the

151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of action in the River Plate region. But Rio Grande do Sul was also a turbulent
area with a long history of struggles between the province’s secessionists and
the central power. It was also a region where authorities had historically faced
rebellions (sometimes simultaneous) of slaves and deserters.23 The proximity of
the Platine borders encouraged slaves and recruiters to desert to the other side.
From 1738 there were registers of runaways in the city of Rio Grande. These
fugitives looked for refuge in lands beyond the Uruguayan border. This
development was so widespread that it is possible to infer that the connection
between the concepts of border and freedom were linked in the social
imagination of Gaucho slaves. As Maestri Filho puts it:
In the South, since colonial times, the slaves had a more secure
destiny: the lands beyond the border. Enslaved blacks that reached
the Spanish lands were received as free men. Some treaties
contrary to this principle were signed but never executed. In
Uruguay, Entre-Rios, etc., the ex-slave could get employed for
wages. This Gaucho [society] singularity possibly diminished the
incidence and importance of other forms of resistance.24
The frontier thus can be considered one of the most important alternatives
of slave resistance in Rio Grande do Sul. One of the particularities of Gaucho
society was the social interaction with countries that emancipated slaves before

National Guard. Neves refused to enter the Army with the rank of “Alferes,” because he feared
that, by assuming a subaltern position, he would lose his large range of action. See Cap. de
Paranhos Antunes, Andrade Neves, o Vanguardeiro! (Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex), pp. 41-2. Fernando
Urecoechea appropriately named Rio Grande do Sul as “The Imperial Minotaurs.”
23On the roles of desertion and slave insubordination for the perception of threats against
Gaucho's social order see Paulo Roberto Staudt Moreira, “Sobre Fronteira e Liberdade RepresentapSo e Pr^ticas dos Escravos Gadchos na Guerra do Paraguai” (1864/1870),” paper
presented in the X X Reunion of the Brazilian Historian Association (ANPUH), Florian6polis-SC,
July 1999.
24 Maestri Filho, MSrio. O Escravo Gaucho (Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense, 1984), p. 73.
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Brazil did. The capacity to enforce law and order was thus connected to the
control of the frontier and, sometimes, control of neighboring territories. When
the degree of control was smaller, as during Rosas’ dictatorship in Argentina,
runaways were more frequent. Possibly for this reason, Gaucho interest in the
Uruguayan politics was very strong.
This singular situation reveals how external and internal questions could
be interconnected in Brazilian politics through the Gauchos’ interests. The lack of
a professional military force impelled the Imperial government to compromise
with the Gaticho elite. Sometimes, as during the Intervention in Uruguay (18641865), it impelled the Imperial government to undertake an expensive military
campaign just to support the Gauchos’ interests, forcing an undesirable, even if
only occasional, alliance with the Argentineans.
For the resources used during these interventions, no large professional
Army was necessary. Brazil’s adversaries in the Spanish republics were mostly
“caudilhos,” that is, local political bosses, who did not have well-organized
armies. In most Platine countries, local elites faced huge internal struggles and
lacked the resources to build and maintain permanent armies.25 Fighting these
caudilhos typically meant finding allies among the local opposition groups.
During the intervention against Rosas and Oribe (1852), their local adversaries
provided most of the infrastructure to supply the Brazilian forces. The social

2SEven during the Cisplatine war, when a National Army still existed in Brazil, the Marquis of
Barbacena, commandant of the Imperial Army, mentioned that in the peak of the campaign the
troops numbered just 7,200; see Marquis of Barbacena to Emperor Pedro I, May 2 9 ,1 8 2 7 , AHMI,
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costs of military mobilization for the Brazilian government were relatively low.
The superior capacity of the Brazilian military forces was so clear that it
exempted

the government from

the

need to

make expensive

military

expenditures.
The patterns of reciprocal loyalty in the relations between the central
government, the political bosses, and their clients supplied the needed
resources. In spite of that, the deficiencies resulting from the lack of efficient
planning and the dependence on forces in Rio Grande do Sul were criticized by
some observers, according to whom the country “should abandon the patrician
and Gaucho system of army organization and adopt a kind of organization
similar to that of the European nations.”26
While criticism could be directed against the organization of military
operations,

there

were

no

immediate

pressures

pushing

heavily

for

administrative reforms. The system worked well in view of the challenges faced
before 1863, and reforms were postponed. Only the impact of a major war, with
its demand for soldiers and material resources, could shake this structure. The
war against Paraguay forced the Imperial government to strengthen the army
and recruit heavily in all the sectors of its society27 To understand the conditions

II - POB, 01/16/1827, Hor. c. 1-9, quoted by McBeth, “The Brazilian Recruit During the First
Empire," p. 82.
“ Francisco Fdlix Pereira da Costa, Histdria da Guerra do Brasil contra as Republicas do Uruguay
e Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: no editor, 1870), vol. Ill, p. 39. Peres da Costa worked as a war
correspondent for the Correio Mercantil, a prestigious carioca newspaper.
27According to Octdvio TarqOinio de Sousa, by May 1832, regular troops had practically
disappeared from Rio de Janeiro and other major cities of the Empire. See Trfes Golpes de Estado
(Rio de Janeiro: 1960), p. 99, quoted in Michael McBeth, op. c it ., p. 85.
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in which the recruitment deteriorated during the Paraguayan war, it is necessary
to follow the course of the war.28
The Paraguayan Campaign
The first wave of recruitment for the Brazilian army (December 1864 May 1865) furnished an adequate contingent of soldiers that helped to drive the
Paraguayan forces out of Rio Grande do Sul and complete the invasion of
Uruguay. By May 1865, Uruguayan Allied government headed by the former
rebel leader VenSncio Flores was supporting the Triple Alliance Treaty, leaving
Paraguay alone in the struggle.29
During this first phase of operations, the enthusiasm of Volunteers
impressed authorities who were used to finding the population extremely
resistant to recruitment. These troops were reasonably motivated because the
invasion of Brazilian territory, without a previous declaration of war, furnished
fuel for patriotic demonstrations and spontaneous mobilization in many areas.
This initial wave of collective mobilization was supported by many manifestations
of patriotism, some of them coming from provinces very far away from the
theater of operations. Those actions underlined a feeling of general enthusiasm

28An additional advantage of the Empire was the fact that Brazil was the only country in the region
that had a W a r Navy. This resource was pivotal in the transportation of troops and in the search of
harbors and fortresses. During the W ar of the Triple Alliance, a navy blockade closed much the
Paraguayan river, helping to isolate that country for most of the war. In spite of that, the Navy was
severely criticized for its lack of mobility. For a defense of the Navy’s position against such
criticism see Visconde de Ouro Preto (Afonso Celso de Assis Figueiredo), A Esquadra e a
Qposi5o Parlamentar (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Franceza, 1868).
29 According to Wanderley Guilherme do Santos in order to win the war the ratio of Paraguayan
casualties against Allied casualties would have to have been 1 to 3. See his "Guerra do Paraguai:
LigSo para os Conflitos Contempordneos" in Revista Dados. Vol. 30, No. 3,1987, p. 315
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during the campaign’s early phases. Ricardo Salles, based on the Army reports
from 1865 and 1866, has given us a well-documented picture of this state of
patriotic spirit. Provincial Reports present additional evidence of widespread
enthusiasm.30

Figure 1 - The Enthusiasm for War

Source: A Semana lllustrada, Rio de Janeiro, June, 1865

In the northeast province of Alagoas, more than three thousand miles
distant from the front, a citizen called Jos6 Severiano de Mello petitioned the
provincial president to present three of his sons and three daughters to
participate in the campaign. In his petition from April 4,1865 Mr. Mello stated that
his feelings were due to T h e true love for the fatherland that has always
inflamed my heart; its flood of electric fire that pushes me to the battlefields, to

30 Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraauai. Escravidao e Cidadania na Formac3o do Ex6rcito. (Rio de
Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), pp. 98-101.
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take my part in this glorious campaign of my fellow countrymen against the
Paraguayans!”31
In Maranhao, another distant northwestern province, similar expressions
of support appeared. In a private letter to the Minister of War, the provincial
president listed many individual initiatives supporting the national effort. Citizens
brought relatives, prot6g6s, and clients to enlist in the newly created Corps of
Volunteers. Others enlisted themselves simultaneously with friends, sons, and
brothers. As noted by Salles, donations were not limited to the rich sectors of the
society, but encompassed many groups and professional affiliations. Such was
the case in the small village of S3o Jos6 da Penha, where Luis Antonio
Rodrigues, a professor of basic studies, a category exempt from recruitment,
offered to contribute until the end of the campaign with ten per cent of his salary.
The coastal pilot (pr&tico mor) of the S§o Marcos bay, Domingos da Silva
Ribeiro, offered ten per cent of his profits (gratificagao) to help in the war
efforts.32 Public employees, small tenants, tailors, and other petty functionaries
also offered donations. The provision of recruits went so well during these first
months that it enabled the provincial president of Bahia to complain that:
The only limit [to enlistment] was due to the orders of the Imperial
government, included in its notice from October 21, 1865, stopping
the organization of new corps and stating that only one more

31 Fala Diriqida A Assembteia Legislativa Provincial das Alaqoas no Dia 05 de Maio de 1865 pelo
Ex. Sr. Presidente da Provincia. Macei6. Tipografia Progressista, 1865, pp. 23-24.
“ ANRJ/SPE/ IG125, fl. 186, Augusta C6sar Reis to Visconde de CamamCi, 25 April 1865.
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should depart for the front. Otherwise, the movement would have
no other limit but the unfailing feeling that inspires it.33
In Pitanguy, a small town in the interior of the province of Minas Gerais,
52 Volunteers presented themselves spontaneously. In addition, a “Society for
the Love of the Fatherland” (Sociedade Amor da P£tria) was created, to collect
donations (in currency) for the campaign. At the Volunteers’ departure there was
a mass and a meeting of the Town Council, with the playing of the national
anthem, and a young lady dressed like an Indian delivered a flag to the
Volunteers. On the day of the Volunteers’ departure, the town’s entire population
came for the farewell. Similar demonstrations took place along the Volunteers’
progress toward the provincial capital (Ouro Preto). Patriotic feelings were
present on a previously unknown level, because the war underlined the
significance of the fatherland as an important source of social identity among the
whole population.34 In view of the success of the enlistment campaign and the
initial wave of victories against Paraguay, the leaders of the Liberal Cabinet that
governed Brazil at that time became very optimistic, as it appeared to them that
the somewhat precarious state organization would be enough to achieve victory.
Through a decisive battle, soon the Paraguayans would be forced to surrender
to the Empire and the war would be over. Such optimistic feelings were

“ ANRJ, Relat6rio Apresntado A Assembteia Legislativa Provincial da Bahia pelo Excelentfssimo
Senhor Presidente o Comendador Manuel Pinto de Souza Dantas no Dia 1o. de Marco de 1866.
Bahia, Typografia de Tourinho e C.e, 1866, p. 21.
34 General Paulo de Queir6s Duarte, Os Voluntcirios da Patria na Guerra do Paraauai (Rio de
Janeiro: Bibliex, 1981), pp. 13-16. The same episode is quoted in Ricardo Salles, Guerra do
Paraauai.... p. 98, FSbio Faria Mendes, “O Tributo de Sangue,” op. cit, p. 226, and Jos6 Murilo
de Carvalho, “Cidadania: tipos e percursos" in Estudos Histdricos. Vol. 9, No. 18, 1996, pp. 350351.
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expressed by the president of Rio de Janeiro, the richest Brazilian province, who
wrote, “Deeply inspired, the [Liberal] Cabinet, relying on the national enthusiasm
and through the creation of the corps of Volunteers saw them coming from every
corner of the Empire to take their part in this Holy War. It became an
acknowledged truth that Brazil does not need a numerous permanent army to
maintain its integrity and its rights....”35
But the Imperial government did not rely only on popular patriotism to
increase the size of the army. The roots of early successes in recruitment were
also located in administrative innovations put into place just after the first
operations. Anticipating difficult obstacles ahead, the Empire took preventive
actions to improve Brazilian military capacity in the event of a prolonged conflict.
Given the impossibility of undertaking a larger process of reform, the government
tried to create pockets of efficiency inside the Army.
The first measure was the Decree 3371 from January 7, 1865, by which
were created the Battalions of Voluntaries da P£tria (Volunteers of the
Fatherland; henceforth, Voluntarios), to be organized in many provinces. As
shown by Peter Beattie, the creation of “Voluntarios” was part of a strategy to
turn the army into a more honorable place for Brazilians from all classes.
Voluntarios offered additional advantages to their members that could not be
achieved by normal recruits such as higher pay, shorter enlistment lengths,
discharge bonuses, land grants, preference for Public Services positions,

35 Relatdrio com que o Sr. Conselheiro de Estado Bernardo de Souza Franco passou a
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pensions, and family support (in case of death). Its creation was aimed not only
at a faster increase of the army, but also at enlisting more virtuous men, avoiding
the difficulties brought by traditional methods based on forced conscription or
even dragooning. The point to be stressed is that the government’s appeal was
made to all kinds of people, even to those who lived in regions not directly linked
to the frontier areas in the South. In this sense, the war against Paraguay led to
a nationalization of recruitment, crossing classes and geographic barriers. The
call for arms helped temporarily to reinforce an integrative idea of the fatherland
as had never been done before. Through the creation of Voluntarios, the
government also symbolically equalized all soldiers, because the Brazilian
Emperor, Pedro II, was number one in the Volunteers list.36
In spite of the great flux of Voluntarios, the Imperial government lacked
the bureaucratic structure necessary to operate recruitment at full scale. This
circumstance made the cooperation of local bosses, normally great planters with
prestige and influence, pivotal for the success of any initiative. When hostilities
against Paraguay began, the Imperial government still depended on the Barons’
good will to raise a strong army. During the first months of mobilization, Imperial
authorities relentlessly appealed to their patriotism, hoping for their help. In a
letter addressed to a big planter, the Marquis of Olinda, President of the

Administraccio da Provlncia do Rio de Janeiro a Jos6 Tavares Bastos. Niterbi, 10 May 1865, p. 4.
“ According to Beattie through the creation of the corps of Voluntarios “The Empire hoped to
overcome the prejudice that surrounded regular army service.” See Beattie, “Transforming
Enlisted Army Service in Brazil 1864-1940,” pp. 93-4.
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Ministerial Council, exemplified the kind of compromise that mixed the planters
and the government in support of the recruitment37:
The manifest deficiency of our army and the urgent need to
increase and support it in a convenient way... obliges the Imperial
government to address the farmers and landowners to demand
their consenting for the recruitment of Volunteers for the Army...
Your Excellency is one of these planters whose patriotism is
necessary to the Imperial government. By yourself or, in
association with other farmers, you can make the complaints of the
outraged and unrevenged fatherland be felt, filling the glorious
commission the Imperial government entrusted to you.38
As exemplified in this quotation, the government relied on the cooperation
of the planters even for the constitution of the new corps of Voluntaries. These
men were normally chiefs of National Guard militias in the interior and their
cooperation was pivotal for the success of any government initiative. All
Provincial presidents encouraged the involvement of such persons in the
recruitment process, appealing to their influence and prestige. In a dispatch to
the Minister of War, the President of S3o Paulo recognized this dependency.
Describing his contacts with a Paulista local boss, Nicolau Vergueiro, the
President emphasized the advantages of Voluntaries as compared with normal
recruits: “I also told him (Vergueiro) that, as the provincial police authorities were
taking care of the recruitment for the army, he should be smart and underline [to
them] that the listed Volunteers are not subject to it [Army recruitment] and that
he should certify them [the Voluntaries] in the government’s name that, on the

37President of the Council o f Ministers was a position similar to that of Prime Minister in the
English system, although the Emperor's confidence was much more important in the Brazilian
case.
“ MHN - GP4.10.11. Marques de Olinda to JoSo Maria Pires Camargo, 14 Aug. 1865. The word
“fazendeiro” was many times used in the official reports to designate planters.
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occasion of recruitment, we will fulfill all the warranties and promises presented
in the Decree 2271 of March 7.”39
In spite of good intentions, the creation of Voluntarios did not solve the
chronic problems related to logistics and infrastructure, problems due to the
state’s inability to provide adequate housing and training to a quickly growing
army. In three letters from Sao Paulo, the Provincial President complained to the
Minister of War about the precarious supply of guns and uniforms. Hardly
disguising his irritation, the chief executive protested that:
The Corps of Volunteers we are organizing in this city [Sao Paulo]
is composed of 235 soldiers that are being housed at the
penitentiary due to the lack of available installation in the barracks.
This corps lacks discipline. There is no discipline without the
constitution of commands. I will need instructions. Unhappily, I do
not have instructors. [Soldiers] have neither guns nor uniforms. I
told the Ministry that I had ordered some linen shirts to give to this
corps a military appearance. My procedures have not been
approved to this date....40
In the initial phases, the organization of troops depended heavily on the
infrastructure provided by the local bosses. That was due to the lack of adequate
means to recruit and mobilize ordinary citizens. The commendatary Jos6
Vergueiro, again, gives a good example of the kind of cooperation these sectors
could furnish. In January 1865, this planter and politician visited the towns of Rio
Claro and Limeira in the new coffee areas of Western S3o Paulo. On the road,
Vergueiro addressed a letter to all "planters and important persons,” explaining

39ANRJ/SPE/ IG1 159, Cx. 587, fl. 552, Correspondence from the Provincial President of SSo
Paulo with diverse authorities. From JoSo Crispinaro Soares to Conselheiro Henrique Bauepaire
Rohan, 29 January 1865.
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his efforts to form a second corps of Volunterios. Commenting on Vergueiro’s’
actions the Provincial President wrote that: ”1 authorized this gentleman to give
military instruction to this corps and also to house them, as it is necessary.”41
The combination of central and local authorities in the same person was
common and strengthened the bargaining power of the Barons when they dealt
with Imperial authorities. The president of Sao Paulo recognized the limits of his
powers when recruiting. Describing his impotence in face of the behavior of an
indolent boss, this man complained, "It is relevant to note that the president of
one of these towns is also the Lieutenant Colonel of the National Guard’s
Battalion of the district! It is clear that very little should be expected from this
person.”42
Depending too much on the good will of both the bosses and the
population, the government admitted its lack of bureaucratic initiative, that is, its
incapacity to extract resources directly from society. As long as conditions were
favorable, these groups of planters could work in favor of government measures.
But such a strategy depended on the duration of the war: the shorter it was, the
better for everybody. With a long campaign, with its continuous drain of
resources, enthusiasm would not stay at its high peak for long. Senator Nabuco
de Aradjo, a leading Imperial politician, lamented that the Brazilian people was

'“ANRJ/SPE/IGI 159, Cx 587, fl.582. JoSo Soares to Visconde de Camamu, 21 Feb. 1865.
41lbid. JoSo Crispiniano Soares to Conselheiro Henrique de Bauepaire Rohan, 29 Jan.1865.
42 ANRJ/SPE/IGI 159 - ex. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Angelo Muniz da Silva
Ferraz. SSo Paulo, 25 May 1866.
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turning despondent just because, “its main feature was enthusiasm not
perseverance.”43
This situation raises the question of internal cohesion, a subject central to
social studies of war and national mobilization. It has been often suggested that
war increases the internal cohesion of the warring state. However, some
analysts of warfare, such as Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russet, have pointed
out that this relationship is more complex. A war may increase internal cohesion,
but only under a variety of specific conditions, including the perception of an
external threat to the society. If this perception decreases, as was the case
during the Paraguayan campaign, cohesion no longer increases.44
In the Brazilian case, the possibilities of cohesion vanished as the long
campaign and the permanent recruitment of freed workers became less
compatible with the interests of the planters and their associates. These key
sectors also had immediate concerns linked to the control of their work forces. If
vagrants and beggars could be easily conscripted, normal field workers were
protected as much as possible. The transfer of free workers or slaves to the
battlefield was viewed with suspicion, and sometimes with indignation. This
situation leads us to a consideration of the importance of patron-client relations
in Brazilian social history.

43 Jos6 Hon6rio Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasilia: Senado Federal, 1978), p.
81.
44 Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russet, "Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences” in Ted
Robert Gun (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict - Theory and Research (New York: The Free
Press, 1980), p. 413.
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Designating National Guards
A second and more controversial measure to increase the size of the
army came through the Decree 3383 of January 21,1865. This edict specified
that 14,796 troops of the National Guard be transferred to the front. The
consequences of such a measure for the internal balance of power were very
serious because, according to the Imperial Constitution, the troops of the
National Guard could not leave the country. When the government designated
National Guards for the war, it touched a sensitive area, because the Guard was
a traditional bastion of the landowners and other powerful local bosses. To be a
member of the Guard was the best excuse a free man could offer to escape
recruitment. Under the umbrella of the National Guard, these individuals could
avoid the normal recruitment procedures through their loyalty to their immediate
bosses. The prestige of these bosses was also related to the protection they
could provide for their proteges. By transferring corps of the National Guard to
the front, the Imperial government was interfering with direct sources of authority
that traditionally resided in the local bosses. The unwritten pact between the
central and local powers was violated by this decree, as it destroyed the image
of the Guard as a sanctuary against normal recruitment. It also undermined the
set of practices in operation since the 1830s. As emphasized before, these
practices helped to give legitimacy to the centralization process in Brazil during
its turbulent first decades as an independent nation. By the 1860’s, they were
sanctioned by custom and accepted as tradition. Their suppression also
undermined the position of the state as an arbiter in conflicts between planters.
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To make things worse, police corps were also transferred from their normal
patrolling functions and mixed with Battalions of Voluntdrios, leaving the
rearguard unprotected against slave rebellions. This situation placed still more
stress on the remaining units of the National Guard, because they had to
perform additional surveillance functions. The president of Rio de Janeiro
emphasized the burden of non-designated National Guards in the province,
emphasizing that: “It is not only the service of designation that weighs on the
National Guard, but also the offer of the police force to march voluntarily to the
campaign. By reason of the law 1370... the [police] has been substituted for the
National Guard even in the surveillance of the province fortresses that was
usually made by the Army but has been done, since 1865, by this Guard.”45
In Rio de Janeiro, a province with a large slave population, the transfer of
the police corps spread a feeling of insecurity that was expressed by the
commander of a unit of the National Guard located in Vassouras, an important
coffee center in the rich area known as the Paralba Valley. Answering to the
government’s demand for more troops, this commander complained that, “the
force already ready to march is so thin that it is barely fit for the normal sen/ices.
These services have been made with much sacrifice and we can’t provide the
necessary number even to guard the town’s jail.’’46

45 Relatbrio aue apresentou a Assemblfeia Leaislativa da Provfncia do Rio de Janeiro o Senhor
Benevenuto Augusta de Maaalh5es Taaues. NicterOi, October 1868, p. 2.
46 Relatbrio do Presidente da Provfncia do Rio de Janeiro Benevenuto Augusta de MaqalhSes.
NicterOi, Oct. 1868, pp. 3-4.
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The above episodes illustrate the problems related to the transfer of
troops and the inadequacy of the bureaucratic structure. But more serious
challenges lay ahead. By the second half of 1865, when Paraguayan forces had
been expelled from Brazil’s southern territory and the Uruguayan Blanco
government was defeated, the precarious structure of recruitment had become
evident. When Imperial authorities began to organize the second corps of the
army, they noticed a major change in the mood of the population. As the theater
of war moved from Imperial territory to northern Argentinean provinces, the
enthusiasm of the population vanished and resistance became endemic. The
situation worsened with the first significant defeat of the Triple Alliance in the
battle of Curupayti.

The War Dynamics and Recruitment Amplification
From April 16, 1866, when the Allied forces crossed the Paraguayan
borders, through September of the same year, the invasion of Paraguay was a
successful series of victories. The weakened Paraguayan army, which had lost
so many soldiers during its offensive, was again defeated and suffered serious
casualties in the battles of Tuyuti on May 24,1866, and Curuzu, when it tried to
regain the initiative.47 As a result of such reverses, the Paraguayans kept
retreating to the Paraguayan River margins, concentrating their forces on the
fortified trenches around the Humayta fortress. These were months of intense
skirmishes, and peace initiatives made no progress.
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Map 5 - Brazilian Offensives, 1 86 6 -1 87 0
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Source: John Hoyt Williams, The Rise and Fall of the
Paraguayan Republic. 1810-1870, p. 213.

The fragility of the Brazilian military organization only became evident
after its defeat in the battle of Curupayti (September 22, 1866), where the allies
lost around 4,000 troops.48 This defeat paralyzed the campaign, creating an

47 Tuyuti is still the biggest set battle in Latin American history. O f a total of around 17,000
causalities, the Paraguayans had 13,000. After that battle, the Paraguayans lost completely their
strategic initiative.
48 According to Dos Santos, in Curupayti the allies lost 4,061 soldiers: 2,011 Brazilians and 2,050
Argentineans. This battle signaled the end of a significant presence of the Argentine troops in the
front. See his “Guerra do Paraguay,” op. cit., p. 322.
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environment of great perplexity among Brazilian troops. Slowly politicians and
military leaders began to understand that they now faced a cohesive enemy
whose army had been recruited through universal conscription. In spite of its
technical limitations, it was well disciplined and loyal to its leader. Now, the
Paraguayans were fighting to defend their territory and could offer a much more
determined resistance than any opponent the Brazilians had faced before.49
In an interesting comparison between the Triple Alliance War and the
conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos
observed that military superiority is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to
define

a

conflict’s

outcome.

Under

certain

circumstances,

industrial

backwardness does not make military defeat inevitable. In situations where the
weaker nation does not surrender and the stronger does not change its
objectives, as the Americans did in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the
only rational strategies are 1) a shift in the original military objectives; 2) the
complete destruction of the militarily inferior nation. Brazilian behavior in
Paraguay offers a tragic example of the second alternative, because its military
superiority was

not sufficient to determine the

conflict’s outcome. The

Paraguayan retreat did not mean the end of their disposition to resist, and such a
change of circumstance made the outcome unpredictable.50 All operations were

49 A detailed description of battles and campaigns in the Paraguayan territory can be found in
Juan E. O ’Leary, El Paraguay en La Unificacion Argentina. La Guerra de la Triple Alianza
(Asuncibn: Institute Colorado de Cultura, 1976).
50 Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, “A Guerra do Paraguai: Ligfio para os Conflitos
ContemporSneos" in Revista Dados. Vol. 30, n o .3 ,1988, p. 313. Drew Gilpin Faust in her analysis
of Confederate Nationalism shows similar concerns. Late nineteenth-century experiences can
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interrupted for seventeen

months. During this

period, Argentineans and

Uruguayans retreated (due to internal troubles), while the Brazilian government
worked desperately on the home front to reinforce its army and follow up on the
campaign. The enormous number of casualties, due mainly to desertion and
diseases, intensified the need to reinforce troops and to pursue a longer
campaign.
The erosion of the Alliance armies became evident in the reduction of
troop numbers, implying more urgent efforts for the recruitment of new
contingents. The terrible sanitary conditions and the lack of adequate food
caused most casualties. According to the testimony of Menenio Agrippa
(pseudonymous of Jose Fernades Pereira Jr.), of the 51 battalions that invaded
Paraguay, only 14 were still organized in 1867. Of 45,000 men, only half were
ready for combat. But it would be naive to believe that these problems only
began with the

interruption of the campaign.

Truly, the paralysis only

accentuated circumstances that had been building since the second half of 1865.
While true enthusiasm was the hallmark of the initial steps in Brazilian
recruitment, resistance (individual or collective) was always present and kept
growing during the war. In many respects, the resistance on the internal front
was as serious as Paraguayan war efforts.
But how did the crisis in the external and internal fronts intermingle? This
work has stressed the existence of hierarchical differences among the three

enlighten the discussion of such problems on a less militaristic approach. See The Creation of
Confederate Nationalism. Ideology and Identity in the Civil W a r South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
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main sources of soldiers for the army: the Volunteers, the Designated National
Guards, and the conscript soldiers or recruits. Volunt£rios entered the army of
their own will. Their motives were considered more altruistic than those of any
other group. They were symbolically and materially rewarded for their actions.
Designated National Guards were subject to political consideration and had
some degree of negotiating power. Conscripts or recruits were at the bottom of
society and normally belonged to categories considered as socially undesirable.
These differences were clear from the moment of enlistment, because previous
status determined place in the military strata. As the campaign progressed, these
differences were progressively erased as socialization in the same units leveled
status differences among soldiers. As a consequence, resistance became
common among all sectors of the population. Under these circumstances, the
internal responses to the war’s circumstances were related not just to historical
deficiencies in the enlistment of recruits, deficiencies that had been accentuated
in wartime due to the great lack of manpower. They were also related to the
perception of changes in the current patterns of selection. The more enlistment
progressed toward universalization, the more acute protests turned out to be.
Delays at each step of the war made it impossible to regroup the existing
army, increasing the demand for new soldiers. Turning to its hinterlands, the
Empire demanded more manpower to fill the lacuna. Notwithstanding these
efforts, the population was

no longer willing to contribute. Slowly, but

State University Press, 1988), p. 3.
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progressively, Brazilians of all classes and regions turned against recruitment
and

resisted

government

measures.

There

were

individual

acts

of

insubordination, as well as collective actions, intended to keep recruits and
National Guards in their places of residence. The resulting tensions between the
center and periphery developed into the most acute situation since the 1840’s.

The Micropolitics of Desertion
In 1867, while describing the problems related to his recruitment efforts in
the province, the president of Minas Gerais gave a detailed picture of the
obstacles he had to overcome to provide more soldiers to the Imperial Army.
This president complained acutely about the enormous number of problems he
faced during a period in which preparation for a new offensive against the
Humayta fortress was at its peak. Trying to justify his poor record to the Minister
of War, the president wrote him a confidential letter explaining the difficulties he
faced while transporting recruits to the Court:
Your Excellency has no idea of the efforts I have been making to
capture and send recruits. While in prison they receive visits of
(important) people that counsel them to resist the guards, force the
doors, and run away.51
This president accused various important elements of the society of Minas
Gerais, including physicians, priests and parish judges, of conspiracy. By their
permanent opposition to the government (that is, the Liberal Party in power),
they undermined the actions of recruiter agents by convincing soldiers to desert.

51 AHMI, l-DPP-22.1.867 - met.c. From Vicente Pires da Mota to Marquis de ParanaguS. Ouro
Preto, 24 May 1867.
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This description underlines a web of relations opposed to recruitment, involving
most sectors of Minas society.
As bad as the lack of confidence in the government could be, it was not as
shocking as the fate of those who were recruited. The most remarkable parts of
this confidential letter are those that discuss the conditions of recruits who were
marched through the hinterlands. In discussing this subject with the Minister of
War, the president offered some of the sharpest images of the deterioration of
Brazilian enthusiasm and the popular support for desertion. Describing the risks
of mutiny while marching, he justified the use of handcuffs and irons, even taking
into consideration the strong impact such a view of dragooned soldiers, marching
against their will, could have on the population on the road:
I gave orders for the handcuffs, with which the recruits march, to be
taken off in [the city of] Petropblis, to avoid making them arrive at
the Court in chains, as they depart from the diverse points from
which they are sent.52
This president regretted these practices but recognized that, without such
safeguards, it would be virtually impossible to deliver recruits to the court.
Answering the Minister’s suggestion that he maintain appearances by unchaining
the recruits each time a village was entered, the president complained that:
Every time we [needed] to unchain them, we would need a
blacksmith...[but] where to find them? In any case, in these villages
escapes would be unavoidable. Each inhabitant, each farmer, and
even...each authority would hide those they could. Believe me this
is the entire truth.53

“ Ibid.
“ Ibid.
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Why did the initial patriotic motivations give way to such widespread
demonstrations of resistance?
Even at the beginning of the operations, desertion was a significant fact in
many provinces. The president of Alagoas, in one of the few comparisons made
between the rates of enlistment and desertion, noticed a huge difference
between the number of individuals enlisted and those that effectively went to the
war:

Table II
Recruitment in the Province of Alagoas 1865
Presented
Voluntarios
Transferred National Guards
Recruits
Freed Slaves
Total

134
101
680
26
941

Sent to the Court
129
73
422
26
650

(96.3%)
(72.3%)
(61.9%)
(100%)
(69.2%)

Per cent of
Evasion
3.73
27.72
38.08
0
30.92

Source: Provincial Report of Alagoas Province, May 1865

The third column permits a comparison between the number of those
originally recruited and those effectively sent to the court, that is, to the capital of
the Empire, to proceed directly to the theater of war. At the beginning of the
campaign, when all provincial reports showed the best possible picture, the total
rate of evasion in Alagoas was above 30 per cent. The highest rates were
among Transferred National Guards and Recruits. In these two categories were
concentrated the individuals who were not voluntary soldiers. They were forced
to go by conscription (in the case of recruits), or through arbitrary acts
transferring National Guards. About one third of the National Guards evaded,
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while 38.1 of recruits never arrived at the capital. Such a reality contrasts sharply
with the picture presented by donations and other patriotic actions at the
beginning of the operations.
The situation in Alagoas does not seem to be unusual when we look at
other provinces. The timing of desertion can be better followed through a report
presented by the president of MaranhSo, a northern province on the border of
the Amazon region. From twelve Guards who left from the village of Tutoia, only
one arrived in the provincial capital. During the passage of the Guards through
Sao Luis (the provincial capital), 66 deserted, 71 did not show up to embark, 94
were dismissed by his predecessor, and 67 fell ill at the hospital. From those that
qualified to board, 26 were dismissed because of disability and 40 more because
of legal exemptions. Thus, from a total of 910 Maranhense guards designated for
transfer, only 546 (60%) embarked for the capital. Such a combination of
desertion, exemption, and pretended illness was typical in all regions, thus
severely undermining the recruitment capabilities.54
No province presented a stronger contrast between the two initial waves
of recruitment than Rio de Janeiro. The Empire’s richest province and the coffee
plantation region’s heart, Rio was also closer to the Court than any other.55
These circumstances ought to have made the province more sensitive to the

54 ANRJ/SEP/IG125 - Cx. 530, fl. 76. Tenente Coronel Jos6 Caetano Vaz Jiinior to Conselheiro
Jos6 Antdnio Saraiva. S3o Luis, 14 Aug. 1865.
55 Rio de Janeiro city was the Brazilian capital from 1763 to 1960. From 1961 to 1964 it was the
capital of the Guanabara state. It is Rio de Janeiro's state capital since 1975.
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appeals of the Imperial government.56 The first wave of Volunteers showed that
most enlistment was spontaneous, rather than a mobilization following from
traditional coercive resources such as the police corps

Table III
Recruitmenl in Rio de vaneiro, 1865
Dec. Percent May to
Source
Percent
1864 of total
Sep.
to recruitment 1865
May
1865
510
Provincial Police Corps
17.0
0
0.0
2458
Volunteers
82.0
473
27.7
32
Recruits for the Army and the Navy
1.0
644
37.7
0
0.0
Designated National Guards
459
27.0
0
0.0
Deserters imprisoned and sent to the
130
7.6
Headquarters
Total
3000
100.0
1706
100.0
Source: Provincial Reports of Rio de Janeiro, 05.1865

In the first wave of enlistees (Dec./64 to May/65), 82% of those enlisted
came from voluntary groups. Feeling very confident about the supply of recruits,
the provincial government dispensed with the services of 1,384 National Guards
previously designated. Soon its decision proved to be a foolish one, because the
second wave of recruitment (May/1865 to September/1865) showed a drop of
43.1% in the total number and 80.1% in the Volunteers contribution. By then,

56 The political alignment between the Fluminense elite and the Imperial government was
proposed as a hypothesis by llmar Rohloff de Mattos in his book O Temoo Saauarema (S§o
Paulo: Hucitec, 1988).
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non-volunteer groups, including those that had deserted during the first call,
were providing 72.3% of the troops.57
Figure 2 - Desertion portrayed in the press

“If the Door is closed” - a recruit is “rescued” through the window.
Source: 0 Cabri5o, Sao Paulo, 1867, June 28,1866

In Minas Gerais, a province well known for its resistance to recruitment,
the provincial report also shows the preponderance of non-volunteer groups but,
in contrast to Alagoas and Rio, coerced groups were in the majority from the
beginning. Minas counted a population of 1,600,000 (16% of the total population
of the Empire at the time).58 The Imperial government requested an initial quota
of just 1,200 (0.075 of the total). In spite of the small number requisitioned, only

57 The small dimension of the initial contingents shows that the Imperial government also
underestimated the dimensions of the war, probably expecting a quick surrender of the
Paraguayan government.
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21% of the stipulated number were effectively presented. From 251 men sent to
the front during the campaign’s first months, only 5 (1.9%) were Volunteirios
while recruits and National Guards made up 216 (86.4%). The remaining 30
(8.3%) were filled through the recruitment of freed slaves, whose enlistment was
not still considered a state question at this time.59
The Bishop of Mariana, an important mining center closer to the capital,
was very concerned about the shortage of recruits and sounded his official
disappointment during his proclamation of November 1866. Attending to a
request of the provincial president, Saldanha Marinho, this Bishop addressed a
“proclamation” to all members of his dioceses proclaiming the Church’s official
support of the war. The Bishop expressed the government’s disappointment with
the province’s low degree of cooperation, emphasizing that "When the fatherland
demands your assistance to your brothers [and] when they call for your help to
obtain the victory [you] run to the forests or pretend illnesses so as to be
dismissed! So many cowardly acts do not seem proper of serious people.... If we
have always to be ready to appear in front of the lord’s tribunal, why not in the
middle of bullets, bayonets and torpedoes!”60

58 The estimate of 10,000,000 inhabitants for the entire Brazilian population would be better
applied for the first census made in 1872.
59ANRJ, Relatdrio aue & Assembteia Legislativa Provincial de Minas Gerais Apresentou no Ato da
Abertura da SessSo OrdinSria de 1865 o Desembarqador Pedro de Alcantara Ceraueira Leite.
Presidente da mesma Provfncia .Ouro Preto, Typografia de Minas Gerais, 1865, p. 22.
60 MHNRJ, GP.412, “Uma Proclamagflo de Dom Vigoso aos seus Diocesanos." Mariana (MG), 6
Nov. 1866. Later in his life Saldanha Marinho became one of the most prominent leaders in the
Republican movement. How much his experiences as a Provincial president convinced him to
change his political options is difficult to state.
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The fear of death was stronger than these religious appeals. One year
later, the next president complained that even priests were campaigning in the
interior against the draft:
There are preachers everywhere to infuse fear in the population
who are ready for the war. In [the city of] Queluz, Dr. Lafayete and
his brothers and relatives are permanent missionaries of this
propaganda.... Just now I am suing a vicar from Diamantina
...because [he] spent his Sundays counseling (from de pulpit)! that
[the people should] resist, run, but not go to the war because this is
like a plague created by a corrupt government to destroy all
Conservatives and peace lovers.61
Figures from the important province of S io Paulo show how the tendency
toward forced conscription had progressed by late 1866.
Table IV
Soldiers Recruited in S3o Paulo, October 1866 to May 1867
Source
Volunteers
Volunteers for the Army
Volunteers for the Navy
Recruits
National Guards
Total

Number Percent
87
6.5
81
6.1
51
3.8
693
52.0
419
31.6
1331
100.0

Source: Provincial Report from SSo Paulo, 1867

According to the above data, during the third wave of recruitment (October
1866 to May 1867), more than 80% of all men sent to the front came from non
volunteer ranks. These numbers support the veracity of contemporary reports
describing the increasing role of conscription. S3o Paulo, at the time, was a
flourishing coffee plantation society. It had been receiving slaves from the
northwest provinces in huge proportions but still faced the consequences of the

61 Ml, l-DPP-22.1.867 - met.c. Vicente Pires da Mota to Marquis de ParanaguS. Ouro Preto, 24
May 1867.
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interruption of the international slave traffic. Under such circumstances, it seems
logical that voluntary enlistment was low. Free laborers were becoming
absolutely necessary to the work on plantations. Naturally, larger planters tried to
defend their work force reserves against conscription, and such behavior can
explain partially why important provinces, such as Sdo Paulo and Minas Gerais,
did so badly in their contribution to recruitment. But resistance was endemic and
spread progressively to the country as whole. Later in the same year of 1867,
the president of Minas Gerais provided testimony about the degree of tension
provoked by recruitment. Complaining about the scarcity of recruits and the
unwillingness of National Guards to cooperate, the president described a terrible
picture with respect to National Guards, emphasizing that, "Almost all active
National Guards who were ready to march took refuge in scattered points that
offered the necessary resources to survive and where the response of the
authorities was late. [They] formed large groups of deserters, both designated
and recruits that could not be captured due to the lack of material supplies.”82
Many causes contributed to the decrease in the voluntary contribution
during the second and third waves of recruitment. According to the President of
Alagoas, this situation was due to "the natural decline of the early manifestations
of offended patriotism, the sedentary character of her [provincial] population, the
traditional existing horror in relation to the Wars in the South of the Empire, and,
above all, to the exaggerated and terrifying news coming from the theater of

62 Relatorio gue Apresentou ao Ex. Sr. Vice-Presidente da Provfncia de Minas Gerais Dr. Elias
Pinto de Carvalho por Ocasfeo de Passar a AdministracSo em 3 de Julho de 1867. p. 21.
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operations concerning the mortality because of the weather conditions, the
fatigue caused by the marches, and the epidemics that decimated the army.”63
The president of Maranh§o complained that recruits evaded service by
running away, hiding, or using legal exemptions. These remarks should be seen
in the context of a popular Brazilian saying according to which "God is great but
the wilderness is greater!,” one that captures well the popular wisdom of the poor
in Brazil. Many individuals or groups who could not count on any kind of
protection hid in the forests to evade conscription. Soon, those with some form of
protection followed them. The terrifying news coming from the South was
combined with collective resistance to army service. Serving in the army became
identified with the worst forms of slavery. Consequently, as soon as the war lost
its initial romantic glamour, resistance became the order of the day.
News and rumors spread quickly, reinforcing the crystallization of an
environment hostile to recruitment, but some individuals had more difficulty in
avoiding service than others. Those without some kind of protection were the
preferred targets of recruiters in all provinces and responded with individual acts
of rebellion. In the small town of Rio Bonito, in the province of Rio de Janeiro, a
superior commander described for the National Guard commanders the criteria
used to designate substitutes. This senior officer presented a guard from the 7th.
Infantry Battalion called Joao Batista Pereira Junior, who had been designated

63 Relatdrio com gue o Dr. EsperidiSo Elov de Barros Pimentel. Presidente da Provfncia das
Alagoas Entregou a Administracao da Mesma Provfncia no dia 10 de Abril de 1866. ao 1o. VicePresidente Dr. Galdino Auausto da Natividade e Silva. Macei6, Typografia do Bacharel F6lix da
Costa Moraes, 1866, pp. 18-19.
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as a substitute for another guard, who had evaded service through legal
exemption.64 His description of this substitute included all the characteristics of a
social undesirable person. According to this commander:
His behavior as a Guard and individual is terrible. Married around
two years ago to evade recruitment [he] abandoned his wife after
eight days.... [DJuring this time he has been making a living through
robbery [while] seeking refuge in the forests. [Because he knew] he
would be captured sooner or later he has been so disgraceful as to
self-mutilate the index finger of his right hand. This wound is
completely cured and [he] is now completely ready for the sen/ice
he has been designated for. This command asks your Excellency,
in favor of discipline, and also to show him as an example to those
that take advantage of mutilations and amputations, to give him the
fate that his cowardice deserves in order to not have imitators.65
There is no doubt that recruits tried to evade service by running away and
hiding, or by more dramatic actions such as impromptu weddings or selfmutilation. Exemptions by legal means, substitution, or political influence were
common and regularly helped individuals to avoid service. These exemptions
were based on the personal relations that linked National Guard commanders to
their men. They offered a much more formidable excuse than the individual
resistance could provide. Those National Guards who were designated to the
front looked to traditional webs of social relations to build obstacles against
recruitment. When such strategies failed they were still able to “buy substitutes.”
These strategies had been used in previous conflicts with relative success, and it

64 Substitutions were widely used as the surest way to leave service. In spite of the criticism
associate to this practice law sanctioned it.
65 APRJ, Documentos da Presidfincia da Provlncia, 1862-1867. Cole^So 215/216, caixas 175/176.
JoSo Jos6 Marinha to Eduardo Pendayba de Mattos, Nicterbi, 1867.
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was natural that terrified men looked to their bosses in order to receive
exemptions.66
As mentioned before, the transfer of the National Guards to the front was
the source of a variety of conflicts.

From the beginning of the war, provincial

reports were full of descriptions of conflicts between recruiting agents and
designated guards. During the war against Paraguay, the political will of the
Imperial government became heavily focused on the transfer of these Guards.
Pressures coming from the center became stronger than before, as imperial
officials insisted that the preservation of national integrity was more important
than any private reservations could be. Such circumstances clashed with
traditional conditions of bargaining prevailing until then, and the range of private
negotiations between bosses and officers was narrowed in the face of a
seemingly permanent shortage of ordinary soldiers to undertake a long
campaign. Provincial presidents were stimulated to press the National Guard
commanders to send the largest possible number of recruits. Some of them,
such as the vice-president of Maranhao, tried to justify his province’s poor
record, blaming the Guards’ behavior while exempting their commanders of
responsibility. In his provincial report of August 1865, the president stated that,
“There is no doubt about the National Guard Commander’s good will,” but he
complained that designated soldiers, those Guards that were sent to the front,

“ Substitution was an international practice in societies were universal military recruitment was not
instituted. See Nuria Sales de Bohigas, “Some Opinions on Exemption from Military Service in
Nineteenth Century," in Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 10, No. 3 ,1 9 6 8 , pp. 261289.
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used all means to avoid marching. “When all failed they ran for the forests, and it
was necessary to make them go to the capital escorted as recruits.”67 This vicepresident appropriately called the organization of the new corps as “an insane
task.”68
Other presidents were not so indulgent about the National Guard
commanders’ behavior. Many recognized commanders’ partiality when faced
with the designation of their men. These Imperial agents recognized that, when
confronted with a choice between to their loyalty to the fatherland or their local
relationships, local bosses did not hesitate to protect their clients. In a letter to
the Minister of War, the president of S3o Paulo complained about the Guard’s
inertia. Disappointed with the lack of cooperation, he confessed that, in spite of
his efforts to recruit, the reality was that, “I do not count on the cooperation of the
commanders of the National Guard

[because] they began to send me

representations where they constantly remind me of the evils brought by the
designation of the National Guard troops."69 In Minas Gerais the Commanders
were also directly blamed for the lack of recruits. Commenting on the poor state
of the army, the president complained that, "The designations, generally
irregular, were not even made at some superior commands.”70

67ln the provincial reports the term “recruit" was often used as synonym of imprisoned men, that is,
those that were not recruited on a Voluntary basis.
“ ANRJ/SPE/ IG125 - Cx.530 - fl. 76, Tenente Coronel Jos6 Caetano Vaz Junior to Conselheiro
Jos6 Antdnio Saraiva, S3o Luis, 14 Aug.1865.
69 ANRJ/SPE/IGI 159.Cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Conselheiro Angelo Muniz
da Silva Ferraz. S§o Paulo 25 May 1866.
70 Relatdrio aue Apresentou o Ex. Sr. Vice-Presidente da Provlncia de Minas Gerais Dr. Elias
Pinto de Carvalho por Ocasiao de Passar a Administrac3o. Ouro Preto, 3 July 1867, p. 21.
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Sometimes exemptions were given as a consequence of the special
position occupied by recruits in the economy. Those working in strategic areas
such as railroads and mail offices were able to avoid service. In a report of
October 6, 1866, the Minister of W ar answered a query concerning the legal
situation of a National Guardsman of the 3rd. Battalion o f Infantry. The
Guardsman was designated to the war, but he was also an employee of the Dorn
Pedro II railroad. The minister argued that, “In spite of the fact that the railroad
became [recently] state-owned, all the employees still have legal exemption from
National Guard service, because the exemption was not conceded in favor of the
company, but in favor of their employees, because of the nature of their
service.”71
Even in Rio Grande do Sul, a traditional provider of troops and horses, the
situation was not going very well. In a private letter to the Minister of War, in
November 1866, General Manuel Luis Os6rio, the most prestigious military
leader of the Liberal party, described the precarious situation there.
The delay in the reunion [of troops] comes from circumstances very
difficult to modify: many people were hidden in the jungle, and
many others have taken refuge in the Oriental state (Uruguay). It is
very difficult to reunite such dispersed elements. Speaking of the
Oriental State I should mention to you that I asked General Flores
permission to take [our] soldiers there and send them for the
service of war.72

71 Relat6rio Apresentado a Assembteia Geral Leaislativa na Primeira SessSo d a Dfecima Terceira
Legislature pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretario de Estado Martim Francisco Ribeiro de
Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 5. Similar exemptions for mail
employers existed in the US. Section two o f the Enrollment Act provided exemption for public
officials. See United States Statutes at Large. Vol. XIII, pp. 731-737.
72IHGB, Lata 312 - Pasta 31 - ColepSo Marques de Paranaguei, General Osdrio to Visconde de
Paranaguei. Pelotas, 15 Dec. 1866. General Vendncio Flores was the president of Uruguay
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Also known by his noble title of “Marquis of Herval,” Osbrio was one of the
most experienced Brazilian generals and one of Rio Grande do Sul’s most
prestigious military chiefs. His correspondence reveals the problems associated
with recruitment in a province traditionally important to war mobilization. One
problem was the high degree of partisanship in politics, which increased tensions
during the election period, as shown by his discussion of the problems
associated with the recruitment of the third corps: “the difficulties are many and
they come from everywhere and I try to make everybody forget about such
political hostilities and just hear the voice of the nation.”73
Osbrio’s testimony also shows how political competition inside the army
affected the loyalty, not only of the Gaucho militias, but also of cattle-ranchers
and saladeros (many of who had lands in Uruguay). In 1867 Osorio calculated
that around eight thousand Gauchos had deserted through the Uruguayan
frontier. As the Gaucho elite had land on both sides, it is plausible to suppose
that these bosses encouraged mass desertions to preserve the loyalty of their
men. Thus, the very province whose demands led to the war and whose leaders
had stressed their capacity for cooperation could no longer contribute.74

between 1865 and 1868. Until the 1930’s General Osbrio was the patron saint of the Brazilian
national army. On Osbrio's myth see Celso Castro, “Entre Caxias e Os6rio: A CriapSo do Culto ao
Patrono do Exbrcito Brasileiro,” in Estudos Histbricos. Vol. 14, n. 25,2 00 0 , pp. 103-118.
73 IHGB, Lata 312, Pasta 31, Manuel Luis Osbrio to Marquis de Paranagub. Pelotas 15 Dec.
1866.
74 IHGB, Lata 372, Pasta 17. Osbrio to Marquis de Paranagub 31 Mar. 1867.
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Another alternative answer to the government’s demands was to recruit
adversaries’ prot§g6s or to take from these opponents the command of
battalions. In Maranhdo the vice-president underlined that, “Amidst all these
problems the Superior Commanders [of the National Guard] and Battalion
Commanders make ‘white hand’ [a local term meaning “to be too liberal”] toward
everyone’s recruitment and send the sick, the elderly, the under aged, the
widow’s only sons, everyman that has the more positive legal exemptions.”75
The president of Minas Gerais complained that, “the works of the
qualification

(designation)

councils were

very

irregular.

Many

iniquitous

designations were made [because] the spirit of [the partisan] party dictated
them.”76 In the province of S io Paulo the president also remarked that, “after
recruiting the single and able for the service, the designations fallen over many
that had exemptions, and those that do not have it hide in the trees."77 Joaquim
Manoel de Macedo, an influential advisor at the Imperial court, reinforced the
vision of recruitment as a weapon to intimidate the poor at the election time:
No party or faction which calls itself a party can throw stones at any
other. They all employ or have employed forced recruiting with the
ultimate immoral end of the blatant oppression of the poor people.78

75 ANRJ, IG125 - Cx. 530, fl. 76. From Lieutenant Coronel Jos6 Caetano Vaz Junior to
Conselheiro Jos6 Antflnio Saraiva. SSo Luis, 14 Aug. 1865.
76 Relat6rio gue 6 Assemblfeia Leqislativa Provincial de Minas Gerais apresentou no Ato de
Abertura da Sessao Ordin5ria de 1865 o Desembarqador Pedro de Alcantara Cerqueira Leite Presidente da Mesma Provfncia. Ouro Preto, Typografia de Minas Gerais, 1865, p. 22.
77 ANRJ - IG 1159, cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Angelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz.
SSo Paulo 25 May 1866.
78 Joaquim Manoel de Macedo to Count of Eu, 5 Sept. 1867, IHGB, cx. 276, pasta 19. Also quoted
in William Sheldon Dudley, “Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1870-1889," (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), p. 68.
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Complications arising from partisan competition were constant and
affected the procedures even at higher positions in the battlefields. In October
1866, disputes between the two main Brazilian military commanders, the
Conservative Polidoro da Fonseca and the Liberal Porto Alegre, were intense.
When news came concerning the nomination of another Conservative leader, the
Marquis de Caxias, as the military commander of all the Triple Alliance troops,
arrived to the encampment, Porto Alegre asked to be dismissed. This kind of
rivalry continued, although with less intensity, after Caxias assumed the army
command. But in the rearguard, partisan political disputes led to instability in
command positions and affected local balances of power. It was a common
strategy to enlist political adversaries or to deprive them of commands over their
own forces. In the district of SSo Miguel, in the province of Rio Grande do Norte,
an officer of the National Guard was removed from his functions as district sub
delegate by the president of that province. According to the Justice Report, as
soon as the change was implemented his political enemies “rejoiced publicly in
their happiness, going to the extreme of provocation." Feeling offended, the
dismissed officer tried to avenge his honor, attacking his opponents with a cane.
What in normal conditions could have been a mild conflict escalated, involving
partisans of both sides and finally resulting in the death of two slaves and one
Indian and injuries to six more people. Fifty soldiers were sent to reestablish
public order in town.79

79 Relat6rio do Ministferio da Justica Apresentado 3 Assembteia Geral Leaislativa na Seaunda

188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

After the retirement of the Argentinean commandant, Bartolomeu Mitr6
(September 1866), Emperor Pedro II nominated the Conservative Marquis of
Caxias to the command of all Triple Alliance forces. Caxias was a legend in the
Brazilian Imperial tradition, and his nomination was aimed at rationalization and
standardization of functions and practices of the command forces. But Caxias
was also a politician, and his nomination intensified internal disputes in the
provinces by depriving many liberal provincial presidents of their recruiting
prerogatives.80 The rivalries between factions led to administrative discontinuity,
with the removal of commanders and the detachment of regiments encouraging
even more desertions. In a private letter to the minister of war, a removed
Gaucho commander complained that:
These facts indicate to me that my command will be taken from me
very soon and this is the reason why I am telling you about all
these circumstances just to emphasize that: I’ve never refused to
give my weak services in these times, as neither I nor my friends
have chosen this situation to...speculate in politics; and far from
preparing a new army [there is] only personal politics, to prepare
the terrain for electoral victories, neutralizing supposed
adversaries.8’
To secure

an additional supply of southern troops, the

Imperial

government suspended Congressional elections in the province of Rio Grande
do Sul during the second semester of 1866. In a special meeting of the Council
of State held on August 23rd' many councilors agreed that the realization of

Sesscio da D6cima Terceira Legislature pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secretario de Estado Martim
Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada. Rio d e Janeiro, Typografia Perseveranga, 1868, p. 7.
80 The political effects of Caxias’ nomination will be seen later.
81 IHGB, Lata 312 - Pasta 31 - ColefSo Marques de ParanaguS. From Severino Ribeiro D ’Almeida
a JoSo Lustosa da Cunha Paranagud. Pelotas 31 Dec. 1866.
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elections and the violence inherent in the electoral process were not compatible
with the recruitment process. Councilor Pimenta Bueno went as far as to declare
that:
[T]hose would not be free elections because the voters would not
go to the pools or they could be recruited while entering or exiting
the churches.82 The government would not be able to keep the law
because arbitrary [local] police authorities would do as they wished
in defense of party interests.83
In the early months of 1867, while the organization of the third corps was
still in

progress, the president of Rio Grande do Sul saw more problems onthe

horizon. Describing

the lack of means to defend the province in the face of

external attacks, he complained to the Cabinet of the president that:
Many desertions have been taking place at...different points of this
province, even in the camp of general Baron of Herval. I keep
sending to the first corps all deserters who have been caught,
including those coming from the Third corps. ...I beg your
Excellency to provide a monthly supply of two hundred contos to
help with the urgent expenses required for formation of the Third
corps.84
The report of so many cases supports the hypothesis that, by the second
half of 1865, desertion had become a national phenomenon. Partisans of
deprived groups saw recruitment as just another source of power exercised
against themselves. As a consequence, disputes over who would be designated
eroded the National Guard’s position. In its turn, the Guard revealed its lack of

82 Elections normally took place inside churches.
83 Jos6 HonOrio Rodrigues, Atas do Coselho de Estado. Meeting held on August 23,1866, pp. 4959. A broader explanation concerning the Council meetings will be provided in chapter VI.
84 A H M I- 93 - I - ZGVM el.c 1-6. Francisco Ignacio Homem de Melo to Zacharias de G6es e
Vasconcelos. Porto Alegre, 19 Feb.1867.
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potential to support the country in the event of a more intense kind of war. The
Justice report from 1867 clearly recognized such deficiencies, emphasizing that:
“The [current war] experience confirmed the need to reform the National Guard.
This militia who was created to defend the order and the public liberties is very
far from its finality....”85
Desertion, individual or collective, was a serious challenge, but did not
necessarily undermine the whole recruiting process. This form of resistance was
neither life-threatening nor well organized, but it nevertheless expressed
contempt for the law and inhibited the enrollers’ efforts to enforce it. A much
graver threat to the Empire’s internal peace was the large number of collective
rebellions against recruitment. Some of them were supported by National Guard
commanders or had the assistance of other important local authorities, such as
judges, priests, or planters. These revolts expressed the disillusion of various
sectors with government agents’ interference with their private lives. This
interference lacked legitimacy in their eyes because it disrupted the local and
regional balance of forces. Under the impact of these external forces, the
resistance of inertia gave way to violent manifestations of collective action, some
of which seem to follow the pattern common to the 18th century British riots
analyzed by E. P. Thompson.86

85 Ministerio da Justica - Relatbrio Apresentado a Assemblfeia Geral Legislativa na Primeira
Sessao da D6cima Terceira Legislature pelo Respective) Ministro e Secreterio de Estado Martim
Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 4.
86 Nothing could better describe the concept of “resistance of the inertia “ than Marc Bloch’s
description of the situation in medieval Europe: “The lord’s abuse of force had no longer any
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In his analysis of the social universe of the English working class revolts
during the 18th century, Thompson emphasized the role of tradition and custom
in the plebeian culture of Britain. According to Thompson, the crowds were
defending a “Moral Economy” based on the existence of customs in common,
shared by those populations. A common vision united the crowd and the gentry
around basic attitudes toward life, commerce, and authority. The urban and rural
poor believed that the operations of the free market worked against their
interests, and thus they denied that planters, bankers or simple merchants had
an absolute right of property in their necessities of life and reaffirmed the
traditional idea of a “just price." In pre-industrial British society, when some new
political force tried to modify customary practices, it faced the workers’ reaction
in the form of riots and revolts.87 Eric Foner also applied this perspective of a
“moral economy” when analyzing the behavior of urban crowds in Philadelphia in
late colonial America. According to Foner, in this colonial society the popular
visions of social consensus, including the control of prices, were in basic conflict
with the idea of the “invisible hand” of the market. The opposition to British
colonial taxation reaffirmed colonists’ assumptions that the idea of economic
freedom should be subordinate to the general good of society.88

counterweight except the amazing capacity for inertia of the rural masses-often, to be sure very
effective-and the disorder of the lord’s own administration.” Marc Bloch, La Soci6t6 Feodale
(Paris: Editions Michel Albin,1968), p. 352.
87 E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" in
Customs in Common (New York: The New Press, 1991), pp. 185-258.
88 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),
pp. 148-149.
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During the Triple Alliance War, the expansion of government prerogatives
in Brazil interfered with another kind of market, that is, with established loyalties
which took the form of private contracts between planters and their clients. Such
state interference with traditional rituals of social control led the provincial
populations, especially those living in small villages and districts in the far
interior, to appeal for protection to local sources of power against the
unreasonable advance of the state. An explosion of local rebellions sought to
push recruitment agents out of villages and districts and restore previously
existing conditions of livelihood. No rebellion achieved the level of earlier
secessionist movements, but some of them seriously challenged the execution of
governmental power. In this sense the moral economy of Brazilian populations
opposed the state’s universalist intentions in a movement that rejected the
progress of rationalization in the name of tradition.
There was no uniform strategy in those revolts. Some actions expressed
individual resistance to recruitment agents, as in the city of Penedo, Alagoas on
October 13, 1866. In a typical personal confrontation, Albino Vieira de Castro, a
designated National Guard, stabbed to death Manoel Leandro do Nascimento,
the second Lieutenant in charge of the recruitment. The assassination took place
in a public square when this officer gave Albino an “order of imprisonment.” In
the town of Pioca, in the same province, another designated National Guard was
less lucky and got killed while fighting two recruiters’ escorts. A similar situation
arose in the village of Imperatriz in Alagoas. There, a recruit shot the bloc
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inspector while he was recruiting. In the locality of Mai6ba, Maranhao, a boy was
killed by a stray bullet from the gun of the uncle of another recruit who had just
been caught by an escort.89
Many such conflicts involved neighbors divided along partisan lines. While
some inhabitants tried to execute the government’s orders, others resisted. But
there were cases when

resistance against recruitment united an entire

community against the government. In these cases resistance could escalate
from spontaneous acts of individuals into a state of open collective rebellion,
involving not only family and friends but also the entire community. Such a
situation happened in the city of Pacatuba, in the province of Sergipe. Many
deserters were hidden in the forests around the town. An escort was sent by the
provincial president to re-capture them “by reason or force.” What followed was
described as a “fierce struggle,” during which three people, including the mother
of one of the refugees, died .90
Sometimes, after being caught, recruits mutinied while on their way to
prison. This was the case in the town of S3o Jodo del-Rei, Minas Gerais, where

89 Ministerio da Justica - Relatdrio Apresentado a Assemblfeia Geral Leqislativa na Primeira
Sessao da Dfecima Terceira Legislature pelo Respective) Ministro e Secreterio de Estado Martim
Francisco Riberio de Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 3. By the
Brazilian law, magistrates had the right to divide their districs into blocs of less than twenty-five
families and to name a deputy into each one. These “inspetores de quarteirao” were exempt from
the service on the National Guard. According to Thomas Flory these exemptions “generated the
keenest resentments.” Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil. 1808-1871. Social
Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 9394.
90 Relatdrio do Minist6rio da Justica apresentado a Assembteia Geral Leqislativa na QuartaSessSo da D6cima-Sequnda Legislature pelo Resoectivo Ministro e Secreterio de Estado Jos6
Thomas Nabuco de Arauio. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Universal Laemmert, 1866, p. 4.
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a group of seventeen recruits and deserters mutinied against their escorts,
resulting in one death and three serious injuries.91
No set of actions undermined the Imperial authority as much as the
attacks against escorts and jails.82 From 1866 to 1868 the Reports of the Ministry
of Justice are full of such cases, which multiplied as the provision of recruits
dropped. Some of them were due simply to misunderstandings based on rumors.
Such was the case in an incident that occurred in the little town of Mar de
Espanha, Minas Gerais, where Portuguese immigrants were employed on the
works of the “Uniao e IndOstria road.” Erroneously supposing some that of their
fellows were "imprisoned for recruitment,” these workers assaulted the jail to
prevent them from being marched to the provincial capital. The delegate and
many escort soldiers were severely injured while resisting this unexpected
invasion.93
At other times, attacks came from the deserters themselves, who
organized gangs in the forests. In the district of Cruz do Espirito Santo, Rio
Grande do Norte, what was described as "a group of deserters and criminals”

91 Idem.
“ Assaults against jails resulting from local controversies concerning impressment were in the root
of some provincial rebellions during the 1830's. One of the strong provincial revolts, the Balaiada,
began by the release of nine conspirators from a Maranhense cell, in 1838. For a contemporary
description of the Balaiada see Domingos Josb Gonsalves de MagalhSes, “Membria Histbrica e
Documentada da RevolugSo da Provlncia do Maranhao" in Novos Estudos CEBRAP. no. 23,
margo de 1989, pp. 14-66 and Luiz Felipe Alencastro, “Membrias da Balaiada. IntrodugSo ao
Relato de Gonsalves de Magalhbes” in Novos Estudos CEBRAP. no. 23, March 1989, pp. 7-13.
The rebellion began through an attack performed by a man called “Cara Preta” (Black Face),
against a town jail to release some relatives.
93 Idem Ibidem.
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attacked the recruitment escorts and the town’s jail, releasing all the prisoners.94
In the Parish of Aguas Belas, Province of Pernambuco, a group of “armed
persons” attacked the patrols in charge of recruitment, killing one soldier and
losing one recruit.95

Chart II
Attacks on Jails 1867 - Numbers by Regions
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On certain occasions, relatives commanded these attacks, as in the city of
led, Ceara, where “a large group of relatives and friends” released a designated
National Guard. “Happy with their success the crowd paraded through the city
streets carrying in triumph the released man.” At other times, attacks were led or

^ RelatCrio do Ministerio da Justica Apresentado a Assemblfeia Geral Leqislativa na Seaunda
SessSo da D6cima Terceira Legislature pelo Respectivo Ministro e Secreterio de Estado Martim
Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Perseveran?a, 1868, p. 7.
95 Justice Ministerial Report, op. cit, 1866, p. 3.
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supported by local authorities who disagreed with the central authorities’
procedures. Usually, the involvement of authorities was indirect, as in the village
of Pau D’Alho, Pernambuco, where a group of armed men attacked the prison,
liberating 34 recruits. According to the Justice Report, four of the prisoners had
been previously convicted as murderers and seven had been accused of other
crimes. In spite of that, all were released by the assailants who, during the
struggle, killed three sentinels and hurt many others. Following those actions,
deserters looked for refuge in the forests owned by Lieutenant Colonel Luiz
Albuquerque Maranhao, a sugar cane planter and National Guard officer, who
was indicted as the movement’s main supporter. It is impossible to know what
happened to this citizen, but probably no juridical action took place because of
his important position in local politics.96
In other cases involvement was direct, touched off by actions that were
perceived as abusive to local interests. In Aguas-Belas, Pernambuco, the
second Lieutenant of the National Guard Manoel Cavalcanti de Albuquerque
Barao, followed by many individuals, assaulted the town jail to liberate a recruit.
Similar actions took place in the parishes of Canelada, Correty, Capoeiral, and
Bonito. In the village of Imperatriz, Alagoas, a group of armed people
commanded by a bloc inspector attacked a patrol and rescued some recruits.97
Sometimes family collective actions were followed by involvement of
authorities, as at the district of Sao Caetano da Raposa, Pernambuco, where

“ Idem, 1867, p. 3.
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relatives of the National Guard Joaquim Manoel Outeir6 attacked the town’s jail
to release him from the hands of the recruiter agents. In the struggle Manoel was
released, but another family member, Antonio Leite de Lima, who commanded
the action, was imprisoned. Immediately two groups appeared in front of the
police chief house to demand his freedom. According to the Justice Report “one
was commanded by the Parish Judge and the other by a second Lieutenant.”
After this “reunion,” and failing to obtain his freedom by pacific means, they were
able to rescue their friend by force. In the village of Imperatriz, Pernambuco,
Lieutenant-Colonel Joaquim da Silva Corr§a appealed for one of the soldiers of
his battalion who had been designated to the war. Not obtaining the release of
his Guard, the Lieutenant reunited some 150 men and, in conjunction with the
sub-delegate, attacked the jail, so as to release “his recruit" and all the other
convicts. But nineteen guards who stayed loyal to the delegate repelled the
attackers. Using the “prestige of his social position,” this National Guard attacked
the village again, this time followed by an entourage that included family and
friends. This time they were successful and performed what was described as “a
series of depredations.” It can not be known if they were able to finally rescue
the recruit, but according to the Justice Report “Such vertiginous spirit did not fit
the pacific nature of the Brazilians and could not endure...”98

97 Justice Ministerial Report. 1866, p. 3.
98 Justice Ministerial Report, 1868, p. 11.
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After discussing all the problems brought about by designations, the
president of Sao Paulo bitterly recognized the inefficacy of the National Guard in
a skeptical vision:
Since it [National Guard] was converted to its present finality
[external war] it became very oppressive for most of the population.
Today it became necessary to proscript all the hopes associated
with the expression “nation in arms.” ...The experience of the
current war erased all illusions...The resistance offered by inertia is
worse than that offered by violence....99
In spite of that, there was neither time nor political will to advance a cycle
of more encompassing reforms. The Report of the Ministry of War of 1867
pointed to these deficiencies as the cause of an enormous waste of men and
resources. According to minister Paranagu&:
The current war made still clearer our need to have a permanent
army, if not numerically big, at least disciplined and well armed. It
should provide for our internal security and tranquillity, [and] at the
same time will become the support of our national integrity. If the
Empire had
(one), when its honor was offended by the
Paraguayan government, our territory would not have been
invaded; The war, against all modern principles of the military
science would not have continued for such long time; the number
of immolated victims would have been much smaller; the public
money would not have been wasted on such a vast scale; in short,
the fatherland sacrifices would have been much smaller.100

Dealing with slaves and criminals
The worst scenario involving revolts was the possibility of slave uprisings.
The fear of rebellion was characteristic of every slaveholder group in the

"ANRJ/SPE/ IG1 159 - Cx. 587, fl. 741. Joaquim Floriano de Toledo to Conselheiro Angelo Muniz
da Silva Ferraz, 25 May 1866.
100Relat6rio Apresentado a Assembtea Geral na Primeira Sess8o da Dfecima Terceira Legislature,
pelo Ministro e Secre&rio d'Estado dos Nea6cios da Guerra. Jo8o Lustosa da Cunha ParanaouS.
Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Nacional, 1867 p. 1.
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Americas. After the episode of Santo Domingo, where a slave rebellion led to the
only war of national independence successfully waged by rebellious slaves,
every small signal of discontent was viewed as threat to the public order. It is not
important in this case whether, in Brazil as well as in the US, revolts were
circumscribed, involving small groups or limited by geographic conditions, but not
spreading to the entire slave community. Their threat was perceived as real and
the fear of them contributed to the latent conflict between the masters and their
captives.101 As Stuart Schwartz notes, the long chain of slave revolts marking the
passage of slavery into the nineteenth century “made the dangers and costs of
slavery clearer than they had ever been.”102
With most coercive resources far from the provinces, slave rebellions were
a risk always to be taken into consideration by the Imperial elites in all of their
divisions. With the designation of National Guard troops and the mobilization of
the police corps for the war, it was evident that the Brazilian rearguard was
weaker and less ready than ever to deal with runaways, rebellions, and other
forms of disruption of bonded labor. Perceiving such fragility, the chief of police
of Rio de Janeiro requested the use of disabled soldiers, because he was
’’convinced of the public utility of such a measure in relation to the public order
and tranquillity constantly challenged.... I appeal to your Excellency to obtain the

101 On these fears see JoSo Jos6 Reis and Eduardo Silva, Neaociac3o e Conflito: a resistfencia
Neora no Brasil Escravista (SSo Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1989) and Celia M. Azevedo, Onda
Neora. Medo Branco. O Negro no lmagin5rio das Elites: sfeculo XIX (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra,
1987).
102 Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia. 1550-1835
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 488.
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necessary authorization to permit the engagement of disabled soldiers of the
army as members of the provisory police corps....”103
Taking advantage of the shift in course of the Imperial coercive apparatus
toward foreign enemies during the Paraguayan war, slaves occasionally
rebelled. At the Carmo Convent at the province of Par£ on July 8, 1865, the
slaves expelled their new overseer and assumed control of the convent. The
substitution of a supervisor by the slaves suggests a relatively more conservative
character for the revolt. This was probably a negotiation over working conditions,
not an insurrection. In spite of that, some sectors could still see the influence of
international events behind the slaves’ movements.104 Lamenting the awful
situation faced by his province, the President of Pard believed that the institution
of slavery in that area was threatened, among other reasons, because, “with [the
end] of the war in the United States, there is rooted among [the slaves] a belief
that all will be freed soon.”105
Other revolts brought more serious consequences In Maranhao, a
province with a history of rebellions by slaves, Indians, and runaways, slaves
organized a maroon close to the parish of Vianna in the district of Sao Bento.106

103 ANRJ - IG1 146, cx. 582, fl. 636. Antonio Jos6 Lino da Costa to Eduardo Pindahyba de Matos.
NiterOi, 10 Sep. 1867.
104 In his Roll. Jordan. Roll. The World Slaves M ade (New York: Vintage Books, 1972). Eugene
Genovese described similar processes of negotiation over slaves' conditions of life and work for
the South of the United States. See especially book one "God is not Mocked,” pp. 1-158.
105 Justice Ministry Report, 1866, op. cit., p. 8.
106 During the early 1830's Maranhao was the place of a huge popular revolt uniting slaves allied
to poor whites. The Balaiada was one of the strongest social movements in the Regencial period
and its memory w as sufficiently alive to raise fears in all the parts of the elite.
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Based in their new camp, these runaways began to raid neighboring farms. In
the face of this serious situation the designation of the National Guards was
temporally suspended while a group of forty soldiers was sent to put an end to
the rebellion.107
In Rio Grande do Sul, revolts were frequent during wartime. On February
14th, 1866 the sub-delegate of Sao Francisco de Paula had to mobilize the free
inhabitants of the region to prepare against a threat from a group of runaways
joined by National Guard deserters who had refused to march. Panicked planters
worried about every rumor. As mentioned by the sub-delegate of Mostardas,
they were very concerned about the departure of the 6th. corps of the National
Guard because:
Many of the same farmers have a great number of slaves, and
when [they lose] their supervisors or administrators or overseers,
[they] do not know which means to use to prevent an attack [from
the runaways].108
According to the police authority, some slaves were imprisoned and
“moderately punished without proofs.” But nothing was discovered that could
objectively incriminate these slaves. According to the police sub-delegate, in
view of the permanent risk, it would be better to exempt supervisors from
recruitment. In some ways, such a succession of false alarms opened the
window for another possibility: that cattle-ranchers might be manipulating such

107 ANRJ/SPE/IG125, ex. 530, fl. 44. Francisco Am6rico Menezes D6ria to Visconde de
Paranaguei. SSo Luis, 23 July 1867.
108 AHRS - Secretaria de Pollcia, mago 8. J. William Harris found similar conflict in Georgia, during
the final years of the war. In 1863 and 1864, petitions poured into the office of Governor Joseph
Brown, requesting exemptions. S ee Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, p. 178.
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fears to obtain the release of their overseers, in view of the stress created by the
Paraguayan war. But their fears could not be totally ignored.
According to Paulo Moreira, a leading student of Gaticho politics, the War
against Paraguay added to the fear of insurrection the suspicion that insurrection
could be supported by foreign elements. In March 1865, the sub-delegate of
Bage communicated the formation of a militia of ten soldiers with the objective of
avoiding a slave insurrection encouraged by “the Barbarian assassins from
Montevideo’s government.” In a secret letter dated from February 2, 1865, the
police delegate of Jaguarao told of the invasion of the province by 1,500 men
under the leadership of General Basilio Mufioz. Along with many other kinds of
damage, the invaders took the slaves they found, and with “the promise of being
freed they were able to bring some." In another letter of February 07 the same
authority declared that:
Eight slaves were sent to me from the district of Arroio Grande.
They had been imprisoned as suspects of convenience in the
slave's insurrection that was planned in the time when our frontier
would be invaded by the forces of Montevideo. According to the
testimony of colored Florencio, slave of Marcos Jose da
PorciCincula, ...(he) declares that he had been invited by oriental
[Uruguayan] Jos6 Benito Varela that...had invited [him] to go to the
Oriental side telling him that this would be the way to enjoy
freedom. It seems to me that some plan was accorded and, due to
unknown circumstances was aborted. I keep performing more
severe investigations to see if it is possible to discover the agents
of such plotting because I have news of some slaves in this city as
having been accomplices in this assault.109

109 AHRS - Delegacia de Polfcia, ma?o 7.

203

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Gaucho slaves and deserters had the added know-how of the use of arms
and

military expertise.

They could give to Brazilian enemies important

information concerning preparations for war and the organization of the Gauchos
defense system. Even without general rebellion, it seemed impossible to ignore
the potential damage that slave revolts could cause to everyday life in such a
frontier area.

Final Remarks
This chapter has tried to answer the question “Why were slaves recruited
for the war against Paraguay”? It showed how difficult it was to extract recruits
from society to fill the ranks of the Imperial Army. Such problems were not new in
themselves but, under the pressure of a huge international campaign, they
exposed the powerful limitations on the state’s capacity to increase its military
force. Slavery was at the base of the problem because it clearly prevented the
formation of a strong army. At the same time that it limited the enlistment of a
significant proportion of the adult males, it also created an unstable situation at
the rear in the country’s cities and fields.
From the beginning of the war, individual or collective donations of slaves
had taken place in many parts of the country. But these were limited initiatives,
not large enough to solve the chronic problems related to recruitment. By the
middle of 1866, the enlistment of slaves had become a question of state and
became a priority for the Imperial leaders. The recruitment of freed slaves would
offer another acute challenge for the Brazilian authorities, as it implied an
expansion of the state’s capacity to extract more resources from their citizens in
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time of trouble.110 No question troubled the center-periphery relationship as much
as that and no other crisis so clearly indicated the urgent need for a more
encompassing cycle of reforms. In the next chapters w e will analyze the specifics
of this process and how it was performed.

110 On the impact of the war for the creation and rising of taxes, s ee Maria Val6rio Junho Pena, “O
Surgimento do Imposto de Renda: Um Estudo Sobre a RelagSo entre Estado e Mercado no
Brasil,” in Revista Dados. Vol. 35, No. 3 ,1 9 9 2 , pp. 337-370.
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Chapter 5

The Crisis of American Recruitment System:
Union Army Recruitment,
April 1861-July 1863

To conduct a whole war, or its great acts, which we call campaigns,
to a successful termination, there must be an intimate knowledge of
State policy in its higher relations. The conduct of the War and the
policy of the State here coincide...
Carl Von Clausewitz (1832)1
We have here an evidence of the wonderful strength of our
institutions. Without conscriptions, levies, drafts, or other
extraordinary expedients, we have raised a greater force than that
which, [was] gathered by Napoleon ... Here every man has an
interest in the Government, and rushes to its defense when
dangers beset it.
Simon Cameron (1861)2
The greatest mistake made in our civil war...was in the mode of
recruitment and promotion.
William T. Sherman3

The Civil War was the most intense conflict faced by the American nation
during the 19th century. As a large multifront war, it required unprecedented

1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On W ar (1832. reprint, London: Penguin, 1987), p. 156.
2 Simon Cameron, Report from the Secretary of War, December 1861. Quoted in David Martin
Osher, “Soldiers citizens for a disciplined Nation: Union conscription and the construction of the
modem American army,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992), p. 107.
3 William T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, vol. 2, pp. 387-88. Quoted
in Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won. A Military History of the Civil W ar
(1983, reprint, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 274.
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levels of mobilization, recruitment and training. It involved civilian populations as
victims and supporters in the war efforts. It led to more American casualties than
almost all the twentieth century contests combined. Union losses alone were
almost as great as all U.S. losses in World War II.
The conflict demanded a state structure capable of coping with a vast and
integrated war effort, leading to spectacular processes of institutional change
and

bureaucratic

organization.

These

proceedings

redefined

national

sovereignty through such procedures as the nationalization of the governmentcitizen relationship and the transformation of slaves into soldiers.
Similarly to the Brazilian situation during the Paraguayan campaign, the
consequences of this war would not be confined to the defeated regions of the
South. The struggle would bring unexpected effects to most areas of the Union,
challenging an entire system of government. Some of these changes affected
traditional assumptions concerning such vital matters as “states rights,”
conscription, personal liberty laws, the centralization of national power, and the
voluntary character and composition of the army. They also reinforced the role of
the Federal government as the main recruiting agency of the armed forces. The
emphasis on states’ rights was progressively replaced by centralization, with the
Federal government assuming a main role in military affairs, fiscal policy, and
economic development.4

4 The Republican administration resorted to a series of unprecedented measures to enforce its
authority and face the increasing expenses generated by the war. Two of them deserve immediate
mention: the Legal Tender Act and federal taxation helped to finance the costs of the northern war
efforts.
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These changes affected the lives of the people of the loyal states in many
ways. They interfered with usual policy-making practices affecting the relations
between individuals

and their communities. These

transformations were

profound enough to affect the social basis of support given by communities to
the continuous efforts to feed and expand the army. As a consequence,
simultaneously with the struggle against the Confederates, there took place a
conflict over the identity the Union itself on the home front, a conflict Lincoln
called "the fire in rear.” 5
While much has been written about the economic transformations
propelled by the war in the North, less attention has been paid to the moral
economy of recruitment and its connections to American social organization.
How was the control of recruitment transferred from the states to the Federal
government? What kind of conflicts did that transfer generate? Under which
conditions did cooperation between local leaders and Federal officers become
possible? How did the local population react to the growing intrusion of the
central government into their lives?
This new situation was caused by the failure of volunteerism and the
introduction of America’s first draft system, through the Enrollment Act, in March
of 1863.6 The approval of this important war measure by the Congress was part
of a more general shift in the nature of the war. From this perspective, the

5 The expression was used during a conversation with Charles Sumner in January 1863. Quotation
taken from James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil W a r Era (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1980), p. 591.
6 The Confederate conscription law was passed in the spring of 1862.
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military events and the politics of war assume a still greater historical
significance, because they reveal the crucial role of military mobilization in
promoting political centralization and establishing more direct links between
citizens and the Federal government. They also produced social conflict on a
scale not previously experienced by common citizens in antebellum America.
Finally, they helped to delineate the multiplicity of issues that emerged as a
result of the constantly changing complex interaction between the growing
military needs of the Republican administration and the strong commitment of
citizens to their communities.7
This chapter focuses on the initial steps of Union recruitment. It places the
development of conscription within the context of the struggle over the nature
and control of citizen soldiers. It examines the relationship of recruitment to
social and political hegemony, with particular reference to the issues of state
power and local resistance. It also pays special attention to the relationship
between partisan politics and enlistment. My focus is on the period from the
summer of 1862 to the spring of 1863, a period that, according to Herman

7 Although conscription has always been discussed in the studies of the Civil War, the focus on the
political and social repercussions of recruitment dates from the 1974 work of Robert Sterling “ Civil
War Resistance in the Middle West," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1974). During
the early nineties further contributions focusing on draft resistance emerged from such authors as
Grace Palladino, Iver Bernstein and David Osher. These studies helped to establish a connection
between the impact of federal legislation and specific local long-term issues. See Grace Palladino,
Another Civil War. Labor. Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of Pennsylvania. 1840-68
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Iver Bernstein, The New York Draft Riots. Their
Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil W a r (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990); Osher, “Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation."
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Hattaway and Archer Jones, marked “the greatest Confederate and poorest
Union efficiency.”8
Recruitment was a critical issue in the sectional conflict, and it demands a
broad and multilayered consideration. As in the Brazilian case during the
Paraguayan Campaign, the Civil War period has to be looked not as a single,
unbroken

development

cycle,

but

as

changing

according

to

diverse

circumstances. When the circumstances were adverse to the Union efforts, as
they frequently were, the federal government needed to create the conditions
required to keep the war effort at full strength. Creating and enforcing a national
conscription system in a governmental tradition based on the preeminence of
states’ sovereignty raised constant problems for the administration and created a
paradox for its political leaders.

Setting the Stage
The Lincoln administration’s shift in the direction of emancipation and
“total war,” during the summer of 1862, was the most important social and
political consequence of the successful Confederate resistance on the battlefield.
Both moves required a strong commitment from northern society to the “new”
war goals as well as a Federal government strong enough to enforce compliance
with them. But riots and popular revolts in five states demonstrated that many
would resist the increasing sacrifices demanded by the quest for reunion.

8 Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p. 274.
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The dilemma faced by Lincoln and his supporters lay in the fact that the
greater war effort tested the limits of state power in such areas as “personal
liberty laws” and the control of state militias. There was enormous community
resistance in certain areas, showing the limits of state action in a society that
accepted as a fundamental principle the idea that the defense of the nation was
a primary responsibility of every citizen, not one reserved to a distant central
state.
While most authors agree upon the importance of these transformations in
the nature of the war, their effects upon the civilian populations of the North are
still subject to extensive debate. All social groups experienced personal
sacrifices, but some authors question whether the burden was evenly distributed
among classes, regions and ethnic minorities. W as it a rich man’s war but a poor
man’s fight, as some say?9
When the Civil War began, the capacity of the North to raise a strong
army was restrained by the traditions of American civic culture. Most Americans
had been historically hostile to the idea of a centralized standing army, as they
had been to a centralized state and centralized taxing authorities. Localism,

9 It would be impossible to measure the impact of the war effort over the whole northern society;
enormous geographic and social diversity would make it an impossible mission for the limits of this
chapter. However, in the last two decades, excellent studies have been filling this gap for some of
the regions most affected by the recruitment See Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest: The
Union and the Civil W ar 1861-1865 (1988, reprint, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
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antimilitarism, and individual liberty were highly valued, and government
interference against these values were viewed with alarm by most.10
For this reason, the evolution of American military institutions from the
eighteenth century followed a path contrary to that observed in Europe. While
the power of Western European states was based on their centralized capacity
to organize and maintain standing armies, Americans revived the concept of
militias, an institution linked to the British tradition but already decadent by 1800
in most continental societies in Europe.11 Militias answered to a notion of
citizenship whose loyalties were fundamentally local. They also answered to the
general scarcity of resources and shortage of labor prevalent in the thirteen
colonies. These material conditions contributed to a general distaste for long
term enlistment and permanent standing armies. In such a system, citizens turn
into soldiers, in the apt expression of John Whiteclay Chambers, when they
“choose to be."12

10 On the classical Republican assessment concerning the efficacy of militias and the threat posed
by permanent standing armies see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),
especially chapter XII “The Anglicization of the Republic. Court, Country and Standing Army,” pp.
401-22.
11 Charles Tilly defined the process undertaken by the Western European countries as an
“accumulation and concentration of coercive power,” in a procedure that parallels Karl Marx’s
“primitive accumulation” of capital. See Charles Tilly, “Logics of Capital and Coercion” in Coercion.
Capital and Europen States. AD 990-1992 (1990. reprint, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 16-19.
12 John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army. The Draft Comes to Modem America (New York:
Free Press, 1987), pp. 13-39. Recent reevaluations have contested this pattern for the Revolutionary
period. Charles P. Neimeyer found that the upper classes generally neglected to sign up, and that
the Revolutionary army was composed of African-Americans, Irish, Germans, Native-Americans
laborers-fbr-hire, and white men without fixed addresses, who rarely cared anything about the high
ideals being spouted in the drawing rooms and conference halls. They were real soldiers. America
Goes to War. A Social History of the Continental Army (New York: New York University Press,
1997), especially chapter 1, “Few Had the Appearance of Soldiers: The Social Origins of the
Continental Line,” pp. 1-8.
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For most of the colonial period, militias were responsible for the defense
of the thirteen colonies. The militias diverged in their organization, terms of
enlistment,

and forms of recruitment and training.

During the

War of

Independence there was a mobilization of a permanent paid contingent,
gathered through long-term enlistment. This suggested that a standing army
could emerge as a result of the colonies’ victory against England. However, the
main result of the Revolution was the rejection of the paramount features of
European bureaucratic development, especially the conception of a legitimate
monopoly of violence enforced by a central state.
Samuel Huntington has pointed out how this rejection was expressed in
the Constitutional debates. According to Huntington, the framers of the
Constitution did not fear the dangers of a standing army as such.13 The
phenomenon of militarism was not yet known during the second half of the
eighteenth century. The Framers, rather, feared “despotism,” especially that
coming from a strong centralizing state, a specter that haunted most Americans
of the early republican period. The pervasive fears of centralized authority,
standing armies, and excessive taxation were the most obvious characteristics of
the Anti-Federalists, but they also were present in a lesser degree on the

13 According to Huntington, the Constitution does not enforce a clear distinction between political
and military responsibilities. The Constitution divides civilian responsibilities on military affairs in
many distinct administrative levels. Within the federal system of government, the militia clauses
divide control over the militia between the state and the national governments. Within the national
government, the separation of powers divides control of the national military forces between
Congress and the President. Within the executive branch of the national government, the
Commander in Chief clauses tend to divide control over the military between the President and
departmental secretaries. See The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 169.
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Federalist side. Such a perspective was not only present among elite members,
it pervaded all the sectors of the active citizenry who participated in the political
life of the early republic.14
The resulting Constitution does not provide directly for “objective control,”
a term commonly associated with civilian control, that is, the exclusion of the
military from political power. Instead, the Constitution furnishes a complicated
system of checks and balances whose main objective is to prevent any branch of
the administration from concentrating too much military power in its hands.
Consequently, according to Huntington, objective control was achieved “in spite
of,” rather than “as a result o f constitutional provisions. It was an unintended
effect of the fear of aristocratic despotism.15
The nationalists failed in their intention to build a powerful standing army
because state militias furnished an appropriate counter-weight against the
growing power of the Federal organization. According to John Whiteclay
Chambers, the pattern that prevailed included three main components: a small
professional army, some state militia units, and local corps of volunteers. Such a
structure prevailed because it “permitted a relatively weak central government to
reinforce quickly the army in order to defend the nation."16 It also reinforced dual

14 For the popular formulation of Anti-Federalist conceptions see Saul Cornell, “Aristocracy Assailed:
The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism," in Journal of American History. 76, March 1990, pp.
1149-172.
15 “Objective civilian control has been extraconstitutional, a part of our political tradition but not of our
constitutional tradition....[The Framers] did not foresee the rise of military profession; consequently,
they did not provide for civilian control." Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 190.
16 John Whiteclay Chambers, To Raise an Army.... p. 29.
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solutions for related problems: the control of power, the defense of the nation,
and the division of military responsibilities among the states and the federal
government. The lack of financial resources and the scattered character of the
population restricted still more the structural potential for creating a permanent
standing army.
Americans sanctioned decentralized institutions to cope with their
defensive/offensive military needs. They gave preference to state militias,
because those furnished the best possible solution for the military challenges
they faced. Even in the South, where potential threats coming from slaves and
Indians were stronger, militia organizations provided enough power to maintain
the social order. Keeping the central government weak did not challenge
territorial integrity because the roots of the political pact lay in the states and
were enforced through agreement in Congress. Without powerful neighbors, and
taking advantage of America’s strategic isolation, the militia system basically
worked well. As Tocqueville wisely observed, the country’s fortunes resulted
from an original combination of both geographic isolation and human skill,
“Detached by geography as well as by choice from the passions of the Old world,
it neither needs to protect itself against them nor to espouse them.”,7
American hostility toward standing armies resembled the position of mid
nineteenth century Brazilian liberals in many aspects. However, it differed
fundamentally in one: Americans reserved

much

more power to local

17 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1848, reprint, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p.
228.
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government than Brazilians did. Their prejudices against standing armies
resulted from a widespread concern about despotic government, not from the
need to preserve a centralized monarchy from military turbulence. Consequently,
militias met the tasks of internal security, territorial expansion, and the balance of
constitutional powers in ways that favored local interests at the same time that
they reinforced territorial integrity. In this political landscape, the idea of
conscription reminded Americans of the worst aspects of European societies. A
militia organization composed of local volunteers, highly motivated, furnished the
most adequate counter-image to examples of European despotism. As
Tocqueville observed “Compulsory recruitment is so contrary to the habits of the
people of the United States that I doubt whether anyone would ever dare to bring
in such a law.”*8
During the nineteenth century, growing reliance on the state militias
constantly embarrassed the federal government, turning the lack of a standing
army into what Stephen
Coordination

between

Skrowonek has

the

military interests

called

“a

of the

standing

problem.”

federal and

states’

governments was never complete, leading to some very confused situations.
When President Madison called up the militia during the War of 1812, the
governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to cooperate. They
justified their position by declaring that only the states could decide whether the
circumstances justified the call or not. Later in the same war, such local/federal

18 Ibid, Democracy in America, p. 228.
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conflict occurred again, when the militia on the Niagara frontier refused, on
constitutional grounds, to enter Canada in support of the regular army forces.19
For most of the antebellum period, the regular army was very small,
ranging between 4,000 and 16,000 men, scattered in many garrisons around the
national borders. The states retained the primary responsibility for raising troops
when the nation required them. The governors of each state had virtual control of
when their men were raised, when they went, and even (sometimes) where they
served. To accomplish such

control,

governors relied not on a strong

bureaucratic organization, but on the strength of the system of parties, an
institution that, in the words of Eric L. McKitrick, had been “historically the chief
agency for mobilizing and sustaining energy in American government.,ao
Anti-professional,

pro-militia sentiment was strong in most political

sectors, including the emerging Republican

Party.

It was reinforced by

Jacksonian doctrines of states’ rights, frugal government, and the virtues of the
common man.21 This mentality survived the early national period and was still

19 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative
Capacities. 1877-1920 (1984, reprint New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For the
discussion concerning the army problems, see chapter II, part 4, “Patching the Army,” pp. 85-120.
20 Eric I. McKitrick, “Party Politics and the Union and Confederate W ar Efforts” in William Nisbet
Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), The American Party Systems. Stages of Political
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 120.
21 One of the positive effects of the militia organization lay in the fact that it reinforced suffrage reform
by extending the right to vote to all persons enrolled. For the relations between the service in the
militias and the extension of political rights, see: Merril D. Peterson (ed.), Democracy. Liberty and
Property: The State Constitutional Conventions of the 1820's (Indianapolis: 1966), pp. 272-73, 280
and Melvin Yazawa. “Citizenship.” in Jack P. Greene (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Political
History: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas. 3 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1984), vol. I, pp.
109-209.
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strong when the Civil War began. Voicing this feeling, Dennis Hart Mahan
accentuated in 1860 the virtues of the militia organization: “This is our best and I
trust will be looked to always as our only safeguard from danger within as well as
without.”22 Only a few voices, including those of Alexander Hamilton, John C.
Calhoun, and some professional officers, were raised in criticism against the
situation.23

The North and the Politics of Secession
From December 20,1860 to February 1, 1861, the secession of South
Carolina and the rest of the lower South shook the temporary unity in the North
that had been achieved to ensure Lincoln’s election. During the interregnum
between the election and Lincoln’s inauguration, the North seemed to be more
divided than the South over the risks of territorial disintegration. To make things
more uncertain, there was no agreement about the proper behavior of the next
administration. President Lincoln himself, isolated in Springfield, did not show
clear signs of his intentions.24
In spite of the gravity of the situation, it was not clear whether secession
of the lower South would or not prevail; nor was it clear whether war would be
the final outcome of decades of political disagreement. Outside a hard core of

22 Quoted in Russel Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought From Washington to
Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), chapter IV.
23 Most Republican leaders as Simon Cameron, William Seward, Henry Wilson, Salmon Chase, and
Abraham Lincoln had joined militia companies when young and still viewed the institution as a
positive asset in American politics. Consequently we can assume they did not have an a-priori
position in favor of centralization in this special issue until late in the war.
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uncompromising “Radical Republicans” favoring coercive measures, most
northern political factions favored some sort of negotiation, envisioning an
“acceptable compromise” capable of restoring the old Union. Compromises had
been achieved during previous crisis and it was expected that the procompromise forces would be able, again, to conciliate the divergent interests.25
The Democratic Party, still a relevant political machine, was strong in both
sections. Even inside those states that followed South Carolina and seceded,
many important areas held strong pro-Union minorities, and the vote for
secession had been surprisingly close in Georgia and in certain parts of the
cotton kingdom.26 More importantly, both sections shared a similar language,
national symbols, a memory of the common inheritance of historical events, and
devotion of the same forefathers. Both also shared a strong reverence for what
they believed to be the American republican culture.27 But these initiatives and

24 Kenneth Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis. 1860-1861 (1950,
reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 179-203; David M. Potter, Lincoln
and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp 134-155.
25 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 90-120; John Ashworth, Slavery. Capitalism and
Politics in the Antebellum Republic. Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, especially
chapter 6, “Slavery, Economics, and Party Politics, 1836-1850,” pp. 366-492. Mark Grimsley,
“Conciliation and Its Failure, 1861-1862," in Civil War History. Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, December 1993,
pp. 317-35.
26 For a good account on the small margin for secessionism in Georgia see William W. Freehling and
Craig M. Simpson (eds.) Secession Debated. Georgia’s Showdown in 1860 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992); also Michael Johnson, Toward a Patriarchal Republic: the Secession of
Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), especially pp. 79-107.
27 And even in those states that opted for secession, differences were very narrow. According to
David M. Potter, in Louisiana the pro-secession difference was 1,763 votes out of a total of 38,665.
In Alabama, the so-called “Cooperationists ,” who opposed immediate secession, had between 36
and 43 per cent of the votes. In Alabama, the difference was 7,500 in a total of 28,100. In Texas,
governor Sam Houston opposed secession and refused to convene the legislature. So, outside
South Carolina, margins for secession were not strong enough to make anybody certain that
secession was inevitable, see, The Impending Crisis, pp. 496-97.
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points of convergence could not overleap a basic question: would the southern
elite concede control of the government to a hostile antislavery majority?28
Notwithstanding the decentralized structure of the antebellum state and
the small size of the Federal government, its power was relevant enough to
provoke slaveowners’ fears of a disruption of their ascendancy over socially
subaltern groups. Potentially, Federal interference might come through the
operation of essential institutions, such as the mail and the courts systems as
well as the operation of traditional patronage practices involving the relations
between the states and the Federal government. According to David M. Potter,
by 1860, the Southern elites feared above all “...the power to appoint Republican
judges, custom collectors, and postmasters in the South.”29 Such power, they
believed, could disrupt their power on the plantations. Their state of mind was
well captured in an editorial published by the Charleston Mercury, in October
1860:
If, in our present position of power and untidiness, we have the raid
of John Brown...what will be the measures of insurrection and
incendiarism, which must follow our notorious and abject
prostration to Abolition rule at Washington, with all the patronage of
the Federal Government, and a Union organization in the South to
support it?...30
28 One of the strongest fears among Southerners was that a Republican administration in
Washington would lead to a wave of slaves' insurrections. On this point, see Carl N. Degler, Neither
Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York: Macmillam,
1971), pp. 47-51; Kenneth M. Stamp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South
(New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 132-40 and Winthrop Jordan, Tumult and Silence at Second
Creek: an inquiry into a Civil W ar slave conspiracy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1993). The best source is Steve Channing, Crisis of Fean Secession in South Carolina (New York,
Simon and Schulster, 1970).
29 Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 477.
30 Charleston Mercury. 11 October 1860, quoted in Kenneth M. Stamp (ed.), The Causes of the Civil
War (1959. reprint, New York: Touchstone, 1991), p. 151.
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Georgian Thomas R. R. Cobb summarized the precariousness of the pro
slavery position under a Republican executive:
The Executive branch of the Government alone can protect us. The
President only can call out the Army and the Navy. The President
only can appoint Commissioners, and Marshals, and Judges, to
execute the Fugitive Slave Law. The President only can protect us
from armed invasions and secret incendiaries. I admit that it is so
feeble that we can hope but little from it, even with a friend as
President - with a foe, what we can hope?31
The Republican Party had come to power in the Northeast and MiddleWest areas of the country on a platform of limiting slavery to the states were it
still existed, restraining its expansion into the Western territories, and sweeping
the “slave power” from the Federal government. The party was deeply committed
to a strong intervention of the federal government in infrastructure, and the
judicial system. Certain sectors tried to picture the party as “the defender of the
white man,” in a clear rejection of slave labor relations. Others openly criticized
the southern social organization as an inferior and backward social experiment.
Lincoln himself recognized in February 1860 that a Republican victory would put
clear limits to slavery affirming that, “The Federal Government

has the power

of restraining the extension of the institution.”32

31 Thomas R. R. Cobb Secessionist Speech, Monday Evening, November 12,1860, in Freehling and
Simpson (eds.), Secession Debated.. p. 25. The extent of southern panic was well expressed at an
incident in November, 1860. Slaves at Georgetown, South Carolina, were whipped for celebrating
Lincoln’s election by singing a hymn with the verse :We’ll soon be free Till the Lord shall call us
home.” The southerners accused the slaves of meaning “The Yankee” when singing “the lord”. See
Susie King Taylor, Reminiscences of Mv Life. A Black Woman’s Civil War Memories, edited by
Patricia W. Romero and Willie Lee Rose.
32 Abraham Lincoln, “The Cooper Institute Address, 27 February, 1860,” in Don E. Fehrenbacher,
ed., Abraham Lincoln. A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 137.
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In spite of the great tension, the disposition to compromise was favored,
above all, by the indeterminate position of the upper southern states, especially
the most important of them, Virginia. Many people believed that if the upper
South stayed in the Union, secession could not last too long. Such a perspective
prevailed long after the opening of the Civil War showed the extent of
Confederate commitment to independence. It had enormous consequences for
the slow shift of Union leaders toward total war and abolition during the first year
of the conflict.

First Phase: Enthusiasm
By 1861 the North was a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic society involved in a
relentless process of economic development and territorial expansion. Robert H.
Wiebe has described the antebellum social organization as made up of “island
communities,” as the constitution of a national market had not yet destroyed the
parochial structures prevalent in most states.33
The 1860 census found a population of 22,339,989 for the entire region,
excluded the populations of western Virginia, eastern Tennessee and other
Confederate

pockets

loyal

to

the

Union.34 The

northern

railroad

net

encompassed 21,973 miles and the North’s 1,300,000 industrial workers were
employed

in

110,000

manufacturing

establishments.

Northern

states

33 Robert H. Wiebe. The Search for Order. 1877-1920 (1967, reprint, New York: Hill and Wang,
1995). See especially chapter 3, “Crisis in the Communities,” pp. 44-75.

34 The populations of such regions not only opposed secession but rendered substantial numbers of
recruits to the Union armies. See Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism. Yeoman Farmers
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manufactured 97 percent of the country’s firearms in 1860, 94 percent of its
cloth, 93 percent of its pig iron, and more than 90 percent of its boots and shoes.
In spite of such impressive numbers, the evolution of the war would show how
little superiority in resources might mean when confronted with a cohesive
enemy, determined to achieve and maintain its independence.35
When the Confederacy finally opened fire against Fort Sumter on April 12,
1861, it reinforced momentarily loyal northern sentiment by giving the cause of
Union a cohesive force, somehow lost during the winter of 1861. By the attack,
Confederates became the aggressors, the traitors to both the American flag and
the nation’s cause. Patriotic feelings united the North and penetrated deeply
most towns and counties. During the first two years of the conflict, most soldiers
who enlisted in the North did so because they “chose to do so.”36
President Lincoln announced on April 15, that “combinations too powerful
to be suppressed” existed in the South and called 75,000 troops for a threemonth term of sen/ice. This call is normally recognized as being the official
inauguration of northern mobilization. But informal actions taken by some state
governors, especially John Andrew of Massachusetts, were already positioning
their state militias for war. These governors, many of whom had taken office
before Lincoln’s inauguration, were not limited by the same clauses that

and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountrv. 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983), p. 129.
35 Numbers presented by Hattway and Jones, How the North Won, pp. 17-18.
36 James M. McPherson, For Cause & Comrades. Why Men Fought in the Civil W ar (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 16.
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restricted preemptive action coming from the President or from his Secretary of
War. Consequently, they took steps to transform their local militias into combat
units, anticipating the presidential call. After the Presidential call and for most of
the first year, governors proceeded with the utmost energy in their recruiting
activities, always keeping the responsibility for the raising of troops in their
hands.37
Table V
Recruitment for the Union Army, 1861
Number Furnished
Date of Presidential Call
91,816
April, 15
2,715
May, 31
697.965
July 22-25
Source: Thomas L. Livermore. Numbers & Losses in the Civil W ar in America. 1861-65 (1900. reprint,
Carlile/PA John Kallmann, Publishers, 1996), p. 50 According to the author, possibly 16,000
regulars on rolls January 1861, should be added to the numbers shown in table V.

As in the war of Brazil against Paraguay, initial calls produced enormous
mass meetings and farewell ceremonies where regimental flags were presented,
soldiers were praised, and speeches were delivered. Even for a society used to
volunteerism, the first exhibitions of enthusiasm surprised many observers. George
Ticknor, a Harvard professor born during George Washington’s government, wrote
that, “The whole population, men women, and children seem to be in the streets
with Union favors and flags.”38

37 By April 13, Massachusetts had 5,000 men prepared for combat. Osher, Soldier Citizens for a
Disciplined Nation, pp. 102-103. John Andrew, a Republican deeply committed to abolitionism, was
also an enthusiast of state militias, resisting the advance of the central government into recruitment
during the war.
38 Quoted in McPherson, For Cause & Comrades, p. 16. In this sense, many of the young volunteers
were reproducing some of the feelings described by Fred Anderson for late colonial America, during
the Seven Year’s war campaigns. See A People’s Army (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1984).
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During these first weeks, the call for soldiers encountered few problems.
Feeling outraged by the machinations of the “southern conspiracy,” thousands of
volunteers enlisted spontaneously in militias organized under the states’ auspices.
These volunteers had scarcely any military experience because, for the most part,
their peacetime activities were very limited, rarely going to the point of real military
training. At that time, the general feeling was that the war would be short, and the
rebels would soon be brought back to the Union.39
Meetings in support of the Union cause were held all around the country.
The war fever extended to all ages and classes, crossing party lines. A local
newspaper in Keokuk, Iowa, reflected the nonpartisan spirit in April, 1861, noting
that some citizens in town gathered and declared publicly ‘that we know each
other, no longer as Democrats and Republicans, but as lovers of liberty, and
supporters of the Constitution of the United States, as framed by our forefathers.”
Henry Tapen voiced the same feeling when he wrote Lincoln that “W e are no
longer Democrats and Republicans - We are under one flag - the flag of the
glorious Union.”40
Lincoln’s call for troops was also answered in areas where Democratic
Party forces prevailed. Such was the case in the coal-mining districts of

39 James McPherson portrayed that state of spirit as the “rage militaire" - an expression commonly
associated with the French experience in combat. Knowing nothing of the risks and consequences of
total warfare that they would experience, many of those volunteers thought about the war experience
as an adventure, an opportunity to see a world very different from that of their daily lives. See For
Cause & Comrades, p. 16.
40 Hawk-Eye (Burlington, Iowa), 20 April 1861, p. 4. Quoted in Sterling, “Civil War Resistance in the
Middle W est" p. 31. Henry P. Tappen to Abraham Lincoln, 19 April 1861, The Lincoln Papers, vol. II,
p. 572. Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p.112.
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Pennsylvania. Grace Palladino’s study of draft resistance showed how the initial
call for troops was enthusiastically answered in this region. These districts had a
significant foreign population, with Irish Catholics predominating. By June 1861, a
Republican newspaper not known for its sympathy toward Catholic immigrants
noted, with enthusiasm, that English, French, German, Scotch, Irish and Welsh
“have banished all differences and [are vying] with each other in their expressions
of loyalty to the country of their choice.”41
At this point, the raising of troops was fully in the hands of the state
governors. According to David Osher, this state of affairs reflected the
“privatization of civic responsibility," that is, a compromise between a fragile
Federal

organization

and

empowered

local

communities.42 But political

cooperation between the federal government and the states was made easier by
the fact that, by 1861, all northern governors were Republican, who represented
both the state organizations and the national coalition responsible for bringing
Lincoln to Washington.43
Although the governors controlled the

process of recruiting, they

depended on the good will of the local political bosses or prominent men who

41 Palladino, Another Civil War, p. 85. Erasing partisan competition was a spontaneous process in
certain regions as well as it was the result of political craft in other areas. According to Robert
Sterling, in Illinois, the Democratic leader Stephen A. Douglas used his tremendous influence to
remove the war issue from the realm of partisan politics. See Sterling, Civil W ar Draft Resistance in
the Middle West, pp. 32-5.
42 Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 95.
43 William Best Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (1948, reprint, Gloucester
Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1972); Allan G. Bogue, The Earnest Men: Republicans of the Civil War
Senate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), especially pp. 125-150; The Congressman's Civil
W ar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially pp. 29-59.
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aspired to become officers in the newly formed companies. At the local level,
recruitment was connected to the popularity of local notables whose prestige
was fundamental in the success of those regiments that were raised and
equipped. Paul Ledman has shown the force of personal prestige in Port
Elizabeth, Maine. In this relatively wealthy coastal community, prominent citizens
advertised in local newspapers, appealed to acquaintances, and spent their own
money in “raising expenses.” In reward for their services, such notables often
achieved the rank of colonel in the initial regiments recruited. Ledman has
demonstrated that without the commitment of such persons during the initial
volunteering period, recruitment would have been a much more difficult task.44
In the absence of a national bureaucracy, personal commitment and
local party structures were the best sources of successful recruitment. As Lincoln
himself recognized in 1862,
The Republican organization, in all its principles, in all its practices,
and by all its members, is committed to the preservation of the
Union and the overthrow of the Rebellion. It is the power of the
State and the Power of the Nation.45
The force of localism was so strong that, in most companies, officers were
recruited in the same communities as their soldiers. This circumstance
strengthened the parochialism normally associated with the act of mustering in.
Consequently, both a chain of command and a complex network of kinship

44 Paul L. Ledman, “A Town Responds: Cape Elizabeth, Maine in the Civil W ar” (M. A. Thesis,
University of New Hampshire, 1999), p. 38.
45 “Oneida County Proceeding of the Republican Party Convention” held at Rome, NY, September
26, 1862, published in the Utica Morning Herald. Quoted in Stephen Skowronek, Building a New
American State, p. 30.
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governed the military hierarchical relations of these locally raised units. These
links were strengthened by the practice, common at the beginning of the war, of
electing junior officers. As James McPherson has explained:
In the American tradition,...,citizen soldiers remained citizens even
when they became soldiers. They voted for congressmen and
governors, why should they not vote for captains and colonels?46
Local and ethnic pride reinforced the links between soldiers. They
impelled many men to enlist and at times kept them in their units far beyond what
their personal interest would have dictated. Fear of acquiring a reputation for
cowardice in the eyes of associates forced many to come to terms with their
fears and fight along neighbors, relatives and acquaintances.47 This particular
discipline was reinforced by the fact that many units were organized around
communal activities like Temperance Associations, Sunday schools, and
churches. In other cases, regiments were recruited from ethnic communities,
reinforcing the links between immigrant commitment and local pride. The
relationship between the first volunteers and their communities remained strong
until the end of the war. It helped to keep many veterans committed to the Union
cause, allying the national pursuit of the war with a strong sense of group
identity.48

46 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 327.
47 On the role of personal courage among the volunteers' early motivations, see Gerald F.
Linderman. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York:
Free Press, 1987), especially chapter 3, “Courage as the Cement of the Armies,” pp. 43-60.
48 McPherson, For Cause & Comrades, p. 54. S ee especially chapter VI, “A Band of Brothers."
According to James W. Geary, the majority of men, 1,342,110, joined the Union forces prior to the
“Conscription Act," when patriotism was still a significant motivation. See W e Need Men. The Union
Draft in the Civil W ar (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 82.
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Northern Public Opinion and War Limits
As Republican governors lobbied for more recruits, thousands flocked to be
enlisted before the war was over. The loyal states’ capitals turned into big camps.
In such a spirit, Ohio Governor, William Dennison, answered the administration’s
first call for a quota of thirteen regiments by declaring that, “owing to an
unavoidable confusion in first hurry and enthusiasm of.... our people, a much
larger force had already mobilized.” The governor added, “without seriously
repressing the ardor of the people, I can hardly stop short of twenty regiments."49
So strong was the general enthusiasm, and so precarious was the military
organization, that Maine Senator William Fessenden exhorted Secretary Cameron
to increase recruitment quotas writing “The People are now at your back, full of
enthusiasm and wrath. Take advantage of it.”50
But the Lincoln administration’s capacity to take advantage of the popular
mood was limited by its ideas concerning the war, by political considerations,
and by the prejudices prevalent in the northern society. As James McPherson
has observed, the Civil War was “[a] conflict where political leadership and public
opinion weighed heavily in the formation of strategy.”5* In this environment,
politics and strategy interacted because it was basically “a political war, a war of

W ar of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington DC, 1889-1901) Series 3, vol. II, pp. 298-300, henceforth quoted as O.R.

49

50 P. Fessenden to Simon Cameron, 9 May 1861, OR, III, 1, pp. 181-182. See also Osher, Soldier
Citizens for a Disciplined Nation, p. 113.
51 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 332.
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peoples rather than of professional armies.”52 Pressures from political parties and
state power groups were carefully taken into consideration by the administration
in all aspects of the war effort, from the designation of the officers corps to the
selection of the racial groups that could be admitted in the army.53
An important area in which the limitations of prejudice conflicted with
strategy involved the enlistment of African Americans. From the beginning of
hostilities, black leaders such as Frederick Douglass, J. Stella Martin, J.W.C.
Pennington, William Wells Brown, Martin Delany, Henry Highland Garnet and John
Mercer Langston, backed by white abolitionist and black publications, were asking
for the enrollment of African Americans. These leaders saw the restoration of
territorial integrity and black enrollment as related tasks. In May 1861, Frederick
Douglas summarized such feelings:
The simple way...to put an end to the savage and
desolating [war] now waged by slaveholders, is to strike
down slavery itself, the primal cause of that war.
... let the slaves and free colored people be...formed
into a liberating army, toward into the South and raise the
banner of Emancipation among the slaves.54

52 Ibid.
53 A number of prominent democrats were commissioned to improve the party’s commitment to the
cause of the Union. Some such as George B. McClellan, had previous personal military experiences
in the Army. Others, like David Hunter, were not military professionals but received their
commissions. If political connections mattered for those persons, it needs to be mentioned that even
in the group of professional soldiers, who attended West Point and were sympathetic to the
administration, political commitments also helped to advance carriers. Important future military
commanders as Ulysses S. Grant and William T, Sherman were nominated in part because of their
political connections with Republican state political bosses. One of the keys to their war success as
commanders was their understanding of the connections between the war and political needs.
54 Philip S. Foner, ed. The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass. 4 vols. (New York: International
Publishers, 1982), Vol. 3, p. 94.
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But the federal government did not accept such pleas and initial offers of
African Americans to enlist were dismissed as unnecessary and undesirable.
Racial prejudice was especially strong among foreign immigrants and those
recently arrived from the South, an important part of the Midwest’s population.
Many people in these states felt closer ties to the agrarian South than to New
England city dwellers. Economically, they were dependent on the Mississippi River
and the southern port of New Orleans for much of their trade and transportation.
Three northwestern states - Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa - had enacted laws to bar
blacks from their states. The war heightened their fear that hordes of black
laborers would descend upon their region and displace them from their jobs. As
stated on a letter from a Massachusetts’ corporal to the president, "When the war
trumpet sounded...the Black man laid his life at the Altar of the Nation, - and he
was refused.”55
During the first year of the war, many northern leaders saw the conflict as a
war for the Union, which should be fought only by white men. Demography
seemed to be on their side, because the North had 3.5 times as many white men
of military age as the Confederacy and a total ratio about 2.5 to 1 among those

55 These fears were not new Leon F. Litwack has analyzed how northern blacks had been
systematically excluded from the best opportunities provided by the urban market during the
antebellum period. The war intensified such feelings due to the fear of a migration oi masses of
runways. For the antebellum period see Litwack, North of Slavery. The Negro in the Free States.
1790-1860 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), especially chapter V, “The Economics of
Repression,” pp. 153-86.; also V. Jackie Voegeli, Free But Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro
During the Civil War (1967, reprint New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 1-9, 98-9. This study
furnishes a detailed description of the socio-political environment in the North during the Civil War.
Corporal James Henry Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, 28 Sept. 1863, quoted in Virginia M. Adams,
ed., On the Altar of Freedom. A Black Soldier’s W ar Letters from the Front. Corporal James Henry
Gooding (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), pp. 118-20.
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actually willing to serve. Consequently, they took for granted northern superiority in
all kinds of resources and imagined that this power would bring a rapid resolution
to a conflict of limited duration. Major General George B. McClellan defined the
essence of this kind of warfare in a letter to Lincoln in August 1861 when he
explained his strategy for campaigning in Virginia, “We have not only to defeat
their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming
strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing,
aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance.”56
Northern efforts to reunite the country did not lead yet to a rupture with
racial stereotypes. Even those who considered recruitment of blacks and Indians
to be reasonable, feared the reaction coming from the conservative branches of
the Union coalition. Some feared that arming free blacks and runaway slaves
could bring “fatal and dangerous dissatisfaction in the army;" and thus “it would do
more injury than good."57 Others, less concerned about African American destiny,
believed the war should reunite the country, not create an additional focus of social
tension.

Important as the conquest of the Confederacy might be, it should never

interfere with property rights or assumed racial hierarchies. Thus, while there was
basic agreement on the main goal of keeping the Union together, other less

56 McClellan to Lincoln, 4 August 1861. Quoted in Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command. The
Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 59.
57 Theodore C. Pease and James G. Randall (eds.), The Diary of Orville Hickman Browing.
(Springfield, 1927-1933), vol. I, pp. 555, 558-60. James McPherson noticed in his sample “relatively
few Union volunteers mentioned the slavery issue [as a relevant motivation], when they enlisted.” For
Cause & Comrades, op. cit, p. 19. In his study of northern soldiers, Bell Willey pointed that scarcely
one in ten Union soldiers “had any real interest in emancipation per se.” See The Life of Billy Yank
(1952, reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), p. 40.
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substantive questions, such as emancipation or the status of the southern states
after reunion, were conveniently kept out of the political debate. On July 4, 1861
Lincoln still envisioned a war of limited goals, explaining that he had “no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery in the states where it exists.”58 At this
time, northern leaders believed secession could be reversed through the use of
limited measures. The “Anaconda plan" presented by General-in-Chief Winfield
Scott exemplifies such a strategy. Scott hoped to slice vital portions of the area in
rebellion and, in conjunction with a naval blockade, envelop the insurgent states
and terminate the war with as little bloodshed as possible. The army should
occupy as much Confederate territory as possible without engaging in long bloody
campaigns. A war of movement, not of permanent attrition, was the preferred
option. Given this limited conception of warfare, expropriation of any form of
property, as punishment or revenge, was rejected by the administration. The New
York Times reflected the sentiments of most northerners in May 1861, when it
editorialized; “The war on the part of the people of the North is not against the
States or the institutions of any State. It is against treason and in defense of the
best government in the world.”59
The Dynamics o f the Civil War
During the first year of campaign, President Lincoln and his military leaders
aimed for a decisive victory (possibly in a major battle), which, they believed, would

58 Blaster (ed.), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. IV, p. 263.
59 New York Times. 10 May 1861, quoted in Howard C. Perkins (ed.), Northern Editorials on
Secession. 2 vols. (Gloucester Peter Smith, 1964), vol. 2, p. 830.
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bring back the Southern states.60 What they soon learned, however, was that
major battles, even if won, might fail to break the back of the rebellion even if they
came frequently and at much cost.
The presidential call for volunteers led to the second and final wave of
secession involving the states in the upper South, including the painful loss of
Virginia. Aside from being the most important state in the Confederacy, Virginia
was also the home of many military leaders, and it was closely identified with the
nation’s patriotic heritage. In spite of this loss, and those of North Carolina,
Arkansas and Tennessee, the upper border states of Maryland, Delaware,
Kentucky and Missouri were kept in the Union. Together, the Border States had a
combined population of approximately 3,137,000 and an area of 152,000 square
miles. They constituted a pivotal asset for the Union during the first inconclusive
months of the war. In those states, slaves were still considered property and
subject to the Fugitive Slave Law. Their allegiance to the Union was far from
complete, as a large proportion of the border population supported the
Confederacy and viewed the Union army as an occupation force.81 The

60 In this sense, they probably reasoned as German strategist Carl Von Clausewitz who declared
three decades before that “fighting is to war...what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it
may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed to towards it, and eventually it must
take place all the same and must be decisive.” Clausewitz quoted in John Keegan, The Face of
Battle (1976. reprint, London: Penguin, 1978), p. 28. According to Keegan, this economic analogy
delighted Marxist philosopher Freedrich Engel’s to such an extreme he included Clausewitz in the
Marxist Temple du G6nie.
61 A famous example of Border support to the Confederacy was the Orphan Brigade in Kentucky.
The 4,000-men 1" Kentucky Brigade was organized their home state, which remained in the Union.
The soldiers, whose allegiance was Confederate, were forced by circumstances to train in
Tennessee. In February 1862, the Confederate army was forced out of Kentucky, and with it went
the 1* Kentucky Brigade, never to return during the war. This forced exile gave the unit its nickname,
“Orphan Brigade."
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enforcement of Federal authority in those states was elusive. Union border policy
was extremely cautious and formed a major obstacle to a quick radicalization of
the war. In particular, the maintenance of the border states’ allegiance moderated
the administration’s racial and recruitment polices during the first year. In the
border states, as in other loyal states, the war effort was based on cooperation
between local and Federal authorities. But such cooperation would only work as
long as the interests of local and federal politics coincided.62

Second Phase: Tension
When operations began, few if any Union policy-makers foresaw the
consequences of the war effort for relations between the center and the periphery
of American society. Although war enthusiasm alone fueled support for the initial
northern mobilization, it did not give leaders a clear vision of the tasks that lay
ahead. The military strategists of the Lincoln administration underestimated both
the force of Confederate nationalism and the level of cooperation its non
slaveholder groups would offer to secession.63

62 A curious example of the Federal caution is in recruitment. While most Border States did not fill
their quotas for recruits in 1862 and 1863, no draft was ordered in those areas.
63 In his analysis of Augusta’s Hinterlands - Georgia, J. William Harris pointed that although poor
men could go “shoulder to shoulder" with slaveholders, such cooperation was not free from
hierarchical and social tension. As the war progressed and conscription expanded, rich men
managed to avoid Confederate service more often than did the poor. Consequently, in that region,
southern “fagade” of social unity would be progressively shaken as war sacrifices mounted. See
Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society, especially chapter 5, “Strains of W ar,” pp. 140-166. For a
different vision of similar problems see Peter S. Bearman, “Desertion As Localism: Army Unit
Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War," in Social Forces. 70:2, December 1991, pp. 321341. Through his analysis of enlisted men from North Carolina, Bearman argues that localism and
not class was the main element for the erosion of Southern identity in that group.
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In addition to enthusiasm, the Confederacy had an enormous territory, rich
in natural resources; it was equipped with good military leadership; and it was
inhabited by a population highly motivated to fight. During the Revolutionary War,
similar

conditions

helped

the

weaker

army

to

prevail.

Technological

developments in modern weaponry also reinforced the superiority of the defense.
Consequently, the war would require a more formidable effort to defeat the rebel
armies, occupy the land, establish lines of communication and force into a
submission an entire country than northerners imagined. Men and resources
would have to be multiplied far beyond initial estimates.64
After a year of war, however, the impression that the South would succeed
in winning its independence was becoming stronger. In April 1862 the Confederate
government passed its own Conscription Act, enrolling most of the male population
in condition to serve, showing the country’s willingness to defend itself from
northern invasion. Soon it became clear the country could only be reunited through
a complete defeat of the Confederate armies. As the last prospects of compromise
vanished, the hopes for friendly reunion would be increasingly associated with

64 On Confederate nationalism see Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism.
Ideology and Identity in the Civil W ar South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988),
David M. Potter, The South and the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1968), and Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War. How Popular Will. Nationalism, and
Military Strategy Could Not Save Off Defeat (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). According
to Faust "Scholars have continued to fear that accepting the reality of Confederate nationalism would
somehow imply its legitimacy...” Ibid., p. 3. For an analytical comparison between the challenges
posed by the American Revolution and the Civil W ar see, John M. Murrin, “War, Revolution, and
Nation Making: The American Revolution versus the Civil War,” Research Paper, Philadelphia
Center for Early American Studies, 1984.
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copperheadism and treason, a stigma that attached to peace Democrats in the
North during the last two years of the conflict.65
While the Confederacy took firm steps to build its army, both the Federal
administration and the military bureaucracy lacked the skills that would be needed
for a stronger mobilization. In 1860, the office of the Secretary of War and the
military bureaus employed 93 people, including 14 clerks. In the Department of
War things did not look better: without counting troops, this pivotal Department
employed 248 people across the nation. If this organization was weak in
peacetime, it proved terribly unreliable in an increasingly violent conflict with its
permanent demand for men and resources.66
The difficulties in raising an army began to show up as soon as regiments
were gathered in the camps. American military tradition, political factionalism, the
lack of infrastructure, the scarcity of adequate military equipment, and bad
management quickly contributed to a deterioration in field conditions. Many troops
were poorly dressed and fed. Constant delays in the soldier’s pay contributed to
the growing dissatisfaction, intensifying the demands for bounties and other local
selective incentives. While demand for men grew, some troops were left on their

65 The classic work on Southern conscription is Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the
Confederacy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924). J. William Harris analyzed how opposition to
conscription affected Georgia’s devotion to republican liberties. See Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave
Society. 147-53. For the significance of conscription to the southern war effort see James W. Geary,
W e Need Men.... pp. 3-5. Geary pointed the fact that the South could not rely on high bounties to
raise her troops because of the scarcity of financial resources. Hattaway and Jones estimate that
around 87 percent of southern white males of arms-bearing age served in the Confederate army.
See How the North Won, p. 721.

66 Osher. Soldiers Citizens for a Disciplined Nation p. 101.
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own in cities and camps where they gathered. Word came from Philadelphia that
“Ohio troops now here have been on our streets as beggars for food.”67
Many of these problems were worsened by the dynamics of the conflict.
After the first battles, romantic assumptions about glory and heroism vanished.
The Civil War introduced a new technology of long-range warfare, propelled by the
rifle and the Mini6 bullet that rendered the Napoleonic style of decisive battle
obsolete.68 Highly effective, new long-range weaponry reinforced the defensive
capabilities, giving the Confederates an extra advantage. This circumstance
prolonged the war and multiplied the scale and severity of casualties beyond
anything Americans had ever conceived. It eventually transformed war so that
armies had to endure long, constant periods of terror and violence while the civilian
infrastructure of transportation, industry, and agriculture became as critical a target
as the soldiers themselves.69

67 Sterling. Civil W ar Draft Resistance in the Middle West, p. 39. All these hazards were described in
detail in the letters soldiers wrote home. In these uncensored documents recruits described the
worst aspects of camp life. They complained about poor food, sickness, fatigue, boredom and
delayed payments. To add to the confusion, the contents of such letters were often read to a broad
public, a circumstance that made the work of recruiting officers still more difficult Disturbed by the
lack of adequate conditions one of these soldiers described the problems faced while in route to
front: “W e were huddled together more like a lot of pigs than human beings...I was compelled to
sleep on the floor... Our rations we could hardly force down. In fact most of it was rotten or nearly so.
The water was very dirty. Yet we were glad to get enough of it.
68 According to Eric Foner, in this sort of war “the effectiveness of political leadership, the ability to
mobilize economic resources, and society’s will to keep up the fight are as crucial to the final
outcome as success or failure in individual battles.” Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney, A House
Divided. America in the Age of Lincoln (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), p. 79.
69 The siege of Vicksburg (May 22 to July 4,1863) in Tennessee furnishes one of the best examples
of how the civilian population could become a target of the war efforts. After months of siege the
town finally surrendered in July 4th, 1863. This special holiday was not celebrated there for decades
after the end of the war.
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Pictures and sketches taken on site and published by illustrated magazines
like Frankie Leslie Illustrated and Harper’s Weekly exposed the war’s realities to
populations far behind the battlefields. The Civil War was the first conflict that
received immediate press coverage. Consequently, communities would be well
informed about the risks and perspectives faced by those who enlisted.
Enthusiasm also decreased due to the circulation of the casualty lists, showing an
increasing number of soldiers dying from infectious diseases, spread by poor
sanitation in the camps.70
During the winter of 1862, recruitment in the North ground to a halt. Men
were less and less willing to enlist for long periods of time to the detriment of their
private activities. Most potential recruits were afraid of suffering the consequences
of mismanagement and lack of care, common during the first months. They also
feared missing the harvest and a chance to help their relatives and friends in their
communities. With rising inflation and frozen military salaries, the discrepancies
between what soldiers received in the army and normal salaries in the market grew
larger. As campaigns became longer, permanence in the army meant more and
more sacrifices for families and relatives in the rearguard. It prevented these same
individuals from enjoying the opportunities provided by the economic boom that
spread in many parts of the North as a consequence of an increasing demand, fed
by the war.

70 According to Jeffrey Bolster and Hilary Anderson, the connection of photography and war during
the American Civil W ar proved “another step in the modernization of combat” becoming "as much a
part of the Civil W ar as the rifle.” See Soldiers. Sailors. Slaves, and Ships. The Civil War
Photographs of Henry P. Moore (Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1999), p. 10.
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In the spring of 1862, enthusiasm was renewed with successes in the
front, bringing a new wave of excitement to northern public opinion. The view
began to change for the better when a new secretary of war took charge. Edwin
McMasters Stanton, a Democrat committed to the war effort, became Secretary
of War, with the promise of a better organization of the war effort.71 With Stanton
in Washington and the energetic George B. McClellan at the head of the army of
the Potomac, both the training and the supply of the Union army were
reorganized. Special attention was given to the Army of the Potomac and to the
spring campaigns on the eastern front.72 McClellan’s obsession with every detail
and his strong administrative capacity convinced soldiers, politicians, and
civilians that Lincoln had finally found his general. Preparations looked toward a
short campaign, to be followed by the occupation of the Confederacy’s capital,
Richmond, during the spring.73
But confidence was again shackled when secretary Stanton discontinued
recruitment through General Order 33, in April 1862, following the capture of
Forts Henry and Donelson in the West. His order reflected a rising optimism and
the overconfidence of the administration in McClellan’s leadership. But soon, the

71 In December 1861 secretary Cameron issued instructions that governors were not to send any
more regiments forward unless they were requested to do so. If such a procedure was intended to
some money, or if its main objective was just to give a better direction to the army businesses, its
reckless effects were heavily felt during the winter. This decision probably stemmed from the lack of
administrative organization during Cameron's term.
72 Such was the enthusiasm on the northern ranks that about June 1“, 1862, the slaves at St.
Simon’s Island were told there would soon be a settlement of the war. See Tailor, A Black Woman's
Civil W a r Memories, p. 38.
73 On McClellan’s administrative capacities and his relations with the Democratic Party and the
Lincoln administration see "Lincoln, McClellan, and Union Failure in the E a sf in Joseph T. Glatthaar,
Partners in Command, pp. 51-94.
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order proved to be a major mistake. From May to July, General McClellan
continually demanded more troops to support his long delayed, then thwarted
attacks against Richmond. The northern manpower shortage intensified during
the spring campaigns because of a combination of war reverses and renewed
economic opportunities in the North. In the Shenandoah Valley as well as in the
western theater, progress was slow and costly.74 As long as Vicksburg resisted, it
was impossible to make the Mississippi River a conduit for Union troops and
supplies. On the home front, the combined effects of an improving economy and
the agricultural work cycle also discouraged many potential recruits. Those who
headed households were less willing to leave families and dependents behind,
as the army payments came slowly.

Third Phase: Federal Reaction
Public depression in the North rose during the spring of 1862, when news
came of the failure of the Peninsular campaign, McClellan’s attempt to take
Richmond. Patriotic feelings began wearing thin and volunteers became
increasingly harder to find. The period, from June 1862 to July 1863, can be
considered the watershed of northern war efforts. The conflict turned from a
campaign to presen/e territorial unity into a total war against Confederate
society. Months of failure and the relentless resistance by the enemy reinforced
the perception that changes were needed if the government were to win the war.
Members of the coalition in power became more convinced than ever about the

74 The battle of Shiloh (April, 1862) cost General Grant 8,000 casualties. Resources were
progressively wasted and good news turned scarce as the season came to an end. Data presented
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need to undertake stronger measures to reinforce the national power. “These
enemies must understand," Lincoln explained to August Belmont during the
summer of 1862, “that they cannot experiment ten years trying to destroy the
government and if they fail...come back into the Union unhurt.”75 In the next two
years, a war between armies would turn into a war of societies, involving the
destruction of southern slavery and the annihilation of the Confederate Army.
This strategic shift encompassed enormous transformations in the organization
of the army as well as in the structure of American government, especially in the
scope of the federal capacity to recruit, interfering with the traditions and the
practices of small and large communities around the country.76
The Union government centralized decisions to an unprecedented level
and extended the range of recruitment to encompass a larger number of citizens
who would not enlist voluntarily. In his war memories, Silas Wright, an assistant
of Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, expressed such a shift in the state of
mind of those directly connected to the war efforts: “We had learned... that war
was such a barbarous institution that it could not be conducted upon democratic
principles of our civil authority.”77 At the same time, the dynamics of the war
created a new and more radical vision of its objectives and main targets. As

in John Macdonald, Great Battles of the Civil War (New York: Collier Books, 1992).
75 Alan Nevins, The W ar for the Union: W ar Becomes Revolution. 1862-1863 (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1960), p. 166.
76 The most important transformation would be of course those connected to the emancipation of the
slaves and the recruitment of black soldiers by the Union army, subjects that will be treated
separately, in chapter VII.
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James McPherson has argued, Lee’s victories in Virginia provided the stimulus
that would bring about the destruction of his own social environment. Senator
William Pitt Fessenden, a conservative republican from Maine, voiced such
feelings in July 1862: “The war must be fought on ‘different principles’; for the
‘white kid-glove warfare was past.”78
Part of the problem lay in the failure of volunteerism. While war
enthusiasm could sen/e as a strong element in support of mobilization, it alone
could not provide the additional numbers needed. Most of those who had
enlisted for patriotic reasons were already in the ranks, and additional manpower
was becoming scarce. In face of a progressive decline in recruitment and
alarmed by the range of tasks lying ahead, authorities began to look for
strategies to keep a permanent inflow of new recruits. To accomplish this, the
Federal government would need the people’s compliance with the government’s
demands and a Federal government strong enough to assure such compliance
would be maintained.

The Militia Act
In order to recover from the unfortunate consequences of General Order
33, the Republican administration decided to coordinate a governors’ call for new
troops in July 1862. Secretary Seward persuaded all the governors to unite in
memorializing the President to call for 150,000 more volunteers. The call

77 Silas Wright Burt, My Memories of the Military History of the State of New York During the War for
the Union. 1861-1865 (Albany: 1902), p. 85. Quoted in David Osher, Soldiers Citizens for a
Disciplined Nation, p. 233.
78 Fessenden quoted in McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 500.
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answered the needs of the army in face of the reverses brought by administrative
mistakes and a sequence of reverses on the battlefields. But the Republican
governors

conveniently

issued

their

request,

as

if

coming

from

a

decentralized/local impulse, not from a Presidential/centralist demand. Although
the general perception pointed to the urgent need to increase the military power
of the Union, many Republicans feared that a direct presidential request could
be interpreted as coming from desperation, increasing the impression of failure
associated with the delicate state of the war.
To the “governors’ call” of June 28 Lincoln responded with a presidential
request for 300,000 more troops on July 2nd. The men who responded to July’s
first call were mustered in for three years’ service. All sides profited from this
strategy: while the Federal government avoided a public demonstration of
weakness, governors kept the initiative in the eyes of their constituents and the
army

received

reinforcements

to support

her

expected

progress

over

Confederate territory during the summer season.79
Meanwhile, Congress discussed and approved the Militia Act. This
measure authorized the first real incursion of federal power into the realm of the
states. The bill authorized the president to call the states’ militia whenever
needed, extending the presidential power to issue quotas in the states. It also
empowered the federal government to order a draft in those states with deficient
or nonexistent conscription laws. In case a state should prove unable to fill its

79 According to David M. Osher 300,000 was clearly an insufficient number in view of the growing
challenges faced in the South.
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designated quota, it was expected that the governor would coordinate its own
draft, calling for Federal help when needed.80
The Militia Act extended the federal recruiting base but it also limited the
terms of service of those enlisted to nine months. Such a clause clearly
contrasted with the terms of the July volunteers.81 It allowed each township to
claim credit for all the men enlisted, regardless of whether they actually resided
or not there. This possibility opened the window to the search for substitutes
from other places. If states did not achieve their July quota by August 15, they
were to fill incomplete regiments through a draft. Although most states avoided
the draft, its perspective stimulated local recruitment, breaking through the
lethargy that had prevailed during most of the spring.82
The Militia Act marked the awakening of the Federal government to the
magnitude of the war, overthrowing traditional volunteer assumptions about
volunteers. It also marked the initial steps in the transformation of a fragmented
and multiform combat force into a national army. It was signed into law by
President Lincoln in July 17,1862, after a very brief discussion in Congress. This

80 This prescription was, nonetheless, never exerted, because state sheriffs, selectmen, and the
state militia executed the 1862 drafts.
81 On a clear contrast with the 3 years length of the July 2 call.
82 One of most important consequences of the militia Act was its repeal of the 1792 federal law
barring blacks from participation in both the state militias and in the regular United States Army. The
Militia Act provided for the employment of free blacks and freedmen as soldiers. See James M.
McPherson, The Struggle for Equality. Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil W ar and
Reconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 196. This point will be discussed in
chapter VII.
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measure marked the North’s first step toward national conscription and was
supported by both political parties and the partisan press.83
Although the Militia Act used a “carrot and stick” approach in order to get
the states to recruit more men, the act did not relieve these same states from the
work of raising troops, nor did it question the authority of governors and local
authorities in this particular area. Many features of the system were kept
unaltered. Recruitment procedures remained in the hands of governors, and the
formation of regiments and enlistment were predominantly local. Communities
raised money and encouraged meetings to obtain new recruits. Militiamen and
volunteers stayed in locally raised units and kept electing their officers. These
“volunteers" had the

privilege of entering

into newly formed regiments.

Consequently, the range of the act was limited: the national government
abdicated the power directly to compel citizens to enlist and to choose lower
officers. Governors retained power to directly coerce local authorities to raise the
troops, in order to avoid the inconveniences and the stigma of having the federal
government draft in their communities.84
While states retained control over officering, they did not provide positive
leadership in the unpopular area of recruiting. Localism remained strong and
delayed the draft in some states for months. Sometimes local authorities were
even able to extend the range of exemptions, saving temporarily their political

83 Mary Frances Berry, Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citizenship and the
Constitution. 1861-1868 (Port Washington: NY, Kennikat Press, 1977), p. 43.
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allies and dependents. Under the protection of sympathetic local authorities,
many men avoided enlistment through medical exemptions or because of their
occupation as railroad employees, state clerks, telegraph operators, post office
employees, or firemen. A growing number of potential recruits also applied for
ideological and moral exemptions such as "conscientious objection.” 85
One of the more effective ways to increase compliance was the offer of
bounties. The bounty system originated in the colonial period and was re
instituted, with great success, during the first year of the war. The Federal
government instituted a bounty of 100 dollars to be paid to those who enlisted for
a three-year's term of service. Originally this bounty was to be paid upon a
soldier’s discharge, but, under pressure from the states, the government decided
to give 25 dollars in advance to those who presented voluntarily. States, local
communities and private individuals soon expanded the bounty system in their
anxiety to fill quotas with volunteers, thereby avoiding the stigma and disgrace of
conscription. Many towns created their own additional bounties. Cape Elizabeth
in Maine duplicated the 100 dollars offered by the Federal government.86 As the

84 For a good summary of active and passive resistance against the draft see John O’Sullivan and
Alan M. Mecler (eds.), The Draft and Its Enemies; A Documentary History (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 61-107.
85 Conscientious objection, an important issue for pacifist religious groups was also kept for Quakers
and some other religious dissenters. For an interesting analysis of Quaker behavior during the Civil
War, see Jacquelyn Sue Nelson, Indiana Quakers Confront the Civil War (Indianapolis: Indiana State
Historical Society, 1991). Nelson contests general assumptions concerning the Friend’s nonadherence to the war effort. Utilizing church records and manuscript collections her major finds
indicate that more Quakers from Indiana took up arms in the Civil War than is generally assumed.
See chapter 3, “Why they Fight?,” pp. 29-44.
86 According to Robert Sterling, by the war’s end, the various public and private agencies had
expend almost three-quarters of a billion dollars in bounty money as inducements to reluctant
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threat of the draft increased, bounties multiplied, especially in those affluent
communities where resources abounded.87
Bounties

distinguished

1862

volunteering from

that of

1861.

As

enthusiasm decreased, the force of “selective incentives" was pivotal in keeping
up recruitment. The richer a community was, the more easily could it get
volunteers. Such regional imbalances worked against the poorest areas, which
lacked the means to pay for substitutes. In the long run, the multiplication of
bounties would break the links between soldiers and their communities, as a
growing number of recruits would no longer be connected to the places where
they enlisted. But in the middle of 1862 these unintended effects were not clear
to most, and they might be avoided if the armies of the Union achieved a rapid
progress on the battlefields.88
The fear of the draft and the incentives of increasing bounties spread a
new cycle of volunteerism in the North. The August 4 troop call, which was
directly linked to the Militia Act, was responded to with enthusiasm by many
states and the District of Columbia. Overall, the number of recruits surpassed the
original demand and thousands were enlisted in new corps of volunteers. Such

volunteers. See, “Civil Draft Resistance in the Middle West...".p. 656. For Cape Elizabeth, see
Ledman, “A Town Responds”, pp. 109-13.
87 For the significance of bounties as a selective incentive for enlistment, see Eugene C. Murdock,
One Million Men: The Civil W ar Draft in the North (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
1971), pp. 154-69.
88 On the bounty system and its effects Eugene Murdock, Patriotism Limited. 1862-1865: The Civil
War Draft and the Bounty System (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1967) and Ohio's Bounty
System in the Civil W ar (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963). See also Chambers, l o
Raise an Armv. pp. 46-9.
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successes were partly due to the excellent results of the July 2 call, which
furnished a surplus for the rest of the year.89
Table VI
Quotas and Terms of 1862 Union Volunteers
Date of the Call
Number Furnished
May and June 1862
15,007
July 2,1862
421,465
August 4,1862
87,588
Source: Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses., p. 50.

While most areas exceeded their assigned quotas, the states of Indiana,
Ohio, Wisconsin and the border areas fell behind. When these states were
unable to draft, their populations suffered repressive measures, generally
undertaken by state agents, sometimes with the support of the militia. Those
included: the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the institution of a
passport system, and, occasionally, a draft. Selectmen and sheriffs appointed by
the states organized the draft at the local level when needed. But overall, the
drafts were scattered and popular resistance was limited, and authorities,
recognized the results as very positive. A Maryland reformer voiced such
feelings: “The fear of being drafted [would] compel every loyal man to foster
recruiting."90
According to Robert Sterling, the Militia Act was halfway point between
state recruitment and national conscription. Although it advanced the power of

89 In spite of that, draft evasion was significant; estimates suggest that approximately forty to fifty
thousand men evaded the draft prior to 1864. See Judith Lee Hailock, “The Role of Community in
Civil W ar Desertion," in Civil W a r History. Vol. 29, no. 29,1983, pp. 123-134 and James W . Geary,
We Need Men, op. cit., especially chapter 8,"Yankee Recruits, Conscripts, and Illegal Evaders,” pp.
87-102.
90 Joseph E. Paine to Charles Sumner, July 7, 1862. Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a
Disciplined Nation, p. 188.

249

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the national government, it did not challenge local prerogatives, nor did it
energize a more organized movement of anti-draft resistance. Consequently, the
regulations concerning the Militia Act provided a curious composite, with national
guidelines superimposed on antiquated state militia statutes. It could work well
as long as both center and periphery cooperated, but its efficiency also
depended on the results of battle.91
In spite of the great enthusiasm that sprouted anew in the North during
early summer of 1862, failure on the battlefields still undermined the Union’s war
efforts. While advances were made in the Gulf states through the extension of
the naval blockade, the Union army was defeated in the second Battle of Bull
Run in August and was unable to get a decisive victory at Antietam in
September. In November, after months of indecision, George McClellan was
finally removed from his command. His replacement, General Ambrose Everett
Burnside, led the Army of the Potomac into disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg
in December, and Union troops retired to winter quarters without achieving the
dreamed-of decisive victory in the eastern theater. A great wave of depression
fell over the North in the aftermath of Friedericksburg, and confidence in the
administration was severely shaken at the same time that internal problems and
political dissension damaged the continuous efforts of the administration to
reorganize its armies. Politically, the Emancipation Proclamation in January,
1863, temporarily weakened the war coalition.

91 Sterling, Civil W ar Resistance in the Middle West, p. 68.
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After

Lincoln’s

preliminary

Emancipation

Proclamation

issued

in

September, 1862, a great uproar was heard from people who felt they could not
support a war to end black slavery in the Confederacy. The combined effects of
the Emancipation Proclamation and war reverses brought “peace Democrats” or
“copperheads” from their initial attitude of resignation to a more aggressive
opposition to the continuation of the war and to the Republican administration.
Other Democratic groups, less radical, continued to support the war while
demanding a return to the war’s initial, limited, goals. These “W ar Democrats”
believed the Union should be preserved, but they did not conceive that slavery
should be destroyed, and they had strong reservations about the temporary
suspension of the civil liberties in certain areas.92 Democratic Congressman
Daniel Vorhees of Indiana voiced the position of this group, complaining that war
enthusiasm would decrease due to the abolitionist measures: “I am showing up
this abolitionist policy as a reason why the loyal enthusiasm which impelled men
at first to the field, under a mistaken confidence and reliance upon the good faith
of this Administration, can no longer be relied on.”93
The commitment of the Democratic Party to the war effort was still
connected to the antebellum local/individualist vision of America, representing

92 The Peace or Copperhead faction of the Democratic Party believed that the increased power of
centralization of the Republican wartime government had brought hard times and political tyranny to
the North. They emphasized the growing sacrifices faced by poor white men and requested a
negotiated settlement between the sections as the best way to restore normalcy. See Richar 0 .
Curry, “The Union as It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the ‘Copperheads',” Civil War
History. XIII, March, 1967, pp. 25-39.
93 Congressional Globe. 37th Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 1232.
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“the great pre-modem cultures within American society”.94 In line with such
views, Democrats opposed confiscation of “rebel property” including slaves.
George C. McClellan voiced this view also in a letter to Lincoln, predicting, “A
declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our
present armies."95
Democratic electoral successes in the 1862 state and legislative elections
sparked the re-emergence of the partisan spirit and the possibility of a
presidential shift in the next elections. As control of state government meant, in
practice, control of recruitment in the state, Democratic governors could become
strong obstacles to the Republicans efforts even when out of the government.
Democrats could become noisy minorities, as they were in Indiana, Ohio,
Connecticut and Pennsylvania.96
Among the many structural problems that affected the army in early 1863
was the urgent need to replenish veteran regiments. Since the beginning of the
war, different troops had enlisted for different terms of service, varying from three
months to three years. Under the volunteer system, recruiting led to the constant
creation of new regiments, while veteran regiments kept shrinking as a result of
deaths, casualties, furloughs, and desertion. The multiplication of calls and
concessions to local needs turned the lack of uniform terms of enlistment into a

94 This perspective is suggested in Eric Foner “The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent
Interpretations and New Directions," in Civil W ar History. X X (September 1974), p. 208.
95 McClellan to Lincoln, 7 July 1862. OR, 1 ,1 1 ,1 , pp. 73-74.
96 For a discussion of the events that culminated in the 1862 fall elections, see Hesseltine, Lincoln
and the War Governors, pp. 249-272.
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major problem. If permitted to choose, volunteers would prefer to enlist in new
regiments, keeping their links with friends and comrades. The Militia Act had
provided soldiers with terms of nine months, which were ready to expire in May,
1863. With most of the two years’ terms about to expire at the same time, the
situation turned for the worse.97
Table VII
Calls by Terms of Service
Union Troops, 1861-1862
Date of Call
April 15, 1861
May 3, July 22-25,1861
May, June, 1862
July 2 ,1 8 6 2
August 4, 1862

Term for Which Called
3 Months
6 Months
3 Months
3 Years
9 Months

Source; Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses, p. 50

Another difficulty was that soldiers received differential pay, as the normal
13 dollars per month wages, established in the beginning of the war, were
increasingly supplemented by Federal, state, and local bounties.

Such

incentives acted like a carrot for new enlistment, but they also increased
resentment among veterans who had not received bounties. They also increased
the Federal and the states’ budgets.98 Those who volunteered at the beginning of

97 Northern democrats had been severely shaken by the crisis spawned by secession (a crisis in the
Democratic party, after all), but maintained their regular organizations everywhere in the North,
holding people’s allegiances in many areas. The party was rebuilt with the electoral victories of
November 1862, regaining part of its pre-war strength. The party was revived at the polls, gaining
thirty-five Republican seats as well as many state chairs plus, the governorship of the states of New
York and New Jeersey. Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil
War Era. 1860-1868 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977).
98 This is one instance the records about Civil W ar are notoriously inaccurate. A man could be paid to
substitute for someone else before that person (the principle) was drafted, but be called a volunteer.
If his principle was already drafted, then he should have been called a substitute. However, in
practice, recruiting officers often called them volunteers as well.
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the war resented being paid less despite their greater sacrifices, while newly
arrived recruits were paid better just because they had enlisted later. This
resentment disrupted reenlistment and risked depriving the Union army of its
most skilled combatants.
Until the spring of 1863, the army relied basically on the enthusiasm of the
population and the good will of local communities to replace soldiers and keep
recruitment at full strength. However, as communities faced increasing sacrifices,
their disposition to cooperate with federal authorities dropped throughout the
North. By the fall of 1862, Union leaders faced a dilemma similar to the one that
the Imperial bureaucrats in Brazil would face four years later: change their
strategy or give up the war efforts. The decision was to make the war still more
violent,

requiring a greater degree of compliance from Northern civilian

populations."
Although there were strong similarities between the Brazilian and
American dilemmas, Lincoln had a much more sophisticated structure to deal
with social and political dissenters. The Republican party’s primary objective from
the beginning of the war was the reunification of the nation. As it soon became
clear, to subdue the rebellion it would be necessary to resort to extreme
measures, including the enhancement of centralized authority. The fate of
Republicans

became

tied

to

the

military

defeat

of the

Confederacy.

Consequently, the Republican Party worked as the energizing force that
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cemented the alliance between state governors and the Federal government.
Without such a political structure, it would hardly have been possible to extend
Federal authority over the states. In the absence of a bureaucratic structure, the
party furnished

the

best possible alternative to strengthen the

central

government’s capabilities, restraining the centrifugal impulses in the states and
transforming the war into what one author has defined as “an enterprise in
modernization.”100
Republican

representatives

moved

in

the

direction

of

a

more

encompassing war legislation, one that would provide for a stronger control of
the Federal government over the whole process of recruiting. In February 16,
1863, Senator Henry Wilson, head of the Committee on Military Affairs,
presented Senate Bill 511, a conscription measure, aimed to provide the Federal
Government with the supplementary powers it needed to enroll troops. The bill
was the subject of extensive debates, with Republicans and Unionist Democrats
in support, and Peace Democrats in opposition. Senator Wilson introduced the
bill in the Senate in terms that revealed a radicalization of the Republican
attitude:

99 Based on the information recorded by regimental commanders Ella Lonn estimated 113,697 men
deserted between the beginning of the war and April 1863. See Desertion in the Civil W ar (1928,
reprint, Gloucester, Peter Smith, 1966), pp. 153-154.
100 Peter Levine, “Draft Evasion in the North during the Civil War, 1863-1865,” in Journal of American
History, no. 67, May, 1981, p. 830. According to Levine “Republicans’ insistence on the lack of
conflict between social classes and their basically middle-class perspective failed to obscure an
obvious disdain for a permanent underclass incessant toiling for wages and incapable of economic
independence because of an inability to conform to the values and virtues necessary for success in
a modernizing society."Ibid.
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[T]he needs of the nation demand that we should rely not upon
volunteering, nor upon calling forth the militia, but that we should fill
the regiments now in the field, worn and wasted by disease and
death, by enrolling and drafting the population of the country under
the constitutional authority ‘to raise and support armies.’101
Peace Democrats opposed national conscription as a matter of principle.
They saw the bill as an undue intervention of the Federal government into the life
of the states. They denounced such interference as a violation of America’s
fundamental beliefs in the primacy of the individual and the right of choice. As
asserted by Democratic Representative John Steele, from New York, “I think it is
unjust to the States. I think it is one of a series of measures tending to centralize
power unnecessarily, and I think it will alarm and distress the people.”102
In spite of the opposition’s complaints, the Republican majority

in both

houses succeeded. On February 28th, 1863, Congressapproved what

was

called "An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces,” commonly
known as the Enrollment Act. The Act was signed by President Lincoln on March
3. Through this measure, the President received full power to raise and support
armies without state assistance. The new law made all men between the ages of
twenty and thirty-five and all unmarried men between thirty-five and forty-five
liable to military duty. In a more radical step, the bill absorbed state militias into
the national forces. This statute centralized and militarized the draft with the
replacement of local elected selectmen and sheriffs by uniformed, nationally
appointed

provost marshals and federal enrolling

officers. The

Federal

101 Congressional Globe. 37th. Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 976.
102 Congressional Globe. 37th. Congress, 3rd. Session, p. 1264.
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government redefined exemptions at the same time that it extended the draft’s
reach to state officials and other groups previously exempt. Officers’ elections
and other democratic links between soldiers and communities were severely
reduced or suspended. Soldiers also lost their capacity to choose their units, as
military service became compulsory, national, and bureaucratic.103
The most significant change came with the designation of Federal Provost
Marshals subject to a Provost Marshal General at Washington, DC. These
agents had special military powers and could call draft in the districts that had
not reached their quota. They reduced the capacity of local functionaries to
mediate between the military needs and parochial pressures, and broke the role
of

io c s i

power in recruitment. By the Enrollment Act, provost marshals were

entitled to ignore hostile Democratic state and local governments and to enforce
authority as they pleased, defining treason and containing the local opposition to
the Washington regime. According to Iver Bernstein the Enrollment Act, more
than any other Civil War legislation “[Bjrought the presence of the federal
government into the community, into the waged workplace, and into the
household - into nearly every corner of working-class life.104
In spite of its centralizing character, the Enrollment Act, failed to provide a
“fair tool” for recruitment. Fairness was lost from the beginning by a series of

103 The text of the law can be found in The United States Statutes at Large. Vol. 13, pp. 731-37. For
an excellent interpretation of the Congressional debates, see James W. Geary, “The Enrollment Act
in the Thirty-seventh Congress." Historian 46.1984, pp. 562-582. See also Sterling, “Civil W a r Draft
Resistance in the Middle West," especially chap. V, “National Conscription Comes to the North,” pp.
132-65.
1M Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, p. 8.
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exemptions and opportunities for commutation and substitution that were
negotiated in the Congress. For those with enough money to pay, it was just a
matter of negotiation on the informal markets for men that spread in the North.
For those who could not find a substitute, commutation clauses and community
efforts furnished a palliative. The more affluent communities raised money to
commute their inhabitants’ services, filling their deficient quotas through the
hiring

of outsiders.

The

system spawned

factious competition

between

communities for recruits and produced the twin evils of bounty jumpers and
brokers. Those free riders took advantage of the rules and profited from the
situation. Many times these “selective incentives” interacted, as substitutes
responded to the increasing offer of bonuses by enlisting in those towns that
paid better.
As the year 1863 advanced and war needs grew, prices for substitutes
rose.

The enforcement of the draft during the summer and the fall of 1863

coincided with the development of insurance clubs and the efforts by factory
owners and political machines to aid those unable to pay for their own
exemptions and unwilling to be conscripted. Commutation costs were fixed at
$300, about two thirds of a workingman’s annual income. Democratic Senator
James W. Nesmith of Oregon, a member of the Military Affairs Committee,
remarked that permitting draftees to “commute their patriotism” would lead to the
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nation’s death.

He ironically suggested an appropriate epitaph: “Died of

Commutation.”105
Northern communities reacted in different ways to the increasing
demands for manpower. Some communities complied by raising funds for
substitutions or commutations. A local study of Cape Elizabeth, Maine shows
that the town’s quota was increasingly supplied by outsiders. According to Paul
Ledman the proportion of enlisted soldiers born in town fell from 51.7% during
the first year to only 6% after the impact of the draft. Such an influx of outsiders
can be explained by high bonuses provided by an affluent community.106
This strategy, however, was not available to all communities, depending
on each town’s capacity to raise enough funds. Evidence points to a situation in
which the richest communities benefited to the disadvantage of the poorest
sections of the country. One result was increasing resentment among poorer
groups. In the summer of 1863 the act was answered by a wave of resistance,
and riots broke out in the main eastern cities and in the Middle West. There was
no planned opposition against the draft, because most people agreed that
something should be done to put down the rebellion. Catholic and Democratic
authorities urged their communities to cope with the increasing war demands.
But many of the less affluent communities saw commutation as an instrument
that reinforced the political hegemony of the Republican party and the economic

105 Congressional Globe. 38thCongress, 1". Session, p. 227.
106 On the impact of the first national draft over Cape Elizabeth, see Ledman, “A Town Responds...,”
pp. 71-103. See also table 4-12 on p. 121. Although the town had voted a bounty, its main source of
income was provided by the private efforts of its draft-eligible citizens to obtain their own substitutes.
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power of industrialists and merchants, penalizing Democrats, immigrants and the
poor. Charges of incompetence, dishonesty, political immorality and political
partisanship were thrown at many officials who worked in the new recruitment
machine. A parody of a popular song mocked the growing interference of the
federal government in the citizen’s personal lives.
W e’re coming, ancient Abraham, several hundred strong
W e hadn’t no 300 dollars and so we come along
We hadn’t no rich parents to pony up the tin
So we went unto the provost and there were mustered in.107
Robert Sterling’s work on the Midwest showed a strong correlation
between anti-draft resistance and class, partisan affiliation, and religion.
Democratic counties with smaller incomes and higher percentages of foreign
immigrants, especially Irish and German Catholics, were more likely to have riots
than more affluent Midwest communities. Sometimes draft dodgers, deserters
and resisters used every device and artifice imaginable, including outright
violence, to escape what they perceived as the injustice and inequity of the draft.
In the Midwest, the resistance to enrollment was most widespread in
Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana. In these states popular reaction went frommere
complaints in the Democrat press to open insubordination,

including attackson

provost marshals’ property and person. Sometimes resisters targeted federal
agents or local appointees responsible for draft enforcement. Rioters usually
targeted the books and lists containing the names of those subject to

107 Quoted in Basil L. Lee, Discontent in New York City. 1861-1865 (Washington: 1943), p. 90; See
also Nuria Sales de Bohigas, “Some Opinions on Exemption from Military Service in Nineteenth-
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conscription, but some riots were more violent; thirty-eight enrollment officers
were murdered in ambushes or by crowds. Consequently, many enrollment
officers and district provost marshals had to be protected by army units.108
Popular

revolts

raised

two

specters

for

government

authorities:

copperheadism, treason and internal dissension on the one hand, and irrational
disorder on the other. Both fears were clearly stated in the final report of the
Provost Marshal General’s Office, Peter Fry. Fry called acts of resistance crimes
perpetrated by the poorest, lower class immigrants, not connected to the
American patriotic heritage. To Fry, the actions of the crowds were not rational
but resulted from the stimulus of opportunistic Democratic politicians who
opposed the war for partisan reasons. New York Congressman Olin voiced such
fears when he defended the use of force by the federal authority during the
debates on the draft, emphasizing that, “the Government [should] arm itself with
every power that lies in the strong arms and loyal hearts of the people.”109
Similar perceptions of anti-draft motivation can be observed in the
pioneer historical analyses made by Eugene C. Murdock and Fred A. Shannon,
based on the information presented in the “Official Records of the Civil War.”
They focused attention on the political-engineering of the war, especially on the
role of the Federal government as an enforcer in a modern society during a

Century Europe.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. 10, April 1968, p. 268, and
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 602.
108 Martin Stephen, Jailed for Peace: the History of American Draft Law Violators. 1658-1985
(Westport: Conn., Greenwood Press, 1986).
109 Congressional Globe. 37*1Congress, 3d. sess., 1863, vol. 41, p t 2, p. 1214.
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modern kind of warfare, rather than on the particular justifications of the groups
negatively affected by this modernization. Both argued that draft resistance could
be best explained by opposition to the Lincoln administration’s determination to
win a war for the Union.110 More recent, multilayered, approaches emphasize the
diversity of interests involved in the resistance against the draft, as well as the
connections between the Republican efforts and the cultural backgrounds of
some resisting groups. These groups did not necessarily oppose recruitment or
the Union cause, but they resisted what they perceived to be unjust features of
the process. Taking into account previously existing local conflicts, analysis
reveals that popular resistance reflected a plurality of grievances and local
complaints, aggravated by the transformation in the nature of the recruitment.
As demonstrated by the classic studies of collective action developed by
George Rud6, Eric Hobsbawn, and E. P. Thompson, it is possible to identify in
the crowd’s apparent disorder organizational forms and coherent logics of
action.111 Recent local studies by Robert Sterling, Grace Palladino, David Osher,
and Iver Bernstein show that popular violence did not result from mere
“copperhead manipulation.” Resisters interpreted factionalism and political
partisanship as part of a Republican attempt to subdue long-established

110 Eugene C. Murdock, Patriotism Limited. 1862-1865: The Civil W ar and the Bounty System (Kent:
Kent State University, 1967) and One Million Men: The Civil W ar Draft in the North (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971). Fred A. Shanon, The Organization and Administration of the
Union Army. 1861-1865 (1928, reprint, 2. Vols. Gloucester Peter Smith, 1965).
111 George F. E. Rud6, The Crowd in History. A Study of Popular
England. 1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1964); Eric J. Hobsbawn,
Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19* and 2 0 * Centuries
Edward P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New York: W . W, Norton,

Disturbances in France and
Primitive Rebels. Studies in
(New York: Praeger, 1963);
1991).
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institutions connected to local autonomy. The military occupation of such areas
reinforced the fears of “political despotism” denounced by local Democratic
newspapers, and reinforced by people’s beliefs in the virtue of local government,
racism and class antagonism.112
In the

anthracite

region of Pennsylvania,

local provost marshals

cooperated directly with the bosses of the largest coal companies, linking the
draft with the suppression of unions and repression of its labor leaders. In Illinois,
martial law was declared in many districts where Democrats predominated,
temporarily subverting long-established local institutions. These actions were
perceived as illegal interference by the national government into local business,
interference that reinforced the position of industrialists and merchants long
connected to the transformations taking place in the structure of American
markets. In the special case of immigrants, the threat of a draft revived memories
of one of the most hated institutions of European politics, the draconian laws that
regulated recruitment in their native societies. Consequently it is not surprising
that immigrants stood out among early resisters.113

112 Grace Palladino also underlined the role of women in the early movements of resistance
occurring in Pennsylvania Carbon counties. In these area the most common sign of contempt was
provided through male evasion with few violent demonstrations, Another Civil War, pp. 99.
113 For cooperation between provost marshals and the coal companies in Pennsylvania, see
Palladino, Another Civil War, especially chapter VII, “The Return to Order The Provost Marshal and
Organized Labor, 1862-1865,” pp. 140-162. According to Palladino, “Provost Marshals Charlemagne
Tower, Samuel Yohe, and Stephen N. Bradford moved well beyond their mandate to enforce the
draft... enforcing] managerial prerogatives in the mines.”
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The Draft and Republican Dilemmas
One of the most dramatic episodes of resistance against federal
recruitment occurred in New York City in July 1863. During five days, armed
mobs interrupted the enforcement of the first federal conscription, challenging
federal authority in the most important American city. The riots originated in New
York's political and social environment but were enhanced by the circumstances
of the war, especially by the grievances resulting from the threat of an imminent
draft whose burden would weigh heaviest on the poorest white inhabitants of the
city. For some participants, the riots signified a contest for political power
between Democratic immigrants and reformist Republicans. But for many
observers, the riots were a challenge to the new rules and laws that had
emerged from the war.114
According to Iver Bernstein, the draft riots must be seen in the context of
an ongoing process of urban change, with ramifications at the regional and
national levels. An important issue was provided by the disputes over the control
of the labor market. Reporting in the aftermath of the 1863 New York City Draft
Riots, a New York Tribune editorial provides an indication of how deeply
threatened some whites felt by black labor: “The mob exults in the belief that if it
failed in its other objects, it has at least secured possession of the labor of the
city, and has driven the blacks to seek work elsewhere.”115

114 Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p. 440.
115 Philip Foner and Ronal Lewis (eds.), The Black Worker From Colonial Times to 1869: A
Documentary History (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1969), p. 22.
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At the national level, the main fuel was provided by the implementation of
the Enrollment Act in the city. The provisions of the act touched three explosive
issues in New York social life: relations between the wealthy and the poor,
between blacks and whites, and between the city and the nation.116 So, what
began as a protest against the draft turned into a direct attack on the wealthy
and on Republican Party institutions, as well as a grotesque racial pogrom.
As a consequence of the five-day riot, the federal government prudently
canceled the draft in New York, avoiding the declaring of a state of emergency.
The federal administration avoided more serious interference in local New York
issues, recognizing Democratic hegemony in the country’s biggest city in
exchange for its tacit loyalty. New York's quotas were filled through the increase
of recruitment in other states, in a process that would bring renewed episodes of
political and social tension during the months to come.
New York’s experience with riots has much to tell us about the ambiguous
results of the draft policy during 1862-1863. If the draft exemplified a push
toward centralization, its failure was clear by the fall of 1863. It revealed the limits
of radical legislation to expand the federal government. If the Republican
government was forced to compromise on conscription, however, this left
unsolved the need to raise an army adequate to the task. The anti-draft riots
were only the most visible aspect of the problem. As Peter Levine has shown,
protest took many forms and turned into a widespread phenomenon during the

116 Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, p. 8.
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spring of 1863. Resistance crossed the barriers of class and ethnicity, involving a
decline of compliance even in the most loyal areas. The combined effects of
illegal and legal strategies of avoidance were more harmful to recruitment than
active resistance.
Table VIII
Results of the 1863 Draft
Names
Drawn
292,441
100%

Failed
to
Report
39,415

Discharged

Examined

Physical
Exemptions

Other
Exemptions

460

252,566

81,131

83,264

Paid
Commuttion
52,288

Substituted

26,000

Held to
Personal
Service
9,881

13.47%
0.15%
86.36%
28.47%
17,87%
27,74%
3.37%
8.89%
Source: Peter Levine, ‘ Draft Evasion in the North During the Civil War, 1863-1865, p.819; Data collected on
Final Report of War, by Provost Marshal General (Washington, 1866), pp. 165-212.

Of 292,441 individuals originally drawn in the 1863 draft only 9,881, or
3.4%

were effectively held to serve themselves.

Resort to discharges,

commutations and substitutions severely undermined the efficacy of the draft,
and 83 percent of those liable to conscription found legal means to avoid
service.117
In order to resolve the dilemma posed by the limits to national power it
would be necessary to fill the ranks with other groups, challenging old prejudices
and opening the army to racial minorities previously excluded. African Americans
provided a perfect solution for the Republican dilemma, because, from the

117 Peter Levine, through a statistical analysis of the Civil W a r records, found that illegal evasion in
districts that tended to vote non-Republican and to contain Catholics and foreign-born residents
while “legal” evasion was more likely to occur in areas containing native-born, non-Catholic
populations. Overall both groups (native Protestant and foreign Catholic) avoided the draft through
different strategies. See Peter Levine, “Draft Evasion in the North during the Civil War, 1863-1865,”
in Journal of American History, no. 67, May 1981, pp. 816-34.
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beginning of the war, it was clear that a mass of available men in the South were
at hand to substitute for northern volunteers. Blacks comprised less than one
percent of the northern population, but formed a large portion of the population in
the Confederate states.118 Such an option offered a much smaller financial and
social cost to the government and might lower the costs for substitutes. The
boom of black enlistment during the second half of 1863 was one of many
possible responses to the North’s difficulties. It would assume a pivotal role in
the enormous expansion of the army in the last two years of the conflict. If
prejudice had prevented the federal government from using African Americans
before, the realities of war had, by 1863, provided enough reason to change.
The shock of war would, therefore, lead to one of the biggest transformations in
the history of racial relations in America.

118 In 1860 the population of the seceded states was 9,103,332. Of these, 3,521,110 were slaves.
According to E. B. Long, approximately 520,000 slaves fled to Union lines during the war. See, The
Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), p. 702.
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Chapter 6

Manumitting and Enlisting the Slaves
Brazil: December 1866 - August 1868

I would like to ask if the [Triple] Alliance still exists
Viscount of Jequitinhonha1
In Brazil the threat is much more serious and dangerous; it is within
us; the danger is inside the country, can surprise us and disturb the
public order and the civil society...”
Senator Nabuco de Araujo2

Introduction
On November 14, 1867, Jos6 Jobim, a respected citizen of Engenho
Novo, then a rural section of the Brazilian capital, wrote a letter to his friend
Thomas Gomes describing the misadventures of one of his domestic slaves. To
replace a recently manumitted slave cook who had served him for more than
twenty years, Jobim went to a traditional slave market, located at Rua da Saude
(Health Street).3 He looked for a particular black woman at the auction who came
from the district of Sao Marcos with good references. It seems a negotiation

1 Jos6 Honbrio Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado. Meeting of 13 Oct., 1866, p. 62.
2 Ibid. Meeting of April 2 ,1 8 6 7 , p. 206.
3 It was impossible to discover the fate of the cook after she obtained her freedom, if she was kept
on at her master’s house or if she was just sent way.
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between the prospective slave and Jobim took place during the auction, because
she was able to include first her daughter in the deal and, later in the day, her
teenage son, Carlos. Together the slaves cost around 2:800$000, 1000$000
each for the new cook and her son Carlos, 800$00 for her daughter.4 The
sources do not reveal the origins of the new slaves. It is impossible to know
whether the mother was Brazilian or African born, or whether or not they had
come from a rural environment through inter-provincial traffic. The three slaves
performed domestic functions: mother and daughter were cooks, and the son
was a bull cart driver.
Shortly after arriving at Mr. Jobim’s establishment, Carlos began to cause
great trouble among the household slaves. According to the sources, he lied and
stole, and he chased most of the slave women, causing great resentment among
the other male servants.
Carlos was blamed for constantly disappearing from work. The young
man also encouraged other male slaves to follow him into the streets where,
armed with

irons, they joined

in disorderly mobs.

Finally, when Carlos

intentionally destroyed the bull wagon, his master decided to sell him to the army
as a soldier for the Paraguayan war. Among Brazilian masters, splitting up
families was a common form of punishment of disorderly slaves. But such a

4 The whole case is in Jose M. da C. Jobim to Thomas Gomes, Engenho Novo, 14 November
1867, AHMI, 101 -mago 141.doc. 6925 (POB). One dollar was equal to 2$174 (two thousand one
hundred seventy four reais). Consequently, the three slaves cost US$ 1290.00. The mother and
the daughter cost US$ 460.00 while Carlos cost US$ 370.00. For exchange value of Brazilian
Milr6is in U.S. Dollars, see Julian Smith Duncan, Public and Private Operations of Railways in
Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 183.
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drastic measure often encouraged strong domestic resistance. Carlos’s mother
protested his sale as much as she could and was finally driven to attempt to
poison Jobim’s food, but another loyal slave (or possibly one with a grudge
against Carlos) denounced her before she could do it.
Surprisingly, when inspected for recruitment, Carlos told the military
committee he was a “broken slave," that is, not healthy enough to serve in the
army.5 It seems his statement to this effect had some degree of truth. After a
brief inspection, the committee accepted his word and refused to induct him.6
Now the unhappy Mr. Jobim realized that he had been deceived twice:
first in paying a high price for an unhealthy individual; secondly in buying a
troublesome slave. In desperation he decided to send Carlos to the Paraiba
Valley, probably aiming to sell him as a field worker to one of the coffee
plantations.7 But Carlos had no intention of working on farms and escaped while
on his way to the valley.8 After a series of short imprisonments and escapes,
Carlos was able to return to Rio de Janeiro, where the police caught him once
again.

5 According to the narrative Carlos informed the recruitment inspectors about his health condition.
6 Medical examinations of recruits were often superficial. In his memoirs of the w ar General
Dionfsio Cerqueira described his own inspection as a young soldier. After presenting himself at
the general headquarters as a volunteer, Cerqueira was inspected by a careless physician who
merely observed him without touching his body. No medical exams, in the true meaning of the
term, were performed. See Dionlsio Cerqueira. Reminiscfencias da Campanha do Paraauai (1910,
reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 1980), p. 48.
7 On the strategic importance of the Parlba Valley, see chapter I, p. 27.
8 Carlos evasion occurred at Barra do Piraf, then the last station of the railway that would link Rio
de Janeiro city to SSo Paulo city through the Paraiba Valley.
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The narrative suggests some interconnection between the police and the
slave catchers because Mr. Jobim was notified of Carlos’s final capture by the
owner of the slave market at Rua da Saude, where he had been sold, not by the
authorities. This businessman probably had good connections, not only with the
police, but also with the military authorities, because, after some negotiation, he
was finally able to enroll Carlos in the army with no further medical objections.
Carlos was sold to the nation for 1400$00 (or U.S. $644.00), the highest possible
price for a slave in his condition. Mr. Jobim recovered his original investment
while the intermediaries received another 400$00 (or U.S. $184.00), as their
commissions. Both the owner and the agents could proclaim their patriotism for
helping to defend the nation by getting rid of an undesirable slave. Jobim finally
achieved his revenge. In his narrative he claimed that Carlos had been tricked
into enlisting.9
The picaresque story goes beyond a mere description of Jobim’s troubles
with his slaves or his attempt to salvage his reputation in the “good society'1of
Rio de Janeiro city. It invokes the circumstances of recruitment of Brazilian
slaves for the Paraguayan War. It offers an opportunity to analyze the relations
between slave owners and the Imperial state, centered on the great changes
which occurred in the structure of the Brazilian slave market during the 1860s, as

9 It is possible that some urban slaves might well have judged their semi-free status preferable to
confinement in the army barracks. This hypothesis has been presented by Hendrik Kraay, “The
Shelter of the Uniform: The Brazilian Army and Runaway Slaves, 1800-1888” in Journal of Social
History. Vol. 29, n. 3, March 1996, pp. 637-57 and Mary C. Karash, Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro.
1808-1850 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 338. Kraay's concludes that most
evidence contradicts the hypothesis, although the above case reinforces his initial hypothesis.
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well as the relations between public and private agents in Brazil. It gives a good
picture of the key role of personal relations in all sectors of Imperial society.
Finally, it offers impressive evidence of the way in which the war effort,
nationalism, and emancipation policies were linked together during the 1860s in
Brazil.
Jobim’s letter implies that military service was considered to be the best
use of undesirable slaves. The state paid high prices for troublemakers, which
reimbursed their owners and enriched the intermediaries. Enlisting slaves was
good business for those who profited from the enlargement of the army. The
slaves, however, had no active role (except the precarious one for Carlos of
choosing between disobedience and escape). For most slave recruits, their final
destination was subject to the higher interests of their white masters. The nation
paid the bill.10
This chapter will examine two questions raised by the narrative above.
Most importantly, how did the recruitment of the Brazilian slaves and their
transformation into "free-soldiers” became a question of state? Secondly, what
was the response among the supporters of the monarchy, the planters?11

10 It was impossible to follow Carlos’ fate after enlistment.
11 Until the 1870’s the bulwark of monarchic support came from the big farmers, especially the
coffee planters of the province of Rio de Janeiro. Those who owned slaves and land saw the
Emperor as the best arbiter for their interests. On the relations between Rio de Janeiro farmers
and the state, see Jos6 Murilo de Carvalho, A Construcao da Ordem. A Elite Polltica Imperial (DF:
UNB, 1980) and llmar Roholoff de Mattos, O Tempo Saauarema (S3o Paulo: Huoitec,1987).
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The Historiographical Debate
The racial situation during the Paraguayan conflict has a much more
limited historiography than the one on black soldiers during the American Civil
War. The subject has been usually a secondary chapter in the classic narratives
of the War and its outcome. Those narratives merged the contribution of black
soldiers into the celebration of the Brazilian nation in its struggle against tyranny
in South America.12
During the 1960s, Nelson Werneck Sodr6, a nationalist historian, opened
new ground by linking the postwar tension between the army and the monarchy
to “a better knowledge of the black situation.” The succession of military crises in
the 1880s opposed the younger officials (Mocidade Militar) and Paraguayan
veterans to the monarchical civilian elite, leading to the fall of the monarchy in
1889.13 According to Sodr6, a feeling of sympathy, strengthened during the war,
united an emerging middle-class officer stratum to the former slaves, and was
directly responsible for the army’s shift in the direction of social reform. Sodre’s
analysis set the path toward a common concern of most recent historical
debates: the post-war consequences of multi-racial experiences, it has been
argued, led to rising criticism of Brazilian social injustice, a behavior crystallized

12 Emilio Carlos Jourdan, Histdria das Campanhas do Uruguay. Mato Grosso e Paraquav-Brasil.
1864-1870 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1893), Lovis Schnneider, A Guerra da Trfplice
Alianca contra o Govemo do Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: 1875), Theotonio Meireles Silva, O
Ex6rcito Brasileiro na Campanha do Paraguay (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Globo, 1875),
Jose Bernardino Borman, Guerra do Paraguay (Curitiba, Jesufno Lopes e Cia., 1887), Augusto
Tasso Fragoso, Histbria da Guerra entre a Trlplice Alianca e o Paraauai (Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa do Estado Maior do Exbrcito, 1924).
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during the critical years of the Paraguayan campaign when whites and blacks
fought side by side, intensifying the politicization of the army’s corps of officers.14
Other recent analyses have been more skeptical about these supposed
connections. While recognizing the relevance of the black soldier for the
Brazilian war effort, recent scholars have attributed greater importance to the
role of the slaves in their struggle for citizenship. They argue that the contribution
of black soldiers was more directly effective in their postwar struggle against
social hierarchies, not just indirectly, through their influence on the Imperial army
officers. The analysis of judicial procedures in the post-war period by the latter
group of historians showed a multiplicity of grievances and the complaints of
exceptional black veterans fighting for justice and social recognition of their role
as patriots. For Dale T. Graden, blacks fighting on behalf of Brazil against
Paraguay contributed to the widening antislavery expression of the late 1860s.15
Ricardo Salles explored the contradictions that were evident in the expansion of
the army as a national institution and its search for a stereotyped vision of the
Brazilian citizenry.16 Jorge Prata de Souza emphasized the deception of those

13 For a summary of the events that lead to the fall of the monarchy, see Celso Castro, Os
Militares e a Republica. Urn Estudo Sobre Cultura e Acflo Polltica (Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1995),
especially pp. 85-104.
14 Nelson W emeck SodrS, A Histdria Militar do Brasil (1965, reprint, Rio de Janeiro, CivilizagSo
Brasileira, 1979), pp. 135-53.
15 Dale Thurston Graden, “From Slavery to Freedom in Bahia, Brazil, 1791-1900,” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, The University of Connecticut, 1991), pp. 157-220.
16 Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraquai: Escravid5o e Cidadania na FormacSo do Exfercito (Rio de
Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1990).
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blacks who served in the army, who felt betrayed in their post-war expectations.17
Hendrik Kraay, based on data taken from the province of Bahia, observed that
officer slaveholding (both during and after the war), conformed to the patterns of
urban siaveownership, confirming the long-noted, widespread nature of Brazilian
slaveholding. Consequently, he argues that, in regard to slave property, the war
marked no turning point in the army’s racial behavior.18
Without disagreeing with the conclusions of these recent analyses, it
should be noted that, except for Ricardo Salles, they share a methodological
limitation common in many social historians' approach to Latin America: their
lack of interest in state-led reforms. Notwithstanding, even if we discard the idea
of a racially progressive role for the army, as Kraay and others have done, there
was still ample room for changes in the post-war panorama, and the crucial fact
remains that most of these changes were propelled by the action of the Imperial
state.
The impact of the war effort and its racial implications created a large
opening for bureaucratic and political transformation in Brazil, and they also
brought ordinary Brazilian citizens into contact with the national government as
never before. The resulting impact challenged the political consensus forged in
the 1850s, and reshaped the behavior of the main political actors. After the war,
the imperial state once again assumed the initiative in formulating abolitionist

17 Jorge Luiz Prata de Sousa, Escravidao ou Morte. Os Escravos Brasileiros na Guerra do
Paraquai (Rio de Janeiro, Mauad/Adesa, 1996).
18 Hendirk Kraay, “Slavery, Citizenship and Military Service in Brazil’s Mobilization for the
Paraguayan W ar,” in Frank Cass Journals. Vol. 18, No. 3, December 1997, pp. 228-56.
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policies, greatly polarizing Brazilian political debate. The slow pace of social
transformation does not diminish the power of the war’s legacy, nor does it
minimize the war’s effects on the Brazilian poor. The relevance of those changes
for a nation “invented by the state” cannot be dismissed simply as “conservative
adaptation.” This process strengthened the Imperial capacity to formulate
national policies oriented toward social reform, showing that there can be life
above the grassroots.19
Preliminaries
The relationships between slavery and military service in Brazilian society
were paradoxical. Slavery prevented a large number of individuals from serving
in the army and the navy but also made slaves a captive market for substitutes.
Manumissions for the military service did not begin during the Paraguayan
war. They were part of a tradition with origins in Brazil’s early history. The LusoBrazilian military had armed its freed slaves since colonial times. Slaves fought
for and against Portugal in the series of conflicts involving the control of the
sugar-cane growing regions before Brazilian independence.20
Describing the unpopularity of the recruitment and the bad state of the
Portuguese colonial militia in Brazil, C. R. Boxer acknowledged that the
recruitment of colored people was one of a set of extreme measures taken by
the colonial authorities to improve the colony’s military capacity. Despite the

191will return to this point on chapter VIII.
20 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries French and Dutch explorers repeatedly invaded
many Brazilian regions. For additional information on this subject see J. Capistrano de Abreu,
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reluctance of the local whites, black and white “social undesirables” served
alongside each other in two regular infantry regiments. Such militias were
organized under a hierarchy of color, each armed group being under the
command of a white but dark-hued officer.21
The organization of segregated and multiracial militias was common to
both Brazilian northern and southern provinces. In the Northeast, during the
colonial war against the Dutch, battalions of black men fought under the
command of Captain Henrique Dias, a freed man of color who supported the
Portuguese side.22 In the Southwest region some provinces also admitted Afrodescendant individuals as soldiers. The French naturalist August Saint Hilaire
observed that, in the province of Minas Gerais, regiments that should have been
composed only of whites could sometimes accept mulattos in their ranks. For the
naturalist such concessions were due “to favor,” not to the military needs of the
Portuguese colonial state.23
In the special circumstances in which it happened, the enlistment of Afrodescendants in Brazil did not create racial egalitarian attitudes, nor did the

Chapters of Brazil’s Colonial History, 1500-1800 (1907, reprint, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), pp. 52-90.
21 Charles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil. 1865-1750. Growing Pains of a Colonial Society
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 142.
22 The expression “Henriques" was associated to those battalions that were organized in the
Northeastern part of the country afterward. On Henrique Dias and the struggle against the Dutch
in Brazil see C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969), p. 119,162. For an analysis of the symbolic appropriation of the myths of Henrique
Dias and his black warriors, see Evaldo Cabral de Mello, Rubro Veio. O lmaqin3rio da
Restauracflo Pernambucana (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997, 2nd Edition).
23 August de Saint-Hilaire, Viaqem pelas Provtncias do Rio de Janeiro e Minas Gerais (Rio de
Janeiro: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1938), vol. II, p. 321.
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services rendered by the former slaves result in full citizenship for them.24 Even
when these sen/ices brought freedom, manumissions were linked to what the
historiography on slavery classified as “onerous manumissions,” that is, in
exchange for money or services.”25 There were neither special programs for
settlement of former soldiers in distant regions nor additional programs to adapt
these persons to their newly acquired free status. As historian Carl Degler points
out: “[The] use of Negroes as soldiers in the colonial period in Brazil, in short,
was not the result of the prior acceptance of the black man as an equal but of the
need of him as a fighter.,eB
After independence, the emerging Brazilian leaders maintained such
practices. The provisions of October 23, 1823 and September 10, 1824
permitted slave owners to be compensated when they gave their slaves to serve
in the Brazilian war of Independence.27 The reference of January 21, 1828,
shows that, through the orders of Emperor Pedro I, edicts were published

24 The most comprehensive treatment of black soldiers in the colonial Americas is Peter M. Voelz,
Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas (New York: Garland
Publishing Inc., 1993).
25 On the concept of “onerous manumission," see Robert W. Slenes, “The Demography and
Economics of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1880," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1976), p.
516, Sillvia Hunold Lara, “Campos da ViolSncia. Estudo sobre a Relagdo Senhor-Escravo na
Capitania do Rio de Janeiro, 1750-1808,“ (Tese de Doutorado, Universidade de SSo Paulo),
1986, p. 219, Vilma Paralso Ferreira Almada, Escravismo e Transic5o. O Espfrito Santo (18501888) (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1984), pp. 148-9. For a summary of the discussions, see Peter L.
Einsenberg, “Ficando Livre: As Alforrias em Campinas no S6culo X IX ,” in Estudos Economicos.
Vol. 17, No. 2, May-August, 1976, pp. 175-226.
26 Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White. Slave and Race Relations in Brazil and the United
States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 79. Such a perspective does not exclude
the hypothesis that military life could bring positive changes for those blacks directly involved, that
is, former recruits coming from the Brazilian poorest social groups.
27 As soon as independence was secured such measures were canceled. They were probably
never effective.
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envisioning the acquisition of slaves for the war against the Argentine
Confederation. Finally, freed slaves participated in the provincial revolts of the
1830s and 1840s.20
The predominantly black or mixed composition of then-Brazilian troops
clearly demonstrates the predominance of men of African descent among the
Imperial forces. Once recruiting from the lower social stratum of Brazilian society
began, it would be a logical outcome that most Brazilian soldiers should come
from social groups where dark-skinned men predominated. For the planters it
offered an additional incentive: it helped to protect them against slave riots as it
split the African community still more.29
In spite of the widespread presence of blacks and mulattos in the ranks,
Brazilian military service was not open to the non-free sections of society. The
Imperial Constitution of 1824 expressly guaranteed property rights. As private
property, slaves could not be expropriated by the Imperial or provincial
governments. Even if the government compensated owners, those would have
to manumit their slaves before enlistment. Consequently, enlistment was open
only to those who possessed civil liberties or those freed by the will of their
masters to defend the nation-state under exceptional and extreme conditions.
But no consensus existed about when a situation could be considered “extreme,”

28 Except for the Revolt of Males (1835), no other riot directly questioned the existence of slavery.
29 This hypothesis was presented by Jeane Berrance de Castro “0 Negro na Guarda Nacional” in
Anais do Museu Paulista. Vol. 23,1969, pp. 149-72.
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nor over the kind of compensation slave owners would receive, should such a
situation present itself.
From the beginning of the campaign against Paraguay, ex-slaves were
reinforcing the ranks of the Brazilian army. The enlistment of such individuals
occurred basically through impressment, donation, or substitution, or when
slaves ran away from their masters and enlisted as if they were free. No specific
demands were made by the state to acquire slaves because the general
assumption was that the war would be short - one or two battles and the
Paraguayans would give up. At the beginning of operations most Brazilians
agreed with the Argentinean president Bartolomeu Mitre, who called all citizens
to “run to the Barracks in 24 hours, to the battle-fields in 60 days, and to
Asuncion in six months.”30
In spite of this initial expectation, many people still refused to go to war.
For these individuals, the easiest way avoid enlistment was to present a qualified
substitute. Such was the case in Vassouras, in the Paraiba Valley, where an
informal bargain took place. Twenty-nine National Guardsmen had been
designated for the War. As was becoming usual, the recruiters took refugee in
the forests in the outskirts of town, creating a focus of social tension in the
middle of the coffee region. The rich political bosses solved the problem through
the donation of thirty freed slaves for the war. As compensation, the Imperial
State released the original 29 National Guardsmen, who had neither left town

30 Quoted in Dterio do Coronel Manuel Lucas de Oliveira (Porto Alegre: Edigdes EST, 1997), p.
54.
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nor been punished for desertion. In that case, a combination of influential local
bosses and quick replacement worked in favor of those originally recruited.31
While such practices were sometimes criticized by the reformist sectors
of the national army, substitution was a widespread practice. Substitutes also
permitted the proprietors to pay for the exemption of their prot6g6s or to buy new
recruits to be offered to the nation. More important, although the recruitment of
freed slaves through substitution could sometimes result from one or another
sort of outside pressure, it did not violate the rights of property. Consequently it
did not oppose the state to the barons.32
A real market for substitutes flourished during this early period of the War.
Free or slave sections of society could provide substitutes. Either enlisted
soldiers or professional officers could present them. Many times relatives offered
replacements to exempt their loved ones. The Report of the Ministry of War
records only 948 slave substitutions nationwide for the five years of war. The two
regions with most substitutes were the city of Rio de Janeiro and the traditional
troops provider, Rio Grande do Sul.

Rio de Janeiro presented 437 and Rio

Grande do Sul 305. An example is the case of Elias, a thirty-four year old
Gaucho, from the region of Pelotas. Son of “a mulatto of free condition,” Elias
was still a slave when Luiz Xavier da Silva bought him for 1:200$000 (U.S.

31 APRJ, PP 2.2-4, Cx. 16, Colegao 8. Oflcios 18 to 23 October 1867, quoted in Jorge Prata de
Souza, Escravidao ou Morte. Os Escravos Brasileiros e a Guerra do Paraauai (Rio de Janeiro:
Mauad/Adesa, 1996), p. 63.
32 As the prices of exemption 600$00 (U.S. $246) were inferior to the normal prices of slaves, it
could be a good business to just pay instead of buying individuals for the recruitment. But it was a
very high amount to be paid by the poor.
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$552). The letter of manumission clearly stated that Elias would be freed on
condition that Camilo Xavier da Silva, son of Luis, be exempted from both the
recruitment and service in the National Guard. Such substitution would require
from Elias a length of service between six and nine years in the ranks, if he
survived the campaign.33
Because slaves were becoming more expensive as the war progressed,
the quality of those sent to the army was sometimes questionable. Complaining
about this problem, the Marquis of Caxias, Commander in Chief of the Brazilian
forces after October 1867, exemplified the kind of tension that could exist
between the military command, the political bosses, and the recruiting agents. In
April 1868, four months before the Humayta fortress was taken, Caxias refused
to accept seven freed slaves, at the same time keeping the originally designated
National Guardsmen in the ranks. This conflict took place in the middle of a
struggle between Caxias and the Provincial president, when Caxias was
concentrating military decisions and prerogatives in his hands. But it is important
to underline that, at this point, most recruits had been trained for a certain
amount of time, consequently, the replacement meant an exchange of
experienced soldiers by immature recruits. As the old Marshal described it: “I
cannot accept such substitution because these individuals do not have the

33 APRS, J-69, Codice J-60, fl 1v.

282

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

qualities needed in a soldier in times of war. They will never be ready to replace
the soldiers already in service."34
What was the fate of the returned slaves? That is a difficult question to
answer. According to the evidence, it seems that most of them, once refused,
were not returned to slavery. In some cases the government maintained
payments, once those slaves, such as Carlos, had already passed the enlistment
exams. Others, while free, had to fulfill some obligations to their masters.
According to Paulo Roberto Staudt, these individuals had to negotiate their
freedom with previous owners, serving them for a certain number of years. That
was the case of Thomas Furtado, a rejected substitute who signed a contract
promising to work for eleven years for his master, until his debts were paid.35
Runaways were also common in many provinces, thus creating points of
tension between the Imperial state and the masters. In the face of the reduced
number of individuals willing to march, and aided by the precarious bureaucratic
organization of the enlisting committees, it was not difficult for slaves to present
themselves with false names, especially in periods of massive mobilization.36

34 Marquis of Caxias to Francisco Indcio Marcondes Homem de Melo, Para-Cu6 (Paraguay), 12
April 1868. APRS, B1.071 - Avisos do Minist6rio da Guerra -1868/1869.
35 Thomas Furtado to Jos6 Silveira Filho, Porto Alegre 13 February 1867. AHRS, fl. 55, livro 19.
Quoted in Paulo Roberto Staudt Moreira, Faces da Liberdade. Mascaras do Cativeiro:
expertencias de liberdade e escravidao percebidas atrav6s das cartas de alforria - Porto Alegre
(1858-1888) (Porto Alegre: Arquivo Piiblico do Estado/EDIPUCRS, 1996), p. 67.
36 And in this sense the Brazilian situation differed remarkably from the American case. In the
United States, especially after the war of 1812, a color bar was maintained to exclude blacks, both
slave and free, from the army. In spite of the courage demonstrated by persons of African
descent, the American Army progressively closed its doors to those individuals until some events
during the Civil W ar modified such attitudes. For the enlistment of African Americans previous to
the Civil War, see Richard Rollings introduction to Black Southerners in Gray. Essays On AfroAmericans In Confederate Armies (Murfreesboro: Southern Heritage Press, 1994), pp. 1-35. See
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Without free regions to which they could run, the army provided a refuge for
some slaves who blended into the corps. For these individuals, their experience
in the Army was an improvement on the lives they had in the fields.
With a multi-racial army recruited from free and freed sectors of its
population, who were not often visually distinguishable from captives, it was not
possible to avoid the occasional recruitment of runaway slaves.37 On these
occasions the uniform worked as a shelter to disguise the previous condition of
runaways and could provide them with the additional sympathy of fellow soldiers
in the barracks. In spite of this, the Imperial government returned at least 36
runaways and took measures to avoid repetition of such cases.38 In a circular
letter to the President of Rio de Janeiro, the minister of war stressed the
inconveniences brought by those circumstances emphasizing that: uWe should
avoid the repetition of cases where, voluntarily or through recruitment, the army
accepts individuals who are later discovered to come from the slave condition.
We need to be very careful and check cautiously the individuals that are
presented.”39
Sometimes

even

free

individuals went through

bizarre

situations

demonstrating that the status of some freed slaves after manumission was not

also Adam Rothman, "West India Regiments at the Battle of New Orleans and Beyond," Paper
prepared for the American Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 1999.
37 And this was the source of great misunderstandings about the status of Brazilian soldiers. Some
authors took for granted that the large number of people of black descent meant they were slaves.
38 Manuela Cameiro da Cunha, “Silences if the Law: Customary Law and Positive Law on the
Manumission of Slaves in 19th century Brazil" in History and Anthropology Vol. 1, n. 2 ,1 9 8 5 , pp.
427-43.
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completely autonomous. In some cases, after being manumitted, such persons
still owed cash payments to their former masters for a certain period of time. In
these cases, freedom did not break the barriers of personal subordination, as
slaves emerged to free life still dependent on their previous owners. The soldier
Ricardo was a freed slave in Rio Grande do Sul who enlisted in the army in
1866. After he left town, his former owner, a widow, petitioned the president of
the province re-calling her servant. In the petition she lamented her poor
condition, declaring "he could not enjoy liberty without paying me the amount of
1:160$000” (U.S. $534). The provincial president refused to release Ricardo,
answering that, taking into consideration the letter of manumission, there was no
doubt that he was free and the contract between Ricardo and his previous owner
could not be used as an exemption for the military service. In this case, the
urgent need to enlarge the army favored

public freedom over private

obligations.40
The impressment of slaves was very similar to the conscription of the free
sections of society described in chapter IV. In many provinces difference in color
between slaves and free poor people was not easily perceived. Under such
circumstances, slaves could be impressed while walking in the streets or when
running errands for their masters. If the slave preferred army life it would be
difficult to force his return unless the owner discovered where he was and

39 JoSo Lustosa da Cunha Paranagud to EsperidiSo EI6y de Barros Pimentel, 2 0 August 1866.
APRJ, ColegSo 8, Pasta 10, mago 12 (1866).
40 APRS, CorrespondSncia dos Govemantes, mago 109 - Oflcios do Presidente da Provlncia ao
Chefe da Pollcia em 14. Feb. 1867.
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petitioned the army. The authority on Brazilian manumissions, Peter L.
Eisenberg, following Warren Dean, observed that during the census of 1872, for
the first time, the pollsters made a distinction between slavery and ethnicity.
Eisenberg postulates that Brazilian society tended initially to identify the color of
the skin with specific legal conditions (e.g., mulatto to freed men). Later in the
19th century, Brazilian society began to dissociate color of the skin and the
individual legal condition. It is feasible to suppose that press gangs could easily
accept those lighter-skinned individuals as if they were freed slaves.41
Once recruited, many slaves changed their names in order to avoid being
discovered. This was the case of a slave called Baltazar, impressed during the
Uruguayan campaign (Aug. 1864 - Feb. 1865) and enlisted in the Third Battalion
of Volunteers. In November 1866 his owner petitioned the president of the
province demanding his return, but the Quartermaster General declared it
impossible to find his name on the list. Many times, links of comradeship built
between the slaves and their officers were the best protection they could have.42
Although a mass of free people were possibly available, their recruitment
was subjected to the limits imposed by their patrons and protectors. These
obstacles limited the capacity of the Imperial state to obtain a permanent
provision of manpower to reinforce the Imperial Army. Without adequate means

41 Peter Eisenberg, “Ficando Livre: As Alforrias em Campinas no S6culo XIX,” pp. 187-8, quoting
Warren Dean, Rio Claro. Um Sistema Brasileiro de Grande Lavoura (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra,
1977), p. 72. Terms such as “pardo,” “mulato,” “criolo,” and “cabra", provided some of the
designations for freedmen. These terms assumed different meanings as the century advanced.
42 From the Quartermaster General to BarSo of Boa Vista. Uruguayana, 07 November 1865.
AHRS, Lata 198, mago 1.
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to extract from the Brazilian people a regular "tribute of blood”, authorities had to
concentrate their recruiting efforts on unprotected persons. Considering the
permanent scarcity of voluntary soldiers, slaves represented a natural source of
substitutes, especially where their concentration was considered a threat to the
public order, that is, in the main cities and particularly in the Court. If cities
provided ideal refuges for runaways, they were also places of permanent
suspicion, where a runaway was liable to be recruited as any vagrant.43
Donations were less common and restricted to the first stages of the
campaign. They can be included in the first wave of patriotic demonstrations
described in chapter IV. This was the case for Manoel Antonio Ayrosa, who
manumitted Pedro, a light mulatto, under the condition that he serve in the army
for the duration of the campaign. This type of manumission became rarer as the
war progressed, virtually disappearing after 1866. The few donations already
made were considered sufficient proofs of patriotism, and donors were
symbolically rewarded with titles of nobility.44
Unlike the U.S. situation, there were no popular demonstrations against
the mixing of free and slave troops. Among other explanations are the facts that
blacks had been serving since the beginning of the war and that the racial
composition of the Brazilian ranks helped to contain any possible tensions

43 According to the data provided by Fabio Faria Mendes, voluntary enlistment decreased from
41,4% in 1864 (first year) to 8,16 during the efforts undertaken in the years 1867-1868. See “O
Tributo de Sangue: Recrutamento Militar e Constru$3o do Estado no Brasil Imperial,” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, IUPERJ (Brazil), 1997), pp. 217-19.”
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involving racial prejudice. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis is the experience
of eleven companies of Zouaves (freedmen soldiers from Bahia), counting 676
troops, who departed from Salvador during the first year of the campaign.45
These segregated companies did not last long: due to administrative measures
they were mixed with other troops as soon as they arrived in Paraguay. No
segregated battalions fought during the Paraguayan War.
For many free blacks, the war offered also an opportunity to prove their
value and bravery in combat and an additional chance to be integrated into the
mainstream of society. Among those free black men who served was Candido
Fonseca Galvao, also known by his self-proclaimed title of Dorn Obd II. The
Grandson of an African tribal king, the said Dorn Ob£ volunteered with 30 other
comrades from the town of Len$6is in the Bahian backlands to take part in the
campaign. Decorated for bravery and wounded in battle, he became a war hero
in Rio de Janeiro, where Candido finally settled after he was mustered out. The
postwar trajectory of Don Ob£ II shows the importance of participation in the
campaign for the postwar black community in Rio de Janeiro, as Cdndido
became a reference for the aspirations and demands of both War veterans and
African descents 46

44 "RelafSo dos Offerecimentos feitos ao Govemo para as Urgencias da Guerra” in Report from
the Ministry of War, 1865, also quoted in Ricardo Salles, Guerra do Paraquai: escravid5o e
cidadania na formacao do exfercito. p. 101.
45 The name Zouave was copied from the French African armies in Algeria where black soldiers
fought on behalf of their metropolis during the colonial wars.
48 For a historical analysis of Dom Ob£'s life and times see Eduardo Silva, Prince of the People.
The life and Times o f a Brazilian Free Man of Color. (London: Verso, 1993).
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Summarizing, the recruitment of slaves during the initial steps of the
campaign was not numerically significant, but offered an opportunity for some
slaves to escape exploitation in spite of the hardships of the campaigns and the
chances of dying in combat. If, before 1866, the recruitment of these individuals
was limited by the voluntary motivations of their owners, war conditions offered
opportunities for large changes in the moods of the government agents. In
several provinces, the draft of free men met violent resistance. In some areas,
especially in the Northeast, Sao Paulo, and Minas Gerais, mobs attacked
enrollment officers, forcing the Provincial presidents to send troops to carry out
the draft.47 Under such exceptional circumstances the state could appeal to the
masters groups because national security was at risk. The country’s military
situation between 1866 and 1868 created a perception of national crisis that
reinforced this kind of state appeal.

The Military Situation
As explained in chapter IV, the struggle against Paraguay offered few
indications that an external threat could strengthen the Brazilian civic feelings for
long. The efforts to recruit and train citizens faced enormous resistance after the
initial months of the conflict. Few free individuals were willing to serve outside the
Imperial borders, facing the risks of combat and disease.46 Powerful bosses and

47 Many such cases were described in chapter IV.
48 According to the Reports from the Ministry of W ar for the years 1867-1868, one fourth of the
Brazilian forces were permanently sick.
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even Imperial agents conspired against conscription, defending their domains to
the point of making recruiter efforts pointless in some regions.
The primitive state of bureaucratic development in Brazil reinforced the
huge obstacles that restricted the attempts of the government to build a powerful
army. The lack of popular enthusiasm, endemic after 1866, completed the
scenario,

undermining the enormous military deficiencies of the Empire.

Commenting on the nature of the war Counselor Pimenta Bueno, a member of
the Emperor’s closest circle, reminded his peers about the nature of the war:
“This is not a campaign that will be ended through one or two battles that will
bring glory to the Prince. This is a war of resources, a series of attacks against
trenches and fortifications, a continuous series of guerrilla, that will be very
depressing.”49
The prolonged campaign created a series of conflicts at the national level,
which reflected increasing social tensions in both cities and the countryside. Little
by little the war efforts tended to increase divisions within imperial society,
especially in the relations between the central and the local powers. Such
circumstances were interconnected with a series of logistical problems at the
front. By the end of 1866, it was not clear whether the Triple Alliance would be
able to prevail. The troops were bogged down around a swampy region on the
right bank of the Paraguayan river, “a land in which no one does well,” as a

49 Jos6 HonOrio Rodrigues (ed.), Atas do Conselho de Estado (Brasilia: Senado Federal, 1973-

1978),Vol. VI, p. 65.
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corporal described it.50 This region did not offer adequate conditions for tactical
movements, nor was it particularly conducive to use of cavalry.51 The Brazilian
financial situation was delicate and there were no concrete prospects for an
early, successful termination of the war. To make things worse, the Paraguayan
government gave no signs of surrender. The territorial instinct is normally a
powerful drive in all defensive campaigns, but the Paraguayans’ defense of their
homeland turned to be one of the most determined and costly in the history of
warfare.52
While the Paraguayans kept control of the Humayta fortress, a wellfortified collection of trenches, they controlled the upper Paraguay River,
blocking the main route to Asuncion.53 After a series of military disasters, the only
thing Paraguayans could fight for was to avoid invasion. The basic aim of the
Paraguayan government, like that of the Confederacy during the Civil War, was
to defend their nation against conquest. The Paraguayans hoped for an
honorable armistice that could preserve their territorial and political autonomy.

50 Francisco Borges Ribeiro to Agostinha Maria de Jesuz, HumaitS, Paraguay, 16 April 1869,
AHEX/RQ, JJ-259-6322. Quoted in Hendrik Kraay, “Soldiers, Officers, and Society; The Army in
Bahia, Brazil, 1808-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin), 1995, p. 500.
51 Until the Paraguayan War, the Gaucho cavalry had been the basis of Brazilian military in her
actions in the River Plate.
52 While underlining the demise of the Confederate will, James McPherson called attention to the
fact that the Confederate war effort, where 5 percent of the population perished, seem feeble
when compared to the 56 percent of the Paraguayan adults who died during the war. Although
McPherson's data can be contested, Paraguayan numbers still provide a good contrast to what
degree territorial defense can push national sacrifice. See Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 856.
53 Some historians considered Humayta as the South American Sebastopol, in a direct reference
to the Russian stronghold during the Crimean War. It seems Alliance leaders overestimated the
strategic importance of such trenches, contributing heavily to the army's paralysis. Consequently,
during this period, many proposals of negotiation came from Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, as well as
from the United States. The fact that they did not prevail does not diminish their importance.
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From June 1865 on, the Paraguayans could “win” the war only by not losing.54
This position was expressed in the testimony of a Paraguayan soldier, collected
by a Brazilian young officer, captain of engineering Benjamin Constant Botelho
de Magalhaes. In a letter to his wife he described his contacts with the enemy:
During three days the shooting stopped completely and the
Paraguayans (soldiers and officers) came to our lines to talk to us.
They brought us presents like bowls (cuias), and said that they had
no intention to keep fighting us. They know everything that
happens in our army, in our politics, and keep calling our men to
talk [saying]: we are your friends and don’t like to shoot you. The
supreme government will take care of the peace negotiations.55
The most immediate threat against the continuation of the war came
however, not from the Paraguayan resistance, but from the possibility of a
rupture in the Triple Alliance, the political and military agreement that supported
the war. Few sectors in Brazil accepted comfortably a diplomatic and military
alliance with any Spanish-speaking republic. Memories of old regional rivalries,
dating from the colonial period, were still strong enough to generate mistrust
among Brazilian regional leaders about any cooperation. Gaucho officers were
especially sensitive because they had a long history of border conflicts with the
Argentineans.

During the war, the maintenance of a special brigade in the

Gaucho lands was constantly pledged because, no sector completely trusted the

54 And this was the Paraguayan message at the meeting that reunited Solano Lopez, Bartolomeu
Mitre, and Venancio Flores at a place called Yatayti-Cord In 12 September 1866 when Solano
Lopez presented his proposal to end the war. For the meeting, see Adolfo J. Baez, Yatavtv-Cora:
una conferencia histdrica (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Papelerfa Juan Perroti, 1929).
55 Benjamin Constant to Claudio Luis da Costa, Tuyuti (Paraguay) 29 November 1866. Quoted in
Teixeira Mendes, Benjamin Constant - Pe?as Justificativas, pp. 118-19. Vitor Izecksohn, “O
Cerne da Disc6rdia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Nucleo Profissional do Exarcito.” (M.A. Thesis,
IUPERJ (Brazil), 1992), p. 105. Renato Lemos (ed.), Cartas da Guerra do Paraauai. Beniamin
Constant na Campanha do Paraguai (Rio de Janeiro: IPHAN, 1999), pp. 63-4.
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Uruguayan and the Argentinean allies. Benjamin Constant defined the fragile
cooperation among the allies through an ironic remark:
This alliance far from diminishing the racial hate that existed
between Brazil and those miserable republics has been serving to
give them a stronger development. God willing, before we return to
Brazil, we could tear [this Alliance] on the battlefield.56
According to Triple Alliance agreements, all Brazilian troops should fight
under the command of the Argentinean president, General Bartolomeu Mitre.
During the first two years of the campaign, this provision was respected,
although, for the Brazilian officers, it was extremely difficult to work under the
command of a traditional Brazilian rival. Consequently, relations were marked by
deep mistrust on both sides.57
The designation of the Argentinean president as commandant in chief of
all the Alliance’s armies was a consequence of many factors. The most
significant were that most of the route to the Paraguayan invasion passed
through Argentinean territory, and that the elite of Buenos Aires gave great
importance to the war as a tool for political centralization.
In the middle of the 1860s the Argentinean institutional situation was still
very delicate. Many provincial chiefs openly criticized the Portefio hegemony and

56 Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhaes to Claudio Luis da Costa Quoted in Renato Luis do
Couto e Lemos (ed.), Cartas da Guerra, p. 113.
57 Brazilian commandant of the Second Corps of the Army Viscount of Porto Alegre believed that
Mitre's actions aimed to demoralize Brazilian military in face of their allies/adversaries; see
Viscount of Porto Alegre to Jo§o Lustosa da Cunha Paranagua, Tuiuty (Paraguay) 19 October
1866inlH G B , Lata 312 pasta 12.
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its economic domination

over the rest of the country.58 Under these

circumstances the presence of Mitre as the supreme commander of the Triple
Alliance troops was functional for the pro-center forces in their long struggle to
consolidate their Argentinean national project. For those Argentineans, the war
was the long desired opportunity to defeat Federalist adversaries both in
Uruguay and Paraguay.
At the same time they fought external enemies, Argentineans expected to
undermine the dissension they were facing in their own country.59 In sum, for
Argentina the Paraguayan war was both an external conflict and a civil war that
involved the problem of national loyalty much more intensely than in Brazil.60
Chart III shows the progressive growth of the Brazilian participation when
compared to the size of their allies’ contribution. Between 1866 and 1867 the
relative size of the Brazilian troops increased from 57.6% to 89.1% of the total.
This increase in the importance of the Brazilian army was not followed by an
expansion in the number of troops. Especially after the second half of 1867, the
number of recruits decreased when compared to the two first years.

58 The meanings of the terms Portefio and Buenairense were defined at chapter II. For an
analysis of the center-periphery relations during the Argentinean state-building process see Jos6
Carlos Chiaramonte, “La Cuestibn Regional en el proceso de gestacibn del Estado Nacional
Argentino. Algunos problemas de Interpretacibn” in Waldo Ansaldi and Jose Luis Moreno (eds.),
Estado Nacional v Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional. Antoloaia Conceptual para el Analysis
Comparado (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp. 169-203.
59 Leopoldo Allub, “Estado y Sociedad Civil: Patrbn de Emergencia y Desarrollo del Estado
Argentino (1810-1930)” in Waldo Ansaldi and Jos6 Luis Moreno (eds.), Estado Nacional v
Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional. (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp. 109-57.
60 Brazilians retained the command of the fleet.
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Chart III

Size of Allied Armies, 1866-1869
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Source: Wilma Peres Costa, A Espada de Damocles, p. 331.

In spite of all the internal turmoil sparked by the Brazilian war efforts, the
decision to continue prevailed. While the resistance against recruitment in Brazil
was intense, no internal group had enough political force to undermine
completely the direction of the events.61 There were strong regional differences
in the scale of provincial sacrifices, but no powerful sector openly resisted the
Imperial government. Revolts had a more local than national range, involving
disputes among provincial factions over who would be the dominant oligarchy.
Political parties could fight each other at a local scale while they were nationally
committed to the war efforts. Consequently, for the Brazilian people, in spite of
the many regional and local conflicts, the war was still viewed as a national
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cause: slaves did not revolt in mass, nor did centripetal forces take advantage of
circumstances to rebel against the Empire.
In contrast with the Brazilian situation, in Argentina the war exacerbated
political conflicts that had been constantly nourished in bloody insurrections
during the century. Those earlier rebellions linked provincial oppression to
national tensions, sparking turmoil in many provinces. Federalist ideas in
Argentina had a stronger appeal than they had in Brazil, and were supported by
the constitution of 1853. Consequently, the war create still larger divisions in the
country, throwing up huge obstacles that undermined national mobilization,
forcing the conscription of mercenaries.62
The Argentinean Federalists disrupted the efforts to organize a large Army
as much as they could.63 Even a regional leader such as Urquiza, who nominally
supported the war, did not permit his province to send troops to the battlefields.
Mobilization was the sole responsibility of Buenos Aires, and its implementation
led to an increasing regional repugnance against the Porteno and Buenairense
power groups. Those groups faced resistance that was not limited just to armed

61 Those numbers represent just an estimate once it is currently impossible to obtain accurate
data concerning the size of combatants in the three forces.
62 For a personal description of the life conditions of immigrant soldiers in the Argentinean army
see Ulrich Lopacher and Alfred Tobler, Un Suizo en la Guerra del Paraguay (Asuncion: Editorial
del Centenario, 1969).
63 Enthusiasm in Argentina for the w a r was limited to the direct clients of the state, especially
those ranchers who could profit by provisioning the armies with horses and salted beef. According
to David Rock, Mitre’s supporters became well-known as the “Purveyors' Party.” See David Rock,
Argentina 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), p. 129.
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confronts, but also dominated the debates in the national press and public
imagination.84

The Black Image in the Platine Mind
The War of the Triple Alliance was fought on many fronts. For the
Paraguayans and their allies in the Argentinean provinces, propaganda and
diplomacy became alternative battlefields in a desperate struggle for survival.
The writer and politician Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) made the most
important public condemnation of the war. Alberdi was the intellectual mentor of
the Argentinean constitution (1853) and his book Bases v Puntos de Partida
(Basis and Points of Departure) had been used as a blueprint for the
Argentinean nationality.85 Because of his continuing disputes against political
rivals, Alberdi lived long periods in exile.

During the years 1865 and 1866,

Alberdi wrote from Paris a series of articles condemning the Argentinean
participation in the war. The articles had a clear objective: to undermine
Bartolomeu Mitre’s position in Argentinean politics, opening the window for a
Federalist-oriented direction.88

64 By 1868 foreigners provided an important number of the Argentinean troops, mainly Belgian and
Italians. A foreign observer underlined the point. S ee Richard Francis Burton, Letters from the
Battle-Fields of Paraguay (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1870), pp. 325, 362.
65 Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases Y Puntos de Partida para la Organization Polftica de La Republica
Argentina, derivadas de la lev que preside el desarrollo de la civilization en la America del Sur.
Exerpeted in Tulio Halperin Donghi, Provecto v Construction de Una Nacidn (Argentina 18461880) (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1980), pp. 74-111.
66 Alberdi works on the Paraguayan war are: “Las Disensiones de las Republicas del Plata y las
Maquinaciones del Brasil” (March 1865); “Los Intereses Argentinos en la Guerra del Paraguay
con el Brasil” (July 1865); “Crisis Permanente en las Republicas del Plata” (February 1866);
"Texto y Comentario del Tratado Secreto de la Triple Alianza contra el Paraguay" (May 1866).
1869 these articles were edited in a single book called La Guerra del Paraguay. References here
are to the 1988 Argentinean edition, published in Buenos Aires by editorial Hyspanoamerica.
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Alberdi presented the war as the result of Brazilian territorial rapacity. His
central hypothesis is that, due to the limits imposed by the torrid weather
(prevailing in most Brazilian regions), the Empire would look for more temperate
lands on the Platine estuary to satisfy her territorial ambitions. The small republic
of Paraguay was protecting the “new world” against the slaveholding and
expansionist Braganzas of Brazil.67 The main consequence of the Brazilian
victory would be territorial expansion and the replacement of a white native
population by black slaves. According to such a perspective, Argentina had been
mistaken in joining this crusade, because her people had historically opposed
Brazilian expansionist aims. Alberdi even predicted an eventual clash between
the two powers over the Paraguayan spoils. The Empire in particular was
blamed for seeking to control the fluvial and political destinies of the River Plate
region due to her geographical limitations.68
It does not matter whether the vision corresponded to reality or not. This
point of view was very effective in crystallizing a derogatory vision of Brazilian
intentions in the war. Positivism and racial determinism were interconnected
ideologies by the middle of the 19th century. Under such pseudo-scientific points
of view it was easier to classify the Brazilian presence as a kind of nasty and

67 Braganzas was the lineage of the Brazilian royal family, a dynasty connected to Portuguese and
Austrian connections.
68 This geographic deterministic approach was strong even among American newspapers. The
New York Herald, the major interpreter of the war in the United States, also sympathized with the
Paraguayan cause.
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backward return to the colonial years.69 It provided an important source for
Paraguayan propaganda as it furnished fuel for racist discussions in the Platine
press, especially in the provinces most deeply affected by the progress of the
war.70
The racial composition of the Brazilian army was a major theme of the
Paraguayan war press. In their illustrated newspapers the Paraguayans
displayed racist cartoons that portrayed the Brazilian Emperor and his main
military chiefs as monkeys. The Brazilian soldiers were referred to the Guarany
term “camba,” meaning “the monkeys.” Illustrated papers like The Cabichui
(wasp in Guarany language) and Sentinela (sentinel) abused the language of
allegory and caricature, projecting a comparative view of their racial superiority
over the Brazilian African background. Many of these cartoons bore captions in
Portuguese, underlining the precarious condition of troops camped around the
Paraguayan river. They emphasized the incompetence of the Brazilian military
chiefs and suggested that this failing was due to the African ancestry of the
Brazilian leadership. Such representations appeared as a serious subject of
concern for the critics of the military conduct of the war because they touched a

69 For a general account on the relations between racism and geographic determinism, see
Seymour Drescher, “The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific
Racism” in Seymour Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom. Comparative Studies in the Rise and
Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 275-311.
70 During the war the Paraguayan government published small brochures in Europe. One of them,
under the title La Politique du Brfesil ou La Fermeture des Fleuves. published in Paris in 1867,
defended the hypothesis that Brazil made war just to close all South American rivers. This anti
blockade position was clearly in accordance with the Paraguayan struggle against the river
blockade, a major aspect of the war.
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fundamental issue: the self-image the Empire was trying to project in South
America.
Figure 3 - The Emperor and his commanders portrayed as Monkeys

Source: El Centinela. Paraguayan Front Newspaper May, 9 ,1 8 6 7

During the first year of the war the Argentinean province of Corrientes had
been occupied by the Paraguayan troops for six months. The population of this
upriver Argentine province resented economic subordination to the port city and
had periodically revolted against Buenos Aires. Correntinos and Paraguayans
shared many cultural values coming from their common Guarany background:
language, ethnic composition, and aspirations to autonomy. During the 1840’s
both governments had even signed treaties of cooperation and self-defense.
Rivalries between Correntino and Porteho groups undermined any cooperation
between those populations and the Argentinean war efforts.71
The fragile economy of this province was severely disrupted during the
Paraguayan occupation because the contacts with the Littoral were totally

711am not affirming that the Paraguayan occupation was pacific.
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broken. The situation deteriorated steadily with the terrible sanitary conditions
prevailing in the Brazilian forces. Their concentration close to the city of
Corrientes, after October 1865, brought the infamous cholera morbus epidemics
that placed still more stress on the delicate relationship between Correntinos and
Brazilians. The spread of the infection deeply affected those populations.
According to Benjamin Constant, from an original population of 16,000, eight
thousand were refugees in the interior, as they were afraid of both contamination
and recruitment. Describing the situation, Constant underlined Correntinos’
strong racist attitudes against Brazilians, emphasizing that, "The Correntinos say
that the Cholera is the worst of all evils we brought to them because it is
devastating their population. They blame ‘the monkeys’ for the epidemics. You
can’t imagine how disgusted against us they are.’’72
The northern Argentinean provinces of Entre-Rios, Corrientes, and
Missiones were strategic for the provision of resources for the Brazilian army.
The eruption of a series of revolts in Argentinean northern provinces at the end
of 1866 put at risk the Brazilian military situation. These revolts were led by the
caudilhos Saa and Felipe Varela. From San Luis, San Juan, La Rioja,
Catamarca, Salta and Jujui, the wave threatened Cordoba, Santa F6, EntreRios, and Corrientes, forcing the Argentinean government to bring back 6,000
soldiers from the Paraguayan front.

72 Benjamin Constant to Claudio Luis da Costa. Corrientes (Argentina), 11 April 1867. In Teixeira
Mendes, Beniamin Constant - Pecas Justificativas. p. 140. Vitor Izecksohn, O Cerne da DiscOrdia.
A Guerra do Paraguai e o Nucleo Profissional do Ex6rcito. M.A. Thesis, IUPERJ (Brasil), 1992, p.
140. Renato Lemos (ed.) Cartas da Guerra, p. 155.
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The practical consequences of this chaos followed quickly. The wave of
revolts forced the Argentinean leader to abdicate military command. Mitre
resigned in February 1867, thus giving Brazilian military officers complete control
over the strategic decisions related to both the operations in Corrientes, and
those against the Paraguayan army. Four hundred Brazilian troops landed in the
city of Corrientes, establishing peace and securing provincial loyalty to the war
effort. At the end, these revolts were completely defeated, weakening an
important focus of insubordination in the Argentinean republic. Finally, with the
assassination of Urquiza, in 1868, Federalists lost their principal leader with
nationwide appeal. Provincial power decreased a great deal during the next
decade, although revolts still occurred during the 1870’s.73
Under the circumstances, the Brazilian army was left to fight virtually
alone during the most severe phases of the campaign. Such a difficult situation
created an even greater need for human and

material reinforcements.

Consequently, from September 1866 to July 1867, Brazilians had to prepare a
new offensive against Paraguay, while simultaneously enforcing peace in
northern Argentina. The intensification of the war efforts occurred during the
peak of the crisis in the structure of the recruitment.

73 Notwithstanding the persistent outbreak of provincial revolts, the tide definitively changed in the
direction of the Unitarian forces, resulting in complete hegemony of the pro-center forces in most
provinces. A complete hegemony was only completely established around the 1880’s. See Jose
Luis Moreno, “Incorporation de la Argentina al Mercado Mundial (1880-1930)” in Waldo Ansaldi y
Jose Luis Moreno, Estado Nacional v Sociedad en el Pensamiento Nacional. Antolooia
Conceptual para el Analysis Comparado (Buenos Aires: Cantaro, 1996), pp. 215-33.
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Ironically, war circumstances forced the Imperial army to reinforce the
Argentinean central authority in that region, in favor of provincial subordination to
a centralized nation. It was an unexpected effect that the Brazilian occupation
forces would turn into enforcers of the stability of a traditional adversary. Such
was the option of the strategic command during the months the campaign was
paralyzed. It can be explained only by taking into account the difficult strategic
conditions faced at the front.74
The Argentinean crises gave the last blow to any illusion that the war
could be won without extreme measures.75 The situation required immediate
actions. If a decision to continue should prevail, the Imperial state would have to
go beyond any previously existent policies. This perspective was exposed in a
confidential letter from the Minister of War to the President of Rio Grande do Sul,
linking the Argentine situation to the urgent need to enlist slaves. According to
Minister Paranagud:
The outbreak of the revolution in [some provinces of] the Argentine
Confederation is very intense and can turn into a national
revolution, requiring the transference of Argentine forces to repress
the rebellion. This measure will weaken the forces in operation
against the government of Paraguay and can put us in the
contingency of having to pursue the war without Allied support....
Your Excellency needs to free the slaves that should be designated
to the service of war, be they offered for free or through an amount
74 This subject was extensively treated in the private correspondence of Marquis de Caxias with
the Minister of War. See ANRJ, Codices 932 and 9 34 .Correspondences of the High Command
with Diverse Authorities.
75 Argentina remained a nominal partner in the Triple Alliance after 1867. According to some
accounts such a situation prevailed just because of secret threats from Brazil that any move
toward a separate peace would be treated as a casus belli. See Efraim Cardozo, "Paraguay
Independiente" in Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta (eds.), Historia de America v de los Pueblos
Americanos. Vol. XXI (Barcelona, Salvat Editores, 1949), pp. 1-401.
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designated by the Ministry of Finances. The Imperial government
considers the manumission of slaves to sen/e as a relevant service
and recommends Imperial recognition through Imperial munificence
to those who cooperate.76
These circumstances cleared the path for a government decision to
support a massive wave of emancipation and the recruitment of slaves coming
from all parts of the territory. Consequently, at both the national and provincial
levels, the war effort forced government officials and slaveholders to address
questions concerning the future of slavery in Brazil. Among those questions,
special attention was given to the inevitability of abolition. The war effort also
reinforced the role of the Emperor as the head of the emancipation efforts, a
situation that would bring important consequences, after the war, from the
perspective from which the monarchical institution was viewed.

The decision to enlist slaves
The decision to give freedom to and arm a more significant number of
slaves to fight against Paraguay was officially taken by the Emperor Pedro II in
November 1866. As we will see, it was not exactly “one decision,” but a series of
movements, retreats and negotiations envisioning a faster increase in the Army’s
capacity to assimilate a larger number of slaves in its ranks. Unlike in the U.S.,
there were neither organized social movements nor the pressure of public
opinion behind the government’s action. The question was discussed behind
closed doors as a matter of national security.

76 JoSo da Costa Paranagu£ to Homem de Mello. Rio de Janeiro, 07 February 1867. AHRS,
Cddices B1070 - Avisos do Minist6rio da Guerra.
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That “decision” resulted from long reflections and debates that led to a
series of steps designed to enforce more encompassing legislation concerning
emancipation. While discussing the subject, the Emperor followed the private
advice of the State Council and took a first step in November 1866. That
resolution was linked to the urgent need to reinforce the Army, but it was also
officially limited just to some sectors where slavery was not considered vital, that
is, slaves coming from the Nation, the Imperial House, and the convents and
monasteries, whose freedom would be considered priority for the war efforts.77
The question was carefully analyzed and discussed in the meeting of the
State Council of November 6, 1866. The State Council was an institution made
up of privileged spokesmen for the political elite. They met periodically under the
coordination of the Emperor to debate pivotal questions. These meetings aimed
to give the Monarch advice on the most important matters of politics and public
administration. Their importance lay in the fact that most councilors were
important members of the Imperial elite at the peak of their careers. The Council
had a small membership and the discussions covered most of the pivotal themes
of public administration. Opinions were freely expressed. As a tool for
consultation the Council had great influence over Imperial decisions.78

77 All those sectors referred to State related activities.
In 1973 the Brazilian Senate published the minutes from the meetings of the Council of State.
See Brasil, Senado Federal, Atas do Conselho de Estado Pleno. direpSo geral, organizapfio e
introdupSo de Jos6 HonOrio Rodrigues (Brasilia: Centro GrSfico do Senado Federal, 1973-1978,
14 vols.), henceforth referred as "Atas.” For more information see Visconde de Uruguay, Ensaio
Sobre o Direito Administrativo (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1960),
especially chapter XXVI; JoSo Camilo de Oliveira Torres, O Conselho de Estado (Rio de Janeiro:
EdipGes FDR, 1965) and JosG Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de Sombras (Rio de Janeiro:
VGrtice/IUPERJ, 1988), pp. 107-38.
78
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Chart IV - Meetings of the State Council, 1860-1871
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As shown in charter IV, during the Paraguayan War the number of
meetings sharply increased due to the urgency and importance of the questions
to be decided. From January 21,1865, to August 31 1867, there were seventeen
sessions of the State Council: two in 1865, eight in 1866, and seven in 1867.
The main issue of the period was the conduct of the Paraguayan War. Of the 17
proceedings, six discussed themes related to the war: financial problems,
recruitment, the presence of the Prince Consort at the front, cancellation of
provincial elections, and the transformation of slaves into soldiers.79

79 Many other questions although not directly linked to the war resulted from problems whose
relevance the war stressed. Such was the case of emancipation, discussed in two crucial
meetings during the month of April of 1867. Such was also the question of the country’s financial
situation and the need to create new taxes also discussed in April 1867.
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Through the reading of the proceedings it becomes clear that most
counselors supported the continuation of the war. The general opinion was that
any peace without a complete victory would reinforce the view of the Empire as
weak, incapable of defeating even a small nation like Paraguay. Echoing the
general feeling, Counselor Nabuco de AraOjo, one of the most active voices,
asserted that under the prevailing conditions “the government should avoid the
contingencies of a kind of peace that would bring shame for present generations
and indignation for future generations.’*0
Three questions constituted the focus of that meeting: 1) If the war
continues, would it be good policy to manumit slaves to increase the number of
soldiers in the army? 2) Which kind of slaves should be given preference for
enlistment: those coming from the nation, that is, owned by the government,
those from the religious orders, or those coming from private owners? 3) How to
take that What steps should be taken next?
The proceedings show there was no consensus among members of the
Council about the need to enlist a mass of slaves, suddenly to be transformed
into defenders of the nation. During the meeting, ten councilors recorded their
opinions concerning the first question, personally or through written statements.
Five voted in favor and five voted against. Most Councilors gave priority to the

80Atas, Vol. VI, p. 81.
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enlistment of slaves owned by the nation, the Imperial house, or by religious
orders over those employed on plantations as private property.81
Direct State Property
The slaves of the Nation were individuals owned by the state through the
Nation’s farms or state-owned industries. The farms of the Nation received in
custody all African contrabands, that is, those slaves captured while being
illegally introduced into the country after the prohibition of the international
traffic.82 These African-born individuals were left under Imperial custody for a
certain number of years before being released.83 Their semi-captive status
permitted the State to dispose of them as she wished: a few were sent to the
public farms, while others were sent to the Imperial iron and powder factories or
to the Imperial arsenals. That was the case of Antonio, a free African working in
the W ar Arsenals after 1849. In March 1862 Antonio petitioned the Ministry of
War to be emancipated. To support his case Antonio pointed to the fact that he
had fulfilled his probationary period. From his petition it becomes clear that free
fellow workers at the arsenal encouraged him to pursue his rights.84

81 Councilors Viscount of Abaet6, Pimenta Bueno, Sousa Franco, Viscount of Sapuci, and Nabuco
de Araujo favored it while Councilors Viscount of Jequitinhonha, Viscount of Itaboraf, Marquis of
Olinda, Paranhos, and Torres Homes voted against it.
82 The public farms were located in Santa Cruz, a distant district of Rio de Janeiro. For a complete
report on the these farm’s situation during the 1860's, see Proposta e Relatbrio do Ministerio da
Fazenda Apresentados a Assembtea Geral Legislativa na Quarta Sessflo da D6cima Seaunda
Legislature pelo Ministro e Secretario de Estado dos Neadcios da Fazenda. Joao da Silva Carrflo.
Rio de Janeiro, Typogrefia Nacional, 1866, especially Map 116.
83 And in this sense the Brazilian contrabands resembled those Confederate slaves received in
the Union fortresses during the Civil War, although similarities end here.
84 AHEx/RQ n. 650/1863. It was not possible to know whether Antdnio was or not freed but the
officer’s remarks attest that his information was true, emphasizing his good behavior while at the
army’s service. One year later the military officers were still judging his request.
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In some provinces, Africans could be distributed among private owners
who assumed their custody, exploiting their labor as if they were slaves bom in
Brazil. That was the case for a situation in the province of Pernambuco, where
from a total of 445 Africans, 113 were sent to private individuals or Alagoas,
including 84 Africans who were sent to planters.85 Some of them were illegally
sold as if they were Creole slaves, while others blended into the freed population
of the cities.86
Officially, freed Africans were not considered to be Brazilian citizens.
Consequently they could not serve in the army unless they were impressed by
mistake or deceived recruitment inspectors and enlisted. But taking into
consideration the lack of documentation, it was very difficult to know the origins
of some individuals. Referring to a case like this, the Marquis of Olinda informed
the Minister of War about a slave who was sent to the army by his son-in-law.
The slave was inspected and no problems were found. Finally, inspectors
discovered his “slavery marks,” that is, the ethnic signs of his African origin.
Consequently, Marquis of Olinda requested to have him sent back, as he would
not fit the army requirements. Regardless of the great need of men to fill the
Army, Africans coming from private owners would not be welcomed in the ranks.

85 Relatbrio apresentado a Assemblbia Geral Leaislativa na Primeira Sessflo da Dbcima Terceira
Legislature pelo Respective? Ministro e Secreterio de Estado Martin Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada.
Rio de Janeiro, Typografia do Correio Mercantil, 1867, p. 6.
86 The large number of African slaves introduced during the years (immediately) before the
abolition of the traffic (1850) created huge stratification among Brazilian captives. In provinces like
Bahia they reinforced previously existing divisions among the large African-descent population.
The freed Creole population saw the newcomers as inferiors. For more information see Kbtia M.
de Queirbs Mattoso, “No Brasil Escravista: RelagOes entre Libertos e Homens Livres e entre
Libertos e Escravos,” Revista Brasileira de Histbria. Volume 2, September 1981, pp. 219-33.
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But it seems the government could be more flexible concerning its own
Africans.87
The lack of resolution about the situation of African contrabands created
considerable tension in British-Brazilian relations. Such tension achieved its peak
in the “Christie question” in 1862, when British squadrons blockaded Brazilian
harbors in the most serious threat the Imperial sovereignty had faced since the
struggle for independence. The situation was solved only in 1864 when the
Imperial government officially freed its Africans.88

The war presented an

excellent opportunity to employ those already released before they were
incorporated into the Brazilian freed population.89
When discussing the subject, councilor Nabuco de Araujo underlined a
point that has never received adequate attention in the historiography about
slavery: the better treatment of both government-owned slaves (Slaves of the
Nation as they were called) and those coming from the Imperial Household,
when

compared

to

the

conditions

faced

by “normal

field

workers.”90

Consequently, Nabuco reminded his peers that proposals of freedom directed to

87 Marquis of Olinda to Marquis of ParanaguS, 07.08.1867, AHMI - 94 - 1- DPP - 7.3.867 - Mma.bi
-1 - 8 (l.n.9).
88 It was not possible to follow the trajectory of freed Africans in the Army. Officially freed Africans
were not considered to be Brazilian citizens. Consequently they could not serve in the army.
89 It is also interesting to note that when the war against Paraguay began relations between Britain
and Brazil were still broken. That seems to be additional evidence against the Imperialist
hypothesis described in chapter II.
90 According to a Confederate observer, the slaves from Santa Cruz farm had much better
conditions. They received daily payments and education. Their children had a band and they
knew how to play the anthems from America, England, and France. See John Codman, Ten
Months in Brazil (Boston: 1867), quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 73.
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the first and the second groups could be elusive, because those slaves might
prefer bondage to freedom.
[Because] [s]uch slaves and those coming from the Nation have
been living under very idle conditions it is possible they will refuse
this benefit [freedom to serve] and will try to hide themselves. It is
why their capture should be done in secret and with all possible
caution. The best possible solution would be to send the police
chief, the delegate, and the judge with the doctors and inspectors
to catch, examine, and evaluate those slaves.91

While discussing the manumission of the slaves from the Nation,
councilors also recommended that their wives should be freed.92 Such concerns
point to the growing importance of families among those individuals, meaning the
process of family formation was advancing in the state-owned properties,
probably due to their better conditions of life.93 The report of the Ministry of
Finances for 1866 shows a total population of 1,427 slaves of the nation. The
male population was 707. From these 339 were recruited. Officially 287 (84.6%)
slaves were sent to the front, while 67 others, owned by the Imperial house, also
shared this same fate.94

91 Atas, Vol. VI, p. 84. On the treatment of African bom slaves there are huge divergences.
According to PerdigSo Malheiro they were treated worse than Creole slaves. See Agostinho
Marques PerdigSo Malheiro. A EscravidSo no Brasil: Ensaio histdrico-Juridico-Social (SSo Paulo,
1944), vol. II, pp. 70-2. Quoted in Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 68.
“ Atas, vol. VI, 72-3.
93 The Reports about the iron works and farms of Ypanema in SSo Paulo, showed a population of
49 men and 26 women of all ages.
^ Proposta e Relatdrio do Ministdrio da Fazenda apresentados a Assembtea Geral Leaislativa na
Quarta Sessao da D6cima Seaunda Legislature Pelo Ministro e Secretdrio de Estado dos
Neqdcios da fazenda. JoSo da Silva Carrao. Rio de Janeiro, Typografia Nacional, 1966, Annexes,
Table 108. The Emperor also owned a certain number of slaves (Slaves from the Imperial House)
employed in Domestic tasks. These servants were the first to be freed. It is impossible to discover
the number of women freed as a consequence of the Imperial decision.
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Indirect State Property
The religious orders owned a certain number of slaves spread through
many church properties all over the nation. It was believed the church owned
some 1,420 male slaves able to serve.95 In spite of the original philanthropic
purposes of the Catholic Church, there was no special commitment from priests
or from the institution as a whole to free slaves. As opposed to the US, where
some churches furnished ideological fuel and personnel for antislavery crusades,
Brazilian society debated these questions strictly under the umbrella of the State.
The Church was completely absent in public discussions.96
Priests could own their slaves as private property, as they frequently did,
while the religious orders maintained a certain number of slaves Their stake had
great influence on the minor role performed by the Brazilian Church in the
struggle against slavery in every one of its phases. Commenting on the subject,
Councilor Torres Homem underlined the great contradiction of the existence of
slaves owned by the Church, emphasizing that: "It is also a strange anomaly that
after eighteen centuries of Christianity, the convents still own a large number of
slaves when the Catholic Church has always refuted, struggled and condemned
slavery as an institution opposed to the spirit of the Gospel.’’97

95 Estimates made by Councilor Viscount of Abaete, Atas. p. 72.
96 The Catholic Church, as the Crown’s official religion, was also committed to the conversion of
non-Catholic groups, which had historically worked as a functional argument for the defense of
slavery. In this ambivalent situation, their main intellectual goals were the conciliation of Christian
morals with the interests of the Imperial state.
97Atas, Vol. 6, p. 89.
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As public servants, the priests defended positions that were similar to, if
not more conservative than, those of the Brazilian bureaucrats. The fact that the
Catholic Church and the nation-state were united in the Luso-Brazilian world was
one characteristic of that tradition. It is not surprising that no abolitionist
sentiment developed among Brazilian priests as a group. They were divided
between their Christian beliefs, which mitigated against slavery, and their fidelity
to the needs of the Brazilian State, of which they were employees. According to
the future abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco, the possession of men and
women by convents and by the clergy in general completely demoralized all
religious feelings of masters and slaves.98
Privately Owned Slaves
The third group, slaves owned by private individuals, was by far the
largest, numbering around 1,500,000 individuals. By 1865 slaves were 15% to
20% of the total Brazilian population, fragmented by ethnicity, status, and
personal loyalties. There were no accurate registers to give an account of the
exact number of slaves in the country. Before 1872 there was no legal need to
register slaves, and slave owners did not need vouchers.99 There were no
regular demographic censuses, only estimates that took as their basis some
counties and provinces. The only statistical registers available are those from the

98 See Joaquim Nabuco, Abolitionism, p. 132. Joaquim Nabuco was the son of one of the Imperial
Councilors, Senator Nabuco de Araujo.
99 According to Robert Conrad, in 1862, it was calculated that if all proprietors suddenly needed to
prove their legal property over their servants, three fourths of all Brazilian slaves would be
considered free. See The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, p. 55.
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province and city of Rio de Janeiro, and these date from 1849.100 Even with such
limitations in knowledge, some councilors believed that by recruiting ten per cent
of the estimated total in condition to march, it would be possible to obtain around
24,000 soldiers from private owners.101
But those were individuals between 12 and 50 years old, that is, in the
peak of their productive lives. Such slaves were as essential to the Brazilian
planters as to the army. Worse than that, by the middle of the 1860s, due to the
termination of the Atlantic traffic and the difficulty of reproducing slavery under
Brazilian conditions, they were becoming a scarce good in plantation regions.
Slavery was facing its biggest crisis in Brazilian history, with an increasing
concentration of slaves in the Southwest regions that contained more than half of
the Brazilian slave population. These circumstances pointed to a possible
resistance to slave conscription from masters, particularly those owning large
gangs.102
Additional problems were related to the lack of registers accounting for the
exact number of slaves in the country. Resistance against the expansion of the
civil registers was a phenomenon widespread not only among slave owners; it

100 Rio de Janeiro, with its 450,000 captives, possessed a larger number of slaves than Cuba in
the same period.
101 The Viscount of Abaete, a councilor deeply committed to the use and generalization of
statistics, defended that position.
102 Those conditions have been discussed in chapter one.
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was deeply entrenched in all classes and prevented the government from
knowing precisely the number of slaves ready to be enlisted.103

Provinces
North
Northeast
South
West
Southwest
Court
Sub-totals

Table IX
Free and Slave Populations by Region104
Estimates for 1874
Free
%
Slave
%
Total

%

573,354

84.2

107,680

15.8

681,034

100.0

3,753,239

89.6

435,687

10.4

4,188,926

100.0

624,982

83.4

124,949

16.6

749,931

100.0

203,503

92.8

15,854

7.2

219,357

100.0

2,839,519

77.81

809,575

22.2

3,649,094

100.0

226,033

82.8

47,084

17.2

273,117

100.0

8,220,620

84.2

1,540,829

15.8

9,761,449

100.0

Source: Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Relatorio e Trabalhos Estatisticos (Rio de Janeiro,
1875), pp. 46-62; Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, 10 de maio de 1883, p. 10.

Debates focused on the question of releasing conscripted slaves. Many
councilors condemned any expropriation without compensation. The Marquis de
Olinda feared any measure could bring unexpected consequences because,
“slavery is a misfortune that should not be touched.” For others it was
dangerously linked to the prospect of immediate emancipation. Finally, a third
group, more concerned with public administration, feared the poor financial state
of the country could not support indemnifying the slave owners.
Those in favor saw recruitment as an essential measure for the nation’s
military needs. Viscount of Abaete went so far as to propose the expropriation of

103 For an appreciation of the meaning of slavery in Brazil as a cross-class institution see Stuart B.
Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia 1550-1835 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 439-67. Analysis of inventories and testaments show that
even the poor and the freed sectors occasionally possessed slaves.
104 North: Amazonas, Para; Northeast: Maranhio, Rio Grande do Norte, Paralba, Pernambuco,
Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia; South: Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina; Southwest: S3o
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espfrito Santo. West: Goias, and Mato Grosso; Court: City of Rio de
Janeiro.
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those slaves for public need in the name of national defense. Councilor Nabuco
de Araujo anticipated that the difficulties in mobilizing the free sectors of the
population would

increase

because of circumstances

like the scattered

distribution of the population, the absence of regular forces to follow runaways,
and political intrigues. Consequently., to organize the military power of the
country, based only on the free sections, would take a longer time than it was
possible to wait. Under such circumstances, the prolongation of the war against
the small Paraguayan Republic would take more labor from industry and
agriculture, aggravating the shortage of free workers once “Brazilians were
characterized by enthusiasm not by persevering into a mission.”
Nabuco defended the enlistment of slaves, especially of those who
constituted a threat to the maintenance of the public order. He focused mainly on
the urban slaves, a group deeply affected by inter-provincial traffic and over
whom there were less rigid rules of social control. Those would be the main
targets of his recruitment efforts and there would be no contradictions in this
because:
[T]he slaves bought [by the state] are freed, consequently they will
become citizens before they are turned into soldiers: they will
become soldier-citizens. Thus, at the same time and through the
same act it is possible to make a great service to the emancipation,
which is the cause of civilization and another service to the war,
which is a national cause; thus [the army] will receive soldiers
endowed with the values of freedom, disciplined by their custom of
obeying.105

105 Atas.

pp.

81-5.
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Nabuco foresaw in mobilization an opportunity to resume debates on
abolition. Such debates had been frozen since 1850, when the Atlantic traffic
was abolished. Finally, he argued for recruitment of the rebellious urban slaves,
whose concentration in the main cities constituted a permanent danger to the
maintenance of the public order. Nabuco referred to individuals like Carlos, the
slave described at the beginning of this chapter, over whom the mechanisms of
social control were weak. Targeting the urban slaves, the war would reduce one
of Brazil’s main problems of social organization without undermining the
agricultural activities so important for the economy. Recruitment would thus
complete the task that the internal traffic in slaves was advancing: freeing cities
from turmoil and threats brought by the concentration of slave groups in
permanent contact with freed and free members of the urban crowds.
Another defense of the enlistment of slaves was made by Councilor
Pimenta Bueno, this time from a much more racist perspective. This councilor
divided his answer into five points: 1) Politically, instead of diminishing the free
population, the state should shrink the number of slaves; 2) The Policy would be
a kind of emancipation that gives destination and occupation to those
emancipated; 3) Although this labor would be useful in agriculture, the sons,
relatives or clients of [the free] workers are much more needed. Many of them
represented the nuclei of future working families, nuclei that the war would snuff
out; 4) Brazilian society was not homogeneous, it was preferable to spare the
most civilized and virtuous class of society, and not the other, less civilized and
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virtuous and possibly dangerous. Between evils it is better to choose the lesser;
and finally 5) The recruitment of free men would become more and more difficult.
In Bueno's Social Darwinist line of reasoning, the war would bring about a
racial improvement of the Brazilian population. By destining blacks for death on
the battlefields, it would diminish their proportion in the total Brazilian population.
Consequently, war sacrifices would, in his opinion, “improve” the Brazilian racial
composition at the same time that they could solve the most immediate military
problems.106
Those opposed to any official recruitment policy for slaves appealed to
both materialist and moral considerations. The Viscount of Jequitinhonha
classified such action as “inconvenient, indecorous, ineffective and very onerous
to the public coffers.” Confronted with the possibility of formation of freedmen
battalions, Jequitinhonha went to the extreme of counseling a return to the use of
foreign mercenaries, a practice long abandoned by the Brazilian army.
Jequitinhonha was followed in this “lesser evil” position by the Viscount of
Itaborai for whom:
Foreign [mercenaries] are less dangerous than the slaves taken
from the state of abjection in which they live to be armed on the
next day, enhancing in their hearts the bad will, indisposition, and
the anger they accumulated during their captivity because they
understand that their freedom came not by feeling of justice or
generosity but just by the need to oppose them to their masters’
enemies.107
106 Journalist Julio Jos6 Chiavenatto erroneously interpreted this perspective as the final result of
the recruitment process. In his book O Negro no Brasil. Da Senzala a Guerra do Paraauai (SSo
Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982), the enlistment of the Brazilian slaves was viewed as a sort of “Final
Solution” for the racial plurality prevailing in the Empire.
107 Atas, pp.73-5.
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Comparing Slave Societies
During the meeting, Councilors constantly appealed for comparative
analysis. Most of the examples used came from European countries and their
colonies. In their considerations, those countries were linked to the elite’s
national self-image: a monarchy connected to the values and practices of
European nations. But the recently ended American Civil War was also an
important reference because American policies concerning recruitment were the
subject of inquiries and comparisons.
The American situation was compared with the Brazilian case by both
sides. Pimenta Bueno referred to the U.S. example to defend the enlistment,
connecting the Union situation to the patterns provided by the classical
civilizations of Greece and Rome 'Which were not embarrassed to appeal for the
help of their captives in times of trouble.” Nabuco de Araujo emphasized
Lincoln’s

Emancipation

Proclamation

(September

1862)

and

the

final

Emancipation Act (January 1863) as good precedents for the Brazilian case.
According to his perspective, the American experience showed that recruitment
of freed slaves could be done without social turmoil.
Refuting the similarity between American and Brazilian experiences,
Councilor Torres Homem pointed out that the Union’s massive enlistment of
blacks was related to the abolition of the institution in the South, a cardinal point
of that struggle. This measure was not a threat to northern society because the
North had a relatively small number of native inhabitants of African descent.
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Freedom was given to all of the southern slaves, without affecting economic and
social conditions in the North, where a free labor economy flourished even during
the colonial period. Enlisted former slaves fought for their own freedom which
was reason enough to maintain strict discipline. Consequently, even those
slaves who did not participate directly in the fight would also benefit from that
struggle. In Brazil, by contrast, freed slaves would be still fighting for a slave
state, and the lack of any prospects for immediate abolition would encourage
revolt instead of social cooperation.
In their discussions about the slaves’ attitudes, Councilors always it took
for granted that slaves would answer as a “group of interest.” They did not
consider that personal relations, patronage, ethnicity, and parental loyalties
might fragment the racial attitudes of the captives. In the councilor’s minds the
slaves’ reactions were measured by a single, monolithic, “Black Behavior.”
Again, the shadows of Santo Domingo were still present.
Curiously, Councilors did not discuss examples of other Latin American
countries. In South America, many of the Spanish speaking republics used freed
slaves as soldiers during the first half of the nineteenth century.*08 British explorer

108 For an extensive discussion concerning slavery and recruitment in the South American
Republics see Voelz, Slave and Soldier, and NCiria Sales de Bohigas, Sobre Esclavos. Reclutas v
Mercaderes de Quintos (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1974) especially “Esclavos y Reclutas en
Sudam6rica, 1816-1826,” pp. 59-135. According to De Bohigas recruitment was connected to
demographic decrease. In the Argentinean territory the black population decreased from 1/4 to
1/14 in the interval from 1810 to 1 8 4 3 .1 believe such a hypothesis still needs to be tested, but the
fact is that many authors have pointed out an astonishing decrease of the population from African
descendent during the first decades after independence. On the Afro-Argentinean population see
George Reid Andrewa, The Afro-Argentine of Buenos Aires. 1800-1900 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1980). The mobilization for the war against Paraguay is discussed on pages
113-37.
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Richard Burton underlined in his “Letters” that Argentina and Uruguay thinned
the ranks of their local black populations by utilizing them as cannon folder.109
During the war, Paraguay also used her small black population, freeing slaves
for the army.110 The only reference to the neighboring republics was made by
Councilor Torres Homem, who feared the impression this special kind of
recruitment would produce in “the neighbor republics and in the civilized world.”
According to Torres Homem, the Empire would be criticized by the republics for
recruiting slaves to fight against one of the smallest states in the Americas.
In discussing the perceptions of the slaves, Councilors feared recruitment
could foment rebellions among those remaining on the farms, disturbing
economic activities at the rearguard. Many Councilors insisted that, for the good
of Monarchical stability, recruitment should never be confounded with immediate
abolition. Councilor Torres Homem emphasized that it made no difference
whether slaves were freed by the state in the name of civilization or just to make
soldiers for the war; the moral effects over the mass of slaves not included would
be the same. He also recalled the public prejudices of the free soldiers who
would be suddenly leveled to slaves in the ranks.111

109 Richard Burton, Letters from the Battle-Fields of Paraguay, p. 122.
110 For a detailed account about Afro-Paraguayan communities see Jerry W. Cooney, “Abolition in
the Republic of Paraguay: 1840-1870" in Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft. n. 11, pp. 149-166 and James Saeger, “Survival and Abolition: The Eighteenth
Century Paraguayan Encomienda” in The Americas. Vol. 38, n. 1, July 1981, pp. 59-85.
111 This position was very ambiguous because it would never be possible to split, for practical
purposes, both perspectives and also because in the mass of soldiers serving in the front there
were no news of racial oriented rebellions.
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Reflecting on the opinions of his councilors and taking into consideration
the precarious state of the army, the Emperor turned to the enlistment of slaves.
To make it clear that such a move would not be confused with emancipation, two
steps were taken. On the same day the council again met, the Emperor freed all
slaves from the Nation and Religious orders through Decree 3725. The Decree
emphasized that those slaves would be freed on the condition that they become
soldiers immediately and serve for a period of nine years. Soldiers’ wives were
also automatically freed by the same decree. A serious step had been taken
now, and the Emperor would have to face the consequences.

Extracting manpower from their owners
In spite of the small number of individuals effectively freed during this first
wave, sectors of the Church still resisted. The order of the Carmelites is a good
example of the lack of cooperation Imperial authorities could find even in sectors
with “carnal relations” with the monarchy. In an official letter from December
1865 the Archbishop of Bahia informed the Minister of W ar that: “due to the
deplorable state of the Carmelites proprieties it would not be possible to furnish a
significant number of individuals.”
According to this superior priest, from 106 individuals living on their best
farm, only eight slaves were in condition to march. Comparing his situation with
that of the Saint Benedictine order, which gave 10 slaves at the same time, this
Archbishop emphasized that “giving eight individuals, poor as the Carmelite’s
were, represented much more than those given by the richer order of
Benedictine.”
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In an anonymous letter from November 1866, a person claiming to be a
“loyal servant of his majesty” put in doubt the Carmelites situation, making the
following revelation:
The Carmelite order possesses around one thousand slaves of
both sexes of different ages in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Sao
Paulo, Esplrito Santo, and Pard. From those it is possible to take a
lot of people. But the current Superior Priest rented many of their
farms, with good slaves, to speculators. From these farms it would
be possible to extract a large contingent for the army. I should
advise the government not to accept any excuses that could
frustrate the government’s intentions. The government should
rescind all contracts and nominate an honorable person to choose
the better slaves for the service of the army. This will bring profits
for the country and for civilization.112
It seems the author of the letter was correct in his criticism, because in
April 1865 a superior from the Carmelites convent wrote another letter listing the
total of slaves effectively freed to serve. In this new document the Carmelites
became more generous, announcing their order could free a total of 45
individuals distributed in many properties, some of them rented.113
From the four individuals originally offered, this religious order was able to
increase by ten times its initial proposition, achieving a total of 45 over a period
of four months (Dec -1866 to Apr. 1867).114 It is also noteworthy that the Court
and the northern province of Para gave more individuals than the provinces of

112 Anonymous to Marquis de Paranagud, Minister of War, Rio de Janeiro, 20 November 18866.
ANRJ, SPE, Codice 572, doc 6, fl. 19.
113 According to a document released in April 1867 six of the Carmelite’s slaves were working in
farms rented to private individuals. See AHMI - 96 - 1 - DPP - 25.4867
114 T h e final distribution of the Carmelite Slaves freed by province was: Para (17), Court (14), Sdo
Paulo (14). From these 6 were rented to private owners. See AHIM - 96 - DPP - 25.04.867.
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S§o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.115 In the same letter the Carmelites, reminded the
Imperial

government

of

the

“necessary

compensation.” The

Church’s

Ecclesiastical authorities did not agree with expropriation, demanding money in
exchange for their servants. The final reports list a total of 95 individuals coming
from the Convents and Monasteries.116
If the government faced problems in extracting soldiers from the Church’s
slaves how much more difficult would the relations with private masters be? The
Council clearly was unwilling to expropriate slaves owned by private proprietors.
During no period of the war were slaves directly recruited. Under such
circumstances government officers made a “series of appeals” with the express
aim of convincing masters to voluntarily donate some of their slaves in the name
of the fatherland. Some of those appeals were answered positively, but others
faced strong opposition. Jose de Souza Breves, one of the richest planters in the
province of Rio de Janeiro, provides a good example of this resistance. Replying
to an official letter from the President of the province inviting him to join in the
government efforts, this important citizen explained that:
during the past year...I destined six slaves [to serve] but these
showed bad will and looked for protection with some of my friends,
refusing the benefits of freedom...at the same time, eleven of my
slaves “mixed and Creoles” after committing smaller offenses also
left my farms and it seems they entered the ranks as Volunteers
offering to march for the theater of war. Being this the situation, I
115 From Frier Fausto de Monte Carmelo to Marquis de ParanaguS, AHMI - 96 - I - DPP 25.04.1867-Mon.c.
116 According to the Report of the Ministry of W ar from 1872, the total number of slaves coming
from the Convents/Monasteries amounted just to 95 individuals or 2.4% of the total amount of
troops listed in that Report. See “Mappa da Forga que cada uma das provlncias do Impgrio
concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay....”, Brazil. Minister of War. Relatdrio. 1872.
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offered freedom to all of those that enlisted as well as to the others
that followed the same destiny. I believe my patriotic intentions are
justified.117
Of course other rural bosses voluntarily donated some slaves. For these,
an additional problem would be who would be responsible for the transportation
of their slaves to the Court in Rio de Janeiro. Very concerned about this problem,
the president of Sao Paulo declared that “...[if] the slave owners have to pay,
none would send their slaves to the court and risk receiving them back when
refused."118
In spite of the good intentions of some planters, the proportion of freed
slaves never numbered more than one or two per planter. A total of 799 slaves
were freely donated, together with 948 used as substitutes. This number fell
below the 1807 individuals freed by public funds. If conditions on the battlefields
persisted, the Imperial government would be in serious trouble during the next
year, as the planters and their associates in the main cities were becoming less
willing to cooperate with efforts to free and enlist slaves.
A turn in the military circumstances on the battlefield made the situation
more favorable to the Empire. From December 1867 on, a series of victories led
to the final taking over of Humayta in August 1868. After that important victory,
Paraguayans could not pose enough resistance to stop the march of events. The

117 Joaquim Jos6 de Souza Breves to EsperidiSo Eloy de Barros Pimentel, 2 Feb. 1867. ANRJ,
IG1 146, ex. 582, fl. 663.
118 Jos6 Tavares Bastos to Jodo Lustosa da Cunha Paranague, 2 March, 1867.ANRJ - IG1 159
ex. 587, ma$o 1867, fl. 820.
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war, for all practical purposes, was won, and conquering the remaining
Paraguayan posts was a question only of time and weather conditions.

Numbers and Losses in the Enlistment of Slaves
The problems in determining the number of freed soldiers who served
during the Paraguayan War are exactly the same as for free individuals.
Numbers coming from the same reports of the Ministry of War do not coincide.
The Report of 1872 tried to give some uniformity to this ocean of data,
summarizing totals for the five years of campaign.
Table X
Total of Soldiers enlisted in the Army:
Free and Freed men 1865-1869
Free Soldiers
Volunteers
Designated National
Guards
Regular Army Soldiers
Substitutions
Total

37,438 (43.1%)
31,198 (35.9%)
17,465 (20.1%)
794 (0.9% )
86,895

Slave Soldiers
Donations
Substitutions
Government Owned
Imperial Household
Convents/Monasteries
Compensate
Emancipations
Total

799
948

(20.0%)
(23.7%)

287
67
95
1.807

(6 .9 % )
(1.7%)
(2.4)
(45.1%)

4003

(100%)

“Mappa da Forga com que cada uma das provincias do lmp6rio concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay
Brazil. Minister of War. 1872 Report".

"

Most of the emancipation efforts were concentrated on State-related
activities. Fifty-six percent of all emancipated individuals came from areas
related to the Imperial donation, such as the Imperial Household or the Imperial
farms, or indirectly related as the Church. Half of private contributions were filed
through substitutions. Private donations represented only about two percent of
the entire war efforts. The lack of willingness of the planters can be attributed to
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the permanent slave labor crisis, but even taking into consideration the difficult
circumstances faced by the plantation economy, their cooperation fell far behind
the Councilors’ most skeptical perspectives. No expropriation took place,
although some slaves could have been mistakenly taken from their owners.
Overall, the State supported the heaviest burden of the recruitment and showed
itself unable to extract a significant number of individuals. The territorial division
of recruitment provides interesting information to support these conclusions.
Table XI
Recruitment of Slaves by Region, 1865-1869
Region
Number
North
66
Northeast
985
West
0
South
396
Southeast
359
Court
2196
Total
4003

Percent
1.8
24.6
0
9.9
8.9
54.8
100.0

Source: “Mappa da Forga...” Report from the Ministry of War. 1872

Numbers show the great contribution of Rio de Janeiro city to the war
efforts. In some ways the data could confirm councilor Nabuco de Araujo’s
expectations that the recruitment of slaves should be focused on the urban
slaves, especially those living in the capital. But a more careful analysis
underlines the enormous weight of the state-related activities in recruitment. As
the capital of the Empire, the Court was much more sensitive to both political
pressures and Imperial manumissions, and it was also the place of the Empire
where the presence of the central State was felt most intensely. From the 2196
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slaves freed for recruitment in the city of Rio de Janeiro, 60.5% came from staterelated activities, most of them bought by the government.
In terms of the regional distribution it seems the enlistment followed the
same logic as the internal traffic. Regions like the Northeast and the South
contributed proportionally much more than the Southeast, which housed half the
country’s slave populations. Such evidence supports the hypothesis that coffee
planters did not cooperate as expected, maintaining their slaves untouched
against the wishes of the Imperial government. To the 4003 slaves freed for the
army 2257 more must be added. This second group came from slaves originally
enlisted in the Navy, making a total of 6260 individuals. This number
corresponds to 4.4% of the total 91,298 soldiers that fought in the war according
to the Report of 1872.119
The relatively small proportion of the total recruitment can be better
appreciated when compared to the dimensions of the war effort from the
beginning of the process November-1866 to August -1868, when manumissions
for the army were officially suspended. According to alternative lists provided by
the Reports of the Ministry of War, during the years 1867 and 1868 around

119 Recent research emphasized the lack of uniformity in the prices of those slaves freed to enlist.
Jorge Prata de Souza found in the Court (Rio de Janeiro City) an average 1:985$000,(U.S. $
913.00) Escravid5o ou Morte. p. 72. Dale T. Graden found the medium price in Bahia as
1:300$000 (U.S. $ 600.00), concluding slaveowners were paid top prices. Graden, “From Slavery
to Freedom...," p. 172. Hendrik Kraay found the following average prices: MaranhSo 1;272$542
(US$ 585.00); Para: 1:133$333 (U.S. $ 604.00); Pernambuco: 1:382$979 (U.S. $ 610.00). Prices
in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia oscillated according to period. Hendrik Kraay, “Slavery, Citizenship
and Military Service in Brazil’s Mobilization..., "p. 240. Paulo Staudt found for the city of Porto
Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul's capital a variation between 800$000 (U.S. $ 368.00) and 1:300$000
(U.S. $ 598.00). Paulo Satudt, Faces da Liberdade. Mascaras do Cativeiro. p. 65. Finally, Ricardo
Salles suggests that the prices for slaves in 1870 varied between 2:000$000 and 3:000$000 (or
920 and 1,380.00 U.S. dollars).
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15,000 troops were sent to the war theater, 3,897 (26%) of whom were freed
slaves. In 1868 an estimated 1,873 slaves were recruited. They made up 23% of
the 8,241 soldiers sent to Paraguay. The recruitment of freed slaves was thus a
fundamental resource to enable Brazilian victory, keeping the supply of new
troops to acceptable levels. If freed slaves made up a relatively small proportion
of the total army contingents they were notwithstanding an essential element of
the last three years of the campaign, when the sources of free soldiers were
drying up. Consequently it is very probable that freed slaves had a crucial role in
the occupation of the Paraguayan territory after the end of the war.120
The situation faced by the Union during the American Civil War differed
remarkably in the scale of the mobilization. Black soldiers recruited during the
last two years of the conflict helped to maintain the Union military superiority
against a weakened but far from dead South. From the 180,000 African
Americans enlisted, an estimated 140,000 came from the Confederate states.
Blacks provided between 10 and 13 percent of the combatant forces. After the
end of the war around 80,000 troops were kept in the South as an army of
occupation. Although raw numbers in America were much more impressive, the
Union army faced strategic needs that were very similar to those of the Imperial
army. Consequently, in the Empire as well as in the Union North, the recruitment

120 Frank D. McCann has conjectured that the occupation of Paraguay to the end of the 1870's
had a major impact upon the military’s political sense. According to the Army Reports produced
during the 1870’s around 2500 troops of occupation were in Paraguay. Those troops were on duty
basically to prevent an Argentinean occupation of additional territory. Some soldiers stayed
permanently in Paraguay after the end of the occupation see Josefina Pla, Hermano Negro. La
Esclavitud en El Paraguay (Madrid: Paraninfo, 1972), especially chapters XI and XII, pp. 159-72.
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of black soldiers turned out to be a fundamental step to maintain the work of an
army of invasion. If we add the enormous contingent of free blacks that had been
fighting since the beginning, the Brazilian army shows a predominance of people
of African descent, in contrast to the prevalence of European elements in the
American situation. The numerical preponderance of black people in the
Brazilian ranks would cause great concerns among the Imperial military
commanders.121

Perceptions and experiences at the battle-fields
The importance of the presence of freed slaves in the army was clearly
perceived by the most important military leader, the Marquis of Caxias. Through
his personal correspondence it is possible to infer the impact of the socialization
of former slaves in an army that went through an intense process of
reorganization. His official correspondence underlines the fear that the Imperial
social order could collapse at the battlefields as a consequence of the great
racial heterogeneity.
While in the position of Commandant in Chief of all the armies in
campaign against Paraguay, Marquis of Caxias showed a continuing concern
about the breakdown of the disciplinary system that distinguished the soldiers
from their officers. After his arrival in Paraguay Caxias worked to undermine the
intense politicization in the officer’s ranks and to centralize all command
procedures. He viewed the large number of freed slaves in the army as the

121 For the American army see chapter VII.
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greatest potential threat to the maintenance of discipline. In a confidential letter
to the Minister of the War, in December 1867, Caxias communicated his feelings
about the kind of slaves that were sent to the army:
Your Excellency knows that the Brazilian Army houses many
soldiers that just left the burdens of slavery to turn into defenders of
the dignity of the Brazilian nation. Unfortunately, the great majority
of these individuals represented the worst degraded elements of
slavery. The slave of good habits, kind and educated in the
customs of obeying and respecting, rarely reached the campaign. It
is very difficult to maintain order and discipline and to sustain the
subordination iand the obeisance with such elements.122
According to Caxias, the concentration of so many recently freed
individuals in a large army justified the implementation of discriminatory
procedures to prevent what Caxias considered “the permanent threat of
insubordination.” A curious example was the payment of bounties, an important
element of the Army reorganization process. Caxias defended the delay of the
payment of salaries to the troops while officers and non-commissioned ranks
received their salaries on time. Caxias justified his position in a confidential letter
addressed to the Minister of War in September 1868, two months after the fall of
Humayta:
It was always my opinion that it is convenient to keep the payment
of salaries to the officer corps just on time while recruits and regular
soldiers should always have three or four months of delay before
receiving their bounties. Discipline and public finances will profit
from such circumstances because the epidemics and the battles
leave an enormous lacuna among the men and such losses bring
profits to the state.123
122 Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of ParanaguS, Tuyu-Cu6 (Paraguay), 4 December 1867 in
ANRJ, Cbdice 924, Livro 2, Reservados, Confidenciais e Cartas, fl. 72.
123 Marquis of Caxias to Baron of Muritiba, Surubi-hy (Paraguay), 26 September 1868. ANRJ,
C6dice 924, Livro 4- Reservados, Confidenciais e Carta, p. 268.
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Another element in Caxias’ plan was the decoration of those soldiers who
distinguished themselves for bravery in combat, an important element of military
identity. During the Paraguayan War an increasing number of individuals coming
from the slave condition placed an unexpected strain on the perceptions of the
old military leader. Because bravery was a "quality” distributed among all classes
and races, it could not be restricted just to the officer ranks. In many
circumstances soldiers coming from the lower stratum of society could
distinguish themselves for courage in combat, especially in a kind of war where
infantry charges supplanted the cavalry elan. Such courage could equalize,
temporarily, soldiers and officers, especially if they received the same medals.
Consequently, the Marquis of Caxias feared that “relaxation, indiscipline and bad
example [would lead] to the breakdown of the basis on which our armed forces
are established.”124
It seems that Caxias’s precautions were taken into consideration by the
Imperial government because, at the end of 1867, there was created a special
medal for bravery, different from all other existing decorations in the Brazilian
army. These were made from the bronze taken from Paraguayan cannons and
destined solely for privates. As for as the Brazilian high Command would be
concerned, the war should not reinforce social or racial equality.125

124 Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of Paranaguei, Tuyu-Cu6 (Paraguay), 4 December 1867. ANRJ,
C6dice 924, Livro 2 - Reservados, Confidenciais e Cartas, p. 66.
125 In 1864 Dictator Solano Lopez ordered all church bells to be fused in order to make additional
cannons. An original of such a medal is currently displayed in the permanent exposition of the
Museu Histdrico Nacional in Rio de Janeiro.
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The military reforms undertaken at the front would lead to unexpected
effects with great consequences for the future of the army and monarchical
stability. Although Caxias did not aim to destroy the monarchical regime, his
actions reinforced the military ethos of the officer corps, turning it into a
bureaucracy that was extremely critical of the Imperial regime.128
Numbers and Historical Interpretation
Numbers registered in the Brazilian reports of the various ministries are
not accurate and cannot give the final word about the demography of
recruitment. In part due to this lack of accuracy, different interpretations have
appeared during the last ten years concerning the exact number of slaves who
went to war and their importance for both the war efforts and the emancipation
that took place in the 1880s.
Ricardo Salles argued that the number should be increased to 10 per cent
of the total mobilization. Robert Conrad calculated that 20,000 slaves were freed
as a result of war mobilization. Based on research in the archives of the old
province of Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Luiz Prata de Souza estimated that there were
many more letters of manumission than in official numbers already stated.
Hendrik Kraay assumed the numbers shown in the reports are basically correct

126 Analyzing the Mississippi situation during the First World War period, J. William Harris
remarked that white racial fears concerning African American courage during the W ar could lead
to the break down of the etiquette of race. See J. William Harris, “Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial
Boundaries in Southern History: A Mississippi Example” in The American Historical Review. Vol.
100 no. 2, April 1995, pp. 387-410. The attitude of the Marquis of Caxias demonstrated similar
concerns, although his actions aimed to reinforce the disciplinarian methods of the Brazilian army,
not the behavior of the entire society. But the implications are equally racist, as Caxias would go
as far as to suppose the soldier’s bravery but not officer’s could come from his ingestion of
alcohol.
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and pointed out that the discrepancies are most likely related to the recruitment
for the navy, a significant element in an important naval base, as Rio was by that
time. Kraay accepted the information provided by the military war reports,
especially the synthesis produced by the end of the war, taking 6,000 freed
slaves as the most accurate estimate. Through an extensive research in Gaucho
archives, Paulo Roberto Staudt found just half of the number of slaves listed in
the army reports as the contribution of Rio Grande do Sul. If the data do not
always confirm the high estimates of Robert Conrad, they nonetheless underline
the connections between the war efforts and measures more directly concerning
the process of Emancipation.

Immediate Political Repercussions of the Enlistment
The enlistment of slaves was an important element of the debate over the
future of slavery in Brazil. Emancipation in British, French, and Danish colonies
and the victory of the Union in the American Civil War made powerful Brazilian
groups realize that conditions had turned against the institution so decisively that
any explicit defense of slavery would be fruitless.
From the year of independence to 1850, the Empire negotiated externally
and internally the end of the Atlantic traffic. Delaying the end of traffic against the
interests of the British Empire proved to be a difficult process. At some points,
national pride and territorial integrity were challenged to the point of humiliation.
During the 1850s and the early sixties, the Empire was relatively peaceful, but
the effects of the slave labor crisis would soon be felt again. During the 1860s,
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progressive legislation, coming from the central state, addressed for the first time
the delicate question of emancipation.
The main consequences of the Paraguayan war reflected the Imperial
attitude toward slavery. During the war, slavery was viewed as detrimental to the
military efforts because it undermined mobilization and caused fears on the
home front. The future of slavery was, not coincidentally, discussed along with
the war efforts. The war seemed to show that the nation could not be strong
while there were slaves at home, ready to rebel. Facing powerful obstacles on
the battlefields and pressed by increasing international criticism, Imperial political
leaders began to shift their attitudes toward a policy of gradual emancipation.
They understood, as a later historian wrote, that slavery’s influence was so
pervasive that, “Nothing escaped, nothing was beyond or above or outside the
slave institution.”127
The victory of the Union in the American Civil war forced powerful
Brazilian groups to realize that conditions had so decisively turned against
slavery that any explicit defense of the institution would be fruitless. By the late
1860s, only Brazil and Cuba held slaves in the Americas. While Cuba was still a
Spanish colony, Brazil was an independent nation and a monarchy, seeing itself
as connected to the main European patterns of civilization. Under these

127 Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, p. 117.
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circumstances, Brazilian politicians reflected on the American experience and
discussed the similarities and differences between the two countries.128
Since 1864, Dorn Pedro II had been very concerned about the outcome of
the American Civil War. In a private conversation with his then newly appointed
liberal Prime Minister, Zacharias de Gois and Vasconcelos, the Brazilian
Emperor declared that the direction of events in America compelled the Brazilian
government to consider the future of slavery “because the same thing that
happened during the abolition of the traffic should not happen again.”129
By 1867, the third year of the Paraguayan war, the enlistment of slaves
had become a fundamental strategy for the defense of the Imperial state. This
development was rife with contradiction, with slaves being used in the context of
the wave of nationalism touched off by the invasion of Brazilian territory. The
Paraguayan War unified all classes around the idea of a fatherland and brought
a new attachment to the patriotic heritage. A national struggle, it involved the
common efforts of the whole population, above all its fighting sectors. Those
slaves manumitted to fight were freed at the very moment that they were
elevated to the highest point on the nation’s altar.

128 On the process of abolition of slavery in Cuba, see Rebecca J. Scott, The Transition of Free
Labor. 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Parallels between the Cuban and
the Brazilian process are many, including the gradualism, that is, the slow path each process took
until a complete abolition of slavery.
129 Quoted in Heitor Lyra, Histdria do Impdrio de Dorn Pedro II. 3 Vols. (SSo Paulo:
Melhoramentos, 1940), pp. 235-6. The Emperor referred to the struggle against the international
slave traffic discussed in Chapter 1. From the year of independence to 1850, the Empire
negotiated externally and internally the end of the Atlantic traffic. Delaying the end of traffic
against the interests of the British Empire had challenged national pride and territorial integrity to
the point of humiliation.
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A new decision-making cycle began with this unprecedented mobilization
of people of African descent as soldiers. At the center of this process was the
Crown’s initiative, hampered as it was by the action of Emperor Pedro II. In his
Speech from the Throne from May 1867 (five months after the authorization of
enlistment was issued), Dorn Pedro II answered the appeal of the French
Abolitionist Society and clearly signaled his position in support of emancipation.
The Brazilian government informed the world in the name of the Emperor that
measures would be taken toward emancipation as soon as the war was over,
stating that:
“The captive element in the Empire will deserve your consideration
in such a way that the higher interest linked to emancipation will be
considered, respecting current property and without causing great
instability to our industry and agriculture.”130
Writing sixteen years later, the abolitionist leader Joaquim Nabuco
declared that the Imperial Speech from the Throne was for emancipation, “like a
bolt of lightning in a cloudless sky.”131 According to the future abolitionist leader,
the “Speech" made it clear that the Emperor would pursue abolitionist measures
as soon as the war ended. Such an initiative, coming from the highest Brazilian
authority and four months after the manumission of most state-owned slaves,
alarmed planters and supporters of slavery around the country. These sectors
feared the government was moving too fast in the direction of abolition and that

130 Anais do Parlamento Brasileiro. Camara dos Senhores Deputados. 1o. ano da 3a. Legislatura,
SessSo de 1867, Tomo 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia Imperial e Constitucional de J. Villeneuve,
1867), p. 96. The “Speeches of the Throne” were a traditional event of Brazilian Imperial politics.
Through the “Speeches” the emperor announced the main legislations as well as the states' goals
for the forthcoming year.
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planter’s immediate interests would be harmed. The fears of immediate
interference in the market for slaves were not realized, but they had a profound
impact on the mood of the powerful planter class. If their immediate interests
were not entirely homogeneous, the defense of slavery provided powerful
cement and unified them around their long-term policies.132

One of the stronger critics of the Emperor’s position was the writer and
politician from Ceara, Jose Martiniano de Alencar. In 1867 he published a series
of letters under the name of Erasmus. In these letters Alencar criticized both the
answer of Pedro II to the French philanthropists and the recruitment of slaves.
Referring to the high expenditures related to the conflict against Paraguay,
Alencar called the emperor “the soul of the war,” blaming him for the delays in
the campaign and the sacrifices it had cost the Brazilian people. Alencar was
especially critical of the “Speech of the Throne,” which he described as a
surrender of the national interests to the “fanaticism of progress."
Alencar

defended

the

slaveholders’ causes with

arguments

that

resembled those used by Georges Fitzhugh in the ante-bellum U.S. South.133

131 Joaquim Nabuco, Abolitionism, p. 49.
132 Analyzing the positions of different groups of planters during the debates of the “Agrarian
Council,” held in Rio de Janeiro in 1878, Peter L. Eisenberg concluded that the Brazilian farmers,
as any other class in history, faced internal divisions. However, these divisions did not follow
geographical cleavages. According to Eisenberg, there were no strong differences among the
Brazilian regional power groups concerning the status of labor. See his “A Mentalidade dos
Fazendeiros no Congresso Agricola de 1878" in Jos6 Roberto do Amaral Lapa (ed .)t Modos de
Produc5o e Realidade Brasileira (Petrdpolis: Vozes, 1980), pp. 167-94.
133 George Fitzhugh was the best known defender of slavery in the antebellum South and his
writings went far beyond his native Virginia. Some of his comparisons between slave and wage
work are still very useful for research concerning working conditions and productivity in slave as
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Unlike the southern Fire-Eaters, Alencar did not blame a region or a group of
people, but the person of the Brazilian monarch, for the evils perpetrated against
the institution of slavery. He accused the Emperor of being more sympathetic to
the interests of the “foreign passions” than to the Brazilians who were
abandoned to their own faith:
You did nothing to liberate the country from the infection of
immorality. Your lack of interest about everything not connected to
the War and your obstinacy about it leads you to tolerate things
that are terrible for those that admire your character.134
Alencar opposed the Paraguayan War first because he thought this
episode revealed the “despotic character of the government” and second for the
troubles he thought it could bring to productive activities. According to him, the
decision to make war or not should be made by the parliament, not by the
Emperor. Through the reinforcement of his authority in a crucial period of the
Brazilian history, the Emperor had put at risk the stability of Monarchical
institutions, undermining the basis of the representative government, as it existed
until that time.
Alencar’s opinions about slavery are complex. He correlated the end of
slavery to changes in the patterns of economic growth and changes in Brazil’s

well as in early industrial societies. His most important works are Cannibals A ll! or Slaves Without
Masters (Richmond: 1857); Sociology for the South, or The Failure of Free Society (Richmond:
1854). Analyses of Fitzhugh’s works include Harvey Wish, George Fitzhugh. Propagandist of the
Old South (Baton Rouge: 1943); Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made. Two
Essays in Interpretation (New York: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), especially Part II “The
Logical Outcome of the Slaveholder’s Philosophy" and Drew Gilpin Faust (ed.) The Ideology of
Slavery. Proslaverv Thought in the Antebellum South. 1830-1860. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1981).
134 Jos6 de Alencar, Ao Imperador. Novas Cartas de Erasmo (Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia de
Pinheiro e Co. 1867), p. 7.
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position in international commerce. Brazilian slave owners, he wrote, should not
be blamed for the outcome of more than three centuries of slavery. The
international movement in favor of immediate abolition sounded to Alencar’s ears
like an enormous hypocrisy.135
Much as Alencar, the Brazilian slave owners had a peculiar vision of the
Brazilian reality. For them, private economic interests should set limits to the
action of the Imperial state.138 According to their interpretation, the actions of
international

philanthropic societies

were

contradictory

because

Europe

furnished “the big stomach” for slave-produced products. The demand for
Brazilian tropical goods was concentrated in the same countries that were the
center of abolitionist demands or,

in Alencarian terms:

“the

European

philanthropists while smoking a good Havana cigar and drinking an excellent
coffee from Brazil discourse against slavery, pretending the most humanitarian
intentions. Why don’t they repeal moralistically such products made from the

135 This radical defense of slavery did not prevent Alencar to accept the position of Minister of
Justice in the Conservative cabinet of 1869. The Emperor’s revenge came in 1871 when he
refused to nominate Alencar as Senator for the province of Ceard. That event caused his political
death. Disappointed with the developments of Imperial politics, Alencar died of tuberculosis in
1874. He is better known currently for his romantic and nationalistic literature than for his political
writings.
138 For a summary appreciation of Alencar’s ideas concerning slavery see the following texts:
“Carta ao Visconde de Itaboraf sobre a crise financeira de 1866” in Obras Completas. Vol. IV, pp.
113; A Propriedade (Rio de Janeiro: Gamier, 1883); and especially the introduction made by
Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos under the title “A Teoria da Democracia Proporcional de Jos6
de Alencar" in Dois Escritos Democaticos de Jos6 de Alencar (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1991), pp.
9-50. Only during the last ten years have the political ideas of Jos6 de Alencar been re-discovered
by historians and political scientists.
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sweat of the African arms? In their theory the sugar and the tobacco are the
backbone of the slavery. Notwithstanding they enjoy them secretly”137
Of course, according to this line of reasoning, the state should defend the
slaveholders when any international power interfered with slavery. The nature of
the political pact was such that the state’s intervention was not seen as a
transgression against the prevalent “laissez-faire” economics, if made to protect
the social and economic status quo. If slave owners as a group did not deny the
importance of the war, they saw it as a secondary issue and tried unsuccessfully
to direct the Imperial action.138
Summarizing, the war undermined the trust between the rich land bosses
and the Imperial state at a moment when the interests of slave owners had been
weakened by enormous changes in the markets for slaves and the products
produced by slaves. The war threatened at least the shadow of expropriation, a
phantom that had haunted the Brazilian oligarchy ever since independence. It
helped to damage the links that maintained the imperial pact thus confirming
Joaquim Nabuco’s vision of the war as a watershed in the history of Imperial
politics.
To make things more grim to the planters, the war effort brought a
temporary expansion of the fiscal power of the state, leading to a reorganization

137 Ibid, p. 28.
138 Of course this particular interpretation of the European liberalism did not go as far as to defend
individual rights. Planters behaved as a collective body who saw the state as a defender of the
national interests, that is, their interests in keeping their slaves. For a broader interpretation of the
Brazilian oligarchic liberalism see Vitor Izecksohn, “ConstrugSo, Crise e Reforma do Estado no
Brasil: uma pequena histdria politics,” in Revista Praia Vermelha. November 2000.
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of some taxes at the same time as others were created. Such a move required
additional extractions from agriculture. To face the burden of continuous
expenditures, the state needed to extract more resources from society. This was
done through inflation, external loans, and the creation or enlargement of taxes.
The growth of the military share of the national budget during the war shows that
no other expenses were cut to face such crucial situation.139
Consequently,

the decision to pursue a complete military victory

contributed to undermining the good will of the planters toward the monarchy at
the same time that it increased the size and the importance of the national army,
a fact that would have strong consequences for the Monarchical order in the
decades after the end of the war. This was a slow process, but it contributed
importantly to the progressive erosion of monarchical legitimacy as well as to the
progressive decline of slavery.

In the words of Joaquim Nabuco: “The

Paraguayan War was the watershed of the Brazilian Empire.”140 After this multi
faceted conflict, nothing would ever be the same.

139 So serious was the financial crisis that it led Marquis of Caxias to propose the interruption of
the campaign. In a letter to the minister of W ar dated from August 1867, the Marquis explained his
understanding that the war was already won and that no advantages would be gained by pursuing
the Paraguayan dictator until his capture. The Emperor did not accept his proposal. See Maria
Valeria Junho Pena, “0 Surgimento do Imposto de Renda: Urn Estudo sobre a RelapSo entre
Estado e Mercado no Brasil” in Revista Dados. Volume 35, no. 3 ,19 92 , pp. 337-70.
140 Nabuco, Urn Estadista do Imperio, p. 126.
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Chapter 7

Forged in Inequality
The Recruitment of Black Soldiers in the United States:
September 1862 - April 1865

When this war is won, there will be some black man who can
remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady
eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this
great consummation.
Abraham Lincoln*

Once let the black man get upon his person the brass letter U.S.;
let him get the eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder,
and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth or under
the earth which can deny that he has earned the right of citizenship
in the United States
Frederick Douglass2
I came to fight not for my country, I never had any, but to gain one.
Private Charles Reason
54th MA Infantry3

The enlistment of black men in the Army of the United States was
authorized under the provisions of the Second Confiscation Act (Aug., 1862), the
Militia Act (July, 1862) and the Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1863). All three

1 John T. Hubbell, “Abraham Lincoln and the Recruitment of Black Soldiers," in Papers of the
Abraham Lincoln Association. Vol. 2, No. 3,1980, p. 19.
2Douqlass' Monthly. April 1863, p. 818.
3 Quoted in Gerald Schwartz (ed.), A Woman Doctor's Civil War: Ester Hill Hawks' Diary (University
of South Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 51-2. Private Reason was a twenty-year-old runaway from

343

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were conceived during the spring of 1862, when the recruitment crisis threatened
the provision of new troops for the Union army.4 The Militia Act emancipated
slaves who worked for the army or the navy. This act stated that the enrollment
of militia should include all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five, permitting, in some interpretations, the recruitment of
black men.5 The Second Confiscation Act extended freedom to those slaves
coming from areas under Union control, whose owners were disloyal. The
Emancipation Proclamation declared free all slaves in the Confederacy, except
those in the Border States, and in the Union-occupied parts of the Confederacy.
Progressive legislation resulted from Congressional as well as Presidential
initiatives. This was part of a general move toward a more determined pursuit of
military victory, a move that captured the nation’s imagination during the spring
and the summer of 1962. This transformation resulted from unexpected
developments in the conflict and the capacity of Republican leaders to learn from
experience, one of many qualities presented by the Civil War generation.6

Maryland who died from gangrene complications after being wounded during the attack on Fort
Wagner.
4 Although it was only presented in September, Lincoln shared a draft of his proclamation with his
Cabinet in a meeting held in Washington on July 21,1862. Following the advice of secretary Seward,
he delayed the Proclamation until a military victory demonstrated that its release was not an act of
despair. Although the battle of Antietam was not a clear-cut victory it served the purpose. See Frank
E., Vandiver, The Long Loom of Lincoln fFort Wavne: Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum,
1987), pp. 10-15; Thomas F. Schwartz, “Salmon P. Chase Critiques First Reading of the
Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln," in Civil War History. Vol. 33, no. 1,1987, pp. 84-7,
John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963).
5 This modified the racial exclusion presented by the 1792 Federal Militia Act. See United States.
Statutes at Large. Vol. XI, p. 592 and 599, for details on black recruitment.
6 For the adaptability of the Republican leadership see Eric L. McKitrick, “Party Politics and the Union
and Confederate War Efforts,” in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burhham (eds.), The
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These developments were mediated by debates involving public opinion
to a degree unimaginable for Brazilians. While in Brazil debates were restricted
to Imperial bureaucrats, Cabinet members, and landowners, the American
debates embraced the complexity of northern society, involving immigrants,
industrial workers, the press, politicians, abolitionist activists, and the northern
African American population. Emancipation and recruitment were among the
most important developments in the political debate concerning the conduct of
the war, bringing questions of social and ethnic diversity to center stage.7
Progressive legislation was part of a general transformation in the
ideological justification of the war, as it evolved into an effort to destroy the basis
of southern power. Emancipation and recruitment of blacks were not pre
ordained projects; instead they evolved out of necessity. The Union Army’s
insatiable demand for soldiers, a changing attitude in the northern policy toward
black troops, and increasing recognition of slavery as the central issue of the
conflict pushed the Lincoln administration slowly to take steps toward black
enlistment. Like the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, Lincoln
understood that war was the continuation of politics by other means. He
calibrated his conduct of military operations according to the interplay of military
and political considerations, moving forward from his initial goals to embrace

American Party Systems. Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press,
1975), pp. 1117-151.
7 On American public debates in the press, see J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955) and John Stanchak, Frank Leslie Illustrated Civil
W ar (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1992). On the Paraguayan War and the Brazilian
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emancipation as a war aim essential to victory. This evolution played a crucial
role, in the growth of the central government’s authority through the creation and
maintenance of a large army. It also brought ordinary Americans into contact
with the as never before.8
This chapter analyses the circumstances that led to the recruitment of
blacks and their incorporation into the Union army. It investigates the conditions
under which the Republican administration decided to recruit African-Americans,
and examines the political controversies surrounding the recruitment and the
organization of black troops. It discusses the motivational factors that impelled
blacks to enlist at a time when white motivation and enlistment were falling. It
stresses the roles of centralization and bureaucratization as fundamental factors
in black enlistment. In doing so, I expect to answer some of the questions that
inspired this dissertation. Which motivations impelled blacks to enlist? How did
racial hierarchies cope with political and military centralization? How did the
black soldier’s military experiences in America compare and contrast with those
of his Brazilian counterpart?

press see Mauro Cesar Silveira, A Batalha de Papel. A Guerra do Paraquai Atrav6s da Caricatura
(Porto Alegre: L&PM, 1996).
8 When affirming their functionality to centralization I am not assuming such process as a result of
previous planning. It was instead the non-anticipated consequence of a kind of war that challenged
many American beliefs. Lincoln’s attitudes have been the subject of vigorous historiographic
debates. Authors diverge about the meaning of presidential changes, some recognizing them as part
of a real political advance while others underlining the conservative aspects of Lincoln's war policies.
Howard C. Westwood, "Lincoln's Position on Black Enlistments,” in The Lincoln Herald. Vol. 86, no.
2, 1984, pp. 101-112; John T. Hubbel, “Abraham Lincoln and the Recruitment of Black Soldiers,” in
Papers of the Abraham Lincoln Association. Vol. 2,1980, pp. 6-21; Arvarh E. Strickland, “The Illinois
Background of Lincoln's Attitude Toward Slavery and the Negro,” in Journal of the Illinois State
Historical Society. Vol. LVI, no. 3,1963; George M. Fredrickson, “A Man But Not a Brother: Abraham
Lincoln and Racial Equality,” in The Journal of Southern History. Vol. XU, no 1,1975, pp. 30-58.
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There is now a consensus among historians that African American
enlistment as well as the contribution of black laborers transformed the status of
black Americans. This point has been underlined in the analyses of black soldiers
during the Civil War, produced since World War II. Most of these writings focused
on the federal government’s slow acceptance of black enlistment, the subsequent
recruitment of black troops into the Union army, the efforts made by a few
northerners to raise black units, and the battlefield experiences of notable black
regiments. Taking as their departure point Joseph T. Wilson’s The Black Phalanx.9
historians have shown that blacks were not passive observers of the destruction of
slavery, and thus challenged the traditional historiographic approach that viewed
the conflict as a white man’s war.10 However, it should be emphasized that these
same works did not connect black recruitment with the draft crisis. Accepting
blacks in the army lessened the effects of the draft on white American citizens by
filling states’ quotas.11

9 Joseph T. Wilson, The Black Phalanx. African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the
War of 1812 & Civil War (1890, reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1994).
10 In spite of the contributions made by Joseph T. Wilson and W. E. B. Dubois, the prevalent vision
before the Second World War portrayed black participation as not significant. The usual notion was
established in 1928 by historian W . E. Woodward in his biography Meet the General Grant (1928.
reprint, New York, Liveright, 1946). According to Woodward: “The American Negroes [were] the only
people in the history of the world that ever became free without any effort of their part.” See page 7.
11 This position is better expressed in Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the
Union Army. 1861-1865 (1956. reprint, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987) and Joseph T.
Glatthaar, Forged in Battle. The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York:
Meridian Books, 1990) who, however, do not establish connections between black recruitment and
the Enrollment Act. Cornish’s The Sable Army remains the single best volume on the subject.
Benjamin’s Quarle's, The Negro in the Civil War (New York: Da Capo, 1953), is still highly
informative. A few works - the bulk of which are post-war memoirs, described the experiences at a
regimental level.
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Associations between

legislation

and black

recruitment have been

developed in more recent studies on recruitment and social control during wartime.
These works demonstrated that integration, democratization and bureaucratization
did not necessarily reinforce one another in American military organization,
emphasizing that access was extended to blacks just when the army reduced the
degree of democratic participation by ordinary soldiers.12
There is much to be learned about the impact of black recruiting on the
processes of centralization and nationalization of the Union army. This chapter
focuses

attention

on the

contrast between

black

recruitment and

the

decentralized strategies prevalent at the beginning of the conflict, and explores
the ways in which partial military desegregation connected with the failure of
volunteerism in the American military tradition. In sharp contrast with the
Brazilian situation, African American recruitment advanced the destruction of
southern slavery during the final years of the Civil War.

African Americans and the American Military Tradition
White Americans had always been ambivalent about recruiting blacks. It is
generally assumed that the use of black soldiers was rare before the Civil War and
that this situation differs from Brazil’s, where the use of blacks in the army was

12 This perspective was established by Robert Sterling, “Civil W ar Resistance in the Middle West,"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1974), James W. Geary, We Need Men. The Union
Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), and James Osher, “Soldiers
Citizens for a Disciplined Nation: Union Conscription and the Construction of the Modem American
Army,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992).
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supposedly more normal and more widespread during the same period.13
However, as Carl Degler pointed out some years ago, this difference between the
two countries cannot be explained by fundamentally different racial attitudes.
Rather,

the

difference

arose

from

the

particular

strategic

and

political

circumstances that responsible authorities confronted in each context.14
During the colonial period, demographic and cultural factors restrained the
recruitment of blacks in British America.15 In the thirteen colonies, a predominant
white population from which to draw soldiers, a small military establishment, and
the close connection between military service and citizenship, all operated against
the use of black soldiers.16 Consequently, the right to use arms or to be temporarily
enlisted in the militia did not officially exist for blacks, either free or enslaved, in
colonial America, while in Brazil both law and custom tolerated it. In America
service was a privilege of race, while in Brazil it was, rather, a punishment for
social undesirables.17

13 In every instance [in Brazil] the [free] Negro participated with the whites in their wars on equal
terms, and some of them achieved the prestige of a national hero...[while in the United States] [t]hey
could not hold office in the black militia.” Frank Tannenbaun, Slave and Citizen (1946, reprint,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), pp. 90-1; 94-5.
14 See Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White. Slave and Race Relations in Brazil and the United
States (New York: Macmillam Company, 1971). In this sense Degler denies the Tannenbaum-Elkins
model concerning a more benevolent attitude from Brazilians in what concerned Afro-descendants.
The path opened by Degler led the way for inquiries concerning the role of political and institutional
processes.
15 Ibid. pp. 80-1. For an appreciation concerning the participation of blacks in previous conflicts,
see Wilson, The Black Phalanx.
16 According to Robert A. Gross, in the town of Concord in colonial Massachusetts only two groups
were exempt from service in the militia: Harvard graduates and a dozen black slaves. See The
Minutemen and Their World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), p. 70. On the limited size of the
American army see chapter V.
17 As shown in chapter IV, Brazilian recruitment during the 19th century also operated as a
mechanism of social control, singling out socially dangerous individuals. Peter M. Beattie,
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An armed militia provided one of the civic bases for the American nation,
but this asset was open only to those considered to be citizens, that is, white free
males. Nevertheless, the fact that blacks were not officially permitted to fight did
not mean that they were not enrolled on special occasions. Necessity often led to
the recruitment of racially segregated minorities in most colonial societies and
British North America was no exception. Men of African descent were always
present during times of trouble, filling the ranks in order to fight the enemies of
white colonists.18 Although demographic conditions reinforced racial segregation in
the militias, military exclusion could be temporarily suspended when some
emergency demanded it. As recent scholarship has shown, such emergencies
were more common than the traditional view would allow, with blacks being called
to fight during colonial revolts such as Bacon’s Rebellion (Virginia, 1676) and in the
campaigns against the Indians, such as the Yamasee War (South Carolina, 1715).
According to Peter Voelz, the foremost analyst of the military impact of blacks in
the colonial Americas:
Desperation was thus a mark of raising and arming slaves and free
blacks on a colony wide basis. It took an emergency to overcome the
habitual fear the planters and masters, fears not only that the slaves

“Conscription Versus Penal Servitude: Army Reform’s Influence on the Brazilian State's
Management of Social Control, 1870-1930," in Journal of Social History. Vol. 32, No. 4, summer
1999, pp. 847-73; Fernando Doers Costa, “Os Problems do Recrutamento Militarno Final do S6culo
XVIII e as QuestOes da ConstrugSo do Estado e da NagSo,” in Anaiise Social. Vol. 20 No. 130,1995,
pp. 121-55.
18Winthrop Jordan in White Over Black. American Attitudes Toward Negro. 1550-1812 (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1969) develops this thesis. The discussion about white fears of a black revolt is
on page 562n. About the different images attributed to Blacks in literature and society see,
Friedrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind.
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might turn their weapons against their masters but also that they
might join an enemy to destroy the colony.19
Americans officially discussed the enlistment of blacks in the Army on a
national basis as early as the struggle for independence.20 Unlike the Brazilian
experience, Revolutionary leaders in the U.S. faced a long struggle to defeat the
British and their local allies.21 As in other colonial revolts, the Patriots faced a
chronic shortage of troops, a permanent nightmare for military leaders on long
campaigns. Of the 300,000 American troops that took part in the Revolutionary
war, an estimated 5,000 (1.6%) were blacks.22 The great majority of them were
recruited from the 50,000 African Americans living in the northern colonies.
Basically blacks substituted for affluent whites in non-segregated battalions,
serving in most theaters and campaigns. Some of these individuals were free men
of color who voluntarily enlisted to fight for freedom from Britain.23 Others were
slaves, who found in the Revolution a good opportunity to gain their freedom on

19 Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier. The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas (New
York: Garland Publishing, 1993), p. 29. Complete lists concerning examples of military use of blacks
during emergencies can be found on Chart 1, pp. 24-8. Chart 2, pp. 34-5, Chart 3, pp. 46-7 and
Chart 4, pp. 66-7.
20 Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters. The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1974), pp. 15-24. Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1961).
21 In Brazil only three provinces reacted against independence: Bahia, MaranSo, and Grio-ParS. The
Brazilian Imperial government did not need more than a small number of loyal regular troops,
supported by foreign mercenaries, to subordinate these provinces to the new order.
22 Peter Maslowski, “National Policy Toward the Use of Black Troops in the Revolution,” South
Carolina Historical Magazine 73. 1972. J. MacLeod Duncan, Slavery. Race and the American
Revolution (London: 1974). Charles Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social History of the
Continental Army (New York: New York University Press, 1996) incorporates an excellent discussion
of African American participation in the Continental Army. See especially chapter 4, "Changing One
Master for Another: Black Soldiers in the Continental Army,” pp. 65-88.
23 David Biron Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1975), pp. 73-83. Davis defined the American Revolution as a movement of
“conservative criollos.”
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the battlefields.24 Southern blacks, for obvious reasons, did not significantly
participate, although many enlisted on the British side.25 The southern colonies'
insecure position was well voiced some years later in a letter sent from the planterdominated “Louisiana Committee of Defense” to General Andrew Jackson,
describing their country as “strong by Nature, but extremely weak from the nature
of its population.”26
In 1792, in the midst of the conservative reaction to the revolutionary era,
Congress passed the Federal Militia Act. This legislation defined the national militia
as “free able-bodied white male citizen[s] of the respective states.”27 The Federal
Militia Act maintained the control of states over the militias, incorporating racial
restrictions and excluding blacks and Indians from military service. These
restrictions also affected the regular army, excepting the occasional black and
Indian scouts who were not considered as regular soldiers.28

24 For a good case study see David 0 . White, Connecticut's Black Soldiers, 1775-1783 (Chester:
Connecticut Historical Commission, 1973).
25 Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991) discusses how the Revolution enabled southern blacks to challenge the
colonial social order in the name of egalitarian principles, seeking liberty by fighting for the British.
From the same author see also “The British and the Blacks: A New Perspective,” The Historian 38
(1976), which surveys the mixture of principle and pragmatism that shaped British treatment of
blacks, particularly in the southern colonies.
26 John Spencer Basset (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington: DC, Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 51-4.
27 Appendix to the Annals of Congress. 1s' Congress, 1st Sessions, p. 1392.
28 On the lost opportunity for African Americans at the end of the revolutionary period two interesting
studies case are Gary B. Nash, Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Philadelphia and its
Aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Shane White, Somewhat More
Independent: The End of Slavery in New York Citv (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991). Both
authors blame pervasive racism in the North for the lack of a vigorous abolitionist policy in the period
following independence.
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Blacks continued to be called up when an emergency demanded a shift
away from dominant racial patterns. During the War of 1812, free blacks were
accepted into the Louisiana troops organized under the leadership of General
Andrew Jackson. Two battalions of blacks composed of 180 soldiers each faced
British forces that included between 1,000 and 1,500 black soldiers, mostly coming
from the British West Indies. For their efforts in the War of 1812, particularly during
the fighting at New Orleans in 1814 and 1815, African Americans earned the
praise of General Jackson, although they were soon stripped of their arms.29
During most of the antebellum period the recruitment of African Americans
was very limited. Participation in state militias meant access to citizenship and
implied equality. Thus, military discrimination formed an important barrier against
the extension of citizenship to the racially segregated. Typical of this color bar
was the attitude of General Nathaniel P. Banks. In 1859, in his capacity as
governor of Massachusetts, he vetoed legislation that would have admitted
blacks to the state militia on the grounds that it violated the whites-only provision
of the 1792 Federal Militia Act.30 During the late 1850s the U.S. Supreme Court

29 David C. Rankin, “The Impact of the Civil War on the Free Colored Community of New Orleans," in
Perspectives in American History. 11, 1977-1978, pp. 379-416. The state of Louisiana paid free
colored soldiers pensions and the federal government granted them bounties. On the black presence
in the West India Regiments see David Patrick Geggus, “Slavery, W ar and Revolution in the Greater
Caribbean, 1789-1815,” in David Barry Gaspar and David Patric Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time:
The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997),
pp. 1-50. See also Adam Rothman, “The West India Regiments at the Battle of New Orleans and
Beyond,’’ (paper presented for the meeting of the American Historical Association), January 1999.
30 Quoted in Manoj K. Joshi and Joseph P. Reidy, “To Come Foreward and Aid in Putting Down This
Unholy Rebellion: The Officers of Louisiana’s Free Black Native Guard During the Civil W ar Era,” in
Southern Studies. Vol. 21, No. 2, 1983, p. 330. Ira Berlin et all., “The Black Military Experience, “ in
Slaves no More. Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil W ar (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 195.
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made another symbolic declaration of black inferiority. When issuing the Dred
Scott Decision, Chief of Justice Roger B. Taney reaffirmed the importance of
racial exclusion in the army in terms that sounded familiar to many white
northerners:
Nothing could more strongly mark the entire repudiation of the
African race...[than] not being permitted to share in one of the
highest duties of the citizens...He forms no part of the sovereignty
of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend
it...31

The Sectional Crisis and Racial Issues
The question of black recruitment was again posed to the Federal
government when the Civil War began. Pressures from black communities in the
North and their allies in the abolitionist movement demanded the inclusion of
African-descendants in northern military efforts. Black leadership understood the
opportunity in the crisis and engaged in a campaign to recruit freed AfricanAmericans. They expected that black support would be rewarded, helping African
Americans achieve both emancipation and citizenship as a result of the war.
Fighting for the Union, blacks could at the same time strike a blow against slavery
and demonstrate their worth as citizens.32 The “colored citizens of Cleveland” who
declared in October 1861 that “We will pray for the Union, will give our money for
the Union, and will fight for the Union” publicly expressed the civic virtue

31 Benjamin C. Howard, compiler, Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Unites States,
and the opinions of the Judges thereon in the case of Dred Scot versus John F. A. Sandford..
(Washington: 1857). Quoted in Osher, Soldier Citizens for a Disciplined Nation.... p. 371.
32 From 1861 black men and women served as military laborers in a variety of jobs. Some worked as
personal servants, teamsters, laundresses, hospital attendants and cooks while others helped as
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demanded of citizens. But most white northerners agreed with the decision of the
Lincoln administration to enlist only whites. Prejudice in the northern states was
powerful, and few whites outside of abolitionist circles believed that blacks had the
character to endure combat. Frederick Douglass lamented such arguments in an
editorial published in May, 1861: “We are ready and would go, counting ourselves
happy in being permitted to serve and suffer for the cause of freedom and free
institutions. But you won’t let us go.”33
Many Republican leaders supported racial military restrictions as long as
these aided their primary objective of bringing back the seceding states. A
restrictive policy satisfied both federal and state legislation and fit with the racist
traditions of military service in America. It was also consistent with Lincoln’s
devotion to the Constitution. One of Lincoln’s favorite themes was the
uniqueness of the American experience. During the first months of the war the
president struggled to preserve the Constitution as a living proof of American
uniqueness.34 Non-interference with slavery was one of the pillars of his
administration’s official politics, as outlined in Lincoln’s . Annual Message to
Congress in December 1861:
In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the
insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable
conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and

guides, scouts and builders of fortifications. Occasionally some of these workers had to take arms for
personal defense when facing situations of extreme danger.
33 Douglass’ Monthly. Ill, May, 1861, p. 451.
34 On the constitutional impasses involving emancipation, see Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep.
African-Americans and the Constitutional Order. 1776 to the Present (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), pp. 50-7.
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remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case,
thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the
primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions,
which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate
action of the legislature.35
No large organized slave uprising capable of bringing the South to its
knees developed before or after Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation,
much to the disappointment of some abolitionists. This can be explained by the
fact that slaves lived in a militarized society, with whites constantly on the lookout
for slave rebellion. Thomas Wentworth Higginson questioned his soldiers about
this issue when taking charge of his “colored regiment" during the spring of 1863.
The former slaves invariably answered they never openly revolted because “they
had neither the knowledge, nor the weapons, nor the mutual confidence to make
any such attempt successful.”36 However, white southerners could not prevent
small, local revolts, involving individuals or handfuls of slaves rather than
hundreds of them. Neither could the Confederate army prevent slaves from
running to the Union lines, a fact of vital importance for the evolution of the war.
Clearly, slaves in the South were not passive observers.37

35 Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861." Quoted in
Fehrenbacher(ed.), Abraham Lincoln, p. 176.

Don E.

36 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, “The First Black Regiment, The Outlook. July 1898, pp. 521-531,
as quoted in Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War. Black Troops in the Civil War. 1862-1865
(Boston: Little Brown, 1998), p. 66.
37 For a good account of black mobilization at the beginning of the war see James M. McPherson,
The Negro’s Civil War. How American Blacks Felt and Acted During the W ar for the Union (1965,
reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), especially chapter II, “The Negro’s Response to the War,
1861," pp. 19-36.
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Blacks in the Confederate War Effort
While northerners denied blacks the right to serve, southerners tried to
optimize the military use of slaves and free blacks. In the Confederacy, the large
black population was viewed by many as an important military resource in the
rearguard. At the beginning of the war, freed blacks around the Confederacy
offered their military services to the cause of secession. Southern leaders
immediately rejected these proposals, invoking moral and ideological principles
that black

mobilization would

have contradicted. As

prominent

Georgian

slaveholder and Confederate General, Howell Cobb stated at the end of the war,
reliance on black military power would be equal to the destruction of the movement
because:
The day you make soldiers of them [blacks] is the beginning of the
end of the revolution. If slaves make good soldiers our whole theory
of slavery is wrong.38
Confederate racial fears did not prevent their leaders from using blacks
(free or slave) in the rearguard, supporting their fighting armies with heavy labor.
From the beginning of the war, slaves built much of the infrastructure of the
southern war effort. Hundreds of thousands worked on fortifications, breastworks,
trenches, forts, and other defensive works that were built in nearly every city and

“ Quoted in Degler, Neither Black Nor White, p. 78. A similar point of view about black soldiers
was also formulated by some officers who told Union Brigadier General Daniel Ulman that: "we
must not discipline them (blacks), for if we do, we will have to fight them some day ourselves."
Quoted in Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, p. 168. On the southern debate over the
enlistment of slaves in the last months of war, see Robert Durden, The Gray and the Black (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), Richard Rollins (ed.) Black Southerners in Gray.
Essays on Afro-Americans in Confederate Armies. (Murfreesboro: Southern Heritage Press,
1994), and Thomas E. Preisser, “The Virginia Decision to Use Negro Soldiers in the Civil War,
1864-1865,” in Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 82, No. 1,1975, pp. 98-113.
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town in the South. Indeed, one of the persistent themes in Confederate politics

was the labor question. How should black labor be used? What compensation
should be given owners of slaves used on national projects?39
Blacks staffed southern hospitals and worked in weapons manufacturing
plants in Virginia and Georgia. They also followed their masters, working as cooks
or assistants and, eventually, taking up arms. If southerners for ideological and
political reasons clearly rejected the draft of slaves, they could not dispense with
their work on the home front. A Virginian slaveholder summarized the sacrifices
planters made to support their army with black laborers:
In this section of the country a heavy draught has been made upon
the farmers (half of the available working force) to work on the
fortifications. I, for one, rendered this tribute cheerfully to a cause
which is dear to my heart, though that, together with the excessive
rains will materially shorten my crop.40
While portions of the slave population worked on the Confederate defenses,
some of them began to run for Union lines. With the advance of Union troops, the
picture begun to change, and so did the position of slaves in the Confederacy.

Runaways and the Union Army
When Union troops moved deep into the South, commanders had to
choose how to deal with the runaways that began to cross their lines. Early in the

39 For a description of the varieties of jobs performed
Jordan Jr. Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees in
Press of Virginia, 1995), especially chapter 8, “Grand
185-200. See also McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War,

by black in the Army of Virginia see Ervin L.
Civil War Virginia fCharlottesville: University
and Awful Time. Body Servants at War,” pp.
pp. 245-48.

40 L. H. Minor to the Confederate Secretary of War, Hanover, Virginia, May 2,1862 in Ira Berlin et al,
“The Destruction of Slavery," in Freedom. A Documentary History of Emancipation. 1861-1867 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Document 264, p. 698 (henceforth quoted as “Destruction
of Slavery."
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war, troop units constituted microcosms of communities, reflecting the customs
and prejudices existing in different parts of the North. For many soldiers, seeing
the South for the first time convinced them that it was indeed a backward society
in need of fundamental changes. As one soldier observed, “They [southerners]
are certainly the most primitive ignorant people I ever came across”.41
The behavior of northern soldiers and their attitudes about the slaves
have been subjected to extensive historiographical debate. Most analyses agree
that northern condemnation of slavery did not necessarily reinforce ideas of racial
justice, nor did it lead to the acceptance of blacks as equal citizens.42 Many
soldiers condemned slavery while

holding reservations

about the

slaves

themselves. With the exception of some abolitionists and of northern blacks,
neither northern society as a whole nor the newly formed Republican Party
supported full citizenship for blacks. This can easily be seen in the “Black Codes”

41 James S. Slight to his wife, Jan. 17,1862, quoted in Randall Jimmerson, The Private Civil War:
Popular Thought during the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1988), p. 133.
42Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank, pp. 40-44; James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades.
pp. 117-30; Nina Silber and Mary Beth Sievens (eds.) Yankee Correspondence: Civil W ar Letters
Between New England Soldiers and the Homefront (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1996); Randall C. Jimerson, The Private Civil War: Popular Though Purina the Sectional Conflict
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), especially chapter 4; Reid Mitchell, Civil
War Soldiers: Their Expectations and Their Experiences (New York: Touchstone, 1988), pp. 11726. David A. Cecere, “Carrying the Home Front to War: Race and New England Culture During
the Civil War," in Paul A. Cimbala (ed.), Look Homeward: Union Soldiers and the North Home
Front Before and After the Civil W ar (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Earl J. Hess,
Liberty. Virtue and Progress: Northerners and Their War for the Union (New York: New York
University Press, 1988). The extreme case seems to be Michael Barton’s Goodmen. The
Character of Civil W ar Soldiers. (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981), in
which Barton argues that southerners and northerners shared the same core value system.
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existing in most of the northern states, with the exception of New England.43 Many
officers reflected this pattern of behavior, including the provost marshal of Norfolk,
Virginia, who told president Lincoln that "the decided majority of our officers of all
grades have no sympathy with your policy...They hate the Negro, more than
they love the Union.”44 Such attitudes, as George Fredrickson has pointed out,
“suggest the tragic limitation of the white racial imagination of the nineteenth
century, namely its characteristic inability to visualize an egalitarian biracial
society.”45
There was no uniform response to runaways.

Because

immediate

communication with Washington DC was difficult, many commanders exercised
considerable discretion in their treatment of runaways. Neither the military nor the
Lincoln administration had a comprehensive plan to deal with the torrent of AfricanAmericans who approached the Union lines. Responses depended on the
commander’s moral beliefs as well as on the relations among Union troops,

43 According to Leon F. Litwack, the extent of antislavery and anti-southern sentiment in 1860 cannot
be taken as an index of the success of abolitionism since many Republicans, probably a large
majority, were explicitly opposed to the doctrine of immediate abolition. Blacks did not share in the
expansion of political democracy during the first half of the nineteenth century. North of Slavery. The
Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). Many years and
hundreds of thousand of victims would be necessary for the Radical wing of the Republican party
achieve the necessary strength in order to organize their demands on a consistent political project.
Only at the war’s end would such a project be able to claim a deep transformation in the country's
racial structures. On the Republican Party’s free labor ideology before the Civil War see: Eric Foner,
Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men. The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil W ar (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil W ar (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980). especially pp. 23-4 and 261-62. As limited as the Republican
attitude could be, Foner claims it was qualitatively more progressive than the average northern
position.
44 Major E. Boney to Mr. Lincoln, 18 Feb. 1861, Ira Berlin et al. Black Military Experience. Doc. 162,
p. 411.
45 Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind., pp. xii-xiii.
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slaveholders, and slaves in each area. In this environment, individual Union
commanders established their own policies regarding runaways. While some
immediately understood the importance of the slaves to the Confederate war
effort, others preferred to return fugitives, expecting some cooperation from loyal
slaveholders. During the peninsular campaign (Spring 1862), Major General John
A. Dix worked to exclude blacks from his lines, assuring local slaveholders that
“special directions have been given not to interfere with the condition of any person
held to domestic service.”46 This position was criticized by radical Republicans
such as representative Owen Lovejoy from Illinois, who declared that, “it is no part
of the duty of the soldiers of the United States to capture and return fugitive
slaves.”47
The

situation

of each

group

of

runaways

varied

according

to

circumstances. In some cases, slaves had fled their masters; in others, masters
had evacuated, leaving their slaves behind; in still others, masters stayed and
declared their loyalty to the Union cause. The first situation involved personal or
collective decisions on the part of the slaves. From the outset of the war, many
slaves sensed that the conflict would ultimately destroy slavery and that, if they
could escape behind Union lines, they would find freedom. Susie King Taylor, a
young slave girl from South Carolina, described the excitement at the time of her
family’s escape: “I wanted to see these wonderful Yankees so much, as I heard

46 Dix to Colonel August Morse, 14 Oct 1861, OR, Vol. II, pp. 773-74. Dix also proposed to send
“contrabands" north to alleviate the demographic pressure in the military camps. See Jordan, Black
Confederates and Afro-Yankees. p. 265.
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my parents say the Yankee was going to set all the slaves free”48 Another
fugitive, informed by a Union general that he could not enlist into the army
because “it wasn’t a black man’s war,” answered that “it would be a black man’s
war before they got through.’’49
During the first months of the war, the Virginia tidewater was the
Confederate theater where Union troops most often met with runaway slaves.
General Benjamin Butler, then in command of the Union forces at Fort Monroe,
refused to return runaways on the grounds that they should be considered
“contrabands of war.” From that moment the runaways were known as
“contrabands."

Butler’s

justification

was

useful

because

it

associated

emancipation with the needs of the war.50
The situation of those who looked for help under northern protection was
difficult. Runaways who came into contact with Federal forces needed to be fed,
clothed, and provided with shelter. They also had to be put to work as soon as
possible, or else they would soon become an obstacle to the army by consuming

47 Congressional Globe. 37m Congress, 1st session, p. 32. Owen Lovejoy was a brother of martyred
abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy.
48 Patricia W. Romero and Willie Lee Rose (eds.) Reminiscences of Mv Life. A Black Woman's Civil
War Memoirs. Susie Kina Tavlor (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1988), p. 32.
49 Testimony given by former Virginia slave Harry Jarvis in John W. Blassingame (ed.), Slave
Testimony. Two Centuries of Letters. Speeches. Interviews, and Autobiographies (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1977), p. 608.
50 This incident took place in May 22, 1861. See Louis Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedmen.
Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks. 1861-1865 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 11-13.
According to Louis S. Gerteis the population of blacks under federal control in Virginia rose from
approximately 1,500 early in 1862 to nearly 5,000 by the end of the year. p. 23. See also
McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War, p. 28. For the official correspondence of the whole affair, see
O.R.. Series I, Vol. II, pp. 52-4,648-51; Series I, Vol. VIII, p. 370; Series III, Vol. I, p. 243.
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supplies and by slowing down the movements of the Union forces.51 In part to
alleviate the problem, Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act on August
6, 1862. This enactment allowed Union commanders to confiscate and employ
those slaves who had been used as laborers by the Confederate military or who
worked for disloyal masters. The act basically confirmed Butler’s policy at
Fortress Monroe. The slaveholder who permitted his slaves to be used against
the government “forfeit[ed] his claim" to his slaves’ labor. The act did nothing,
however, for those slaves who had not been in Confederate service.52 An
editorial from Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper portrayed the derogatory way
in which runaways were viewed in the northern press during these first months.
Under the title “Morning

Mustering of the Contrabands” the

magazine

emphasized that, “Doubtless the nigger band have never had so pleasant an
existence as under their new state of contraband existence.”53
The relations between soldiers and runaways turned more complex as
Union forces advanced over the Confederate heartland, assuming command of

51 Women and children significantly surpassed the male population in many camps. In December 12,
1863, a report from a refugee camp in Natchez, Mississippi, recorded 495 men, 1,612 women, and
875 children for a total of 2,982 refugees. Liberator. 15 January 1864. Quoted in Dan R. Frost,
“Blacks and Emancipation: The Decisive Factors that Resulted in Union Victory in the Civil War,"
(M.A. Thesis, Fullerton State University, 1987), pp. 103-4.
52 George P. Sanger (comp.), The Statutes at Large, treaties, and Proclamations, of the United
States of America (Boston. Little Brown Company, 1863), Vol. 12, p. 319.
53 Frank Leslie Illustrate Newspaper. 2 Nov. 1861. Open prejudices were part of what Michael
Barton defined as the “Victorian Panorama.” According to Barton “Victorians believed that the
economy was a test of morals, and that the poor could not control their impulses. Rescuing the
poor, therefore, meant teaching them willpower and new morals. Many of the poor believed this
too." Barton, Goodmen. p. 50.
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plantations and dealing with black populations whose labor was potentially
useful.
Figure 4
The Popular Idea of the Freedmen’s Bureau - “Plenty to Eat and Nothing to Do.”
The derogatory image of blacks surviving the end of the war.
FR A N K .L E S L IE ’S I L LU S T R A T E D NEWSPAPER.

• *’ T M E POPULAR IO A A O f THE PREEDM CN'B B U R E A U -P L E N T Y .T O
_____________________ E A T AM P NOTHINO T O DO.**____________________

Source: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper. October, 1866.

At first, the problem of caring for and governing large slave populations
was quite without precedent for the Union army. When South Carolina’s Sea
Islands were occupied in November, 1861, masters and their families fled the
region, leaving a significant black population of 10,000 persons behind. The
former slaves as well as the plantations were subjected to the supervision of the
Department of Treasury. The Port Royal Experiment, as it became known, united
a particular set of northern expectations to an experiment in “free labor” applied
directly to the Confederate landscape. While the flower of New England
Abolitionism came to the Sea Islands as teachers, some military and civilian
administrators, including businessman less interested in the well being of the
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freed slaves than in profiting from the wartime circumstances, also came.
Conflicts involving northern officers, former slaves, commercial agents, and
religious missionaries soon emerged, showing the limits of reform ideals. In
retrospect, the Port Royal experience was atypical when compared to the
Northern management of slave labor elsewhere in the conquered South.54
In the central and the Gulf departments of the army, the experience was
quite different. The Union invasion of heavily populated areas in Louisiana and
the Mississippi Valley did not assure complete control of the territory or its
people. Taking advantage of this precarious distribution of power, many masters
declared loyalty to the Union and pressured the army to enforce labor discipline.
The initial labor program of the Union Army on the Mississippi River reflected the
fragile military situation and maintained the hegemony of the planter class. As
work conditions deteriorated, many slaves ran away from the plantations. The
army’s main concern then was control of the labor force, especially the runaways
whom they classified as “vagrant blacks.”55 General Nathaniel P. Banks assured
Louisiana’s white population that “the well being of this people [blacks] requires

54 On Port Royal conflicts, see Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction. The Port Roval
Experiment (1964, reprint, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 199-216; Ira Berlin et al.
The Destruction of Slavery, pp. 101-114; Eric Foner, Reconstruction. America’s Unfinished
Revolution (1984, reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1989) pp. 51-5.
55 Thomas May, “Continuity and Change in the Labor Program of the Union Army and the
Freedman's Bureau," in Civil War History. Vol. XVII, number 3,1971, pp. 245-54.
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that they should labor, and be preserved from vagrancy and idle, vicious
habits.”56
Former slaveholders in these areas kept a high degree of control over the
African American work force and had the cooperation of the Union’s main
representatives until late in the war. They were supported by an interpretation of
free-labor ideology that blamed the slaves’ own lack of initiative for their
economic plight. Late in the war, an editorial expressed the concerns of many in
the northern white community about the rupture of the South’s social hierarchy:
“The slaves with the idea of freedom had not imbibed the idea of labor, and were
in a state of perfect bewilderment. Many wandered around the streets, so many
in fact to become a growing evil.’’57
The difficult problem of defining the status of black refugees continued
even after the war. The Second Confiscation Act solved part of the problem by
giving commanders full power to employ them, pay them for their work and,
eventually, demand their cooperation for military purposes. However, it did not
give commanders a clear blueprint of how to deal with recently emancipated
slaves. Still, the ambiguous policies of federal authorities could not block the
deterioration of slavery, a process flowing inevitably from the logic of the war.
Dislocation, migration, and the introduction of wage labor impelled the

56 Louis S. Gerteis argued that the experience of blacks in Civil War Louisiana, where General
Nathaniel P. Banks established a labor system that critics charged resembled slavery, shaped
Reconstruction f a r more than events on the Sea Islands.
57 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper. 21 May 1864.
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destruction of slavery, but military recruitment was the decisive factor in
preventing a return to the antebellum status quo.58

Early Experiences with Black Soldiers
As Union troops occupied plantation states, unauthorized recruitment of
black soldiers began to take place. Initially, local Union officers, largely on their
own initiative and without official sanction, recruited blacks. The federal
government tolerated some of this but several officers were subject to strong
censure. During the spring of 1862 David Hunter in South Carolina, Benjamin
Butler in Louisiana and James Lane in Kansas, seized the chance to arm former
slaves against their masters, before the Lincoln administration had taken definite
steps to authorize it. Although these unauthorized actions met with rebuke from
the Lincoln administration, they paved the way for a shift in Federal military policy
once manpower demands became pressing and white induction declined. In each
case, the local initiative answered a perceived emergency in a region considered
vulnerable to Confederate guerrillas. While the president remained “averse to
arming negroes” he agreed to allow local commanders “to arm, for purely
defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.”59
In occupied Louisiana, General Butler, facing a military shortage and
Confederate threat, recruited the 1,400-man Louisiana State Guard, a force of free

58 According to Joe H. Mays, from a pre-war population of 4,000,000, approximately 520,000 African
Americans in the Confederacy entered the Union lines during the war. “Black Americans and their
Contribution Toward Union Victory in the American Civil War, 1861-1865, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Middle
Tennessee State University, 1983), p. 53.
59 David Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln’s Cabinet - The Civil War Diaries of Salomon P. Chase (New
York, Longamas, Green, 1954), pp. 96, 99-100.
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blacks who had served as an auxiliary militia with the Confederates.60 Butler thus
became the first Union general to successfully organize a black regiment, although
his regiment, the Louisiana Native Guards, would not see combat until the spring
of the next year.61 The ranks of the Native Guards were filled by free blacks, most
light-skinned mulattos, who had been previously enrolled under the Confederacy
(although their sen/ice was refused in 1861). Their enrollment helped to coopt this
expressive minority, who possessed some property and influence in New
Orleans.62 'The Darkest of them” said General Butler ‘Were about the complexion
of the late Mr. Webster.’63
Louisiana’s non-white community was heavily stratified and differences
between free people of color and slaves were stronger there than in any other part
of the South. Consequently, in its early phase, recruitment of Louisiana’s black
soldiers did not lead to an Emancipation policy. This made Buttler’s regiments
more palatable for white public opinion in the North and for loyal slaveholders in

60 Late in the summer of 1862 Confederates reversed the initial progress of Union troops and re
captured Baton Rouge, the state capital. Complete control of the state was only achieved after the
fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July 1863.
61 In 1860 18,647 free blacks lived in Louisiana, 10,689 of them in New Orleans. In 1830 some 750
free men of color owned 2,351 slaves. Rural Louisiana developed a significant class of slaveholding
free blacks. See, Ted Tunnel, “Free Negroes and the Freedmen: Black Politics in New Orleans
During the Civil War," in Southern Studies. Volume 19, number 1,1980, pp. 5-28.
62 For Congressional debates concerning Butler’s recruitment efforts in Louisiana, see Congressional
Globe. 37th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 2620-1.
63 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment. (1869, reprint, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970), p. 1. According to Manoj K. Joshi and Joseph P. Reidy, on the eve of the Civil War,
New Orleans freemen owned two million dollar’s worth of property, and fully 85 percent worked as
artisans, professionals, and proprietors. The most prosperous owned large plantations and dozens
of slaves. See, “ T o Come Forward and Aid in Putting Down this Unholy Rebellion’: The Officers of
Louisiana’s Free Black Native Guard During the Civil W ar Era,” in Southern Studies. Vol. 21, Issue 2,
1983, p. 326.
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the state. Even so, Butler’s successor, Nathaniel P. Banks, did what he could to
dismiss black officers.64
In May, 1862, while Butler’s efforts in Louisiana were proceeding, General
David Hunter, military commander of South Carolina, ordered the enlistment of
all able-bodied African Americans.65 Recruitment in the Port Royal area was
complicated because it threatened economic gains made by the recently
liberated slaves. Many were employed as wage laborers, earning an income on
the cotton plantations for the first time in their lives and improving their standard
of living. They felt no willingness to become soldiers and risk their precarious
status on an uncertain enterprise.
Hunter’s decision instituted the first African American draft of the Civil
War, a practice that spread later to other parts of South. The implementation of
the draft spread panic on the plantations, with men fleeing to the woods and
being hunted down by the soldiers. Those who were caught were marched off
under guard, as if they were still slaves. Almost six hundred men were
dispatched to Hunter’s headquarters to be drilled.66
The regiment did not last long. President Lincoln refused to sanction the
recruitment of black troops and never authorized Hunter to pay or to equip them
properly. By August, Hunter’s regiment was disbanded, to the joy of its “would-be

64 Ira Berlin et al., Black Military Experience, pp. 41-44.
65 In sequence, Hunter proclaimed the emancipation of all slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida, whether or not within Union Lines.
66 The violence of the draft system was symbolically connected with masters’ previous insinuations
that the Yankees would sell the former slaves to the Caribbean plantations.
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soldiers,” and General Rufus Saxton replaced Hunter as the military commander
of the Sea Islands. Probably the worst effect of Hunter’s attempted conscription
was the bad impression left on the black population around Port Royal. As a
result of Hunter’s draconian impressment, many former slaves remained deeply
distrustful

of the

Union

army.

Colonel

Thomas

Wentworth

Higginson,

commanding officer of the First South Carolina Volunteers, later complained that
Hunter’s actions were detrimental to his own recruiting efforts:67
The trouble is in the legacy of bitter distrust bequeathed by the
abortive regiment of General Hunter - into which they were driven
like cattle, kept for several months in camp and then turned off
without a shilling, by order of the War Department. The formation of
the regiment, was on the whole, a great injury to this one...those
who now refuse to enlist have great influence in deterring others.68
In Kansas, Senator James Lane, a veteran of the border wars, undertook
a different strategy for black enlistment. In July 1862, Lane introduced a
recruiting system under which black agents were authorized to enroll former
slaves under the promise they might become officers. The system worked very
well, although gaps in the ranks were filled by impressment. By October 1862,
the 1st Kansas Colored Volunteers was formed, with many volunteers responding
to the promises of equal pay and equal promotion with white soldiers. However,

67 Hunter’s experiments with black regiments also alarmed Border State politicians. In Washington
D.C., Kentucky representatives introduced resolutions before the House denouncing recruitment in
South Carolina. See, Congressional Globe. 371” Congress, 2nd Session, Part 3, June 9, 1862, pp.
2620-2621, Part 4, July 3, 5,1862, pp. 3102, 3109, 3125. See also, Bell I. Wiley, Southern Negroes.
1861-1865 (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1938), pp. 297-98.
68 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment (1869, reprint, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970) pp. 15-16.
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because Lane acted without Federal authority, his regiments were not paid, nor
did his black officers receive commissions, until 1864.69

The Emancipation Proclamation
An important difference between the Brazilian and American processes
lies in the direct consequences the Civil W ar had for emancipation in the South,
in contrast with Brazil, where emancipation did not immediately follow the
Paraguayan War.

By 1863 northern Republicans thought of themselves as

attacking the enemy by emancipating slaves as well as by putting them into the
army, while in Brazil, emancipation would have inflicted damage on the regime’s
own supporters. While Brazilian

leaders compromised with slaveholders,

Republicans formulated a policy of emancipation. During the spring and summer
of 1862, opinion in the North began to shift in favor of stronger measures to deal
with slaves and abandoned property in the rebel areas. Another important
difference between military emancipation in Brazil and the U.S. was the role of
public debate. In America, debates were not restricted to the presidential
cabinet. While Lincoln’s decision for emancipation was essential, there were also
intense

discussions

in

the

Congress

and

the

press.

Senators

and

representatives were tuned in to public opinion, which reflected changes in
behavior and attitudes taking place in the North. It is possible to follow in these
debates the gradual steps taken towards abolition during the 37th Congress.70 On

69 On James [Big] Lane recruitment’s procedures, see Cornish, The Sable Arm, pp. 69-76.
70 The thirty-seventh Congress was one of the most influential in American legislative history with
fundamental contributions in land-grants, colleges, confiscation, banks, and expropriation of
property. See Leonard P. Curry, Blueprint for Modern America: Non-Military Legislation of the First
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April 16, 1862, President Lincoln signed a bill abolishing slavery in the District of
Columbia. By July 1862, the Republican leadership clearly favored emancipation
as a war aim. The continuing drop in the enlistment of white volunteers and the
lack of success on the battlefield convinced Lincoln that emancipation was a
needed weapon to defeat the Confederacy. In March 1863, Henry H. Halleck,
General-in Chief of the army, summarized for Ulysses S. Grant, Military
Commander of the Department of Tennessee, the new understanding of the
administration:
The character of the war has very much changed within the last
year. There is now no possible hope of a reconciliation with the
rebels. The union party in the South is virtually destroyed. There
can be no peace but that which is enforced by the sword. We must
conquer the rebels or be conquered by them. The north must either
destroy the slave oligarchy or become slaves themselves;71
The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was issued on September,
1862. It asserted that unless the rebels relinquished their arms by January 1st,
1863, their slaves would be considered free. The border states and other areas
with a population of “loyal masters” were excluded from the proclamation. The
New York Times of November 21, 1862, expressed this new pragmatic spirit in
support of the presidential decision:

Civil War Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). For the Republican behavior in
the Congress see Herman Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights: Politics and Constitutionalism in
the Civil W ar Era. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).
71 Henry W. Halleck to Ulysses S. Grant, 31 Mar., 1863. Quoted in Berlin et. al., Black Military
Experience. Doc. 50, p. 144.
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Slavery is a prodigious element of the strength of the rebellion. It
multiplies its military power, - for it releases every white man from
labor and sends him to the field. It is a tremendous weapon in the
hands of the rebels...Why have not our military authorities precisely
the same to deprive the rebellion of that weapon which they have
to deprive of any other?72
Prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, there existed a
very real possibility that the South would indeed achieve independence.
Confederate victories on the battlefield and the unexpected length of the war had
taken their toll on northern morale and enlistment into the army had greatly
declined. There were indications that the Confederacy might be recognized by
France and England, turning the war into a still more difficult enterprise. Lincoln’s
stated purpose in issuing the proclamation as a war measure was no subterfuge.
The North was desperate for manpower to conduct its offensive war against the
Confederacy. In addition to defeating Confederate armies, the Union army had to
occupy and administer large areas of southern territory. The army had to protect
long supply and communication lines from Confederate cavalry and guerrillas.
Union forces often had to attack entrenched Confederate positions, and this
proved costly in lives. Mounting casualty lists caused many citizens and the
government to look favorably upon black enlistment. Many northern and
southern blacks were willing to join the war because of the promise of
emancipation. Emancipation encouraged slaves to flee the South, thereby
depriving the Confederacy of its labor. In turn, blacks serving as laborers
strengthened Union armies, liberating white troops from fatigue duties. The final

72 The New York Times. November 21,1862.
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Emancipation Proclamation on New Year’s Day authorized the freed slaves to
“be received into the armed services of the United States" for garrison duty.
Within days President Lincoln took further action allowing black men, whether
freed slaves or free born, to become full scale Union soldiers.73
While the federal administration acted cautiously in the border states, it still
faced strong resistance in some northern areas where the political controversy
over the recruitment and organization of black soldiers was stronger, confronting
what Eric Foner called “the inner civil War.”74 Northern Democrats had great
influence until very late in the conflict. Peace Democrats opposed emancipation
and black enlistment, positions still very popular among immigrants and Middle
Westerners.75 Many of these sectors feared that freedom would bring a flood of
black immigrants to the North, competing for the most menial jobs in the cities.76
The Democratic press, politicians and soldiers complained bitterly against
what they perceived as a subversion of the war’s objectives. Upon receiving the
nomination for governor at the New York Democratic state convention on
September 10, 1862, Horatio Seymour expressed common northern reservations
about the

Emancipation

Proclamation:

‘The

scheme

for

an

immediate

emancipation and general arming of the slaves throughout the South is a proposal

73 Emancipation Proclamation in Fehrenbacher ed., Lincoln,
Emancipation Proclamation.

p. 212. See also Franklin, The

74 Eric Foner, Reconstruction America's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1984),
pp. 11-18
75 Although Democrats could not avoid the victory of Emancipation they could filibuster to retard
approbation of emancipation legislation, see Leonard P. Curry, “Congressional Democrats, 18611863," in Civil War History. Vol. 12,1966, pp. 213-19.
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for the butchery of women and children for scenes of lust and rapine, of arson and
murder unparalleled in the history of the world.” In November, he swept to victory
in the polls, one of many electoral defeats for the Republicans.77

From Contraband to Soldiers
When the Congress began to discuss the possibility of recruiting black
soldiers, it was moved by a public opinion willing to sacrifice some of its most
cherished values in exchange for a more effective strategy of mobilization. It was
also moved by a relentless shortage of troops only partially relieved by a
conscription policy that was partial and difficult to implement.78 Senator John
Sherman, a conservative Republican, captured this reversal in a letter to his
brother, General William T. Sherman:
You can form no conception at the change of opinion here on the
negro question. Men of all parties who now appreciate the
magnitude of the contest and who are determined to preserve the
unity of the government at all hazards, agree that we must seek
and make it the interests of the Negroes to help us.79
By the spring of 1863 the perception of the war had changed substantially
in the North. Many soldiers had died, others were disabled or out of combat, and

76 Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, pp. 166-7.
77 Thomas Cook and Thomas Knox, Public Record: Including Speeches. Messages. Proclamations.
Official Correspondence and Other Public Utterances of Horatio Seymour (New York, 1868), p. 54.
Quoted in William Seraile, "The Struggle to Raise Black Regiments in New York States, 1861-1864,”
in The New-York Historical Society Quarterly. Vol. LVIII, No. 3, 1974, p.224. New York was the only
state in the North where the state government did not help the federal administration to raise a black
regiment. Recruitment in New York was directly promoted by the Federal authorities in connection
with a group of affluent citizens organized around the Union Club.
78 On the problems presented by conscription in America refer to chapter V.
79 Senator John Sherman to General William Tecumseh Sherman, August 24, 1862. Quoted in
Quarles, The Negro in the Civil W a r , p. 158.

375

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the number of desertions was growing.80 After the approval of the Enrollment Act
(March, 1863), pressure on the free male population increased substantially, and
soon there were clear signals of increasing resistance to the conscription lottery.
Not unlike the experience in Brazil, three years later, Secretary of the Navy,
Gideon Welles, remarked in January of 1863 that “partyism” seemed stronger
than "patriotism” in most northern states.81 However, in Brazil, the Emperor held
a great deal of discretionary power, while President Lincoln had to deal with an
extremely competitive political system. Federal law enforcement could adopt
extreme measures to cope with public emergencies, as in the temporary
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but elections were not suspended, and
all politicians had to respect the attitudes of the common man.82
Resistance assumed unexpected dimensions during the New York draft
riots of July 1863. For many people the draft transformed the republic into “one
great military dictatorship.” The mob’s attacks included not only racial targets, but
also symbols of Republican power such as the residences of politicians and

80 According to James W . Geary 116,125 soldiers deserted during the last two years of the war. We
Need Men, p. 14.
81 Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson,
3 vols. (New York, 1960), Vol. I, p. 324.
82 In addition to the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary powers the Emperor counted on a fourth
power called the Moderator which weakened congressional independence. Through the Moderator
Power the Emperor could call new elections and forge a majority when he needed it. Joaquim
Nabuco, Um Estadista do Impferio. Nabuco de Araujo. Sua Vida. Suas Qpinides. Sua Epoca ( S & o
Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1936). For a liberal critique against the opeation of this power see
Zacarias de G6es e Vasconcellos, Da Natureza e Limites do Poder Moderador (Rio de Janeiro:
Laemmert, 1862). During the war, provincial elections were suspended in the Province of Rio
Grande do Sul.

376

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

industrialists.83 A group of Boston businessmen expressed a common sense of
the connections between the recruitment crisis in the North and the recruitment
of black soldiers in the South:
In the free States the great numbers already drawn from
the workshops and fields have seriously embarrassed many
branches of the industry upon which the production of the
country depends, and it is desirable to reduce the call upon
such resources to the lowest point which is consistent with
the vigorous prosecution of the War...For these and other
reasons we earnestly recommend that permission should be
immediately given to the loyal states to recruit soldiers
(against their Quotas) in those parts of the Rebel States
within our control, both to fill up the white regiments now
there and to create such black regiments as you may deem
it expedient to authorize.84
Official recruiting of black troops in the wake of the Emancipation
Proclamation effectively began in the winter and the spring of 1863, when the
effects of the Enrollment Act were most deeply felt. This process involved
several steps in early 1863 in which the federal government extended permission
for the recruitment of slaves in the northern states. The Enrollment Act of March
1863, by subjecting the mass of white northerners to the draft, encouraged the

83 Through violence portions of the poor produced a symbolic theater for a white laboring audience
who participated in the process of dehumanizing its victims by committing the most horrendous
atrocities on the bodies of black man they murdered. James McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, pp.
71-77. Ernest McKay, The Civil War and New York City (Syracuse.: Syracuse University Press,
1990). See especially chapter 11, “Riot pp. 195-215. Alessandra Lorini, “Class, Race, Gender, and
Public Rituals: the New York African-American Community in the Civil War Era," in Storia
Nordamericana (Italy). Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990, pp. 117-137. From the same author see also Rituals of
Race: American Public Culture and the Search for Racial Democracy (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1999), especially chapter 1, "Parades in New York City: Rituals of Loyalty and
Freedom," pp. 1-32. On this subject the classic reference is Natalie Davis, “The Rites of Violence,” in
Society and Culture in Early Modem France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 152187.
84 Amos A. Lawrence et al. To Honorable E. M. Stanton, 10 Dec. 1863, enclosed in S. Hooper to
Honble. E. M. Stanton, 19 Dec. 1863, H-1807 1863m Letters Received, RG 107 {L-159}. Quoted in
Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience. Doc. 39A, pp. 108-9.
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use of black soldiers -- that blacks could “stop a bullet as well as any white man”
became a common attitude in the North as the war in Virginia and in Tennessee
became ever more costly. Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, a Republican
and a leading proponent of using black troops, noted with enthusiasm the impact
of the draft a white attitudes around the North:
When the [Enrollment] act was passed, you had a wild,
unreasoning prejudice against using a black man to fight the battles
of our country. But when people who were filled with these
prejudices saw that they must go themselves, and bare their
bosoms to the shot and shell of the enemy, they learned that the
black man’s blood was no more sacred than their own, and that
they would as soon have a black man stand up and fight the battles
of the country as to do it themselves.85

By May, the Bureau of Colored Troops had been created to take care of
the organization of black troops and to standardize procedures. The Bureau also
completed the process of centralization, as most regiments would be directly
linked to the Federal government, not to the states.86 By the middle of 1863,
Secretary Stanton permitted all of the northern states to recruit freed slaves in
the South. The Union government had reached the end of the long process
through which it became committed to the recruitment of black troops in both the
North and the southern and border states.87

85 Congressional Globe. 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 80.
86 A famous case was the 1st South Carolina Volunteers subsequently renamed the 33rd U.S. Colored
Infantry. See Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, p. 193,
87 Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm.
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The Parameters of Change
By the fall of 1863 war weariness in the North made whites increasingly
more willing to accept the revolutionary impact of emancipation and black
enlistment. At the same time, many conservatives in both parties understood that
the African-American population offered a possible solution to the troop crisis.

States
Border
Upper South
Deep South
Total

Table XII
Black Population and White Population
Soul hern and Border States, 186088
Slave Population
White Population
432,585
2,650,243
1,097,643
2,503,963
2,240,901
2,943,257
3,771,129
8,097,463

Source: Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters. Tables A and B, pp. 396-399.
OBS: Border (Washington DC, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri); Upper South (North Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia); Lower South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Texas).

With the threat of a draft quite near, many white northerners began to see
the enrollment of black volunteers as preferable to the draft of relatives and
friends. An Illinois soldier expressed this opinion clearly in early 1863: “For my
part I would like to see all the negroes we could raise armed and put under
military discipline...! think if a negro could save their lives [the lives of whites] by
sacrificing theirs, they [the whites] would be willing.”89 For this soldier, against a
background of mounting casualties, desertion, and growing sacrifices, the
recruitment of African Americans came to seem as a “lesser evil.” A letter from

88 Black free population not included.
89 David Givler to a friend, 14 Feb., 1863, in “Intimate Glimpses of Army Life During the Civil War;
Autobiography, Diaries, Letters, of David B. Givler, Company C, 7th Illinois Infantry..." typewritten
MS, Illinois State Historical Library), p. 101. Quoted in Victor Hicken, “The Record of Illinois’ Negro
Soldiers in the Civil War,” in Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society. Vol. LVI, Np. 3, Autumn
1963, pp. 538-9.
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the Governor of Iowa to the General in Chief of the Army illustrates the same
attitude, even more crudely. “When this war is over, “he wrote,” and we have
summed up the entire loss of life it has imposed on this country I shall not have
any regrets if it is found that a part of the dead are niggers and that all are not
white men.”90

Mobilizing Black Regiments in the North
The final Emancipation Proclamation called for the enrollment of blacks in
the Union Army and Navy. During the winter of 1863, few black units were
recruited. General Rufus Saxton nominated Thomas Wentworth Higginson, an
abolitionist minister from Massachusetts, to reorganize the unit disbanded by
General David Hunter, now renamed the 1s* South Carolina Volunteers.91 The
regiment was composed mainly of men of the South Carolina Sea Islands,
together with refugees coming from the coastal areas of Florida, Georgia, and
North Carolina. In spite of the importance normally associated with this initiative,
the regiment saw little action during its first year, except for occasional raids on
the gulf coastal areas.92
Initial steps toward recruitment in the North followed the traditional
American pattern, where the governors of states undertook the organization and
designated officers. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, governors John

90 Samuel J. Kirkwood to General Henry W. Halleck, 5 Aug. 1862. Quoted in Berlin et al., The Black
Military Experience. Doc. 25, pp. 87-8.
91 James W. Geary estimates that between two and three thousand slaves enlisted in these
experimental regiments. We Need Men, p. 30.
92 Higginson’s diary, Army Life in a Black Regiment, is one the best sources for the story of this
regiment. See also Luis Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment.
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Andrew and William Sprague received authorization to raise the first black
regiments in New England. Abolitionist governor Andrew of Massachusetts
immediately nominated prominent black leaders such as Frederick Douglass,
Martin Delany, John M. Langston, and several clergymen to recruit in diverse
parts of the North. From February to May, 1863, two regiments were raised and
trained, the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Colored Infantry.93 Soon, following the
examples of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, most northern states requested
authorization to raise their own black regiments.94 The 54th soon achieved fame
through its heroic attack against Fort Wagner in South Carolina. Although they
were repelled, the high number of casualties helped the regiment to acquire a
reputation of courage that encouraged black recruitment in other Northern
states.95
The federal administration soon realized that the relatively small number
of free blacks of military age in the North would not supply the manpower needs

93 Prevalent racist attitudes in certain parts of the North drove many free blacks to the Massachusetts
regiments. See, William Seraile, “The Struggle to Raise Black Regiments in New York State, 18611864," in The New-York Historical Society Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, Number 3, July 1974, pp. 215-233,
and Michael 0 . Smith, “Raising a Black Regiment in Michigan: Adversity and Triumph,” in Michigan
Historical Society Review, Vol. 16, No. 2,1990, pp. 22-41. In the 55th Massachusetts Regiment, 106
troops (11%) of its 961 soldiers were from Virginia. Ervin L. Jordan, Black Confederates and Afro
Yankees in Civil War Virginia, p. 268.
94 Five regiments were initially raised in the North: the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Volunteer
Infantry, the 5th Massachusetts Colored Cavalry, the 29th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry and 14th
Rhode Island Heavy Artillery. Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, p. 407.

95 On the action and the role of the regiment's first commander see Russel Duncan (ed.), Blue-Eyed
Child of Fortune. The Civil War Letters of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw (Athens, University of Georgia
Press, 1992); Luis F. Emilio, History of the Fiftv-four Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry.
1863-1865 (Boston. Boston Book Company, 1894); “The Union Army’s Fighting 54th. Black Men
Banded Together in a Civil War Regiment to Provide Their Might and Passion for Justice," in
American Visions. Vol. 4, No. 6,1989, pp. 20-6.
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of the Union army.96 The number of free black males between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five in the North, excluding the border states, totaled
approximately 46,150. An impressive 32,671, or seventy-one percent, of these
black men did serve in Union armies. Because the proportion of African
Americans in any one locality was very small, these regiments were filled with
people coming from many areas.
However, the Union’s greatest manpower reserve was southern blacks,
who were finding their way to Union lines. They were the “yet unavailed”
resource that Lincoln desperately wanted to tap. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated
editorials, again, showed how much white attitudes could change when
confronted by the draft. After months of fighting, with thousand of casualties and
enlistment down to a trickle, the newspaper reconsidered its conservative
position on black troops and in Christmas editorial in December, 1862,
surrendered to the war needs: “Whatever may be the abstract opinion of the
community as to the policy of forming contraband regiments, there can be no
doubt as to the great interest with which the public must regard the first hostile
collision between the slaves and their former masters."97
Recruitment, Emancipation, and the States
The experience of black soldiers illustrates the importance of state power in
the shaping of African-American citizenship. During the American Civil War, the

96 According to Benjamin Quarles, from a total of 980 recruits enlisted in the Massachusetts 54th, 287
or (29.2%) had been slaves. See The Negro in the Civil War, p. 187.
97 Frank Leslie Illustrated Newspaper. 20 Dec. 1862.

382

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

army emerged as the most important sector of the federal bureaucracy, its
functions going far beyond the straightforward military sphere in which it was
constitutionally enabled to perform.98 Unlike the system of parties or the courts, the
post-1863 army had a centralized command and a nationalized bureaucracy. As a
force of occupation, the army became the organizing branch of the federal
government in the South, implementing policies that disrupted traditional labor
relations, confronting the interests of southern oligarchs when the necessities of
the war demanded. In its quest to enhance national authority, the army interfered
in local affairs in ways not previously admitted in America by any other branch of
the federal government. This movement altered the fundamental relationship
between citizens and the federal government, because black rights were basically
federalized. Many commanders assumed positions as military governors of
Confederate territory held by the Union troops, turning into arbiters of the social
conflict that followed conquest and emancipation. In the border states, their
authority sometimes surpassed that exercised by loyal governors, especially where
it affected the structure of the labor market. After the Emancipation Proclamation,
military successes magnified the immediate power of generals and their local allies
among non-slaveholding whites.99 William H. Johnson, a free black soldier from
Connecticut, passionately described the connections between the army’s
success and emancipation: “The abolition of slavery is rapidly progressing South

98 Allan Nevins, The W ar for the Union: The Organized War to Victory. 1864-1865 (New York,:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960), provides a good account of the transformations in the Union Army’s
organization.
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- it is the natural course of events, and must be; for wherever the Federal Army
goes, the so-called master dies, and the slaves, once chattels, are transformed
into men!”100
In the recruitment of black soldiers, the national government confronted
southern sensibilities more intensely than in any other area. This interference
precipitated a series of crises between federal and state authorities. Loyal
slaveholders in the border states were gradually forced to recognize that the real
breakthrough in recruiting black regiments occurred in the occupied South and
border region. Some fought these changes. From Kentucky, Congressman
William H. Wadsworth protested administration policy, arguing, correctly, that: “If
they...arm the negro they are logically bound to recognize his freedom and
equality.”,0, Kentucky provided the most extreme case of slaveholder resistance,
but the situation was far from exceptional.102 Some Tennessee slaveholders
submitted more easily, recognizing their powerlessness “It matters not what may
have been our opinions upon this subject, “one wrote; ”or whether we prefer a

99 Nearly sixty percent of eligible Kentucky blacks served in the army forces. Eric Foner,
Reconstruction. America’s Unfinished Revolution, p. 8.
100 William H. Johnson, 8th Connecticut Infantry, Roanoke Island, North Carolina, 10 Feb. 1862; Pine
and Palm. 27 Feb., 1862. Quoted in Edwin S. Redkey, A Grand Army of Black Men. Letters from
African American Soldiers in the Union Army. 1861-1865 (New York, Cambridge University Press,
1991), Letter 7, p. 18.
101 Congressional Globe. 38th Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, February 1 0 ,1 1 ,1 6 ,2 6 ,1 8 6 3 , pp. 598602. For a detailed account of the conflicts in Kentucky see John David Smith, “The Recruitment of
Negro Soldiers in Kentucky, 1863-1865," in Register of the Kentucky Historical Society. Vol. 72, No.
4, 1974, pp. 364-90.
102 Kentucky local opposition delayed the enrollment of all blacks until March 1st, 1864. See John
Blassingame, “The Recruitment of Colored Troops in Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri,” The
Historian. 29, 1967; Victor Howard, “The Civil War in Kentucky: The Slave Claims His Freedom,”
Journal of Negro History 67.1982.
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different state of things, the destruction of negro slavery in this country, is an
accomplished and immutable fact, and we are willing to accept it as such.”103

Figure 5
“A Queer Recontre”

A QUEER RENCONTRE.
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Source: Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper

Unlike in Brazil, most blacks recruited for the Union army came from areas
that stood on the periphery of the Northern industrial economy. Thus, the
reaction faced by the federal officers who confiscated agricultural slave labor
was qualitatively different from that faced by the Imperial agents in Brazil.
Brazilian Imperial policy was deeply constrained by the interests of powerful
slaveholders, especially the coffee producers, who constituted the pillars of
Brazil’s agrarian economy. Black recruitment in Brazil was limited by the
willingness of planters to cooperate and by the need to defend the stability of the

103 John W. Bowen et al. To Hon. Secretary of War, 26 Sept., 1863. Quoted in Ira Berlin et al„ Black
Military Experience. Doc. 65, p. 174.
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Imperial state. In the American South, the conflict took place in a very different
political environment: it mainly affected the center of the slave labor region, not
the commercial and industrial markets in the North. Recruiting from the
Confederacy meant depriving the enemy of valuable resources. Disruptions in
the plantation economy did not directly affect the operation of the northern
economy. Only in the border states, and in pockets such as southern Louisiana
and the Mississippi Valley, did conflicts similar to those in Brazil arise. There,
some loyal masters were able to keep part of their pre-war power and press the
government for concessions. Nonetheless, as soon as these areas lost their
strategic importance for the Union war effort, guarantees of exemption previously
given to slaveholders vanished.104 In early 1864 the Adjutant General of the Army
informed the Secretary of the War of the disruption of slavery in Kentucky: ‘Being
informed at this place that the slaves of Kentucky on the borders of Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois and Tennessee, were constantly crossing the lines and quite a number of
them enlisting in organizations were for the distant states of Massachusetts and
Michigan, I...suggest [to the governor] the organization of regiments within its
limits, and thus obtain a credit for the Negroes in the States quota.”105
Throughout the South black recruitment was inseparable from the politics of
emancipation. Although President Lincoln proclaimed respect for loyal propertyowners, there was no strategy of social control capable of containing the disruption

104 After Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg the power of loyal slaveholders steadily
decreased. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 689-716.
105 Adjutant General {Lorenzo Thomas} to Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, 1 Feb. 1864. Ira Berlin, Black
Military Experience. Doc. 98, pp. 253-54.
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brought by emancipation, recruitment, and the social forces they unleashed.
Recruitment made emancipation inevitable even in those regions originally exempt
from it, overcoming the limits originally established the Lincoln’s proclamation.
Union officers and agents increasingly interfered with plantation work throughout
the South and border states.

By the spring of 1864, the enrollment of African

Americans was conducted on a large scale in most southern and border regions.
The right of emancipation granted to any conscript slave (and his family),
authorized through the act of Congress of March 3, 1865, became the one of the
last measures taken against slaveowners’ rights in these states.106
Chart V

Sources of Recruitment for Black Soldiers in the Union Army, 1862-1865
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Source: O .R .. Volume 3, No. 4, pp. 1260-1270.

106 Official Records. Series III, Volume IV, April 18,1864, pp. 233-4. For a good account concerning
the destruction of slavery in the Border States see Suzanne Leslie Rowland, “Emancipation and the
Black Military Experience During the American Civil War: A Documentary History,” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Department of History, University of Rochester, 1991). Of course, the last blow against
slaveowner's rights was the 13mAmendment in January, 1865.
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Although the federal government played a crucial role in the disintegration
of slavery, the slaves themselves took the most important part. Slaves sensed the
opportunities and moved quickly to take advantage of them. During 1863 and 1864
a vast number of slaves left plantations and headed for army camps, dissolving the
bonds of servitude. The process was spurred by the credits given for black soldiers
against state draft quotas.107 Consequently, in 1863 and 1864 the nation watched
the practical destruction of slavery and the development of freedom on a scale
unknown to any other slave society in the Americas. Agustin L. Taveau, a southern
master from Charleston, commented on the realities of post-emancipation South
and the lack of attachment of former slaves to the old social order “I believed that
these people [slaves] were content happy, and attached to their masters...If they
were content, happy and attached to their masters, why did they desert him in the
moment of his need and flock to an enemy whom they did not know, and thus left
their, perhaps really good masters whom they did know from infancy?”108

Blacks and the Nationalization of the Army
By April 1865, around 10 percent of the Union Army (or 178,000 men)
was composed of black troops, many of them former slaves.109 During the last

107 The first African American to receive the Congressional Medal Of Honor, Sergeant William H.
Carney of the 54th Massachusetts furnishes a good example of migration for enlistment. Bom in
Norfolk, Virginia, Camey fled to Massachusetts and enlisted at New Bedford. Elvin Jordan Jr, Black
Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War Virginia, p. 272. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War,
pp. 183-202.
108 New York Tribune. 10 June, 1865. Quoted in Eugene Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. The World
the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 112
109 Some authors disagree with these numbers. Susan Cooper estimates at 185,000 the total
number of African Americans who served in the USTC’s. See “Records of Civil War African
American Troops Inspire Major Archival Project” in The Record. Vol. 3, No. 2, November 1996, pp.
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two years of the campaign, blacks comprised 13.1% of the 1,261,571 estimated
soldiers recruited after the passage of the Enrollment Act.110 Approximately
144,000 (78.5%) of the African American troops who entered the Union ranks
came from the slave states. These southern-born freedmen comprised the large
majority of those recruited. They were overwhelmingly illiterate, suspicious of
white motives but drawn by the guarantee of freedom offered by enlistment.
Many of their families were still enslaved or living in refugee camps, and they
faced an uncertain fate if captured. Confederate behavior towards captured
black soldiers was ambiguous. As the well-known episodes at Port Hudson, Fort
Pillow, and Poison Springs showed, the fate of those captured could be worse
than re-enslavement.111
It should be noted that, at the time of their enlistment, these men were not
considered to be citizens and could be more easily subjected to severe treatment
than white soldiers, even post-1863 white draftees. Disparate treatment was
evidenced in less pay, worse living conditions, harsher discipline, and other

9-11. Jacob Metzer estimates the number in 186,017 or 17.7 percent of the colored men ages 15-49.
“The Records of the U.S. Colored Troops as a Historical Source: An Exploratory Examination," in
Historical Methods. Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 123-132. For methodological convenience I
am working from data coming from O.R.. the same source used by Ira Berlin, Joseph Glatthaar and
most authors on the subject.
110 James W. Geary, We Need Men, p. 31.
111 Howard C. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Soldiers in Charleston - What to do?” in Civil War
History, Vol. 21, No. 1,1982, pp. 29-44; John Cimprich and Robert C. Mainfort Jr., “The Fort Pillow
Massacre: A Statistical Note," The Journal of American History. Vol. 76, No. 3, December 1989, pp.
830-839; Ronald K. Huch, “Fort Pillow Massacre: The Aftermath of Paducah,” in Journal of the
Illinois State Historical Society. Vol. 66, No.1, 1973, pp. 62-70; Ronald K. Huch, “W e Cannot treat
Negroes...as Prisoners of War: Racial atrocities and Reprisals in Civil W ar Arkansas,” in Civil War
History. Vol. 42, No. 3, 1996, pp.193-210.
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forms of discrimination.112 Harsh military discipline broke with the established
patterns of voluntarism because it was more compatible with the needs of a
modern army in campaign than the democratic relations between officers and
soldiers that were sanctioned by American military tradition.113 It suited the
modern strategy of “friction,” in which northern demographic superiority was used
to degrade southern manpower in a sequence of bloody battles that forced
Confederates to spend their reserves while defending their heartland.114 As the
Secretary of the Navy confided to his diary “all of our increased military strength
now comes from Negroes.”115
African American soldiers were approximately one fifth of the country’s
eligible black population (17%). They fought in 449 battles, leaving thirty-seven
thousand dead on the service of the Union (or ten percent of northern casualties
- two thousand at the battle-fields).116 When we add the 200,000 blacks, men
and women, whose labor supported the soldiers on the field, their work can be
seen as absolutely essential to the northern war effort. Black soldiers fought

112 Black soldiers comprised 21 percent of all executed federal soldiers. See Joseph Glatthaar,
Forged in Battle, p. 118.
113 In March 9 ,18 63 , the War Department issued a manual titled United States Tactics for the Use of
Colored Troops.
114 For the changing nature of the Civil W ar see Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William
Tecumseh Sherman. Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
115 Quoted in Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. xiv.
116 Andrew K. Black gives different numbers. According to Black’s numbers 33,294 black soldiers
died during the Civil War. From these, 3,331 died in combat, while 29, 963 were victims of diseases.
Andrew K. Black, "In the Service of the United States: Comparative Mortality Among AfricanAmerican and White Troops in the Union Army,” in The Journal of Negro History. Volume LXXIX,
N.4, Fall of 1994, pp. 317-333.
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bravely and with honor in spite of the enormous discrimination suffered while in
the ranks.117

Centralization
In clear contrast to the local character of white recruitment before 1863,
the Department of War and the Bureau of Colored Troops directly recruited most
African Americans for service in the Union Army.118 Only a few of the 144
regiments of United States Colored Troops carried a state designation.119 After
May 1863 these

regiments were mustered directly into federal service,

organized and led by officers acting under the authority of the United States. The
War Department decreed that henceforth all new black regiments, even though
they

might be

recruited

and sponsored

by northern states,

would

be

administered together and labeled “United States Colored Troops” (USCT). Onethird of the regiments it administered were organized from units mustered early
by state and regional military administrations. Eventually, all black regiments,
with the exception of those from Massachusetts and Connecticut, were
designated “USCT.” Most were infantry regiments (USCI), some were in the

117 Although blacks only participated effectively during the last three years of the war, seventeen
black soldiers and four black sailors won Congressional medals of honor, see Joe H. Mays, Black
Americans and their Contributions Toward Union Victory in the Civil War (Lanhan: University Press
of America, 1982), pp. 125-7. For descriptions of the acts of bravery performed by these soldiers see
William C. Stark, “Forgotten Heroes: Black Recipients of the United States Congressional Medal of
Honor in the American Civil War, 1863-1865,” in The Lincoln Herald. Vol. 88, no. 1,1986, pp. 70-80.
118 An order from Assistant General's Office dated March 11, 1864, stated that “thenceforth all black
regiments should be designated by numbers and include the word ‘colored.’” See, Benjamin Quarles,
The Negro in the Civil W ar, p. 200.
119 The 54th Massachusetts Infantry is perhaps the most famous of these state-organized regiments.
They were kept under state jurisdiction throughout their service. OR, series 3, Vol. 5, p. 661.
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cavalry (USCCO), and a few were in the heavy artillery (USCHA). No regiments
composed of black troops elected their officers, and very few of them had black
officers.120
The recruitment of African Americans continued the gradual subversion of
local-volunteer practices that prevailed when the war began, denominated by Ira
Berlin a “minor revolution." The old system was based on the traditional primacy
of states rights and on the assumption that the primary allegiance of the body of
citizens was to state and local sources of power. Under volunteerism, military
service was viewed as a privilege of race, as it was identified with access to
citizenship, a monopoly of white men.121
Conscription
While black enlistment in the army advanced the African American
struggle for citizenship, it is not necessarily the case that the military experience
was good for the soldiers who served in the USCT’s. One problem facing Union
recruiters in enlisting emancipated slaves was the freedmen’s reluctance to
leave their families without support. Jane Walls of York County, Virginia,
complained that her husband was kidnapped and forced to join the Union army
in 1863, leaving her and their three children without means of support.122

120 From the 7,000 men who officered USTC troops fewer than one hundred were blacks and those
were heavily concentrated in the Louisiana Native Guards, an auxiliary institution whose existence
preceded the formation of the USCT’s. The regimental division by branch was: 145 of Infantry, 7
Cavalry, 13 artillery and 1 of engineers. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, p. 199.
121 Jacob Metzer, “The Records of the U.S. Colored Troops as a Historical Source: An exploratory
examination," in Historical Methods. Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 123-32.
122 Quoted in Laura Virginia Hale, Four Valiant Years in the Lower Shenandoah Valley. 1861-1865
(Strasburg, Virginia: 1975), pp. 336-7.
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Thousands were enlisted against their will by ambitious agents or army patrols.
John Banks of Virginia, testified in January 1864 that, while cutting wood, he was
seized by about ten black soldiers and threatened with death if he did not
enlist.123 The precise number of black men drafted or impressed against their will
and sent to distant camps will never be known. A revised estimate by David
Osher suggests a total of 50,000, or twenty eight percent of the total.124 Blacks in
the South could be more easily targeted because there was no public opinion to
defend them against these attacks. The southern African American population
was also forbidden to own guns, consequently, their capacity for self-defense
was much more limited than that of their white counterparts, who could also
count on Democratic Party support.125
Opinion about conscription of blacks was divided. Some, such as Senator
Andrew Johnson, from Tennessee, and Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas,
strongly supported it, while governors John Andrew, John Murray Forbes, and
George Stearns opposed such practices, preferring volunteer solutions and a
transformation of the South’s racial relations, reshaping them on a northern freelabor model.

Resistance to impressment also came from some military

commanders more interested in using blacks as laborers than as soldiers.

123 Statement of John Banks, 2 Jan. 1864, in Ira Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience.
Document 47C, pp. 139-40.
124 If Ostler's data were correct, the number of African American drafted would be larger than the
number of whites enrolled in all the three drafts of the Civil War. See “Soldier Citizens for a
Disciplined Nation,” p. 420.
125 The threat of a draft against blacks was not restricted to the South. Eugene Murdock, pointed that
in some cities police officers intimidated black men, accusing them of invented crimes in case they
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General William Tecumseh Sherman protested against the depletion of his work
force. Benjamin Butler, commander of the Department of Virginia and North
Carolina in 1864, also banned recruiting agents, reporting to the Secretary of
War that African Americans were sold at 50 to 100 dollars to become substitutes
to white draftees.126
The fact that southern blacks were more easily subjected to the draft than
whites expanded the reach of conscription but also brought problems to
recruiters. Some African Americans protested against being treated as ablebodied citizens for purposes of a draft, even while state laws denied their rights
of citizenship. As Robert Sterling noted, the thesis that blacks should be
exempted from the draft on the grounds that they had being never granted
citizenship became the basis of several petitions to the War Department. A black
draftee from Wisconsin, who previously had been rejected as a volunteer,
underlined the contradictions presented by the draft of African Americans:
Now will you permit a poor fugitive from Bondage to ask you Some
questions, Am I by the Laws of Wis. A citizen of the State [?] And if
not and am not allowed to inlist in the Army to fight for our Country
which you know was my wish to do when I saw you. Am I by the
Laws of the United States Subject to be Drafted - the same as the
white Man who has rights under the Constitution [?]....127

did not enlist. Through this expedient they aimed to sell them as substitutes for whites. One Million
Men., p. 289.
126 Jordan Jr., Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees. p. 270.
127 Andrew Pratt to Salomon, November 22, 1863, Salomon Papers. Quoted in Sterling, Civil W ar
Draft Resistance in the Middle West, p. 605.
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Substituting for Whites
In spite of the progressive nationalization of black recruitment, states
continued to receive credits for their quotas on the basis of the regiments raised.
Republican governors in the North faced the dilemma of being loyal both to the
federal administration, in its efforts to reunite the country through a military
victory, and to their constituencies, who increasingly reacted against military
service. With local resistance increasing, the recruitment of black substitutes
became an important element in reducing local tensions, enhancing its appeal to
the white community. On July 4, 1864, an amendment to the Enrollment Act
extended black recruitment to all the rebellious states except Arkansas,
Tennessee, and Louisiana. Although no more than 5,050 substitutes were
enlisted in the southern states, a growing number of Confederate-born African
Americans went North and enlisted as substitutes for whites. Section 13 of the
Enrollment Act, which provided for substitution and commutation, represented
the most controversial provision of the draft. Under this section, draftees could
pay other men to serve in their places, or escape military sen/ice completely by
paying the federal government a $300 commutation fee. Substitution was legal
throughout the four federal drafts, while commutation was in effect for just the
first two. In theory, substitution would enable only draftees with a civilian station
or occupation that was crucial to the war effort to remain at work, but in practice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

it allowed any citizen with sufficient financial resources to avoid military
service.128
By mid-1864, black soldiers had become eligible for federal bounties, and
state competition for their services grew relentlessly during the final months of
the war.129 There were increasing opportunities for substitution after the
commutation clause was eliminated in the summer of 1864, and substitutes
became a significant portion of the enlistment in the North.130 According to Taylor
Cornish, so widely accepted was the practice of substitution that even Lincoln’s
secretary, John G. Nicolay, furnished a replacement when he was drafted in New
York, in 1864.131
Many communities in the North contributed toward the purchase of a
substitute for each of their draft-eligible men, eliminating white men from the
state’s draft quota. According to James D. Geary, the highest proportion of
substitutes was provided by the state of New Hampshire, with 75 of substitutes
for each 100 drafted men.132 But the average was high in the entire North.133 Data

128 Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison, The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 178-80. On the debates concerning commutation see
Congressional Globe. 38th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 64-5, 80, 142, 143. Commutation issues
generated an enormous debate inside the Republican Party. While Senator Jim Lane attacked it,
many other Republicans, led by Senator Hemy Wilson, defended its maintenance under the
argument the it would furnish a positive benefit for the poor. For more information see Chapter V.
129 It should be noted that, previously, various states cities, towns, and even individuals were offering
enlistment inducements (formally and informally) to blacks.
130 O.R., series 3, vol. 4, p. 473. See also Berlin et al, The Black Military Experience, p. 77.
131 Cornish, The Sable Arm, p. 235. Nicolay’s substitute was an African American from North
Carolina, Hiram Child, who later died in battle.
132 Geary, We Need Men, p. 113. On January 8, 1864, Senator Daniel Clark referred to the
permissiveness of this practice in his state. See Congressional Globe. 38th Congress, 1st Session, p.
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from the

New

Hampshire

Colored

Troops confirms the

significance of

substitutes. Out of a total of 393 black soldiers recruited from 1862 to 1865, 75
percent (295) came from out of the state.134 Confederates and foreign soldiers
provided around 58 percent of the total, the border states about 4 percent, and
other northern states, about 12 percent. The high percentage of southern-born
people illustrates the correlation between draft policies and the acceptance of
black enlistment, because most of these troops were black substitutes for whites.
Following the national pattern, most New Hampshire colored soldiers were
recruited in the last two years of the war, 1864 (45%) and 1865 (23%), when
substitutions were authorized on a federal basis. If the Granite State provides an
example of the importance of black substitutes in northern war efforts, it
nonetheless typifies a regional situation: by the end of 1863, the recruitment of
southern blacks had become functional, and therefore acceptable, to northern
states, and resistance to recruitment had been contained to the border states.135
To recognize the growing importance of bounty money for black
enlistment does not mean that blacks volunteered only for the prospect of a

140. William Marvel, “New Hampshire and the Draft, 1863," in Historical New Hampshire. Vol. 36,
1981, pp. 58-72.
133 In Michigan Michael 0 . Smith found black substitutions accounting for 50.7 percent during the last
two drafts of the war. See Raising a Black Regiment in Michigan... p. 38.
134 This figure is impressive when we compared with the percent of blacks in New England’s
population before the war. According to the U.S. Census of 1860, 0.8% of New England’s population
was black. The proportion by state was: Maine 0.2%, New Hampshire 0.2%, Massachusetts 0.8%,
Vermont 0.2%, Connecticut 1.9%, and Rhode Island 2.3%. See William Loren Katz (ed.), U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negro Population in the United States. 1790-1915
(1918, reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1968), p. 51.
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financial reward. Choosing the most advantageous terms for enlistment was one
of the few options available for men who could not even choose their units and
who suffered inferior treatment while in the ranks. Furthermore, the absence of
federal enlistment bounties until late in the war and the differential payments,
enhanced the role of local bounties in the minds of prospective recruits. Many of
these black soldiers also had families to support and were reluctant to accept
less than the best offer for their services.

Fighting for Union and Freedom
The recruitment of African-American soldiers illustrates some of the
complex ramifications of racial issues during the Civil War. In 1861 ethnicity,
class, status, and place of birth fragmented black people in America. Obvious
contrasts distinguished southern and northern recruits from one another as well
as the free blacks and slaves within the Confederacy. In the North, blacks came
from the native free population and from southern and foreign migrants. Some of
these volunteers were educated and active members of the abolitionist
movement, accustomed to working in a biracial organization.
While some of them had known slavery by experience, others had never
before seen a slave. While many blacks volunteered to fight for freedom, others
who served under northern quotas were forced to fight by draft officers and

135 Data collected and processed from Ira C. Evans, Revised Register of the Soldiers and Sailors of
New Hampshire in the W a r of the Rebellion. 1861-1866 (Concord, NH: Ira C. Evans [printer], 1895).
The information about the United States Colored Troops (USTC) is in pages 1016 to 1026.
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northern agents.136 In the South, many recruits were ex-slaves, suddenly freed to
enlist. Others were runways who were compelled to enlist by northern agents
operating in the “contraband camps.” There were also free black communities
who fought in order to maintain their relatively higher status after the war.
The motivations of the free black volunteer for service, his conduct during
the war, and the associations that he formed with the white officers who led him
into battle were different from those of the freedman enlistee. For many
freedmen, the army was an escape from slavery, a ready source of employment,
and a chance to take up arms against their former masters. The free black
soldiers did not share these motivations. They viewed the army as an opportunity
to prove their worth as men and as an argument for gaining equal rights under
the law as well as a means to destroy slavery. In spite of their differences, both
groups had both much to win and much to lose by enlisting.137 Samuel Cobble, a
southern runaway who enlisted in the 55th Massachusetts Infantry as a private,
exemplifies some of these feelings. In a letter to his wife, still a slave in South
Carolina, Cobble stated some of the reasons why he enlisted:
I would like to [k]no[w] if you are still in slavery if you are it will not
be long before we shall have crushed the system that now

136 Some regiments reflected the preponderance of specific groups. The 36"' United States Colored
Infantry was organized among former slaves seeking refuge within Union lines in eastern North
Carolina and southeastern Virginia. The Fifth Regiment of Infantry USCT was raised among the free
black community of Ohio. Recent regimental studies have explored such differences. See James
Kenneth Bryant II, "A Model Regiment: The 36th United States Colored Infantry in the Civil W ar.” (MA
Thesis, The University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, 1996); Michael James Paradis,
“Strike the Blow: A Study of the Sixth Regiment of United States Colored Infantry, (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Temple University, 1995).
137 It should also be underlined that a minority came from other countries, especially Canada and the
Caribbean.
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oppresses you for in the course of three months you shall have
your liberty. Great is the outpouring of the colored people that is
now rallying with the hearts of lions against that very curse that has
separate you and me. Yet we shall meet again and oh what happy
time it will be when this ingodly rebellion shall be put down and the
curses of our land is trampled under out feet. I am a soldier now
and I shall use my utmost endeavor to strike at the rebellion and
the heart of this system that so long has kept us in chains...138
For many black people, North and South, the decision to enlist was not an
easy one. Enlistment meant, in practice, the surrender of their freedom to white
authority and military discipline. It also meant a split from family and friends as
well as a disruption work and income. For some in the South, there was the
additional risk of meeting slave-pickets who patrolled the Confederate borders. A
northern commander observed that courage was an attribute of every southern
volunteer because: “There were more than a hundred men in the ranks who had
voluntarily met more dangers in their escape from slavery than any of my young
captains had incurred in all their lives. ”139 This insecurity was especially painful
for those with relatives who stayed behind in the hands of the former masters
and who might suffer some form of revenge. Testimony from a black soldier’s
widow gives an idea of the perils to which the soldiers’ families were exposed:
My husband ...had only been about a month in service when he
was killed. From that time [my master] treated me more cruelly than
ever whipping me frequently without any cause and insulting me on
every occasion...When my husband was Killed my master whipped
me severely saying my husband had gone into the army to fight
against white folks and he my master would let me know that I was
foolish to let my husband go he would ‘take it out of my back,’ he

138 Samuel Cabbie to his wife, 1863, National Archives, Record Group 94, Records of the Adjudant
General’s Office. Quoted in Susan Coper, “Records of Civil W ar African American Troops"
139 Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, p. 248.
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would ‘Kill me by piecemeal” and he hoped ‘that the last one of the
nigger soldiers would be Killed’.140
Unlike the situation of the majority of white troops, there were few ways
open for advancement for blacks inside the military organization. The color bar
was much stronger in the American army than in the Brazilian. Blacks could not
become officers, nor could they elect their commanders. Non-commissioned
officers did not receive higher salaries. Many of them could not even choose
their regiments, as most whites had previously done. With the exception of some
chaplains and doctors, few blacks became officers, and even officers were
subjected to extreme discrimination in their camps. African Americans had to
serve in segregated regiments commanded by white officers, facing ail kinds of
prejudice. Their inferior camp conditions were evidenced in the greater rate of
death by disease as well as the larger number of punishments inflicted and
capital sentences recorded.141
African-Americans who served in the Union Army did so under more
difficult conditions than those of their white compatriots. They were assigned
more onerous duties which exposed them to a greater risk of disease. When
they became ill they received substandard care. They became more likely as the
war continued to be assigned to combat. For blacks this was healthier duty. A

140 Berlin et al, Black Military Experience. Doc. 106, pp. 268-9. This woman ran away with her baby,
leaving five of her children behind.
141 Even black non-commissioned officers received the same salaries of private soldiers. For African
American rates of mortality in the military service, see Andrew K. Black, "In the Service of the United
States: Comparative Mortality Among African-American and White Troops in the Union Army,” in The
Journal of Negro History. Vol. LXXIX, No. 4,1994, pp. 317-33. According to Black, white troops were
twice as likely to die from disease as in battle, while black troops were almost ten times likely to do
so.
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black Sergeant described the health of the troops in his regiment at Fort
Redoubt, Florida: “At one time nearly all of our men were sick. My company
could not muster but seventeen men fit for duty, and some of the other
companies could not muster as many.”142

Hierarchical Relations
The relations between black soldiers and white officers were complex.
Joseph Glatthaar emphasized the positive aspects of the relationship, referring
to it as “an alliance,” between black soldiers and their officers, a term he
borrowed from diplomacy.143 Ideological allies in their common cause for Union
and freedom in general united soldiers and officers. According to Glatthaar, it
was during Reconstruction, not the Civil War, that the ideological alliance was
broken.144 Glatthaar’s perspective, however, has faced scholarly challenges
during the last decade.145

142 Sergeant Milton Harris, Co. F., 25th USCI, Christian Recorded, December 17, 1864. Quoted in
Redkey (ed.), A Grand Army of Black Men, p. 151.
143 On a huge work of comparative biography, British historian Allan Bullock made an ironic remark
concerning the failure of alliances through history. While discussing the Russian-American
agreements during the Second World War, Bullock commented that the history of alliances in not an
encouraging one, “few have accomplished more, most nothing like so much.” Hitler and StalinParallel Lives (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 889.
144 Joseph Glatthaar, Forged in Battle. The Civil W ar Alliance Between Black Soldiers and White
Officers (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). Glatthaar presents the war as an event capable of
forging a new relationship between black soldiers and their 7,000 white officers. Although Glatthaar
discusses the situation of opportunistic officers (those who enlisted in Colored troops to receive
promotions), what he most emphasizes is the presence of many members of traditional abolitionist
families in the officer ranks. From this perspective, the opportunistic group appears to be the
exception not the rule. The “Alliance Thesis” is best explained in chapters III “Recruiting the Officers”
and V “Coping with Racism.”
145 Gary Kynoch, “Terrible Dilemmas: Black Enlistment in the Union Army During the American Civil
War,” in Frank Cass Journal. Vol. 18, No. 2, August 1997, pp. 104-27; James W. Geary, “Blacks in
the American Military: A Review Essay," in Ethnic Forum. Vol. 11, No. 1, 1991, pp. 59-68, William
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There was much diversity among the white officers of black units, who
were drawn largely from two groups. Many were selected because they were
educated, Christian, anti-slavery activists well known in abolitionist circles. The
narratives of officers and soldiers alike show that underlying the alleged alliance
was strong paternalism on the part of the philanthropic officers. Others, most of
whom were accepted later, were experienced non-commissioned officers in
white volunteer regiments who, for a variety of personal reasons, sought
commands unattainable in their original units. Many showed strong prejudice
when dealing with soldiers and their families. A private at the 43rd USCI warned
the readers of the Christian

Recorder, a black newspaper,

about the

consequences of prejudice for military discipline: “Our officers must stop beating
their men across the head and back with their swords, or I fear there will be
trouble with some of us.”146
The exact nature of the relationship between black soldiers and their white
officers remains elusive. There were some, like Colonel Isaac F. Shepard, who
defended his black soldiers when they were molested to the point of whipping a
white soldier.147 But there were others, such as the infamous Lieutenant

Cheek and Aimee Lee Cheeck, “White Over Black in Union Blue,” in Reviews in American History.
Vol. 18, No. 3,1990, pp. 104-27.
146 “Private,” 43rd USCI, Bermuda Hundred, Virginia. Quoted in the Christian Recorder. January 26,
1864.
147 Berlin etal, Black Military Experience. Doc. 164, pp. 414-15.
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Augustus Benedict, whose behavior toward his soldiers was so discriminatory
that it produced a mutiny among his troops.148
The relationship between officers and men, including the importance of
drill and ritual, can be more carefully considered through a comparative
approach. In the story of military organizations one can identify many examples
of sympathy and care across ethnic boundaries or between officers and their
men, especially at times of crisis. This does not mean that ethnic differences
disappeared in the course of the struggle. During the Paraguayan War, Alfredo
D’Escragnole Taunay produced one of the best reports on battle solidarity in his
1867 A Retirada da Laguna (Lagunas’ Retreat). In his marvelous description of
the Mato Grosso 1867 campaign, Taunay describes how the Brazilian Imperial
officers could show the tenderest solicitude for their soldiers without bridging the
social chasm that separated the classes and the races in the army. Indeed,
officers are supposed to take care of their men, and it is not clear how these from
the USCT were different. Taunay himself showed great compassion for his
soldiers although he never admitted their capacity for personal initiative or
intellectual command.149
In the regiments initially raised in the North, there was a clear
preponderance of abolitionist Christians among the officers, carefully chosen by
committed abolitionists such as Governor John Andrew. As the recruitment of

148 On Benedicts’ episode see Phillip Rutherford, "Revolt In The Corps D’Afrique,” in Civil War Times
Illustrated. Vol. 24, N o .2 ,1985, pp. 20-3.
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blacks spread through the South, the philanthropic idealists were replaced by a
more generic group. Concerned that this heterogeneity would endanger
discipline, the federal government created a board of examination, aiming to
standardize the recruitment of white officers.150 Those intended to lead black
regiments had to undertake a series of exams and special training.151 The Board
effectively broke with the patronage system in the designation of the officers’
corps, but merit alone was not a warranty against racial prejudice. This new
channel of promotion created new avenues for ambitious non-commissioned
white officers originally assigned to white regiments.152 Some of them espoused
strong racist beliefs and resorted to harsh punishment. Fourteen of the nineteen
Union soldiers executed for mutiny were blacks.153
Another sensitive area involved soldiers’ pay, of fundamental importance
in military life and essential to the process of standardization. While some
governors had initially promised equal pay, federal legislation sanctioned

149 Alfredo D’Escragnole Taunay, A Retirada da Laguna (1867, reprint, S3o Paulo: Editorial
Tecnoprint, 1946). See also his, Cartas da Campanha de Mato Grosso (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca
Militar, 1944), and Membrias (S3o Paulo: Instituto Pregresso Editorial, 1948).
150 Those intended to be examined could attend the Free Military School for Applicants for Command
of Colored Troops, which was established in December 1863.
151 The army produced special manuals such as U.S. Infantry Tactics, for the Instruction. Exercise,
and Manoeuvers of the Soldier, a Company. Line of Skirmishes, and Battalion, for the Use of
Colored Troops of the United States Infantry, Prepared under the Direction of the War Department
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1863). See Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, pp. 103-4.
152 Even among those deeply committed to abolition, promotion could be quick. Robert Gould Shaw,
the famous 54th commander, was promoted from Captain (in the Second Massachusetts Infantry) to
Major and finally to Lieutenant Colonel in less than two months. Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War,
p. 9.
153 Howard C. Westwood, “The Cause and Consequence of a Union Black Soldier’s Mutiny and
Execution." In Civil War History. Vol. 31, No. 3, 1985, p. 222; Berlin et al. The Black Military
Experience, pp. 365-66 and 388-95.

405

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

economic discrimination. The clauses of the Militia Act stated that blacks were
entitled to $ 10 a month, less $ 3.50 for clothing expenses.154 By contrast, whites
received $ 13 plus $ 3.50 for clothing. Officers and politicians justified the
difference in terms of differential military risks: initially blacks were supposed to
perform fatigue duties, not to fight. As the war progressed, these excuses
became more and more untenable. Black troops were used as combatants in
Virginia and other theaters, suffering a great number of casualties. James Henry
Gooding, a corporal in the Massachusetts 54th, put the situation in a simple way
in a letter addressed to the president: “Now if the United States exacts uniformity
of treatment of her Soldiers, from the Insurgents, would it not be well, and
consistent, to set the example herself, by paying all her Soldiers alike?”155
Early recruits felt betrayed by the abrogated promises of equal pay made
by governors and agents. They complained bitterly in northern newspapers
about camp conditions: “Do we not fill the same ranks? Do we not cover the
same space of ground? Do we not take up the same length of ground in a grave
yard that other do?” wrote a soldier in the Massachusetts 54th.156 Protests led to
repeated cases of insubordination, a famous example of which was Sergeant
William Walker from Company A of the Third South Carolina Colored Infantry.

154 U.S. Statutes at Large. Vol. XII, p. 599.
155 Corporal James Henry Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, 28 Sept. 1863. Quoted in Ira Berlin et al,
Black Military Experience. Document. 157A, p. 386. Only those who were free as of 19 April 1861
received equal and back pay and they had to swear an oath to provide testimony from another
source before receiving back pay retroactive from 19 April 1861 to 31 January 1864. Not until March
1865 were all black soldiers assured of the same pay as white soldiers.
156 Private E. D. W. Christian Recorder. April 2,1864. Quoted in Edwin S. Redkey, A Grand Army of
Black Men, p. 48.
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Walker was charged with leading his company in a strike to protest the lower rate
of pay for black troops. Although some officers sympathized with Walker's
conduct, Walker was court-martialed on January 9, 1864 and shot on March 1st
of the same year without having been given time to appeal.157
Many at home refused to enlist until the problem was settled.158 Yet the
struggle for equal pay furnished an opportunity to enlarge the debate concerning
equal rights. Although prejudice was strong, the army worked as an arena where
many blacks, for the first time in their lives, could testify against whites and
complain publicly against racial discrimination. By March 1864, the War
Department agreed that those already free at the time of their enlistment were
entitled to equal payments as well as to reimbursements dating from the period
of their service. Prejudice was temporarily subordinated to administrative
uniformity.159

Immediate Consequences
By the end of the conflict, many African Americans recognized the
essential opportunities the war offered their race. The war provided a valuable
platform for combating decades of racial prejudice, raising new expectations,
opportunities, and awareness among blacks. In contrast with the conditions in

157 For a summary of the events involving Walker’s protest and execution, see Howard C. Westwood,
“The Cause and Consequence of a Union Black Soldier’s Mutiny and Execution," in Civil W ar
History. Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 222-35.
158 Some 14,870 black soldiers deserted the Union army, approximately 8.2 percent of all black
soldiers enlisted. See Roberto Sterling, Civil W ar Resistance in the Middle West, p. 605.
159 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment. Appendix D, "The Struggle for
Pay," pp. 280-85; Herman Belz, “Law, Politics, and Race in the Struggle for Equal Pay During the

407

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Paraguayan war, black enlistment in the Union army encouraged social
reform in the defeated South. It politicized thousands of black soldiers and
created a proud and determined black political leadership, thus accelerating the
quest for equality both during and after the war.160
Another essential difference was the importance of black public opinion
for black recruitment in America. Although many black man were drafted,
voluntary recruitment also derived from public pressures coming from black
communities in the North. African Americans were active participants in the
political debate over recruitment. They kept pressure on the President and
Congress to abolish slavery, enlist blacks, and provide for racial equality. They
had their own black churches, secular leaders, and newspapers that kept many
informed about the situation in the front. They formed freedmen’s aid
associations, which helped recruiting in certain parts of the North. This kind of
pressure was completely absent in Brazil.
Federal recruitment of African Americans during the Civil War was an
important part of the process that destroyed slavery and initiated the reordering
of American race relations. Enlistment, especially for those who fled slavery,
provided opportunities to help defeat the pro-slavery Confederacy and to

Civil War," in Civil War History. 22,1976; Otto Friedrich, “W e Will Not Do Duty Any Longer for Seven
Dollars per Month,” in American Heritage. Vol. 39, No. 1, February 1988, pp. 64-73.
160 The African American community in the North was informed of many aspects of black military life
through the letters published in some newspapers that appealed directly to the black population: the
Christian Recorder, of Philadelphia, the Weekly Anqlo-African. and the Frederick Douglass's Monthly
were published by black editors. Other newspapers such as The Liberator occasionally published
letters from black soldiers. On blacks and the war press see the "Preface” in A Grand Army of Black
Men, pp. ix-xv.
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promote changes for blacks, the most important of which was the approval by
Congress of the 13th Amendment in January 1865, granting freedom to all
slaves.
The burdens of race, nonetheless, haunted black soldiers virtually every
step of the way. Segregated within camps, assigned the most degrading and
menial duties, and often scorned by white fellows, African Americans were
distinctively second-class citizens in an army whose fortunes they had so
brightened. In spite of these problems, blacks’ presence in the USCT helped to
transform the action of the Union forces in the South into a real army of
liberation. The vision of black regiments marching through southern cities and
the epic behavior of some of those same armies in battles such as Forth Wagner
and the Crater helped to speed the achievement of citizenship for both northern
and southern black Americans. In countless settings, black troops communicated
with freedmen and freed women the meaning of the war, the role black people
played in defeating the Confederacy and destroying slavery, the new rights
liberty allowed, and the new responsibilities it demanded. Many individuals who
filled the ranks understood that they were fighting for a just cause and helping to
build a new political situation in post-Civil War American.
Unfortunately, the army’s degree of true integration was at most relative. It
presented a genuine step in the democratization of American society, but it was
limited by the cultural stereotypes still prevalent in the American North. If the
structure of society had been changed, racial attitudes and stereotypes survived
and, in the long run, recovered part of their pre-war strength. Still, the war
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equipped black people with elements to continue the struggle for social equality.
This process was unparalleled in any other multiracial society and was
perpetuated in the nation’s memory by the occupation of the defeated southern
states and later by Civil War veterans’ dependence upon military pensions during
the decades following Appomattox.161
In contrast to the American experience, the way freedmen were integrated
into the Brazilian army did not allow black participation during the war to be used
as the basis for the construction of a movement aiming black social improvement
in the post-war landscape. Black interests were diluted as the freedmen were
integrated into a military organization in which the roles of the soldier and the
citizen were not connected. At the end of the Paraguayan War, quick
demobilization

of troops

prevented

army

veterans from

supporting

the

formulation of new social demands under the shelter of the army. Those who
served returned to civilian life as dispossessed individuals living in poverty in a
country of abundance, as acknowledged by an Imperial representative.162 The
debate about African American soldiers and their motivations in the U.S. reveals
the distinct new options offered by the war to blacks. It helps us to understand
that historical progress does not rise in a steady line, but many times is the
unexpected and unintended result of events.

161 On the importance of veteran’s pension in the post-war see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers
and Mothers. The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
162 Atas do Parlamento Brasileiro. Cflmara dos Deputados. p. 390.
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Conclusion

I claim not to have controlled events but confess plainly that events
have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years [of] struggle the
nation’s condition is not what either party, or any man devised or
expected. God alone can claim it.”
Abraham Lincoln1
It is lamentable that partisan politics ...led to the understanding that
National revenge is a monopoly of some political faction.
Marquis of Caxias2

In order to have historical comparison, two conditions must be
fulfilled: a certain similarity or analogy between observed
phenomena - that is obvious - and a certain dissimilarity between
the environments in which they occur.
Marc Bloch3
The comparative analysis of military enlistment undertaken throughout
this dissertation has emphasized similarities and dissimilarities in the trajectories
undertaken by the Brazilian Empire and the American Union during the 1860s. It
demonstrated that, in spite of diverging patterns of historical evolution, Brazil and
the United States each faced similar logistical problems during their major 19th
century wars. These problems were linked to the lack of bureaucratic expertise

( Norman A. Graebner (ed.), The Enduring Lincoln (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1959), p.
105.
2 Marquis of Caxias to Viscount of Muritiba, 14 Aug. 1868. AN, Cbdice 934, Confidenciais,
Reservados e Cartas, p. 137.
3 Marc Bloch, “Toward a Comparative History of European Societies,” quoted in Shearer Davis
Bowman, “Antebellum Planters and Vormaz Junkers in Comparative Perspective,” in American
Historical Review. Vol. 85, No. 4 ,1 9 8 0 , p. 780.
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and to the incomplete development of national armies in each country. Despite
differences in political cultures, these two societies made similar efforts toward
centralization, extraction, and recruitment during their wars.
War efforts created new necessities, forcing each government to search
for adequate means to reach its needs. Recruitment became a crucial issue,
when traditionally established militias failed to maintain troop strength in the field.
The question was less a fundamental struggle over the future of national
organization

than

a

temporary

emergency,

necessitating

unprecedented

recruitment to face the enemy’s relentless resistance. The people most affected
by these changes, however, thought their world had been turned upside down by
powerful external forces. Their reaction was proportional to the intensity of these
perceptions.
If the concept of “political culture" does not provide a satisfactory
explanation for the dilemmas created by these wars, it accounts much better for
differences in the degree of post-war social transformation in each society.
Political culture made the difference in the impact black recruitment had on each
society, and this difference was especially evident in the American struggles of
the

Reconstruction

period.

The

Civil

War

consolidated

a

new

moral

consciousness about the country’s social and ethnic diversity. No group was
more permanently affected by this change than African-Americans. Conflicts
over a new concept of citizenship were a mark of post-bellum America. These
conflicts involved the emergence of African-Americans as central actors in
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national politics, as blacks took advantage of growing federal power to obtain
civil and political rights.
During the war, an expanded national state emerged in the U.S. Unlike its
antebellum predecessor, this new polity showed a strong commitment to creating
national citizenship based on equal rights. Although it reflected the contradictions
of the coalition of interests that supported the Union, it compensated for this
deficiency through the exercise of a victorious authority, a bloody mandate to
enforce social and racial transformations in the defeated Confederacy. Nothing
comparable occurred in Brazil after its victory. Consequently, it is during the
post-war periods that we can find the strongest correlation between political
culture and divergent national outcomes. The long-term results for slavery immediate emancipation and citizenship in the U.S., delayed emancipation with
few political rights in Brazil - can be better explained by the “idealist” differences
in political cultural than by the “materialist” needs of each state.
In this conclusion, the comparison will focus on the main issues related to
wartime problems and war’s immediate aftermath.

Similarities and Dissimilarities
The Civil and the Paraguayan wars erupted out of very different long term
conditions. The American Civil War was the culmination of decades of political
and regional tension, involving different visions of social organization, political
power, and racial hierarchy. It was the logical outgrowth of the revolutionary
process initiated in 1776. The Civil War resolved many of the problems which
413

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

caused its outbreak. A wartime Congress imposed tariffs and created the
National Bank System, and the Homestead Act expanded access to the western
lands, an agenda favored by the North since the 1820s.
The Paraguayan War resulted much more from external factors, mainly
the process of state formation on the River Plate region. It was an international
conflict, involving a diplomatic alliance of the two most powerful countries in the
region, the Brazilian Empire and the Argentine Confederation. Most of the action
took place outside of Brazilian territory, far from centers of plantation agriculture.
The war had no direct influence on the process of agricultural transformation that
had been taking place in Brazil since the 1850’s. Agriculture was affected only
indirectly, through the temporary demands made by the war on the landowner’s
human and financial resources.
For both Republican and Imperial leadership, the question of territorial
integrity was paramount. For Brazilians, protecting territorial integrity meant an
articulation with the colonial past as well as preservation of its chief imperial
achievement: Brazil was the only Latin American country to keep intact its
colonial territorial configuration. Despite all its internal divisions, few issues so
united the Brazilian population.
For the Union, territorial integrity signified the survival of principles viewed
as essential to the American polity. In his annual message to the Congress, in
December of 1862, President Lincoln emphasized the symbolic and practical
meanings of territorial preservation in terms that would have sounded familiar to
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a Brazilian Imperial bureaucrat: "The territory is the only part [of a nation] which
is of certain durability... It is of the first importance to duly consider, and estimate,
this ever-enduring part.’’4
Both

conflicts

showed

strategic

and

material

similarities

in

the

administration of the war effort. The wars produced internal conflict, opening a
window to alternative visions of national organization and social reform. They
showed the limits of the central states’ capacity to extract additional resources
from their societies, especially the problematic action of recruitment agents in the
far interior. Subsequent war efforts exacerbated problems of social cohesion and
national stability to an extent never before reached in the historical evolution of
either nation.5
A common issue in both countries was centralization, that is, national
political consolidation, which interfered with perceptions of regional rights. During
the Paraguayan war, the Emperor’s excessive intervention undermined the
strength of the political system. Increasingly, political and personal differences

Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress," 1st Dec., 1862. Quoted in Don E.
Fehrenbacher, Abraham Lincoln. A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings,
pp. 202-3.

4

5 1 am defining national unity as the maintenance of territorial integrity, that is, the achievement
and the maintenance of administrative control of larger portions of an extensive territory by a
political center. It comprehends the creation of a differentiated and autonomous set of institutions
that claim sovereignty and a monopoly over the tasks of coercion and extraction. This control was
historically achieved through the diffusion and acceptance of the central authority by the whole set
of inhabitants of specific regions. It involved enhanced national symbols, rituals, and costumes,
forging a large conception of nationality, based on territorial integration concurrently with the
feeling of being part of a larger structure. Two good accounts on this subject are Eric Hobsbawn
and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
and Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth. Reality (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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interfered with the performance of the army in the field.

Victory elevated the

army to the role of national savior, providing the officers with a platform for the
nation that transcended the influence of the monarchical state. This situation led
to the fall of the monarchy within two decades.6
Compared to Brazil, American political organization was stronger and
much more consistent. The virtue of the northern party system lay in the strong
links between local and national organizations and in the vitality of the
Republican Party as a fundamental instrument to maximize the war effort. In
Brazil, military initiative was an apparatus of the central state, with no ideological
agenda. Those in power would recruit their opponents and vice-versa, but there
was no essential moral or political rationale uniting state and national efforts.
Also, no political authority was capable of taking up the burden of unpopular war
measures. Political and social contention was directed toward the Emperor and
the monarchy, as was the case during the attacks on the enlistment of slaves.7
While it can be said that, during the Civil War, the American government
went beyond its formal constitutional powers, it is also certain that the evolution
remained consistent with the liberal traditions of the country, because the costs
of the war could be more evenly divided between the government and the party.
The party acted as a strong motivational force at the local level, maintaining the

6 Dudley, “Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1879-1889,” pp. 126-224, John Schulz, 0
Ex6rcito na Polltica. Oriqens da lntervenc3o Militar, 1850-1894 (SSo Paulo: Edusp, 1994), pp.75121, Ricardo Salles, Nostalgia Imperial, pp. 158-92.
7 Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990),
pp. 195-238.
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allegiance of a substantial part of the population in the states and towns. This
role was exercised during the debates over commutation and substitution. With
commutation viewed as a triumph of the idea of “a rich men’s war but a poor
men’s fight,” other sources of troops had to be identified. The recruitment of
blacks worked as an escape valve, to keep local Republican support alive while
alleviating the burden on poor white males.

Transferring Troops to the Front
No central interference was more unpopular in Brazil than the transfer of
the National Guard corps to the front. The National Guard had been an essential
institution for the repression of slave revolts and the maintenance of internal
peace in Brazil. After 1850, the local political bosses commanded the Guard’s
militias and armed their clients. These bosses possessed the arms and the
authority to use them. Such rights were seen as a civic privilege. The transfer of
National Guards to the Paraguayan front temporarily undermined the efficiency
of the system of social control, generating a problem that was potentially more
serious than was the arming of slaves.
The Imperial government assumed control over the private militias,
subordinating them to the centralized control of the national army. The presence
of the state in an area so fully connected to local private interests was seen as a
threat to the moral economy of recruitment. It touched off many conflicts over the
command of the Guard and the employment of its troops. By 1866, many
slaveholders still saw the Empire as a society haunted by the menace of slave
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rebellion, and saw the National Guard as essential for the maintenance of
internal peace. These fears were exaggerated, but the perception was what
counted.
Imperial patriotic appeals, therefore conflicted with the more utilitarian
needs of the slaveholders and other powerful local groups. The Barons’ lack of
cooperation and the government’s timid retaliation upset the professional military
officers. Some of these officers complained bitterly about the lack of support for
the army and the corruption of higher Imperial echelons. They were also very
critical of the ways in which political partisanship influenced the operations of the
army.

Immediate Political Repercussions of Recruitment
In Brazil, emancipation and recruitment of freed slaves came to be seen
as an attack on the regime’s main supporters. In America, by 1863, northern
Republicans thought of themselves as attacking the enemy by emancipating
slaves and putting them into the Army. As the war progressed, many
Republicans were convinced that the South could not return to the pre-war
situation and sought to use military victory as a way to revolutionize conquered
states. For the next ten years, the American national government was the
strongest defender of civil rights, in a clear inversion of the Jeffersonian
republican doctrines that had prevailed in antebellum America. Government
initiative for change was extended by the operation of two main institutions: the
Army and the Freedmen’s Bureau.
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The fundamental geographic differentiation between North and South is a
key to explaining differences between the US and Brazil. The simple existence of
a free North gave American Emancipation an opportunity to break down racial
hierarchies in the South. No other society in the hemisphere shared this contrast
between a free and a slave region. Frederick Douglass’ description of his first
impressions of northern labor activity gives a glimpse on the impact of a free
society of an individual who had recently left slavery:
I saw no whipping of men; but all seemed to be smoothly on. Every
man appeared to understand his work, and went at it with a sober,
yet cheerful earnestness, which betokened the deep interest which
he felt in which he was doing, as a sense of his own dignity as a
man. To me it looked exceedingly strange.8
Although recent literature has shown the extent of northern racism, and
the extend of black inequality in the industrial cities, only through comparison
with other slave societies can this contrast be adequately balanced and the role
of the North reevaluated.
The free institutions of the North changed the meaning of freedom in the
South. They reinforced the roles of the occupation forces, bringing the values of
northern society to the forefront of Southern political debate. They spread liberal
values that became much stronger among African Americans than among
Brazil’s blacks. They provided blacks with elements of a liberal culture, defiant of
despotic authority; a tradition blacks could adapt for their own needs. This
process was happening among blacks well before the Civil W ar but was
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accelerated with the occupation of Confederate territory and the vision of black
troops as liberators.
The effects of sectional difference were clearer for the former slaves than
for the free African American population. Blacks in the South achieved some
gains that could not be taken back even with the failure of Reconstruction.
Prominent

among them were the

reorganization

of black families, the

establishment of black churches, and freedom of movement. African Americans
were able to some extent to disconnect American civic values from the racist
assumptions of American civic culture that had informed them.9
The values of northern society affected the function of the army. During
the Civil War, those who escaped slavery to enlist ran away not only in the
geographic sense, but also in the cultural sense; they escaped in the direction of
an institution regulated by values different from those of the plantation. Although
blacks were segregated in camps, many of them were able to use the
opportunities created by the war to advance their struggle for citizenship, such as
during the conflict over equal pay and promotion. The values of freedom that
informed liberal society in the North informed the action of black soldiers. The
army provided them with a valuable opportunity to contest decades of racial
prejudice. The political system magnified their chances to conquer social and
political rights and to envision a social transformation.

8 Frederick Douglass, “Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas,” in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. The
Classic Slave Narratives (New York: Mentor Books, 1987), p. 323.
9 These elements were described in chapter I.
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Nothing similar happened

in Brazil. There was

no nation to be

reconstructed, no political alliance with dispossessed groups, and no assimilation
of alternative political leaders to the mainstream of national debates.'0 The
Imperial political system ended the war severely damaged by factional and
personal conflicts. In this context, initiatives for reforms were restricted to the
Imperial inner circle, and debates took place in the same closed coteries where
they had been held during the war. The Council of State and the Parliament
were the arenas where representative political forces responded to statecentered initiatives. No expansion of the electoral franchise took place, nor did
reform result in increased popular participation. As traditionally had been the
case, the initiative toward reforms came from the government, not from public
opinion. This distance between governors and governed widened through the
electoral reform of 1881, which diminished the range of public participation to
less than one percent of the adult male population. Consequently, while in
American Reconstruction there was an enlargement, even if temporary, of the
electoral franchise, post-war politics in Brazil led to a decrease of participation,
connected to a slow erosion of the regime’s legitimacy."

10 Of course, there was Paraguay. The reconstruction of Paraguay was analyzed in Harrys
Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance. The Postwar Decade. 1869-1878 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1978). Unfortunately it is not possible to follow the developments in
Paraguayan Reconstruction in this work.
11 Seymour Drescher, “Brazilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective" in Rebecca J. Scott (ed.),
The Abolition of Slavery and the Aftermath of Emancipation in Brazil (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1988), pp. 23-54.
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Social Conflict and State Action
Emerging social conflicts in each case help us to understand the limits of
state action in these periods of national emergency, especially when the state,
with its centripetal nationalistic demands, confronted the local interests of
individuals and groups. Most of these conflicts centered on the extension of
recruitment and its consequences for social stability. They led to great debates
involving the war efforts and its consequences for the victorious societies.
Conscription and emancipation were central issues in the debates about
mobilization. Armed mobs in the far interior of Brazil, as well as anti-draft riots in
America, were perceived as a dangerous menace to progress and social
stability. The threats posed by these movements of local resistance were more
symbolic than real, reflecting attitudes of desperation in the face of changing
conditions of livelihood, without ever becoming a real risk to the maintenance of
the social order. In spite of that, protests contributed to changes in the
formulation of public policies during the decades following the end of each war.
In Brazil they led to the formulation of new proposals on the organization of the
army, the introduction of universal recruitment, and the abolition of the National
Guard. In America, they enabled expanded intervention of federal power in the
South as well as the birth of a national citizenship.12

12 In Brazil a new recruitment law was created in 1874 by minister Oliveira Junqueira. Through this
law corporal punishments abolished and military service was made compulsory. A lottery would
select those who would serve, thus minimizing the problems of conscription. The law had no
practical effect and Brazilian recruitment was modified in practice only in 1916, during the First
World War. John Schulz, O Ex6rcito na Politica (SSo Paulo: Edusp, 1994), pp. 76-93, William S.
Dudley, “Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1870-1889," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
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The years 1863 (in the US) and 1867 (in Brazil) show similarities that
justify a more careful comparison. During those years, the dominant and
hegemonic groups of each society confronted unexpected challenges, as in each
nation, a crisis emerged in response to the expansion of state action. There was
a clear choice in both countries to pursue a complete military victory in spite of all
obstacles and human costs. This determination, common to both the Republican
and the Imperial bureaucrats, set the path for further compromises. The rhetoric
of elite members in both societies expressed their main concerns about
recruitment, and revealed the limits to their current definitions of citizenship.
In Brazil, government rhetoric emphasized the dangerous insecurity
brought by the exacerbation of partisan factionalism. Elite opinion demanded a
massive intervention of state power to suppress local opposition and keep peace
locally while maintaining the war effort. In America, repression was also used,
and the government interfered with the lives of its citizens in many ways, but no
suspension of the electoral calendar took place. The government could influence
the party system, but did not try to replace it.'3

The Army and Reform
It has been argued by some authors that the army can be an avenue of
social mobility for disadvantaged people. The fact that the army was one of the

University, 1972), pp.126-80. For the law of 1916, see Frank D. McCann, "The Nation in Arms:
Obligatory Military Service During the Old Republic,” in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (eds.),
Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, The
University Presses of Florida, 1977), pp. 211-43.
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few bureaucracies open to members of socially subordinate groups suggests it
was a channel for uplift. The evidence presented in this dissertation shows,
however, that it basically depends on the state of a political system: if
disadvantaged individuals can find some support from other groups, expanding
their roles and pressuring for reforms,

army experiences provide good

opportunities for social mobility. If that outside support does not exist, the army
will not play such a positive role, and the chances for social and racial mobility
can be correspondingly remote.
The evidence presented here lends some support to the hypothesis that
black participation in the Paraguayan War was a key element in the Brazilian
abolitionist struggle. Post-war goals depended on compromises between the
state and the landowners. There was popular mobilization to some extent, but it
was much less significant than in the United States. The Brazilian army was
impregnated by the values and practices of slavery. It could accept former slaves
and occasionally protect runaways, but the slave who escaped to the army did
not find a totally new racial environment. The army was deeply marked by the
same social hierarchies existing in the rest of society, and its discipline many
times reproduced the harsh treatment received by field workers in the farms. If
the slave disappeared into the shelter of the army, the hierarchical and
authoritarian character of the society was continued in the barracks.

13 I am not considering resources connected to the use of patronage or Congressional
adjournment as detrimental to a democratic order.
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In America, there was a civic culture from which the blacks could draw to
demand rights and fight for a better position even when subject to discrimination.
The Republican Party became a force that combined various elements to
achieve black empowerment after the war. This party mobilization was anchored
in the participation of a public opinion and in a long democratic tradition,
suddenly opened to blacks. Consequently, in the United States the army turned
into a platform for African Americans to demand equality and racial justice.
There was no similar public opinion behind black enlistment in Brazil,
where society as a whole did not participate actively in the debate about the war.
The Imperial army’s composition reflected the predominance of a forced draft,
targeting basically the poor, black or white. An important distinction between the
Brazilian and the American political systems was that, in Brazil, poor whites were
also outsiders. Thus, the disciplinarian rules were directed not just against
blacks, but against social undesirables of all races. Consequently, blacks were
immersed in the same mass of social undesirables whose demands were
ignored by the Imperial Military authorities. Recent empirical research has shown
that the links of sympathy between the officers and their men were far from
generating a corporate response in opposition to the prevalent social hierarchies
that structured Brazilian society. This reduced the possibilities for social
mobilization. During the Paraguayan War some officers did complain bitterly
about the presence of freed slaves in the ranks, but this was mainly because that
presence was harmful to their own social position. Criticism from within the
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officer corps envisioned an order where the military had a higher status and
elevated social role. It did not break with the social and the racial hierarchies that
typified racial relations in Brazil.
During the Paraguayan War, the military hierarchy worked hard to
maintain the rigid social patterns that excluded a good deal of the population
from political life. Segregation affected even the rewards of soldiers, who
received different medals depending on rank. After the war, officers struggled
against the political civilian elite, fighting to be recognized as important actors in
the national politics. Thus the struggle over the nature of political-military
citizenship in Brazil was far from being a popular revolution. The officers who
opposed the Monarchy aimed at a more influential role in the country, but their
ideas concerning the role of the poor and the black were usually very much
contradictory. In the long run, the army proved unable to fulfill any expectations
that it might create a more democratic and egalitarian nation, tending rather to
perpetuate social exclusion and political authoritarianism.
The military in Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries, were
not the redeemers they hoped they could be. Military intervention after the
proclamation of the Brazilian Republic, in 1889, has demonstrated that a
bureaucratic branch of the state, alone, lacks the legitimacy necessary to create
a better order.14 Those expectations, then as today, rest on the creation of a

14 On the corruption of Brazilian military, see Shawn C. Smalmman, “Shady Business: Corruption
in the Brazilian Army Before 1954,” Latin American Research Review. Volume 32, Number 3,
1997, pp. 39-62.
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strong democratic political system, where all representative political forces play a
role in the social and political reforms needed to combat the hierarchies
responsible for social and political exclusion. Slavery disappeared, but some of
its social legacies resist in Brazil, as well as in the United States. Indeed, the
battle against social exclusion is also a battle against the heritage of slavery. We
live in hope.
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